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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation comprises a case study and formal simulation model of DTE 
Energy’s Lean Six Sigma continuous-improvement (CI) program from its inception in 1998 
through the end of 2009.  The case history is based on qualitative fieldwork involving 
interviews, direct observation, and collection of company documents and records.  DTE 
Energy is one of the top 20 largest electricity and natural gas utilities in the U.S.  It 
adopted CI from its automotive industrial customers in southeast Michigan.  During the 
12-year period I studied, DTE Energy’s CI initiative was stressed by three organizational 
crises.  Typical of other companies’ CI initiatives, DTE Energy’s success with CI was 
variable, prompting experiments and revisions to its CI training and methods, to its tactics 
for garnering managers’ attention and support, and to its methods for orchestrating 
improvement work.  Several leaders of the CI initiative were graduates of MIT’s Leaders for 
Manufacturing program and were heavily influenced by research on the Toyota 
Production System (TPS) by Steven Spear (e.g., Spear and Bowen 1999) and Jeffrey Liker 
(e.g., Liker 2004).  About halfway through this history, DTE Energy added Six Sigma tools 
and practices to its CI initiative, creating a Lean Six Sigma program. 
I formulated a System Dynamics (SD) simulation model based on this case study.  In 
this dissertation, I elaborate and extend previous work in the SD literature on the 
implementation dynamics of CI initiatives, especially Sterman and colleagues’ (1997) 
model of the Total Quality Management (TQM) program at Analog Devices.  My model 
represents explicitly the corporate hierarchy, which I divided into three levels: senior 
executives, middle managers, and front-line employees.  I also examined the interactions 
between front-line employees engaging in their own Lean-style CI activities and Six Sigma 
Black Belts doing CI projects. 
Based on my simulation analysis, I find that managers' and Black Belts' support and 
coaching required by front-line employees is usually chronically inadequate.  I also find 
that Black Belts or industrial engineers, as full-time experts for process redesign and 
improvement, are crucial to the growth and long-term sustainability of a company's CI 
initiative. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Change is like heaven: We all want to get there, but you have to die to accomplish it.” 
 — DTE Energy manager 
 
In this thesis, I address a chicken-or-egg problem faced by companies like DTE 
Energy trying to implement a continuous improvement (CI) initiative.  Employees at all 
levels of the company hierarchy must be convinced that learning and using CI methods 
and tools would be worthwhile.  But they are convinced primarily by a track record of CI 
successes in their own company.  These successes are not possible without the right 
degree of support on the part of the company's managers and without the right degree of 
skill with CI methods on the part of the company's employees.  Such management support 
and employee skill development are not enacted without managers and employees being 
convinced that CI would be worthwhile.  My case study of DTE Energy’s experiences with 
its CI initiative examines how DTE Energy overcame this vicious circle. 
 
1.1. Contributions 
In this thesis, I make three contributions that elaborate and extend previous work in 
the System Dynamics literature on the implementation dynamics of CI initiatives, which 
includes Sterman and colleagues’ model of Analog Devices (Repenning & Sterman, 
1994b; Sterman, Repenning, & Kofman, 1997c), Repenning and Sterman’s study of Ford 
Electronics (2002), Oliva and colleagues’ study of National Semiconductor (1998), Keating 
and Oliva’ study of AT&T’s Transmission System Business Unit (2000a), and Morrison’s 
study of Harley Davidson (2003). 
First, I disaggregate the Commitment construct from the formal simulation model of 
Analog Devices (Repenning & Sterman, 1994b; Sterman, Repenning, et al., 1997c) into its 
constituent parts of (1) belief in the general effectiveness of CI tools and methods, and (2) 
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effort earnestness, which represents the translation of employees’ belief into action but 
also incorporates the (de)motivating effects of other factors.  Such disaggregation enables 
me to analyze changes in employee behavior, which happen rapidly in response to 
prevailing effects, separately from changes in employee belief, which exhibit significant 
inertia. 
My second contribution is to represent explicitly the corporate hierarchy, which I 
divide into three levels: senior executives, middle managers, and front-line employees.  
Except for a few differences, these levels share a common model structure, which I 
implement using subscripts in most model equations.  These few differences, coupled with 
the handful of equations that link the three levels together, have important ramifications.  
My simulation scenarios in Chapter 6 demonstrate how the dynamics that unfold at each 
level can lead, lag, or even run counter to the dynamics of the others.  I discuss the 
implications of these level-specific behaviors in Chapter 8. 
My third contribution is to examine a CI initiative that includes both the TQM 
approach of front-line employees engaging in their own CI activities and the Six Sigma 
approach of Black Belts, as specialized CI experts, working to deliver CI savings and 
coaching the front-line employees.  I demonstrate that Black Belts, dedicated to process 
improvement full-time, are a crucial part of a CI initiative’s success and sustainability. 
 
1.2. Methods 
Case Study 
For my qualitative case study in Chapters 2-4 (and in the appendices), I designed my 
data-collection plan to follow Robert Yin’s three recommendations: (1) use multiple 
sources of evidence, (2) create and maintain a case-study database, and (3) maintain a 
chain of evidence (Yin, 2003, pp. 97-106). 
I collected and analyzed archival, interview, and observation data as multiple 
sources of evidence.  I identified interviewees via the snowball method.  My first 
interviews were of employees who had been involved with DTE Energy’s CI initiative 
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since its inception.  I asked each interviewee for the names of other employees who might 
have useful perspectives on the CI initiative, both positive and negative.  I conducted 37 
interviews, recording and transcribing them when permitted by my interviewees.  Most of 
my interviews were about 90 minutes in duration, although two were 60 minutes and four 
were between 100 and 120 minutes in duration.  I attended 19 meetings, six of which 
were quarterly all-day retreats for DTE Energy’s CI personnel.  A few of these meetings 
included site visits to several of DTE Energy's power plants and service stations.  I took 
copious notes by hand at all meetings and retyped them immediately after each meeting.  
I also collected 196 company documents, 6 spreadsheet databases, and 12 publications 
(none of which contained confidential information). 
I created a database to organize and track these various sources.  For each data 
source, I assigned it a unique identifier and categorized it as one of the following: 
interview, meeting minutes, document, spreadsheet database, or publication.  For 
interviews, I recorded the date, interviewee’s name, job title, and department.  For 
documents, spreadsheet databases, and publications, I recorded the date I collected it, a 
short description, from whom I obtained it, its format (e.g., hardcopy, spreadsheet, PDF 
file), how many pages it contained, and where I stored it.  I imported all of my interview 
transcripts, meeting notes, and text documents into Scrivener (Blount, 2010), a software 
application designed to assemble and organize research materials for writing manuscript 
drafts.  Within Scrivener, I wrote summary memos for the major documents that I could 
not import.  To each of my documents in Scrivener, I assigned the following metadata: the 
document's unique identifier from my project database, the date I obtained (or created) 
the document, from whom I obtained the document, and the document's type (e.g., 
interview transcript, meeting minutes, corporate newsletter). 
Yin’s third recommendation — maintain a chain of evidence — pertains to analysis 
more than to data collection.  Scrivener provides the researcher with the ability to work 
with chunks of text (called "scrivenings") as short or as long as the researcher desires — 
like flexible 3x5 index cards.  I divided my source documents into scrivenings, each one 
retaining its parent document's unique identifier, and reorganized them into groups.  I 
created a folder for each year from 1997 to 2009.  Each year folder contained the 
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following main groups: (1) senior executives, (2) middle managers, (3) front-line 
employees, and (4) the CI initiative.  I used these chronologically organized scrivenings to 
write the case study in Chapters 2-4. 
In addition to my chronological groupings, I also created thematic groups.  I used 
these thematic groups to provide additional detail in my chronology, when warranted, and 
to write the non-chronological sections in the appendices.  These thematic groups 
included the following: leadership, DTE Energy's culture, 4G9S, Operating Systems, CI at 
Chrysler, CI at GM, CI at Johnson Controls, CI at Ford, Fos Gen CI examples, MichCon CI 
examples, front-line engagement, project selection, measurement and tracking, and 
communication. 
I made extensive use of another useful feature of Scrivener to maintain my chain of 
evidence.  Scrivener provides the ability to make annotations in one's manuscript that 
Scrivener removes when the researcher exports the manuscript to another format (like 
Microsoft Word).  In my case-study manuscript, I annotated each quote, paraphrase, or 
other datum with the unique identifier of its source document. 
Simulation Model 
I used an iterative approach to construct the formal simulation model presented in 
Chapter 5.  My first step was to construct a series of 20 “brainstorming” stock–flow 
diagrams that represented what I perceived to be the structural features of each section of 
my DTE Energy case study.  In this stage, I sought to be comprehensive by including in my 
diagrams all the concepts (variables) that I could identify in my case study.  I noted on 
these diagrams where the variables’ causal relationships formed feedback loops.  My 
second step was to clarify the feedback-loop structure by constructing a series of 14 
causal-loop diagrams (CLDs) based on my 20 stock–flow diagrams and on the text of my 
case study.  In this step, I included only those concepts (variables) necessary to complete 
these loops.  My third step was to build a formal simulation model specific to DTE 
Energy’s experiences with its CI initiative, based on my CLDs, stock–flow diagrams, and 
my case study text.  In general, I sought to include all the feedback loops from my second 
step, but I excluded the variables from my first step whose effects seemed marginal.  My 
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fourth step was to build a second formal simulation model in which I removed all DTE 
Energy-specific formulations in favor of a generic structure that could be applied to other 
companies (by changing model parameters).  In constructing both my DTE Energy-specific 
model and my generalizable model, I used standard formulations from the System 
Dynamics literature where possible and appropriate (see Chapter 5) using Vensim DSS 
version 5 (Eberlein, 2010).  My fifth step was to formulate the six simulation scenarios 
presented in Chapter 6.  This step required simulating the model, comparing its output to 
my DTE Energy case study, and revising either the model parameters or the model’s 
equations to achieve a good fit. 
 
1.3. CI Definitions 
In this section, I provide definitions for the most important concepts in my analysis of 
DTE Energy’s CI iniative. 
Continuous Improvement (CI) 
While I was conducting this research project, I discussed possible definitions of 
continuous improvement with many people at DTE Energy.  Opinions differed, of course, 
but we settled on one main criterion: problem solving that is structured with the scientific 
method — analyzing data to understand root causes, not just symptoms — instead of 
acting on presumptions.  At its core, CI means following a rigorous process to ensure that 
your countermeasures address the right problem, that they are likely to be effective, and 
that they are likely to stay in place. 
CI necessarily involves improving an organization's capabilities by increasing the 
rational design of its work processes to boost their efficiency, reliability, consistency, 
and/or output quality.  An organization achieves such capability improvement by boosting 
the problem-solving and project-management skills of its employees.  By this definition, 
an organization that cuts the size of its workforce or the scope of its work and then tries to 
figure out how to live with those cuts is not doing CI because its capability remains 
unchanged.  (The one exception: CI is accomplished if the organization redesigns its 
processes to produce the same output with fewer people.)  Lean consultant and former 
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Harley-Davidson vice president Don Kieffer recommends that CI be implemented as 
follows: Design the organization's processes first such that they function well, then 
improve those processes incrementally and continually. 
 
CI Initiative and Operating System 
I found it easier to define a CI initiative.  I assert that any “flavor” of CI — TQM, 
Lean, Six Sigma — comprises elements from all four of the following categories: 
1. Technical tools — histogram, control chart, Pareto chart, cause-and-effect diagram, 
analysis of variance, multivariate analysis 
2. CI procedures — PDSA, DMAIC, 5S, phase-gate project management, 
benchmarking, flowcharting, value-stream mapping 
3. Organizational practices — QC circles, improvement project teams, rapid problem 
solving, learning lines, kaizen events, employee-suggestion systems 
4. Management principles — employment security, supplier partnerships, waste 
elimination, reduction of variation, explicit process (re)design, work standardization, 
just-in-time, leaders as CI coaches, employee involvement 
Technical tools are very specific and usually involve the analysis of data.  CI 
procedures are roadmaps or recipes that tell employees how to use the technical tools.  In 
other words, CI procedures define ways to approach problem solving.  Organizational 
practices are the vehicles or forums for organizing and coordinating employees’ actions.  
Management principles are the background conditions or underlying assumptions that 
managers put in place as the “ground rules”. 
Companies trying to “implement” a CI initiative typically pick from what amounts to 
an amorphous grab bag of elements.  Some companies try to stay denominational.  They 
might adopt Lean, focused on orchestrating the pace of production, or Six Sigma, 
emphasizing defect elimination and reduction of variation.  Other companies eschew the 
religious war between competing CI “schools” and adopt a hybrid approach (e.g., “Lean 
Six Sigma”).  I claim that Lean and Six Sigma, in essence, differ only in organizational 
practices and in management principles, not in technical tools or in CI procedures.  The 
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Operating System fad, I suspect, was an attempt to bring more order and clarity to this 
grab bag of elements.  A company’s Operating System typically specifies what elements 
from all four categories constitute its CI initiative (see Appendix C for DTE Energy's 
Operating System). 
DTE Energy began its CI initiative in 1998 with a Lean-only orientation and added 
Six Sigma elements later.  The distinction between Lean and Six Sigma that I claim matters 
most is whether DTE Energy's CI activities were projects conducted almost solely by CI 
experts (Six Sigma) or workshops (like kaizen or swarm events) and projects conducted 
mostly by front-line employees (Lean).  Even though DTE Energy did not label its CI 
initiative as Lean Six Sigma until 2004, its CI personnel had introduced CI-expert-run 
"demonstration" projects two years earlier.  DTE Energy's Lean organizational practices 
and management principles included kaizen events, swarm events, UMP teams, learning 
lines, C1-C4, and OPCA (see Glossary for definitions).  DTE Energy's Six Sigma 
organizational practices included Black Belt projects, Black Belt certification, and statistics 
training.  DTE Energy's CI tools and procedures included problem-solving processes (4G9S 
and DMAIC) and tools like flowcharts and fishbone diagrams. 
 
Belief in CI 
The seminal System Dynamics study of CI implementation was Sterman and 
Repenning’s model of Analog Devices (Repenning & Sterman, 1994b; Sterman, 
Repenning, et al., 1997c).  The Analog Devices model contained a construct of employee 
Commitment to the CI initiative that commingled employees’ belief in the usefulness of CI 
tools and methods with all other factors that would affect employees’ behaviors with 
respect to the CI initiative.  These factors included upper management’s push for CI work, 
positive and negative word of mouth about the initiative, employees’ perception of their 
job security, and the amount of support they receive from upper management for engaging 
in CI activities.  The Analog Devices formulation for Commitment was parsimonious, but 
prevented separate analyses of employees’ belief in CI and their CI behaviors.  In my 
model, therefore, I separate employees’ belief from a separate construct of their CI 
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behavior, which I call effort earnestness (see sections 5.1, p.137, and 5.7, p.172). 
To define my construct of belief in CI, I borrow the useful distinction between 
efficacy and effectiveness from the medical literature (e.g., Glasgow, Lichtenstein, & 
Marcus, 2003).  Flay defines an efficiacy trial as a test of whether a “program does more 
good than harm when delivered under optimum conditions” (Flay, 1986, p. 451).  Clinical 
trials typically test whether drugs are efficacious; that is, whether they produce the desired 
physiological effect in the human body.  An effectiveness trial, on the other hand, tests 
whether a “program does more good than harm when delivered under real-world condi- 
tions” (Flay, 1986, p. 451).  Whether a patient benefits from a treatment regimen with a 
drug depends on its efficacy and on all other moderating factors, such as how compliant is 
the patient with the treatment regimen. 
When defining belief in CI for my simulation model in Chapter 5, I decided that such 
belief would refer to the efficacy of CI in general, not to the effectiveness of CI at DTE 
Energy specifically.  This choice was arbitrary, so I selected the alternative that made my 
model equations easier to define.  In my model, employees become convinced or 
disillusioned with CI from their results only (see sections 5.10, p.189, and 5.11, p.195).  
All other prevailing factors – job security, support from upper management, coaching from 
Black Belts, financial stress and distractions – affect effort earnestness and thereby results 
downstream (see section 5.7, p.172). 
In my simulation model, I represent the belief construct by dividing all employees 
into three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states: believers, neutrals, and 
skeptics (see section 5.1, p.137). 
 
CI Skill 
The simulation model presented in Chapter 5 includes a construct that I call CI Skill.  
This construct represents an employee’s ability to achieve real improvement results from 
his or her hours of work time expended on CI activities.  As I explain in section 5.3 
(p.149), I use a version of the classic learning-curve formulation as my mathematical 
expression for CI Skill.  An employee’s CI Skill increases nonlinearly as he or she 
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accumulates relevant experience with CI tools and methods.  I define empirically the 
substantive content of this CI Skill construct, however, from my case study of DTE Energy’s 
CI initiative.  The specific behaviors that I include in CI Skill are listed in Table 1 below. 
 
Managers and CI Experts Front-Line Employees 
Collect, evaluate, prioritize, and select 
improvement ideas to implement 
Monitor one’s own work processes for 
abnormalities, problems, and inefficiencies 
Manage project sizes, scopes, and financial 
payoffs 
Constantly question the design of one’s own 
work processes 
Organize CI activities 
Constantly learn about one’s own work 
processes 
Reinforce CI principles 
Always report improvement ideas to one’s 
managers 
Coordinate among groups Initiate fixes if possible 
Lobby for needed resources 
Proper CI tool use, especially the scentific 
methods (DMAIC, PDSA, 4G9S) 
Insist on proper CI tool use Refine countermeasures 
Ensure changes stick Work to make changes stick 
Encourage skill development Seek training and assistance when needed 
Resist the check-the-box mentality Resist the check-the-box mentality 
Table 1. Definition of CI Skill 
 
Managerial Push and Employee Pull for CI 
The potential for divergence of beliefs about CI, and of actions based on those 
beliefs, between bosses and their subordinates was an important finding from my case 
study of DTE Energy.  I encountered historical examples where apathetic managers 
stymied the efforts of pro-CI employees.  But I also encountered historial examples where 
enthusiastic managers coerced anti-CI employees to reluctantly “go through the motions” 
on CI projects that, consequently, couldn’t possibly deliver what those managers hoped 
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for.  This latter phenomenon recalls Oliver Williamson’s distinction between consummate 
and perfunctory cooperation (Williamson, 1975, p. 69).  I observed that employees did 
what their bosses mandated, but their cooperation was only perfunctory when they 
disliked or disagreed with the mandate. 
Keating and Oliva (2000a) categorized manager-initiated and employee-centered 
motives for engaging in CI according to Shiba, Graham, and Walden's (1993) constructs of 
managerial push and employee pull, respectively.  Managerial push is formed primarily 
from incentives imposed by a manager on his or her subordinate for certain behaviors, 
and includes expectations and beliefs, communication of goals and priorities, and other 
means of providing direction.  Employee pull is formed primarily from someone's own 
mental models, perceptions and beliefs about all the various costs and benefits associated 
with enacting the new behaviors.  Employee pull is also bolstered by one's own 
capabilities.  I assume people want to exercise skills that they've worked to acquire, 
especially if such exercise reinforces certain individual or group identities. 
Motivating employees to improve their work processes has always been a central 
concern in managing organizational change.  In his 14 Points for Management, Deming 
(1986) insisted on fostering pride of workmanship (Point 12), driving out fear in the 
workplace (Point 8), and eliminating management by objectives (Point 11).  In his later 
work, Deming said that these Points follow naturally from the application of his “system of 
profound knowledge” (1994, p. xv), which includes (managerial) psychology.  
Specifically, he believed that his own observations in many companies as a quality 
improvement consultant confirmed the overjustification effect (Deci, 1971), that extrinsic 
motivation, used extensively in traditional styles of management, destroys employees’ 
intrinsic motivation — an innate desire and joy to learn and innovate (Deming, 1994, p. 
122).  (Deming wrote before empirical support for this effect became controversial (see 
Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 2001).) 
Unfortunately, where psychologists draw the line between intrinsic and extrinsic 
sources of motivation does not match lay conceptions.  Edward Deci and Richard Ryan 
(1985) include in extrinsic motivation those types of self-regulation that originate from 
one’s social context: introjected, identified, and integrated regulation (see Ryan & Deci, 
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2000, p. 72).  They restrict intrinsic motivation to the pleasure derived from self-
determined knowing, acting, or being stimulated.  Their definition of intrinsic motivation 
excludes acting from internalized values or norms. 
The Deci-Ryan distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is not helpful 
for theories of CI implementation because it is not congruent with how managers think 
about the sources of motivation that influence organizational change and whether these 
sources constitute policy “levers” or not.  For example, a manager will take a particular 
approach if she is intent on behaviorist reinforcement with rewards and punishments.  
Another manager will take a different approach if he wants to foster taking pride in one's 
work.  For this reason, I intentionally avoid the intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy. 
I posit that each individual has his or her own orientation toward CI, as determined 
by managerial-push and employee-pull influences.  For simplicity, I have dichotomized 
the effects of each influence into positive and non-positive (neutral and negative) 
orientations.  Two possible levels for each dimension yields the four possible orientations 
summarized in Figure 1 below.  I intend a person's orientation to be revealed through his 
or her actions such that categorization is possible by examining what people choose to do 
in a given circumstance. 
 
Figure 1. 4C Grid of CI Orientations 
I define complacent as not positively disposed toward CI.  An individual of this 
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Committed 
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Employee-Pull 
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orientation would not enact CI behaviors.  An individual is committed if his or her positive 
beliefs in CI are aligned with managers’ incentives for it.  If someone does not believe in 
CI but is compelled by managers to participate, then he or she will ceremonially conform, 
but his or her effort will be half-hearted and the outcome less beneficial than a committed 
individual would produce.  Oliver Williamson calls such behavior perfunctory 
cooperation (Williamson, 1975, p. 69).  An individual may strive to enact CI in an 
apathetic organization, but his or her ability to act will be constrained by a lack of 
managerial support. 
 
1.4. Overview of DTE Energy 
DTE Energy Corporation (NYSE: DTE) has assets of $24.2 billion, annual revenues of 
$8.0 billion, net income of $535 million, and almost 10,300 employees (2009 figures).  
DTE Energy is a holding company that was established in January 1996.  Its two main 
subsidiaries are Detroit Edison, an electric utility, and Michigan Consolidated Gas 
Company (MichCon), a natural gas utility.  The operations of these two regulated utilities 
produce 75 percent of DTE Energy’s earnings.  DTE Energy’s other, non-regulated 
businesses include coal and rail services, natural gas pipelines and storage, industrial 
energy projects, and energy trading. 
Detroit Edison, founded in 1903, generates and distributes electricity to 2.1 million 
customers in southeastern Michigan (see Figure 2 below).  Detroit Edison’s total 
generation capacity is approximately 11 gigawatts.  About 10 percent, or 1.1 gigawatts, of 
this capacity is represented by its nuclear power plant, called Fermi 2.  Detroit Edison’s 
nine coal-fired power plants — Monroe, St. Clair, Belle River, Trenton Channel, River 
Rouge, Marysville, Harbor Beach, Greenwood, and Conners Creek — make up about 72 
percent of its generation capacity.  The remaining 18 percent consists of gas, oil, and 
pumped-water storage.  Historically, Detroit Edison operated the entire chain from 
generation to retail, but it sold its high-voltage transmission subsidiary, International 
Transmission Company (ITC), in December 2002.  (Transmission is the link between 
generation and distribution.) 
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Detroit Edison has been a member of the Midwest Independent Transmission System 
Operator (MISO) organization since it was created in December 2001.  (MISO operates 
and monitors the electrical transmission system for 13 Midwestern states and the Canadian 
province of Manitoba.)  Detroit Edison constitutes about 8 percent of MISO’s total 
generation capacity and typically serves about 11 percent of its peak demand. 
MichCon is engaged in the purchase, storage, transmission, distribution, and sale of 
natural gas to 1.2 million customers in Michigan.  MichCon was founded in 1849 as the 
Detroit Gaslight Company and was acquired by DTE Energy in 2001. 
 
Figure 2. Detroit Edison and MichCon Service Areas 
The main labor unions represented at DTE Energy are the Utility Workers Union of 
America (UWUA) and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW).  
UWUA Local 223 is the largest union chapter at DTE Energy with about 4500 members.  
It is organized into eleven divisions.  IBEW Local 17 is the second-largest union chapter at 
DTE Energy with about 500 members.  After DTE Energy acquired MichCon, its 1000 
members of Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 80 voted to become 
members of UWUA Local 223 to eliminate wage and benefits disparities between the two 
union chapters. 
Both Detroit Edison and MichCon are regulated by the Michigan Public Service 
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Commission (MPSC), which reviews and approves the setting of rates.  As subsidiaries of 
publicly traded DTE Energy, Detroit Edison and MichCon are each allowed a maximum 
return on equity of 11 percent (close to the national average) by the MPSC. 
 
1.5. Case Study Overview 
For my study of DTE Energy’s continuous improvement (CI) initiative, I examined its 
six main business units: Fossil Generation (Fos Gen) and Distribution Operations (DO) of 
Detroit Edison, MichCon’s gas distribution operations (MichCon), Customer Service 
(which handles retail operations for both Detroit Edison and MichCon), Corporate Services 
(which includes supply chain, warehousing, and fleet operations), and the Corporate 
Support operations at DTE Energy’s Detroit headquarters (finance, IT, HR, and the senior 
executives).  I did not examine any of DTE Energy’s non-regulated businesses or, for 
reasons of security, DTE Energy’s nuclear power plant. 
Looking back over DTE Energy's 12 years of history with CI (1998-2009), I perceive 
three distinct implementation "waves".  In this context, I define a wave as my unit of 
analysis comprising two sequential phases of events: an unstressed phase of relative calm 
in which DTE Energy's CI proponents sought to grow the initiative mostly unencumbered 
by outside pressures, followed by a second stressed phase in which the company and the 
CI initiative were subjected to considerable pressure.  I define these waves as a useful 
device for compactly describing the ups and downs of DTE Energy's CI initiative through 
the years. 
The three waves of DTE Energy's history constitute three cases, which I then 
compare.  My criterion for defining the boundaries of each wave and its two constituent 
phases was the prevailing agenda of DTE Energy's senior executives at the time.  I defined 
a wave as the period during which an extraordinary agenda like cutting costs or 
completing a merger was in effect, plus the previous period of business as usual.  It is 
important to note that these implementation waves do not correspond to any CI 
implementation plans formulated and used by DTE Energy's CI personnel.  For example, 
the second wave spans two of the OSSG's CI implementation plans. 
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The three waves that I identify in DTE Energy's chronology are as follows.  The first 
wave consisted of the start of the CI initiative in 1998-1999 with kaizen events and the 
subsequent stress of the MichCon merger in 2000-2001.  The second wave consisted of 
the OSSG's emphasis on demonstration projects by CI experts (Black Belts) in 2002-2004 
followed by the cost-cutting pressure of McKinsey's PEP initiative in 2005-2006.  The third 
wave comprised the OSSG's strategy of promoting both Black Belt projects and CI 
workshops (CILWs, swarm events) in 2007-2008, which were put to the test responding to 
the economic crisis in 2009.  I devote the next three chapters to each of these three 
waves.  In all three chapters, I present DTE Energy's story via journalistic exposition, 
keeping my own interpretations to a minimum, except for the last section of each chapter 
in which I summarize its wave. 
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Chapter 2: Wave One — 1997-2001 
 
2.1. Start of the CI Initiative — 1997-2000 
In the late 1990s, the federal and state governments began to push for deregulation 
of utilities.  DTE Energy’s senior executives were worried that financial-performance 
pressures arising from such deregulation would trigger consolidation in the industry.  In 
1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 888, requiring 
utilities to open their transmission lines to competitors.  Subsequently in mid-2000, the 
Michigan legislature passed Public Act 141 into law, requiring Detroit Edison to allow its 
customers to purchase electricity generated by other suppliers beginning on January 1, 
2002.  (Under this program, called Electric Choice, Detroit Edison would still distribute 
the purchased electricity.) 
Tony Earley, DTE Energy’s CEO, wanted the company to control its destiny instead of 
being a potential acquisition target.  In response, DTE Energy began diversifying its 
business and concentrating on improving its cost structure and operations.  Over several 
years following FERC’s Order 888, DTE Energy started several non-regulated energy 
businesses, acquired Michigan Consolidated Gas Company (MichCon), and began seeking 
people and ideas from outside the utility industry. 
DTE Energy has always had close ties to the U.S. automotive industry.  The “Big 
Three” car companies — GM, Ford, and Chrysler — constitute 10 percent of Detroit 
Edison’s load, and their first- and second-tier suppliers make up another 10 percent.  DTE 
Energy's executives knew and were influenced by their peers at the Big Three.  
Understandably, they were particularly interested in the car companies' 10-year efforts to 
adopt Lean production techniques from Toyota. 
Chrysler’s adoption of Lean had the most direct influence on DTE Energy.  Chrysler 
employees had developed the Chrysler Operating System, a coherent and holistic 
framework comprising Lean tools, practices, and principles, packaged for easy 
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dissemination throughout the company.  Three employees who contributed to this 
development were graduates of MIT’s Leaders for Manufacturing (LFM) program — Steve 
Nagy, Jamie Flinchbaugh, and Jamie Bonini.  As we shall see, all three of these former 
Chrysler employees were influential in DTE Energy's development of its own 'operating 
system'. 
The idea of forming a Lean improvement initiative was brought to DTE Energy by 
David Meador in 1997.  Meador was one of the founding trustees of the Society for 
Organizational Learning and had been strongly influenced by the Chrysler Operating 
System.  After a successful 14-year career in Chrysler’s finance organization, Meador 
joined DTE Energy as controller and treasurer.  CFO Larry Garberding groomed Meador as 
his successor — a position Meador assumed when Garberding retired in December 2001. 
Meador’s arrival was significant because he already believed in CI from his 
experiences at Chrysler and he was placed high enough at DTE Energy to influence his 
peers and nurture a CI effort.  Meador hired Steve Nagy from Chrysler in 1997 to run a 
new supply-chain department, and to think about creating a CI initiative and a group to 
run it.  One of the first members of that group, Gary Lemont, recalled, “[Meador] had this 
Operating System vision and wanted to bring somebody in to lead that charge.”  Nagy, 
one of the Chrysler Operating System’s architects, seemed a perfect choice.  Another of 
the group’s first members said, “Dave [Meador] had seen the Chrysler Operating System 
work and he liked it, but he didn't really know what it was.  He just liked the idea.  Steve 
[Nagy] was the first one to show up who really knew what the game looked like and what 
it was going to take.” 
It took Nagy almost two years to lobby DTE Energy’s senior executives for the 
resources necessary to create a CI group with full-time employees.  Eventually, he would 
hire his LFM classmate Shawn Patterson from GM in 1999 to be the manager of the new 
Center for Continuous Improvement (CCI).  But to reach that point, Nagy and Meador had 
to sell the idea to DTE Energy’s other senior executives. 
Nagy and Meador used two tactics, leveraging their Chrysler connections for both.  
One tactic was to influence DTE Energy’s senior executives by having them meet — 
sometimes informally over dinner — with Dennis Pawley, Chrysler’s executive vice 
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president of manufacturing and labor relations, who oversaw the development and 
implementation of the Chrysler Operating System.  The second tactic was to demonstrate 
to the senior executives what could be accomplished with Lean techniques at DTE Energy.  
Nagy hired Lean consulting firm Achievement Dynamics, which had assisted Chrysler 
since 1995, to run a few demonstration kaizen events in 1998.  Shawn Patterson 
recounted, “Dave [Meador] and Steve [Nagy] were trying to get anything to stick.  They 
brought [Achievement Dynamics] down here to do a couple kaizens.  It was interesting, 
but didn’t really go anywhere.  A couple kaizens, a couple dinners, just a lot of talk until 
[the senior executives] said, ‘You know, we’ve got to get a group, some people solely 
dedicated to this.’” 
Even though Meador secured the money needed to create CCI, Patterson explained 
that the rest of the senior executives regarded it as an experiment: “There was very little 
understanding.  There were a couple people who had a vision for what we were trying to 
create:...people working on continuous improvement all the time.  The vision was...the 
right things would be taking place anywhere you go in the company.  But beyond that, it 
was a pretty fuzzy picture.  And, frankly, there were a lot of people who thought, ‘Who 
cares?’” 
When Shawn Patterson joined DTE Energy to lead the nascent CCI, it consisting of 
only a handful of members from inside the company.  Patterson soon hired Jamie 
Flinchbaugh, another contributor to the Chrysler Operating System, to assist him with 
designing the CI initiative and, eventually, an operating system for DTE Energy. 
Patterson expanded the scale of Nagy’s kaizen tactic into a formal program.  He 
recalled, “Steve [Nagy] and I strategized and decided that just launching this Operating 
System was going to lose people.  We first needed to get some quick wins around 
continuous improvement and teach some basic Lean-type tools, so we decided to launch 
a kaizen program to do exactly that.”  Gary Lemont, Jamie Flinchbaugh, and Achievement 
Dynamics founder Andy Carlino continued to run kaizen events and, within four months, 
began training business-unit personnel to run their own.  Lemont said, “Eventually, we 
had quite a core group of people that were capable and were running their own.  We had 
some real successes — and we had some [kaizens] that were less successful — but it 
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really had some legs for a couple years.  ...There were enough successes to keep interest 
in it.”  About 50 business-unit employees trained as facilitators eventually conducted 
approximately 50 kaizen events per year in 1999 and in 2000. 
A kaizen event was typically a week-long workshop, ideally attended by everyone 
who was affected by the problem being addressed: front-line employees, other subject-
matter experts, and decision makers.  Lemont explained, “We would bring the people 
together and teach them some basic concepts around waste, teach them problem-solving 
skills.  ...We tried to make them on-site, so that we could actually go out throughout the 
week and implement solutions.” 
The consensus among DTE Energy's employees was only 50 percent of the 
approximately 100 kaizens conducted in 1999 and 2000 were considered successful.  A 
CI manager summarized bluntly: “Fifty of them were good and fifty of them were bad.”  
Some managers were reluctant to allow kaizen teams to make changes without their 
approval.  A kaizen facilitator explained how he tried to overcome this resistance by 
insisting managers attend the events, arguing, “If you need to be part of the decision 
process, then you need to be there during the week.  We don’t want to come and spend 
the whole week and then have you say no.” 
Lemont said that some kaizen teams worked on problems that were too big to be 
fixed in one week.  Kaizen participants would take away to-do lists that were too big and, 
in many cases, were never completed.  Many kaizen teams would convene to flowchart 
new “ideal-state” process designs — sometimes at an off-site retreat — yet never examine 
the current process or try to change it.  Another facilitator said, “The more successful ones 
were where they had done a current state and an ideal state and they had time in the 
workshop to actually get the things done.” 
Gradually, CCI’s members realized that the kaizen program “was not the silver 
bullet,” according to Lemont.  And front-line employees began to take notice of the kaizen 
program’s poor track record.  When one of the facilitators asked a new kaizen group what 
they hoped to achieve, they answered, “We just don’t want another failed kaizen.”  Jamie 
Flinchbaugh experienced many DTE Energy employees resisting what they perceived to be 
an inappropriate automotive fad foisted on them by what they called “the Chrysler mafia” 
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(Flinchbaugh, Nagy, and Meador).  A CCI member said, “We needed to have a different 
way of thinking, not just throw a bunch of tools at things.” 
Patterson also continued Nagy’s tactic of executive influence and education, at least 
until DTE Energy announced its plan to acquire MichCon in October 1999: 
 
While we were working on [kaizen events], we were working on the executive-
development piece in parallel.  Whatever we could do to get our executives 
synced in with other executives, or people they had a lot of respect for, whom 
they could learn from. 
 
We brought in [Harvard Business School professor] Kent Bowen to hold some 
executive sessions.  We had some of our executives...go out to Alcoa to meet 
with [CEO] Paul O'Neill to learn about the Alcoa Business System.  We had 
some more follow-up dinners with Denny Pawley.  We did a benchmarking 
trip down to Mackie [Automotive Systems], a supplier...who was well-known 
for its outstanding operations. 
 
We really worked hard at whatever we could put in front of our executives [to 
help] get them to a clearer vision.  We were rolling along and starting to get 
some momentum towards creating this Operating System.  Then the merger, or 
acquisition, was announced.  ...When the merger came, we were just getting 
ready.  We had the executives ready to go, realizing that we need to move 
beyond kaizen.  It was useful for quick wins and early adoption, but not the big 
game changer that an Operating System could be. 
 
2.2. The Union Management Partnership Initiative — 1999-2000 
A related initiative arose in the late 1990s from DTE Energy’s labor relations.  The 
1992 contract negotiations between DTE Energy and UWUA Local 223 failed, prompting 
them to adopt a new interest-based bargaining process1 for the next round of negotiations 
in 1995.  This process was so successful that DTE Energy and Local 223 created an 
initiative to foster collaboration and greater union involvement in decision making.  This 
initiative, called the Union Management Partnership (UMP), was launched as part of Local 
223’s next contract in 1999. 
                                            
1 When they first introduced interest-based bargaining, Fisher & Ury (1981) called it 
“principled negotiation”. 
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UMP’s goals were similar to those of a CI initiative: Institutionalize a set of principles 
that would increase front-line employee participation in decision making and process 
redesign, thereby expanding their skills, improving their work conditions and safety, and 
boosting productivity. 
The structure of the UMP initiative was similar to Nagy’s kaizen program.  DTE 
Energy’s executives and Local 223 leaders created a department, the Office of Labor 
Management Partnership (OLMP), to oversee the UMP initiative.  OLMP hired 
Restructuring Associates Inc. (RAI) to train “partnership consultants” who would facilitate 
Partnership teams in DTE Energy's power plants and service centers.  These teams 
typically met once per month and (those that were successful) concentrated on small 
projects that could yield quick results. 
One of Nagy’s supply-chain employees remembered some Partnership teams 
requesting assistance from the CCI group to facilitate improvement work in some of DO’s 
service centers.  She said the service centers’ budgets weren’t cut as a result of that 
improvement work.  Instead, they were allowed to put the money they saved to other 
uses. 
One area of overlap between the UMP and CI initiatives in 1999 was an assurance 
of no layoffs.  The compromise between the unions, wanting to ensure their members 
stayed employed, and DTE Energy's executives, wanting to retain flexibility, was an 
agreement on employment security instead of job security (see Glossary).  CEO Tony 
Earley explicitly transferred that assurance from the UMP initiative to the kaizen program, 
announcing, “You will not lose employment due to participation in kaizen.” 
The UMP initiative had its share of problems too.  First, its focus on labor relations 
created a perception among non-represented employees that it was a union-only initiative.  
Second, like some kaizen teams, some Partnership teams clashed with managers who 
were unwilling to relinquish their traditional command-and-control style.  An employee 
observed that Partnership teams worked best when they had UMP facilitators and 
managers who were committed to the initiative. 
A third problem was some Partnership teams simply didn’t know what they were 
supposed to do to achieve “partnership”.  One of the UMP facilitators said, “That was the 
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biggest struggle: We sat in rooms, talked about things we should do.  We all agreed that 
the Partnership Principles said all of the right things but without the CI tools we struggled 
to get sustainability in the workplace. Principles alone were not going to get us there.”  
Without such tools, many Partnership teams got bogged down or sidetracked.  A facilitator 
described a team he was on that took six months to determine “the different levels of 
decision making: what they should be, who should be involved, and stuff like that.” 
 
2.3. The MichCon Merger — 1999-2001 
DTE Energy issued a press release in October 1999 announcing its plan to acquire 
MCN Energy, the parent company of MichCon, in a deal estimated at $2.6 billion in cash 
and stock.  (Despite being an acquisition, all employees referred to it as a merger.)  The 
senior executives created a temporary strategic-planning department to orchestrate the 
merger activities.  The CCI group was moved under this new department because, as 
Patterson said, “the goal was to use this kaizen methodology to integrate processes in six 
months.”  Patterson’s CCI group began this work, collaborating with MichCon’s 
counterpart, the Business Process Improvement group. 
Planning and negotiations proceeded well for six months until the merger became 
mired in regulatory hurdles, legal hurdles, and arguments over MichCon’s purchase price 
that lasted through the next 13 months.  Executives at both companies became frustrated 
and — each at different points — almost abandoned the deal. 
Unsurprisingly, this outcome uncertainty in mid-2000 killed the planning that middle 
managers and front-line employees were doing for combining the two companies.  
Employees did not want to waste effort doing work that would not be used.  Patterson 
recalled the situation at DTE Energy: “Operating units’ guys were like: ‘Puh!  We may or 
may not merge.  What am I going to go tinker with my processes for?  It just means I've 
got to go through another 'do' loop.’”  A MichCon employee reported that the same 
abandonment happened at his company: “When you look back...you do find some very 
good continuous-improvement efforts had been done at the company right around merger 
time.  Lots of process mapping was done.  Lots of documentation was written.  It was 
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right, it was great, the metrics were good.  What happened to it all?  There was no 
upkeep.” 
Wrangling over the merger dominated DTE Energy’s senior executives’ attention.  
But they had several other demands on their attention as well.  One demand was 
negotiating Local 17’s new 5-year contract, which — unlike recent negotiations with 
Local 223 — a union member euphemistically said involved “tension and struggle” 
between the two parties.  Another demand was a 12-month phasing in of the MPSC-
mandated Electric Choice program, to begin on January 1, 2001.  Not only was DTE 
Energy compelled to create expensive new processes to enable Electric Choice, but its 
senior executives were rightly worried about this program’s effect on sales.  Because DTE 
Energy’s residential customers were subsidized by its commercial customers, those 
commercial customers had an incentive to switch to cheaper electricity suppliers — 
which they did, cutting DTE Energy’s sales by about 20 percent in 2002.  (This “rate 
skewing” was not abolished until Michigan energy legislation was passed in September 
2008.) 
With senior executives’ attention thus diverted, Patterson, Nagy, and Meador could 
not proceed with their plan of influencing them in favor of a large-scale CI initiative.  
However, Patterson said, “The merger put kaizen on the back burner, but it didn’t 
disappear entirely.”  They had to wait until the merger turmoil subsided before renewing 
their efforts. 
 
2.4. Wave One Summary 
Unstressed First Phase — 1997-2000 
An important aspect of understanding diffusion — of diseases, of ideas, of trends or 
fads — is understanding how it begins in the first place.  In many ways, DTE Energy was 
best positioned for its CI initiative to diffuse throughout the company.  At the outset in 
1997, DTE Energy's cadre of senior executives was primed with a few CI believers — CEO 
Tony Earley and CFO Dave Meador — who authorized some initial experimentation with 
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CI.  These pro-CI executives, later joined by Bob Richard in 2003, defended the fledgling 
CI initiative from its detractors. 
DTE Energy was fortunate in other ways.  Its employees learned from the experiences 
of southeast Michigan's automotive companies, who had already introduced Lean and Six 
Sigma.  It was able to hire well-trained engineers away from those companies.  Some of 
those engineers, like Patterson, Flinchbaugh, and Schulist, had personal connections to 
leading CI researchers in academia and practitioners in industry. 
These early CI proponents convinced DTE Energy's neutral senior executives with 
two tactics.  First, they used social means, such as meeting with Dennis Pawley from 
Chrysler and Paul O'Neill from Alcoa, to explain CI and its potential benefits.  Second, 
they conducted small-scale CI experiments in the form of kaizen events to demonstrate 
what improvements could be made with CI techniques at DTE Energy.  Eventually, enough 
of the senior executives were convinced that they allocated money to hire Lean 
consultants and, later, employees dedicated to the CI initiative full time. 
The primary purpose of kaizen events was to convince DTE Energy's senior 
executives of CI's potential so they would invest in it further.  While kaizen events, if 
executed well, could also convince DTE Energy's middle managers and front-line 
employees, this purpose was not emphasized.  The kaizen-event participants faced a 
chicken-or-egg problem: Nobody at DTE Energy had much experience or skill using CI 
techniques to achieve successful kaizen events, but employees were unwilling to 
participate and build their CI skills without perceiving a high probability of success 
beforehand. 
Kaizen teams, especially those of the UMP initiative, also faced another related 
chicken-or-egg problem.  Success of a front-line kaizen team partially depended on the 
support and, in some cases, the involvement of that team's middle managers.  Without a 
strong push for kaizen events from DTE Energy's senior executives, these middle managers 
had little incentive to increase their workload by participating in kaizen events.  Their lack 
of involvement decreased the success rate of kaizen events, thereby creating a self-
fulfilling belief that their participation in CI activities was not worthwhile. 
The CI initiative was kept alive during this period with forcing.  The CCI personnel 
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kept up their executive-development push to convince the senior executives.  The kaizen 
facilitators compelled the participation of front-line employees (but not their middle 
managers). 
Stressed Second Phase — 2000-2001 
It is not surprising that the CI initiative was suspended when the merger's problems 
consumed the senior executives' attention.  But CCI's strategy was working; executives 
were being convinced — slowly — that CI had merit (even if the lower levels of the 
company hierarchy were not being convinced).  Two observations support this 
conclusion.  First, before the merger negotiations ran into trouble, DTE Energy's senior 
executives wanted their subordinates to use kaizen events for post-merger integration.  
Second, as we shall see in the next chapter, the CI initiative resumed apace after the 
merger closed. 
It is unlikely that DTE Energy's early CI proponents could have done much better.  
Their targeting the senior executives was a necessary first step for securing money to grow 
the CI initiative.  The distraction of the merger was unfortunate, but could hardly have 
been avoided.  Perhaps DTE Energy's CI proponents could have prevented some 
disillusionment among front-line employees and middle managers if kaizen events had 
been run with even greater care in project selection, facilitator skill, and management 
politics.  CCI's limited budget, however, constrained what was possible. 
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Chapter 3: Wave Two — 2001-2006 
 
3.1. Creation of DTE Energy’s Operating System — 2001-2002 
The merger of DTE Energy and MCN Energy was officially completed in May 2001.  
CEO Tony Earley created an Operating Council, comprising the three presidents and their 
operations vice presidents, to oversee the work of consolidating duplicate processes, like 
those for customer service, and reducing the sudden surplus of facilities, vehicles, and 
equipment. 
Even if the pre-merger kaizen events were forgotten, the vision of achieving 
operational excellence with CI was still alive.  Earley was convinced that DTE Energy 
would be making future acquisitions and he believed that CI was the way to make them 
successful — a strategy used best by Danaher Corporation for hundreds of acquisitions 
(Hindo, 2007; Pethokoukis, 2006).  Patterson recalled Earley announcing to Wall Street 
analysts in 2001: “We are going to be the first utility to adopt Toyota Production System 
concepts.”  Earley spoke about DTE Energy emulating Alcoa and other companies that 
benefitted from Lean.  According to one manager, “Tony Earley was still hot-to-trot on 
creating an Operating System.” 
With senior-executive support for a corporate-level CI department, Shawn Patterson 
and his counterpart at MichCon, Marcia Jackson, held a 5-day workshop to combine DTE 
Energy’s CCI group, MichCon’s Business Process Improvement group, and any other 
personnel judged to be CI related.  CCI employee Gary Lemont described the process: 
...[S]ince we were going to have a corporate effort, we needed to look 
throughout the organization and see...who belonged where.  ...We invited 
people from the business units to be part of the workshop.  There was a staff 
group that was supporting both Customer Service and Distribution Operations.  
They were primarily a continuous-improvement group supporting that side of 
the business, so we absorbed the analysts — three or four [people].  We did not 
absorb the administrative people.  ...We didn't identify anybody at Fermi.  On 
the Fossil Gen side of the house, there were some people....  It was decided at 
the workshop that they were primarily business-unit people that were just doing 
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continuous-improvement stuff, so they were left in the organization; we didn't 
absorb any of that complement.  ...The next combination came from the 
Partnership.  ...They had a separate organization, the Union Management 
Partnership...that was determined to be enough about continuous improvement 
that it was absorbed into our group.  That was about four people.  ...We went 
from a group of four or five people to a group of twelve now to support [the 
OS].  It was a combination of Gas, Shawn's group, DO, and the Union 
Management Partnership.  That was the creation of the central group, with that 
overall corporate support [and] philosophy. 
 
Patterson became director of this new Operating System Strategy Group (OSSG).  
Jackson explained that they expected to need a large group for the CI initiative at the start, 
but over time they could shrink to a smaller, strategic group — CI experts who would 
concentrate on improving the CI initiative’s tools, methods, and strategies for culture 
change. 
The UMP initiative ended when its facilitators were transferred to the OSSG.  One 
manager claimed that UMP “totally lacked leadership, so it was having a hard time 
becoming mainstream.”  Patterson said that the senior executives “didn’t know what to do 
with it,” but perceived it similar enough to the CI initiative to combine the two.  
“Honestly,” Patterson added, “not a lot of thought was put into it.”  The UMP steering 
committee solicited comment from the initiative’s facilitators only ceremonially.  One 
facilitator recalled, “They brought us into a room and said, ‘We are thinking of merging 
the two groups and would like your input.’  [But] it was clear their minds were already 
made up.” 
Many union members felt disappointed and even betrayed by UMP’s demise.  An 
OSSG employee recalled, “The unions, especially 223, were really big on [UMP].  It was 
one of their ideas.  They saw it as the way of transforming the business and the culture of 
the organization.  ...They said, ‘Management, this is what you bought into.  This is the way 
to go.  Why are you paying so much attention over here to this Operating System thing?’  
Those Toyota ideals and principles obviously didn’t sit well with the unions, so they saw 
us as a threat.”  And one of the transferred UMP facilitators concluded, “To some people, 
'Partnership' is a dirty word because we never did do what we said we were going to do.” 
Despite these feelings, Patterson believed the CI initiative benefitted from the gain of 
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these labor-relations people.  He said, “I was glad to have [the UMP initiative], because I 
thought there were some really good things.  I saw it was a chance to leverage our 
relationship with the union in a different way than we had before, so I was happy to take 
it.  I had pretty good relationships with the union guys, [Local 223 president] Mike 
Langford and Kevin Shaffer, [president] at Local 17.  They were a lot less concerned about 
it and the executives were happy to...not have two things to worry about.  It cut through a 
lot of confusion....” 
The Operating Council members agreed in November 2001 to create a DTE Energy 
operating system.  Patterson assembled a team of 10 people to collect and study the 
operating systems of Chrysler, Alcoa, Danaher, Visteon, and others.  They studied the 
Toyota Production System and visited TMMK in Georgetown, Kentucky, where Jamie 
Bonini, another contributor to the Chrysler Operating System, had recently taken a job 
(Spear, 2004a).  They visited a Chrysler factory and another manufacturer to see how 
those companies used Lean on the front lines. 
The Operating Council hired organizational-development consulting firm Maxcomm 
to assist with the change-management aspects of the CI initiative.  Maxcomm consultants 
helped Patterson design and conduct workshops for the senior executives.  “There was a 
lot of prep getting them on board again, a lot of re-teaching,” Patterson said.  “[Harvard 
Business School professors and TPS researchers] Kent Bowen and Steve Spear showed up 
to talk about what they were doing and with whom.  ...[W]ithout [the workshops], I don’t 
think they would have really got it.”  Lemont said, “We had stuff for the executives to look 
at.  We had trouble explaining to them what the heck an operating system was because 
we were tool-focused in the company.  We would bring in tools, we would do problem 
solving.  That was our history.  ...We brought in these different examples and used that to 
get them to think about what do we want to do, who do we want to be, and how do we 
define that.”  An employee who had worked previously as a CI expert for Johnson 
Controls said that it was common for companies to think of CI as nothing but learning and 
applying specific tools to problems: “I have this tool belt.  I have all these tools.  If you use 
these tools, you'll be Lean.  Errrnt, wrong answer!  That wasn't it.  We didn't understand 
process.  We didn't understand the production-system side of it:...using them all in 
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conjunction [and] getting everybody everywhere using them, not just in pockets.” 
Because many of the senior executives had worked for DTE Energy for decades, it 
was important to acknowledge their previous improvement efforts.  An Operating Council 
executive said, “Detroit Edison has dabbled in lots of improvement programs over the 
years.”  The fads mentioned by employees included Management By Objectives (Drucker, 
1954), the Complex Change model (Ambrose, 1987; Knoster, Villa, & Thousand, 2000), 
the Kepner-Tregoe method (Kepner & Tregoe, 1965), and Business Process Reengineering 
(Hammer & Champy, 1993) (see the Glossary for more information on each of these fads).  
Maxcomm CEO Bill Adams told the Operating Council, “You’ve got to honor the past of 
what has been here.  Let’s not just race to something new, let’s understand how we got 
here.”  Ensuring that past improvement programs were echoed in the new operating 
system was a shrewd way of overcoming the Not-Invented-Here syndrome, especially 
because so much of its design was copied from other companies’ operating systems. 
The team also conducted workshops with managers and union members to solicit 
their opinions.  Everyone agreed that the most important part of DTE Energy’s operating 
system was a set of twelve principles (see Operating Principles in the Glossary).  The team 
verified that these principles encapsulated the UMP initiative’s principles, such that they 
could claim continuity.  One of the team members said, “The story became that it’s like 
[Prego’s advertising slogan]: ‘It’s in there.’”  A former UMP facilitator said combining these 
principles with CI’s tools into a single operating-system framework was the best thing he 
has seen in his 30 years with DTE Energy.  The workshop attendees agreed that new 
behaviors require thinking differently about how to approach one’s work, and that this 
new thinking is stimulated by an explicit statement of guiding principles.  Jamie 
Flinchbaugh explained, “What decision gets made at 2:00 A.M. on the loading dock?  You 
can’t tell the guy what to do specifically, but you can tell him what principle to follow.” 
Creating DTE Energy’s operating system took about four months.  It was a 1-page 
diagram depicting the intended elements of the CI initiative (see Appendix C).  OSSG 
personnel used it primarily for communicating what elements constituted the CI initiative.  
They disseminated laminated posters of the Operating System diagram as broadly as they 
could throughout the company.  OSSG personnel also used it as a framework for 
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organizing new training courses. 
 
3.2. The CI Initiative’s First Plan — 2002-2004 
As Patterson’s OSSG team was developing the DTE Energy Operating System, they 
were also developing a 2-year CI implementation plan.  OSSG team member Gary Lemont 
described the underlying logic of this plan as a campaign to convince all employees — 
not just the senior executives — of CI’s value: 
At this point in time, we're trying to get a foothold for something that's 
sustainable, instead of just doing projects.  ...The philosophy of this whole thing 
was we can't go out and sell this to people as a theory.  They're not going to 
buy it — it's the program of the month, blah-blah-blah.  What we have to do is 
show them some results.  The concept was we'll do some demonstration 
projects and then, as we're spreading the word, we can point to these things 
and say, “In your organization, for instance, we did this.  And look at how neat 
that was!  Not only do we want to do this, but these are the kinds of results that 
we think we can get by doing this.”  That was the strategy.  ...We said we're 
going to do demonstration projects, then...as we're teaching people, we're 
going to be able to point back to the demonstration projects. 
 
Early in the plan-formulation process, the team confronted two questions.  The first 
question was about the initiative’s initial breadth.  Lemont explained: “There was a big 
discussion: Do we go a mile deep and not very wide, or do we go to ten thousand 
employees and an inch deep?  The mile deep won.  ...So we weren't telling anybody else 
about it, other than the executives.  That was the mile-deep thing: We're going to teach 
people who can go out and use it...show[ing] them the demonstration projects that have 
results.  Then they'll go out and do their own [projects] and it'll just grow.” 
The second question was whether to incorporate Six Sigma — already well 
underway at Motorola, GE, and Allied Signal — into the CI initiative.  Several OSSG 
members remembered the idea being considered, but ultimately the team settled on a 
Lean-only approach.  When I asked about the team’s reason for dismissing Six Sigma, one 
member answered, “They just didn’t want to do it.  They didn’t think they needed it.”  
One ramification of this decision was the development and adoption of a phase-gate 
problem-solving and project-management model called 4-Gate 9-Step (4G9S) as an 
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alternative to Six Sigma’s DMAIC model (see both 4G9S and DMAIC in the Glossary). 
This first CI implementation plan comprised four 6-month phases, running from mid-
2002 until mid-2004, with gradually increasing targets in each phase for the number of 
employees trained, for the number of demonstration projects completed, and for the 
amount of savings gained.  Patterson explained the plan’s design: 
We created this implementation plan.  ...We had envisioned that this was a 
two-year thing to create full engagement in the organization.  We would go 
through these different phases.  You could break this down into how we were 
going to train, what was going to be the executive-development piece, what 
kinds of projects we were going to work on, how would we measure.  And it 
would grow as you go through these different phases.  We defined how that 
would look at each phase. 
 
The plan called for the OSSG personnel to train 25 OS Experts during each 6-month 
phase.  These OS Experts were expected to complete demonstration projects.  External 
consultants would assist at the beginning, but this assistance was expected to taper off as 
the OS Experts gained experience.  The goal was to train directors first because they were 
in positions to promote CI both up and down the management hierarchy.  One OSSG 
member said the directors selected to become OS Experts were “good problem solvers to 
begin with, or engineers who liked to analyze things.”  Twelve of the OSSG’s 17 
employees also became OS Experts to act like an internal consulting group, many of 
whom would work on projects in their former business units leveraging their subject-
matter expertise. 
Shawn Patterson hired a Lean expert in early 2002 after OSSG personnel had 
difficulty creating the OS Expert training course.  An OSSG manager recalled, “When we 
first started designing it...it was not well integrated.  We all had little sections, based on 
our [OS] framework that we were going to teach.  That’s okay; when you’re starting out, 
you don’t know what the hell you’re doing.  But it became apparent that we needed a 
Lean expert.  That’s when Michele came in.”  Michele Hieber was previously a Lean 
consultant at RWD, with a certification from Masaaki Imai’s Kaizen Institute of America, 
past experience at Johnson Controls, and a Master’s degree in adult education.  She 
assumed responsibility for the OS Expert training: 
  47 
Jamie [Flinchbaugh] had already put together the training package.  These [OS] 
Experts were the directors of the organization.  They were going to put them 
through these long classes, over a long period of time.  There was a humongous 
body of knowledge that was put together for them.  The first day I came, they 
were starting module one.  Jamie left to start the Lean Learning Center, so I 
picked that piece up. 
 
...There were twenty-five directors and managers in the class, it was twenty-six 
days long, and it was parsed out over an eight-month period.  ...It was full of 
applications, games, and simulations — all kinds of stuff.  It was all Lean.  
...There were twenty-six things listed [on the Operating System Framework].  I 
had to have a module for all twenty-six of those things.  There were things like 
corporate governance.  ...I had the corporate secretary come down and talk for 
two hours about what governance meant to the vice presidents and the board 
of directors.  I never understood what corporate governance had to do with 
teaching Lean concepts. 
 
For the second class, I took it from twenty-six to twenty-four [days].  We got 
through that and then we made the determination that there was no way we 
were going to be able to [train everybody as an OS Expert].  At that time, we 
had about eleven thousand people in the organization.  I had just spent a year 
and a half and got fifty trained [by the end of 2003].  ...We were able to get the 
organization to [agree that] you don't need to know about governance, you 
don't need to know this, you don't need to know that.  We moved to this 
[second OS version], so I didn't have to do those twenty-six things anymore. 
 
After designing the OS Expert course, Hieber developed a 6-day introductory course 
for front-line employees called OS Specialist training in 2003.  She said, “I quickly took 
from [the OS Expert course] the stuff that I thought [employees] needed to know and what 
other corporations had done — Johnson Controls and Ford.”  OS Specialist training was 
intended to introduce employees to CI and the Operating System, providing enough 
background for them to contribute to demonstration projects if they were called upon to 
do so.  The OSSG personnel trained about 250 OS Specialists in the course’s first twelve 
months, but the implementation plan’s emphasis was on training OS Experts to complete 
demonstration projects. 
The CI implementation plan specified targets in each phase for demonstration-
project savings.  Patterson said that these demonstration projects were “kaizens on 
steriods, taking on meatier things, longer-term projects.”  Another manager explained: 
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When we first started with these demo projects in 2002, we didn't have any 
Black Belts or any of these statistical methods.  The reason they were called 
demo projects was because the vice presidents were requesting proof that the 
methodology worked.  ...[A]n [OS] Expert and a [Project] Lead would go out 
and take a large project that would take, say, three months to six months to fix.  
They would use the 4-Gate 9-Step process to prove that that methodology 
worked.  They would go through the gates with the various vice presidents and 
produce a report at the end.  ...After a while, they believed. 
 
The plan assumed the OS Experts would complete 91 demonstration projects, saving 
an average of $2 million per project, for a 2-year savings target of $182 million.  Shawn 
Patterson reported progress toward these targets monthly to the Operating Council.  By the 
end of 2004, the OSSG had trained the expected 125 OS Experts, who completed over 
150 projects, reportedly saving approximately $175 million (see Figure 3 below). 
 
Figure 3. CI Initiative Targets and Reported Savings 
One OSSG employee believed that Patterson’s plan to convince the senior 
executives of CI’s value succeeded with these results.  He said, “I think we got some 
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people’s attention [for] the potential of what we were talking about.”  Another perceived 
that they weren’t sure at the outset what CI was or what the initiative was going to be, “but 
they figured it was a good thing to have.”  He also perceived that the senior executives, in 
2002, did not consider CI to be part of their core strategy to improve the company’s 
performance at that point, despite CEO Tony Earley’s public statements to the contrary. 
The CI initiative’s results at the end of 2004 were not all positive.  One employee 
observed that the business-unit managers began resisting the CI initiative because they 
didn’t want their budgets reduced.  (As we shall see, their budgets would be cut a few 
years later anyway.)  A management report circulated in December noted a few other 
failures.  First, about 60 percent of the reported savings were considered “soft” — avoided 
costs that did not directly reduce expenses from one quarter to the next.  Second, the 
OSSG failed to engage union members in the CI initiative, training only about 50 
represented employees (5 percent of all employees trained).  Third, the plan’s authors 
naively assumed that the CI initiative would be “fully implemented” throughout DTE 
Energy in only two years.  In 2008, Shawn Patterson reflected on how unrealistic, yet 
necessary, was this timetable: 
I thought it was a cool plan, but totally flawed in a number of ways.  When we 
created the plan, we had a big to-do over at the DAC to bring everyone on 
board.  A lot of the executives had contributed pieces to it, so we brought them 
all in to explain this is what we're going to do.  I remember sitting [there] and I 
honestly thought that two years was long.  Man, that's a long time.  If we don't 
get there, we really screwed up. 
 
I look back [in 2008] and, honestly, we're probably somewhere in this [second] 
phase now.  What I've learned, as I look at other companies and read about 
Danaher and see what Chrysler and GM struggled with, there's a period of five 
years of, What is this thing and exactly how do I engage around it?  Then, once 
the rules are understood and the principles behind it are somewhat understood, 
there's the [question], Now how do I really link it into where I'm trying to take 
the organization strategically? 
 
At best, these are probably two-year phases.  More realistically, [they are] 
probably three- to four-year phases that you need to move through.  Problem is, 
going back to 2002, if we had put a ten-year plan together, [people would have 
said], “Whatever!  We've got forever to get this thing going.”  So you almost 
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need to force it.  It's totally unrealistic to think that in two years you can have 
full engagement around this work. 
 
If you think we really got going by 2002 — by the time we did all our pre-work 
and everything — you're looking at 2012.  It will be interesting to see where 
we are then.  I think there isn't a lot of questioning of [CI]: Are we going back?  
Are we not doing this?  But I think there's still a lot of skills to build in the 
organization.  It's ten years, it is. 
 
3.3. Addition of Six Sigma — 2003-2004 
In 2003, the OSSG's plan for demonstration projects was well underway and was 
succeeding at convincing the senior executives.  With the CI initiative thus established, 
employees familiar with Six Sigma began to question its Lean-only orientation.  These 
employees knew that both Ford and Johnson Controls had parallel but separate Lean and 
Six Sigma initiatives.  Then, a new CI manager and a new vice president, both of whom 
were enthusiastic proponents of Six Sigma, joined DTE Energy and lobbied their peers for 
its adoption.  I believe that the OSSG yielded to this influence because, with the hype of 
introducing DTE Energy's Operating System subsiding, adding a Black Belt program would 
keep the executives' attention on the CI initiative.  One OSSG manager, perhaps with a 
little historical revisionism, said, “Our initial Operating System framework and the 2002 
strategic plan was getting stale.  ...It needed to continue to grow.  It had probably gotten 
too rooted in Lean concepts.” 
Shawn Patterson hired John Weiss2 from Florida Power & Light (FPL) in April 2003 to 
replace one of the OSSG’s outgoing CI managers.  The OSSG personnel were interested in 
FPL because, in 1989, it was the first non-Japanese company to win the Deming Prize, 
awarded by the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (Bacon, 1990; Hudiburg, 
1991).  Weiss had worked for Qualtec Quality Services, the division FPL created in 1986 
to provide what would become Six Sigma consulting services to other companies and 
government agencies.  (FPL later spun off Qualtec.)  Several of DTE Energy's managers 
reported being unimpressed with FPL’s CI program 13 years after winning the Deming 
                                            
2 a pseudonym. 
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Prize, but they were eager to learn from Weiss’ Six Sigma experience in a utility.  One 
manager said, “Even though people had been talking to Shawn about [Six Sigma] all 
along, [Weiss] came in and he was able to convince Shawn it was the right thing to do.” 
A few months later, Bob Richard joined DTE Energy as vice president for Fossil 
Generation.  Richard had become a Six Sigma Black Belt during a 13-year tenure at GE.  
He was hired by Bethlehem Steel as vice president of operations and process 
improvement to attempt a turnaround following the company’s 2001 bankruptcy.  
Ultimately, Bethlehem Steel’s assets were sold to International Steel Group in 2003, so 
Richard left for DTE Energy. 
Richard created the impression among his executive peers that DTE Energy needed a 
Six Sigma program.  He wanted a Black Belt training program and he was able to 
articulate how he wanted to use Black Belts.  A union employee observed, “John’s whole 
background was Six Sigma.  When Bob Richard came in, it was very easy to see where we 
were going as an organization.  I think Shawn was kind of going there before John [Weiss] 
came in, but that's what brought the whole Black Belt model as we have today.” 
According to Patterson, DTE Energy adopted Six Sigma smoothly.  He said, “Two 
years into the strategic plan seemed like the perfect time to freshen things up, bring some 
new tools.  ...A lot of people liked the whole Six Sigma thing, being a strong engineering 
company as we are.”  He said Six Sigma was easy to adopt because “it was well 
packaged”: The role of Black Belts was clear and the set of tools was well defined.  
“[T]here was a lot of discussion around, does this change our whole thinking?  Or is it just 
new tools?  The new-tools [argument] won out,” recalled an OSSG employee.  “Lean is 
not an Operating System.  Six Sigma is not an Operating System.  They are tools, and the 
Operating System and the principles can incorporate both.  So that's when the Lean Six 
Sigma thing got born.” 
Bob Richard, like Dave Meador before him, joined DTE Energy already a CI believer 
and convinced of its potential value to the company.  They both acted upon their beliefs 
by trying to introduce to DTE Energy what they had learned elsewhere.  They both used 
their positions to promote their ideas among their senior-executive peers.  Patterson said 
Richard was particularly influential in showing how to use Six Sigma Black Belts: 
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“Importantly, he really knew what he was looking for, so he was awesome in terms of 
connecting with his peers, other vice presidents, and showing them good models of how 
you'd use this.  He did a great job of linking continuous-improvement work to the 
strategic plan, getting his Black Belts plugged into the most important things.  He really 
did a great job, I think.  He intimidated some of his peers in some ways with how skilled 
he was at this.  He was great.  That was huge.  We needed someone at his level who 
really, really knew how to play and act in this world, and he was good at it.”  Emmett 
Romine, a former CI manager, described Richard’s intentions: “The only guy that was 
doing it for real in those days was Bob Richard.  ...He wanted Black Belts everywhere.  He 
wanted to inundate the system, which is probably what you had to do to change the 
culture.  Inundate the system to the point where you can't get anywhere without running 
into a Black Belt doing a project.” 
The OSSG personnel debated how to reconcile Six Sigma Black Belts with DTE 
Energy’s Lean-oriented OS Experts.  They discussed the possibility of keeping them 
separate, but decided in the end to have Black Belts replace OS Experts.  (By that time, the 
OSSG had trained about 150 OS Experts.)  Weiss and Michele Hieber, therefore, began to 
transform the OS Expert course into a Black Belt certification program.  A plant manager 
said that Weiss “was able to put a power-plant twist on it, which was nice.”  After a few 
months, however, Weiss took the newly vacant position of CI manager for Fos Gen.  The 
Black Belt course development was taken over by Paul Mullenhour, an Achievement 
Dynamics consultant who earned his Master Black Belt certification at GE. 
The OSSG made a good start training the first cadre of Black Belts.  In 2004, the first 
year of the program, about 26 Black Belts were trained and certified internally, and 11 
externally trained Black Belts were hired.  A similar number were trained and certified in 
2005, bringing the total to 56 but falling short of the CI initiative plan’s target of 75 (see 
Figure 4, p.91). 
Patterson and Weiss, at first, followed the common Six Sigma prescription that 
employees selected to become Black Belts should be promising candidates for 
advancement.  These future managers would be change agents (Bennis, 1963).  Hieber 
said, “We started up the Six Sigma program as quickly as we could and started graduating 
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Black Belts internally.”  Richard announced that being a certified Black Belt would factor 
in his promotion decisions (but he stopped short of making it a requirement).  The first 
cohort of Black Belts were eight Fos Gen employees whom Richard wanted to work on 
improving specific metrics.  A certified Black Belt recalled, “We did it right the first time: 
We picked the best of the best, the select few who were really good at their jobs and 
really smart.  They went to a bad training class and we made them Black Belts.  They went 
out and did a bunch of good stuff, because they were really good people, influential, and 
kicked butt.” 
Many employees felt that Richard's push for Six Sigma successfully changed Fos 
Gen's culture.  By 2008, the plant managers of four of DTE Energy’s five biggest power 
plants were Black Belts.  One of these plant managers said: “When the Black Belts first 
came out, it was one of those, ‘Okay, what's Bob Richard trying to do?  What's he trying 
to create with us here?’  It was a lot of math, a lot of statistics.  There's going to be 
resistance to some of that, trying to understand where it was coming from.  I think, 
because he stayed pretty strong in making sure that was a process he wanted to have used, 
...we have an institution here that looks at always continually improving.” 
After Weiss became CI manager for Fos Gen, Patterson had to hire a corporate 
Master Black Belt to lead the training and certification program.  The Master Black Belt 
position proved difficult to keep filled over the next five years.  The first Master Black Belt, 
hired from Ford, turned out to be a poor teacher, so he only mentored Black Belt 
candidates while consultant Paul Mullenhour continued to teach the Black Belt course.  
This first Master Black Belt left about a year later, in 2005, and was succeeded by a survey 
statistician from DTE Energy’s marketing department who, surprisingly, was not a Black 
Belt.  The statistician left after a few months when her husband, also a DTE Energy 
employee, took a job in another state.  The statistician’s replacement, a Black Belt this 
time, lasted from late 2005 until November 2007.  The position was then vacant for six 
months until a Master Black Belt was hired from EDS in May 2008. 
Several managers thought that the Black Belt program suffered from this lack of 
leadership continuity.  They voiced three main complaints (see also Appendix B).  First, 
each Black Belt program leader revised the course to emphasize his or her preferred tools 
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and methods.  As a result, Black Belts trained at different times had highly variable 
expertise.  Second, the Black Belt program languished in the gaps between leaders; most 
importantly, Black Belt candidates' progress toward their certifications was suspended 
during these gaps.  Third, the criteria for Black Belt certification, especially for acceptable 
projects, were variable and inconsistent over time.  Consequently, one Black Belt said that 
the program “lost its momentum, got messed up...and watered down....”  These problems 
stand in contrast to the approach taken by many of Michigan's automotive companies.  
Several Black Belts, who earned their certification at other companies before joining DTE 
Energy, reported that Ford and Johnson Controls hired Six Sigma Academy (SSA) to design 
their Green Belt, Black Belt, and Master Black Belt training courses and to train their future 
instructors.  (SSA was the original Six Sigma consulting company started by Mikel Harry, 
who developed Six Sigma at Motorola in the late 1980s with Bill Smith.)  Once installed, 
these companies' Six Sigma programs were consistent, stable, and commensurable with 
each other. 
 
3.4. Learning Lines — 2004-2005 
In addition to starting a new Six Sigma Black Belt program, the OSSG personnel also 
decided to attempt a learning line.  Manufacturing companies adopting Lean typically 
experiment with the new techniques on a smaller line separate from the main production 
line.  OSSG members were encouraged to try a utility analog of this practice by Steve 
Spear, who had used learning lines successfully at the University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center (UPMC) (Thompson, Wolf, & Spear, 2003).  (UPMC had adopted Lean from Alcoa 
in 2000.) 
I present this story of DTE Energy’s first learning line in detail because of its 
importance to the CI initiative — it was still discussed as a paragon four years later — and 
because it shows necessary elements of CI that DTE Energy struggled to replicate later and 
elsewhere in the company. 
MichCon personnel had been trying to improve the field employees’ service-call 
productivity (service calls per hour).  OSSG member Gary Lemont said, “I think it was two 
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or three years they were tracking it, trying to improve it.  They had done different things 
and it hadn't been giving them any results, so they generated a project for it.”  MichCon’s 
frustrated vice president came to the OSSG for help.  Marcia Jackson, MichCon’s CI 
manager, assembled a team, which included Lemont and two other OSSG employees, to 
meet with the MichCon executives.  “When we sat down with them,” Lemont recalled, 
“we said, ‘Well, this is a pretty big thing.  Why don't we go to one service center and we'll 
do some work around there?’”  Jackson said that their objective was “to see what type of 
improvements we could make and possibly sustain over a ninety-day period.” 
The learning line took place from February to April 2004.  Of MichCon’s four service 
stations in Detroit, Jackson's team selected Coolidge Service Center for the learning line 
because it had the worst productivity, and because the station manager was willing to let 
them in. 
The OSSG team knew that they were going to focus on making improvements at 
Coolidge over a 90-day period (this was perceived to be a long duration), but they 
otherwise didn't know what they were going to do.  Their first step was to understand the 
work being done, so the OSSG personnel and Coolidge leaders accompanied the front-
line employees on their service calls for a few days.  The team sought to understand the 
timing and duration of customer service calls and, especially, what barriers hindered 
MichCon's employees.  Jackson recalled: 
Basically, the approach was to first observe work.  We assigned a [team 
member] to each person [whom] we selected to be on the learning line.  The 
learning line was ten employees: They were union employees, a supervisor, 
and a leader.  We did ride-withs for a couple of days.  I asked each team to 
look at the timing of every single thing that was done, from seven thirty until 
the end of the shift, ...to really understanding what happens [and] primarily 
what gets in their way — how many times they had to go back and forth to the 
truck because they forgot something, or they didn’t bring what was needed 
with them. 
 
Once that was completed, we invited everyone to a meeting.  I facilitated the 
session to look at what was observed and the timings....  Then we started 
talking about what were some things that we could do to remove those 
obstacles or barriers.  Part of it was an elementary kind of [CI] workshop: We 
taught them about Lean and what we were doing, that is, to increase the 
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number of jobs completed per day.  It was a little bit of teaching and an 
exercise about observing work.... 
 
Based on that meeting, we defined a scope.  We decided that those ten people 
whom we rode with would be part of the learning line.  They would be taken 
out of their sections to experiment and implement small changes.  They were a 
combination of seasoned and new employees. 
 
Jackson’s team immediately encountered resistance.  One of the employees selected 
for the learning line was a union steward who said, “I can't work any harder than I'm 
already working right now.  We're always getting used.  People are always wanting to 
look at Coolidge.  They always want to improve Coolidge.”  Another union steward tried 
to have the station manager throw Jackson’s team out of Coolidge.  Their second step, 
therefore, was to try to engage the learning-line employees as willing participants.  Lemont 
explained, “There was skepticism at first because most of the time when this happens, the 
vice presidents come down and say, ‘This is what I want you to work on, because this is 
the problem.’  And quite honestly, they haven't got a clue.”  Instead, he told the learning-
line participants, “You're going to drive this.  We don't want to know what the vice 
presidents think is wrong; we want to know what you think is wrong.  ...[W]e're going to 
talk to you and try to build an initial list of things to work on.  ...We want to try to fix the 
things that are getting in the way of you being productive.”  Lemont added, “They 
appreciated the words and when we followed it up with action, that's when they got 
engaged.  They said, ‘Oh, they're going to work on what I think is important?  They're 
going to let me try different things to fix it?’  That was it: They were sold!” 
The team also found it necessary to demonstrate to the union employees that their 
improvements would not lead to layoffs.  Lemont explained: 
The other thing that sealed the deal was a commitment to not reduce 
complement.  ...We warned management up front that that would be a push-
back [otherwise].  They were talking about productivity and a big backlog.  
...We told them up front: “If you're going to improve productivity and lay 
people off, this is not going to go off.”  ...We brought the union management 
and the corporate management in to do the orientation and the roll-out, so 
[union members] knew we had upper management support and union support.  
...They said, “Okay, so they're supporting it.  They're not going to whack us.  
The union is involved; they're supporting it.  They are actually going to listen to 
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me.”  Very quickly — over a period of two or three weeks — there wasn't any 
problem with engagement anymore because things were going very well. 
 
Jackson used a few other tactics to overcome resistance.  She held all of her team 
meetings at Coolidge, even the ones that did not involve the Coolidge employees, to make 
their seriousness and persistence apparent.  She also invited MichCon’s executives to 
attend progress-report meetings to emphasize upper management’s support for the 
learning line. 
The OSSG team’s third step was to help the learning-line participants iteratively 
experiment with different ways of organizing their work processes or with possible 
countermeasures to workflow barriers.  The OSSG team gave each employee only one 
task per day, such as recording how frequently a problem occurred or assessing whether a 
countermeasure fixed a problem as expected.  Lemont said that they didn’t use rigorous 
root-cause analyses or statistics, but used simple tools like 5S or after-action reviews, 
“whatever we needed to keep the ball rolling.”  They helped the employees brainstorm 
potential fixes and “play[ed] around with two or three different things until [they] found 
something that worked a little bit better.”  Jackson told the story of this experimentation: 
We didn’t know what we were doing.  We were just trying to actualize Steven 
Spear’s work of doing learning lines.  We were just having a ball.  ...We looked 
at where they worked — their area, their environment — and we looked at 
how they did their work too, and tried to agree on what are we going to 
improve.  A lot of fits and stops.  ...But the point was we were just trying 
different experiments, some my team suggested and  others that the learning-
line team suggested.  Sometimes it was hard because it was an approach that 
they weren’t used to.  If the night before we said, “Let’s try this tomorrow,” the 
next day you try it.  And while you’re trying it, by the way, we’re going to be 
calling you to see if it’s working.  We may not be out in the field with you, but 
we’re going to call you, the leader’s going to be on the conversation. 
 
I found that, the more we experimented with our process as we went along, we 
started structuring and improving how we were doing things.  We had a top-of-
the-day call, this is what we’re going to implement, and an end-of-the-day call, 
how did it work?  Well, even when we first started doing that, it was kind of all 
over the place because there wasn’t a real agenda.  We moved from not having 
an agenda to an agenda in the morning and an agenda in the afternoon.  We 
moved to a cadence of weekly meetings where the director or the vice 
president would come to see how we were doing. 
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Then we started using tools.  We created a master schedule once we 
determined what it was we were going to work on and who was assigned to it.  
And we got a little smarter: Because we wanted to use union employees, my 
team split up.  I worked with the union employees to 5S the station.  Curtis 
Wilson worked with the leaders to make sure that they were changing how 
they were looking at work.  We told the employees, “You should never be at a 
job more than thirty minutes before you diagnose it.  If you can’t diagnose it 
within thirty minutes, then you must call your leader.”  That was our andon 
cord.  Because we were supposed to be all open and honest, a senior field 
person who had been with the company for years said, “You know what?  You 
all expect me to know everything and how to do everything, but I don’t always 
know how.”  Which was great.  “Okay, you diagnose the problem.  You can’t 
figure it out?  You call the leader.”  The leaders should be monitoring the work 
load, looking at their watches to see how long they’ve been at a job and call 
them to see if they need assistance, because it should be a two-way street.  We 
tried that.  Well, this is what tended to happen: You’re going into a home that’s 
not in the best condition and when you go downstairs there’s cobwebs, or stuff 
in the way, whatever.  You get involved in what you have to do to get to the 
furnace, moving stuff, the homeowner’s talking to you, and then you’re trying 
to figure out what’s going on.  Thirty minutes goes very quickly.  We said, 
“How do they know when they’re at the thirty minutes?”  So we went out and 
bought some egg timers.  That was one they didn’t like!  ...We tried that.  We 
just tried simple fixes. 
 
...Another situation was when everybody’s supposed to be gone from the 
station, but there are always these people left.  I asked them, “Why are you still 
here?”  They said, “I don’t know where my truck is.”  So we decided to time 
[how long it took for] the dispatcher to get the truck to them.  We gave them 
ten or fifteen minutes.  We also gave them a visual to know where the trucks 
were in the yard and who they were attached to, if it was in repair or somebody 
else had been assigned to it or whatever the case may be at that time. 
 
I think that there was a lot of tension at the beginning.  Once we didn’t leave, 
when we kept coming back, kept coming back, even though they didn’t want 
us to be there, after a while they got used to us being there.  Then they started 
suggesting: “You know, what if we tried this?” or “What if we do this?” 
 
We used visual management to make it clear to the employees what’s going on 
or how long it takes them to do their job.  We had the employees in all four 
sections displayed as either green or red depending on whether they got there 
[to their first job] within the thirty minutes or not.  You were red if you didn’t.  
There were a couple of people in our learning line who were really good 
employees but who got marked red.  It caused them to say, “Marcia, why did I 
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get marked red?”  I said, “Let’s look at what you did that day for you to be red.”  
Well, she would take her [job list], go outside, turn on her computer, determine 
what her jobs were going to be, and start calling while she was sitting in the 
parking lot.  She was setting up her day as opposed to calling one, going to that 
job, [and proceeding in sequence].  Our metric was to be at the first job within 
thirty minutes and to get everything out of the way of doing that.  ...We had a 
huge metric board and part of the huddle was to see how we were doing.  Now 
they would just look up and see: “Oh, we’re green here, we’re red there, we’re 
yellow there.” 
 
...One of the problems in the morning was the employees needing to calibrate 
their gas meters.  The room to recalibrate your gas meter was probably about 
[the size of a conference table], and there were about sixty people across the 
four sections.  Give or take, on any given day, maybe forty-five were there.  
They were all going in and lining up to calibrate their gas meters.  So, easy 
enough, we just had somebody on the midnight shift have those ten gas meters 
ready when they came in and communicated to the employees where their 
meters were going to be placed.  And it was clearly marked.  That [idea] was 
such a good one, we did it for the whole station.  ...One day you come in and 
everybody’s labeled and everybody has a gas meter.  “We have assigned 
seats?”  Well, it wasn’t a matter of having assigned seats.  It was a matter of 
[ensuring the] equipment you need for your truck will be there at that place. 
 
...Then we looked at parts being left behind: Why are they being left behind?  
Who are they for?  And why didn’t they pick them up?  There were various 
reasons: I didn’t know, I forgot.  So we started putting up parts.  Once 
everything is marked, you can put the parts there too.  You can sweep every 
day and you can problem solve when there are parts left.  We measured the 
number of parts left in an effort to decrease the number.  Making sure the right 
person had the right part at the right time to complete the job.  We measured 
how long it took to get out to the field and we started doing that across the 
station.  What else did we measure?  Anything that walked, we measured it. 
 
...I think the 5S helped too, because they knew what stuff was in the lazy susan 
and what wasn’t going to be there.  And the environment changed and began 
to look better; we cleaned it up and threw out a lot of old documents and other 
waste that no longer belonged in the station.  We sorted, set up, and 
standardized areas where you could retrieve equipment, tools, and documents, 
or where you could check to see your schedule and other important 
information pertaining to the work. 
 
The learning line was a success.  The employees boosted Coolidge’s productivity 
from an average of 1.2 to 1.7 service calls per hour, an increase of 42 percent.  (The 
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OSSG team had to demonstrate that this improvement was statistically significant, via t-
test, before DTE Energy’s Six Sigma enthusiasts were satisfied.)  “During the three months, 
they worked off the entire backlog,” Lemont said.  “They started loaning people out to 
other service centers because they didn't have enough work for them to do.  It was a very 
dramatic impact.” 
The Coolidge employees’ experiences with the learning line convinced them of CI’s 
value in two ways.  The first way was being able to improve their jobs by exercising their 
own volition.  Lemont said: 
It was received tremendously by the employees because of their involvement, 
their ability to tackle the things that they thought were wrong, to implement the 
things that they thought would work, and the support that they got in terms of 
doing things differently.  A couple times we got into trouble because the union 
people were suggesting things that the union leadership didn't want them to 
do!  One of the [problems] was starting time.  They said, “Why don't we take 
trucks home and just drive to the [first] job?”  We said, “Okay, why don't we 
try it?”  Well, there's something in the union contract about not being able to 
do that.  They got in trouble with their own union, but they were very engaged. 
 
These front-line employees were won over also by seeing managers demonstrate the 
importance of CI work by participating themselves — not just exercising close oversight, 
but literally getting their hands dirty too.  Jackson related this anecdote: 
You know what else happened?  This was kind of interesting.  I brought the 
team in, I explained to them what the 5S tool was, we started doing the work.  
...I saw they wanted to be a part of it.  ...[W]hen we did 5S, they were saying, 
“Wow, they really care!  Wow, things are changing!  Wow, they’re painting 
that?  Wow, they’re throwing out all that old stuff?  Wow, we’ve wanted to 
change that!  We’ve wanted to move that desk and it got moved!”  ...I had rags!  
I was cleaning!  [laughs]  They saw a manager with rags and cleaning, really 
trying to make it better.  There was stuff that had been there for years.  It wasn’t 
used anymore, so it was gone: We made room for other things.  As they saw 
that coming together, the environment changing, that’s what engaged them 
more, I think. 
 
The success of this learning line was widely publicized throughout the company.  
The Coolidge employees presented the results of their work to the senior executives.  
Jackson concluded this story by describing the rewards that the employees’ requested, 
countering a prevailing assumption that union employees insist on more money for doing 
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“extra” work: 
The attitude of the line — what I saw was they began to feel special.  They 
were part of the report out to the executives!  Some people had probably never 
presented in their lives and, to be honest with you, the day before we had to do 
that, I didn’t know what was going to happen! [laughs] There were still times 
that they were mad at me, so I didn’t know what was going to happen.  They 
did the report out. 
 
When teams naturally come together, (a) you see the skill sets, and (b) you see 
the things that they are passionate about, and they’re drawn to those things.  So 
they reported out those things.  That worked really well.  And the [union 
steward] guy that I said told me, “You’re not going to make me work any 
harder; I’m not busting my duh-duh-duh...”?  He got up and said, “I didn’t work 
not one day harder.  And in fact, it’s easier!”  And it was easier. 
 
...They became a shining star.  [CEO] Tony Earley came to see them.  All the 
execs were there at that report-out.  [Energy distribution president] Bob Buckler 
was there.  They were just so pleased with what they heard in their voices and 
what they saw in terms of their own ownership.  It was a happy meeting!  It 
really was. 
 
What I thought was the most interesting thing:...They asked them, “What do 
you want?”  You know what they said?  A baseball game.  They wanted to go to 
a baseball game and they wanted to see Fermi nuclear power plant.  That’s 
what they wanted.  It taught me something about what is really rewarding to 
people, and it’s not money.  Money is only a reward for a few minutes, because 
then you get used to it.  A memory is more rewarding.  The great thing was Bill 
O’Conner, who was the vice president for Fermi (he’s retired now), personally 
took them on the tour, so that was real special.  They welcomed us with small 
tokens and provided us breakfast.  And then for the baseball game, Bob Buckler 
said, “Marcia, call so-and-so and get the suite.”  So we had a well-stocked suite 
for the entire game!  That was very rewarding.  That’s probably why they still 
like me, because we partied! [laughs] ...That was a wonderful experience. 
 
After the learning line concluded, Jackson’s team wanted to spread Coolidge’s 50-60 
countermeasures to the other service stations.  They called a meeting of representatives 
from the other stations to ask them which of the learning-line countermeasures could be 
broadly adopted.  Those representatives resisted adopting countermeasures that had not 
been tested at their respective stations.  Lemont remembers telling them, “Okay, instead of 
trying to guess about that, why don't we go to another site?  We'll take this [list] with us.  
As we review and start getting [problems] from the new location, if we can pull a solution 
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off the shelf and try it, we'll do that.  If there are completely new issues that come up, then 
we'll address those in the same way we did [at Coolidge].” 
Lemont led a second learning line at the Broadway Service Center in Ann Arbor.  
The team worked to improve service calls per hour, as at Coolidge.  As expected, they 
were able to use some of Coolidge’s countermeasures with some tweaking, and other 
problems required new countermeasures.  They boosted Broadway’s productivity by about 
20 percent. 
This second learning-line team felt that it was harder to engage Broadway’s station 
employees.  An OSSG member said, “They made improvements, but it wasn’t the same 
feeling, the same comfort level, the same [outcome of] the people being engaged to the 
point that they wanted to do it.  ...The culture was a little different there.  They were a 
little less accepting, I think, because they were further out and usually people don’t bother 
them.”  Lemont agreed that these difficulties arose from the Not-Invented-Here syndrome: 
Our culture says, “We're different than everybody else.”  That's why we 
couldn't take the solutions from one [station] and implement [them elsewhere] 
because, even if they were appropriate, the people there have to admit that 
they're appropriate before you cram them down their throat.  “I'm different 
than everybody else.”  That's the mentality that we've got.  So we brought them 
along: When a problem came up, we'd say, “You know, over at Coolidge, we 
tried this and it worked.  Why don't you guys at least try it?”  They were willing 
to do that, try it and see if it worked.  If it did then they were willing to sign off 
on it.  But saying, “Here's the solution” — that wasn't our culture. 
 
By late 2004, a few MichCon employees were earning their Black Belt certifications, 
so they took over MichCon’s CI activities from the corporate OSSG group.  Several OSSG 
members reported that these MichCon Black Belts called a few of their improvement 
projects at other service stations “learning lines,” but they were not proper learning lines. 
Eventually, such misuse of the term ‘learning line’ poisoned it among DTE Energy’s 
front-line employees.  A project was undertaken at Pontiac Service Center in November 
2005, which was called a learning line for lack of a better name.  But it included plans for 
eliminating positions.  The front-line employees, particularly union members, linked the 
name ‘learning line’ to the planned layoffs. 
The OSSG personnel regarded the learning-line approach as the most effective way 
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to engage front-line employees in CI activities, although they admitted that it requires a lot 
of time, attention, and coaching expertise.  As we shall see, the OSSG directors wanted to 
reintroduce the learning-line approach in 2009, albeit under a new name, to 
experimentally develop specific ways of enacting CI in each of DTE Energy’s business 
units. 
 
3.5. The CI Initiative’s Second Plan — 2004-2005 
The first CI implementation plan came to an end in mid-2004, triggering several 
changes to the OSSG.  A new plan was needed to guide the CI initiative forward, 
especially because it had not reached Patterson’s anticipated company-wide “full 
implementation” after two years.  The new plan also needed to reflect the 2004 switch 
from OS Experts to Black Belts.  Furthermore, after being the CI initiative’s driving force for 
five years, Patterson was ready to hand that responsibility to someone else.  Patterson was 
part of DTE Energy’s talent-planning program, which required candidates for upper-
management positions to rotate through the major business units of the company.  He 
moved to Distribution Operations (DO), running DTE Energy’s north area operations for a 
while before becoming DO’s director of resource management. 
John Weiss succeeded Shawn Patterson as OSSG director.  Several managers thought 
that Weiss was not the CI visionary and cheerleader that Patterson was, but he was chosen 
to lead the CI initiative for several reasons.  First, managers considered Weiss' utility 
background an asset.  Second, he benefitted from several senior executives' enthusiasm 
for the new Six Sigma Black Belt program, which he championed.  Third, many pro-CI 
managers thought that the CI initiative had matured such that it no longer required 
Patterson's entrepreneurialism.  Patterson had always viewed his OSSG-director role as a 
teacher and mentor to the senior executives.  He felt that the CI initiative was so fragile at 
its beginning that he had to prevent the senior executives from making mistakes.  He said, 
“Things were always so tenuous that if they were going to do something stupid, I had to 
somehow do something to counteract it.”  By mid-2004, however, Patterson believed that 
such nurturing of the initiative was no longer required.  “We had the delusional belief that 
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we were farther along than we really were," said Patterson, "and that anyone could have 
stepped in.  That was the feeling with John [Weiss]: Things are good enough; we can’t 
push backwards, everyone gets it.  But that proved not to be the case.” 
The transition from Patterson to Weiss was gradual, lasting the latter half of 2004 as 
they collaborated on a second CI implementation plan.  Jason Schulist, another graduate 
of MIT’s LFM program, also contributed to the plan.  (Schulist had joined DTE Energy from 
GM in March 2004 as the new CI manager for DO.)  The second plan retained the 
essential features of the first one: Train a specified number of CI experts (now Black Belts) 
who would complete projects to reach annual savings targets.  The plan’s authors 
expected that improvement projects would save $125 million each year in 2005 and 
2006, and would reduce operations and maintenance (O&M) costs by three to five 
percent annually thereafter.  They also hoped for improvements in non-financial measures 
like customer satisfaction, safety, and absenteeism, but the details of these objectives 
remained vague.  The plan also called for all 100 directors and senior executives to attend 
a CI “champion” course.  The plan specified a training rate of 25 people every 6 months.  
The OSSG personnel began designing this CI Champion course but, for reasons explained 
in the next section, never launched it. 
According to one member, the OSSG personnel reconsidered their 2002 decision to 
follow a “mile-deep/inch-wide” approach.  They felt that the front line’s lack of 
understanding was hurting the CI initiative.  One front-line employee recalled, “There was 
a big push...saying everybody needed to have OS training.”  The OSSG trainers 
subsequently achieved the second plan’s target of training 600 OS Specialists by the end 
of 2005.  Judging this number to be insufficient still, the OSSG personnel began planning 
a large push to train 4000 front-line employees on the Operating Principles (see Glossary) 
and five basic CI tools.  No one mentioned that the second plan, like the first, did not 
specify exactly how these front-line employees would become involved in CI work after 
they were trained.  One employee observed that the front line didn’t take the OS Specialist 
course seriously: “[For] most people in an office, unless you were busy, wasting three days 
in training was usually a good proposition.  [It] gets you to meet different people.  It was 
fun...I think we got to go up to Big Rapids [Michigan] or something, golfing afterwards.” 
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The second implementation plan was clearer about the Black Belt program.  Weiss 
wanted to train and certify at least one to two percent of DTE Energy’s total workforce as 
Black Belts, between 100 and 200 people, by the end of 2006.  An OSSG manager said, 
“We’ve never met that, never got close to that.  Most of the vice presidents will say they 
know they need more, but they can’t see how to fund it.  ...Most companies have a hard 
time figuring out how to fund that, because it’s always about, What have you done for me 
lately?”  DTE Energy certified 56 Black Belts by the end of 2005 and 75 by the end of 
2007. 
The OSSG personnel debated whether these Black Belts should be members of the 
OSSG and assigned to business-unit projects as needed, or owned by and embedded in 
DTE Energy's business units.  They decided to decentralize the Black Belts, placing them 
closer to where problems arise.  Weiss also wanted the OSSG to have a Master Black Belt 
mentor for each of DTE Energy’s four major business units, but the senior executives never 
approved this staffing plan. 
The plan included no overall project targets, but each Black Belt candidate was 
required to complete two projects to earn his or her certification.  These candidates were 
required to use DTE Energy’s 4G9S project-management process for their projects (see 
4G9S in the Glossary).  Emmett Romine, a former CI manager, said that this requirement 
caused many employees to believe that “if [a project] is not four-gate nine-step, it’s not 
CI.” 
With large annual savings targets and a continual need to convince CI skeptics, it is 
unsurprising that Weiss maneuvered to count the benefits of successful improvement 
projects toward the CI initiative’s targets even if those projects were not undertaken as part 
of the CI initiative.  For example, Weiss permitted Frank Wszelaki, the director of Monroe 
power plant, to count his periodic outage handbook project toward his Black Belt 
certification, even though most of the work was done before the Black Belt program was 
established.  Wszelaki said, “I think [the OSSG] wanted to highlight that [project] because 
it was so much savings — in the millions of dollars.  We wanted to have something up 
there that showed if you take a big project — we're talking megawatt-weeks now — you 
can save so much.  You're talking twenty-five, thirty-five millions of dollars that you can 
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save by just making sure these units are available sooner, by doing the right planning up 
front.” 
Every power plant unit must be taken out of service every couple of years for 
periodic maintenance.  In 2001, Fos Gen personnel used to ‘guesstimate’ how long a 
major periodic outage would take (usually between 4 and 15 weeks) and did not control 
each one with rigorous project management.  Wszelaki said, “We didn’t have a structured 
approach to doing outages.  When I was in Fossil Gen [before 1991] at Monroe, we had 
developed very good rigor around how we managed periodics.  Over time, for whatever 
reasons, there was no format, policy, procedures around managing outages.”  He 
assembled a team that, over the next 18 months, developed a standardized process after 
studying the procedures used internally at Fermi and Monroe, and externally at TVA in 
Tennessee and at Progress Energy in North Carolina.  The team also solicited contributions 
from union members and from upper management.  They published a periodic outage 
handbook in 2003. 
The handbook was a success, and Wszelaki and others kept improving it.  The new 
procedure saved DTE Energy about $11 million in its first two years of use.  Wszelaki and 
another outage manager revised the handbook for their Black Belt certifications: “One of 
the things that we observed when we wrote the outage handbook was we didn't have a 
good understanding of when the outages would occur, so we couldn't sequence who 
needed to do what when and we didn't communicate it well.  So we tried to improve our 
ability to show...how many outage weeks can we do.”  One of the first outages to occur 
after the revision was scheduled at Monroe, where Wszelaki had become plant director.  
He insisted his staff follow the handbook to the letter.  “We learned quite a bit from doing 
it,” he said.  Those learnings became the basis for the next revision.  Wszelaki and his 
team presented it to other utilities, at conferences, and at industry-group meetings like the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), receiving “a lot of kudos on it.” 
Another project given retroactive credit was led by one of the few union members to 
pursue a Black Belt certification.  He explained that prior to the 2001 merger, neither 
MichCon nor Detroit Edison managed their vehicle fleets well.  As an example, he said 
one could go to a service center in the middle of a work day and see 50 idle vehicles in 
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the yard.  He said, “There were stories of linemen who had two or three bucket trucks!”  
After the merger, DTE Energy therefore sought to trim its fleet of over 7000 pieces of 
mobile equipment.  The union Black Belt’s fleet project enabled DTE Energy to auction off 
50 bucket trucks for a financial gain of $8 million.  (In 2002, a bucket truck cost about 
$125,000 and had a 7-year expected life.  DTE Energy’s truck-maintenance reputation was 
so good that bidding utilities offered high prices.)  The union Black Belt recalled 
presenting his results to a group of senior executives that included CEO Tony Earley: 
“When we rang the cash register, they were very happy.” 
The union Black Belt’s other certification project is an example of the large benefits 
obtainable with better design and control of neglected processes.  He instituted new 
policies and procedures for approving and reporting overtime in DO.  He explained that 
when a circuit is out from a down wire, for example, the overhead linemen may have to 
work overtime to get the lines back up.  But the dispatchers would sometimes grant the 
linemen, who wanted extra pay, their requested overtime even if their relief shift was 
sitting in the service station yard with nothing to do.  The Black Belt said, “It was a free-
for-all, and it was [costing] millions and millions of dollars.” 
Gerry Anderson, the executive vice president for Fos Gen, was promoted to DTE 
Energy president in mid-2004 and to COO about a year later.  Many managers believed 
that he was being groomed to succeed Tony Earley as CEO.  At the time, Anderson knew 
little about CI, but he continued other executives’ expectation for its use.  At an upper-
management retreat in early 2005, Anderson reportedly told DTE Energy's directors, “I 
want you to do CI and work it hard.”  But because Anderson did not believe in CI himself 
at that point, he did not specify a method for working CI hard and, furthermore, delegated 
oversight of the OSSG to senior vice presidents Steve Kurmas (DO) and Bob Richard (Fos 
Gen).  Patterson explained that Anderson’s family owns a large agriculture-related 
business.  His siblings, who run the company, had been unsuccessful with CI experiments 
of their own, so Anderson “has always been a bit of a skeptic from day one.”  As a former 
McKinsey consultant, however, Anderson brought a stronger focus to the mounting 
pressures on DTE Energy’s financial health. 
Some senior executives, including Anderson, had begun to doubt the veracity of the 
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savings attributed to the CI initiative.  From 2002 through 2005, the OSSG’s reported 
savings approximately doubled each year, but the savings classified as “soft” made up 
progressively larger proportions of the annual amounts (see Figure 3, p.48).  These "soft" 
savings constituted 67 percent of the 4-year total.  Even the so-called “hard” savings had 
not necessarily produced visible changes to DTE Energy’s financial statements.  Patterson 
recalled, “I think Gerry [Anderson] got frustrated with where the [CI] program was going.  
That's where the [cost-cutting] came from.  He didn't feel like the Operating System was 
catching hold the way that he had expected it to.  He didn't feel like it was delivering the 
kind of results that it should have.  And he was right.  ...Gerry [Anderson] saw the statistics 
about our soft versus hard savings [and said], ‘I'm not driving the structural change to this 
business that I'd expected.’” 
The OSSG personnel felt strongly that the Operating Council should have decided 
how the CI savings would be put to use from 2002 forward, whether funding extra 
projects, increasing shareholder earnings, or reinvesting the gains in more improvement 
work.  Instead, the senior executives, not wanting to imperil the restarted CI initiative, let 
the business units keep their savings.  (The executives did so by not reducing the business 
units’ budgets.)  An OSSG employee characterized the business units’ argument as 
follows: “If I save a million dollars and you take it away from me, I'm not going to save 
any more money for you.  So if I save a million dollars, you've got to let me do what I 
need to do with it.”  But these uses for CI savings were not necessarily the best for DTE 
Energy's strategic objectives or for the health of the CI initiative.  The business units 
typically used their CI savings to fund over-budget projects, to fund desired projects that 
upper management had rejected previously in the budgeting process, or — as one 
disapproving employee put it — “to go waste the money elsewhere.”  One of DTE 
Energy’s CI experts said, “We went along for a while, doing a lot of good work and not 
seeing anything fall out on the bottom line.  When Gerry Anderson talks about not getting 
any results, he's not talking these [savings] numbers not being big.  He's saying, ‘I don't 
see them anyplace.’” 
DTE Energy's managers and Black Belts cited several reasons for the CI initiative’s 
failure to affect DTE Energy’s bottom line through 2005.  Two big problems were poor 
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project selection and poor project management.  Several managers complained that the 
demonstration projects and the Black Belt projects of the two CI implementation plans 
tended to be ill-defined, too broad in scope, and not selected strategically (see also 
Appendix B).  One Black Belt thought that DTE Energy’s CI initiative compared 
unfavorably to the Six Sigma initiative at GE, where he had worked previously.  He said, 
“It was like we weren't taking it seriously.  It was frustrating.”  An OSSG manager recalled, 
“[W]e were advocating that [the business units] needed a portfolio of projects.  They 
needed a PMO [project management office].  They needed a way to prioritize.  We didn't 
have that in many of the business units.  People just did stuff.  (That time was still a little 
early on in the Black Belt [program], so there wasn't a huge pipeline of people.)  They just 
worked on things.  A director would tell you what to work on.  We were trying to build 
that structure, but we had no functional power.  We were [telling] them: ‘You need to get 
your act together.’  ...It's a lot better now in the areas that have [CI] managers.”  For 
example, DO's CI manager Schulist was responsible for auditing a line-restoration 
improvement project in DO.  He recalled that the project was so big, it was really 13 
projects.  He refused to let the team close the project when the 13th sub-project ran into 
trouble.  He said, “I didn't count it as a successful project because it was scoped wrong.”  
These project-management problems persisted despite the OSSG personnel designing the 
4G9S process to avert these difficulties suffered by the kaizen events prior to the MichCon 
merger.  Another manager summarized his perception of the Black Belt program's 
deficiencies: 
The training itself was not well crafted.  When you went to the class, right out 
of the chute it felt like a waste of time, in some cases.  ...You came out of what 
was called a Black Belt program with what is probably the equivalent of a 
Green Belt in other companies.  Having seen other programs, I knew that.  
...Why are you calling this a Black Belt?  It's not a Black Belt. 
 
...Secondly, the projects:...there wasn't good tracking, there wasn't 
enforcement, there wasn't a good connection with the budgeting process.  
People were getting to call it "savings" and there was no interaction with the 
finance guys to say, "Okay, this is a good project and we will take this out of 
the budget for next year." 
 
 70   
Do the Black Belt projects always have to focus on financials?  No.  They could 
focus on other things.  But...they weren't going in and saying, "We're doing a 
project on reliability.  We're going to increase our forecast for reliability from 
now on because we think we've affected it with this program." 
 
...It felt like a toy, like a program of the month, so people didn't take it 
seriously. 
 
A few managers with strong consulting and finance backgrounds believed that the CI 
initiative, until 2005, failed to improve DTE Energy's cost structure because it did not 
counteract a culture of “gaming the system” with a strong emphasis on executives holding 
their subordinate managers accountable for verifiable results.  One such manager said: 
When John Weiss was running [CI], it was demonstration projects.  All of a 
sudden, you had a whole bunch of little toy projects out there that somehow 
managed to stack up to a hundred and twenty million dollars or whatever he 
was promoting.  Nobody believed it.  There was very little buy-in that that was 
actually happening, because one of the cultures we have here, as a company, 
is we love to game the system.  We love to [claim] that we saved money when 
we really didn't.  There was a huge culture behind that.  ...[CI] didn't change 
the culture such that...we were accountable, and honest, and had high integrity 
with these things.  It was not mainstream.  It wasn't part of core operations.  
You put a Black Belt...on a project, keep him busy — politically, you’re 
covered.  There's still some of that today.  ...There were a few projects that 
were highlighted that did get into core operations, but far and few between. 
 
...For a long time, I looked at Fossil as being a leader until I...got close to them, 
and looked under the covers.  ...In this case, I would say that the finance guys 
were somewhat [complicit].  What they would do is say, "I've got an O&M 
budget of four hundred and twenty million dollars.  I asked for four hundred 
and fifty, so my CI gap is thirty million dollars."  They would work supposed 
expenditures down to where they hit the four hundred and twenty.  ...They had 
all these people out there doing these little projects, and they had weekly calls, 
and it was cadenced, and it was worked hard....  Some projects probably had 
merit, but the approach didn’t appear from the outside [to be] making a real 
impact. 
 
Patterson, looking back on the performance of the initiative he cultivated, noted its 
successes and failures.  DTE Energy had progressively built its capability for improvement 
projects, from the early kaizen events, through the post-merger demonstration projects, to 
the Black Belt program.  But he thought that the firm foundation for cultural change — CI 
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leadership from the senior executives and broad participation by front-line employees — 
had yet to be laid: 
[With] kaizens, we started getting lots of people involved, early wins, teaching 
some things.  Get twenty people in a workshop?  Awesome, they're going to 
learn something.  But we were really working on very isolated processes, like 
how do I get this type of an accounts receivable from ninety days to thirty days.  
Really small, low-level kind of stuff. 
 
Then we got into the [post-merger] integration work, so it got a little more high-
level.  Early on [with] the Operating System, we tried to nail some very major, 
strategic problems in organizations that we wanted to close gaps with. 
 
But then we got so focused on this cadre of Black Belts that that almost became 
the program.  It was like these fifty people were the ones, the disciples, [who] 
make everything happen.  We weren't letting everyone else into the game.  The 
projects almost collapsed under their own weight, because it did require lots of 
other people to have skills to understand [for example] why you're putting 
kanban in this place.  The fifty Black Belts were the only ones who were 
working on anything. 
 
We [were] working on some nice stuff, but lost a lot of the development of the 
organization.  Now Jason's tried to steer it back: How do we get to the masses 
again?  How do we not turn this into, “Black Belt project? I can track it!” but a 
cultural change?  You know, really understand that. 
 
Another thing: When we went out of the gate, there were some things in [the 
2002 plan] on how we were going to develop our executives, but it wasn't the 
same type of focus that we had before we created that plan.  [Previously,] we 
were getting them out with Alcoa and bringing in Steve Spear.  We really did 
not do enough on the executive-development piece.  You had an organization 
[that] was starting to out-pace the leaders of the organization in terms of what 
they were capable of doing.  When you needed that executive presence, 
executive backstop on some projects — “No, we're going to go this way and 
these changes are going to happen” — they collapsed because they didn't get 
it.  That was a miss too, early on. 
 
Plus, I think hearing from other leaders — to be patient with it and keep 
growing your skills and keep building — would have been really helpful.  We 
missed that one. 
 
We had our two-year plan that we were working on and, in terms of checking 
the dots, we had done it, but whether it was true to the intention of what was 
supposed to happen was questionable. 
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Senior vice president Bob Richard agreed with Patterson.  The CI initiative was still 
led primarily by the OSSG, which consisted mostly of training a few experts to do 
projects.  Richard was looking for a broader transformation in work practices.  “Like most 
companies,” he said, “we spent a lot of time on education and tools, and not as much 
time on implementation and execution and employee engagement.  We were 
implementing a lot of tools, developing a lot of change leaders, a lot of Black Belts.  They 
were doing projects and getting some things done, but we weren’t fundamentally 
changing the company” (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 37). 
 
3.6. The Performance Excellence Process — 2005-2006 
In Chapter 2, we saw that DTE Energy's senior executives were nervous about the 
consequences of utility-industry deregulation.  It was this apprehension that prompted 
DTE Energy's executives to start the CI initiative in 1998.  These fears were rekindled 
when MISO’s day-ahead and real-time trading system went live in April 2005, decoupling 
customers’ price of electricity from their utilities’ cost to generate it.  A 40-year veteran of 
DTE Energy said, “I personally thought this was never going to work.  The model we’ve 
had for electricity was developed in the 1800s [and has] worked well for over a hundred 
years.  ...I said, ‘They’re never going to deregulate.’  I was very much wrong.”  About the 
launch of MISO’s trading system, he said, “When they got to the summer, it was a disaster.  
By September, it was like a well-oiled machine.” 
DTE Energy's operating costs were high, putting it at a disadvantage in a deregulated 
market.  One manager recalled: “Gerry Anderson pushed benchmarking.  [He] wanted to 
see where we were relative to the rest of the utilities industry.  ...[W]hen you did an 
overall and honest-to-God look at the cost structure of the company, it was pretty bad.  
We had the highest administrative cost.  We were third or fourth quartile [relative to our 
peers] in a lot of other places from a cost-structure point of view.”  Also in 2005, DTE 
Energy anticipated making large capital investments at its power plants to comply with 
stricter environmental regulations in the coming years.  Several managers said that DTE 
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Energy’s “cost structure was going to be unsustainable with all these investments coming.”  
Consequently, DTE Energy’s senior executives were “fully aligned” in their agreement that 
something needed to be done, so COO Gerry Anderson hired McKinsey, his former 
employer, to design a cost-cutting and consolidation initiative called Performance 
Excellence Process (PEP). 
The McKinsey consultants began their analyses in August 2005, assisted by two other 
consulting firms.  They scrutinized every aspect of DTE Energy's operations, looking for 
opportunities to trim costs, consolidate or eliminate services, and divest where 
strategically appropriate.  Patterson, having moved to an operations role in DO, 
explained, “The idea was we’re going to do benchmarking [against other utilities], we're 
going to see where the gaps are.  [Gerry Anderson] expected plans from all operating 
executives for how they're going to close from wherever they are to first-quartile 
performance — and we're going to use the Operating System to do that.  Well, the leaders 
didn't know how to use the Operating System to do that.  They had some Black Belts who 
could work on some projects, but Gerry was very demanding on how quickly it was going 
to happen.  Some of these projects, to really do them right, were longer-term projects.  So 
it became your traditional [cost cutting]: outsource things, stop doing certain services.”  
Power plant director Frank Wszelaki related the story of when McKinsey's consultants 
came to Monroe: 
It was August of '05.  They came in and showed us that our business model 
was not efficient.  That's what they said. 
 
They came here [to Monroe power plant], they went to St Clair [power plant], 
they went through our records, they went through how the [coal-fired] units 
operated, they looked at my financials, they looked at my organizational charts.  
They brought in a team of three to four people and we inundated them with 
data for weeks.  Then they studied it. 
 
They got back to us.  They had different areas where they told us we were 
having issues.  They benchmarked us against what they thought was the 
industry best, the top quartile, and made suggestions.  They worked with us. 
 
I got to admit, from a standpoint of telling you your baby's ugly, it made you 
look at yourself in a different context.  Plus, the way they presented the stuff, 
you could tell it was PhD professional.  They were able to show us charts and 
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graphs that made good sense really fast.  ...Taught me a lot on the presentation 
of data, more than even my Black Belt training.  They had a way to present 
information so it made sense. 
 
I thought they also did an okay assessment of us.  It got us to move toward 
trying to improve and trying to learn.  [But] sometimes you've got to move on 
your own and keep going.  That's what we did. 
 
...They were pushing huge change.  They did an Activity Value Analysis for 
engineering and they did a process evaluation for Monroe and St Clair [power 
plants].  We went through and did [an employee] headcount walk.  We had 
five hundred and twenty-four employees, a hundred and seventy-five full-time 
contractors, and close to two hundred [Detroit Edison] foreign labor [see 
Glossary for definition]. 
 
...If we did certain things, what improvements could we make in what areas?  
They pushed you to put a plan together.  We presented that plan in front of 
Gerry [Anderson].  I can remember doing it here. 
 
...My only problem with that whole [employee] numbers thing was we were 
told it was to maintain and operate [the plant].  We never looked at [staffing 
requirements] for periodic outages, forced outages, [and] capital-modification 
work.  We were told what it would take to maintain and operate the site and 
somehow those numbers got twisted. 
 
When I told people we would have an outage where I needed extra operators, 
or if I had a forced outage where I had to put an extra operator to [shut down] a 
unit, [they asked:] "Why do you need to do that?"  [I said,] "If it's a periodic 
outage, I got five hundred people standing around.  I don't think one guy's 
enough to [shut down] the unit, do you?" 
 
...[McKinsey's consultants] told me I could run a unit side with one [system 
operator].  [If] we have a unit trip, we almost have to have three [operators] to 
bring it down....  They were good MBAs, they took their data, but sometimes 
plants aren't created equal.  In some ways, we had to take it with a grain of 
salt.... 
 
We reduced our patrols [see Glossary for definition], which were very heavy.  
Dunlap has probably had the biggest reduction in fuel supply: He went from 
nine patrols to five.  He's cut probably fifty people out of fuel supply.  He 
doesn't have a general foreman out there anymore, he doesn't have a 
maintenance foreman on nights.  ...I've only got two foremen out there now.  I 
had seven or eight [previously].  We've made some major changes in how we 
do the business out there in the plant that are just huge. 
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Then we got beat over the head with the [employee headcount] numbers.  
Instead of us making a budget, you [also] had to make your [head]count, which 
didn't make a whole hell of a lot of sense to me.  If you tell me a budget you 
want me to make and I make it...?  Here is what we ended up with in 2007: 
three hundred and one plant employees, one hundred full-time contractors, 
and seventy-five [Detroit Edison] foreign labor — prior to the scrubber plant 
[installation].  The scrubber plant [is expected] to add seventy-five employees 
for two units (or a hundred and fifty for all four [units]). 
 
Headcount became such an emotional event — and sometimes still is, to this 
day.  I'll tell you, the troops’ morale was down in the dumps because we would 
do a process improvement and eliminate a person.  So everybody checked out.  
[Upper management] are wondering why: "You gotta keep going, you gotta 
keep doing."  I'm thinking to myself, "You got to come to the front lines!  Get 
out of wherever you're thinking and come to the site and look at what's going 
on here."  ...[I]t's taken time to get out of that sting.  The engineers went 
through it.  It was ugly. 
 
I whittled Ops down pretty low.  I got pretty nervous there for a while.  We had 
to build [staffing levels] back up — not to the levels we had before, but to a 
level where you can maintain the units. 
 
We just looked at the headcount number, we didn't look at the criticalness of 
[each] position.  Some people didn't understand that.  I mean, I only have 
twelve operators in the plant running a thirty-two hundred megawatt station.  
Sometimes I have nine. 
 
The McKinsey consultants determined budget cuts from their own analyses and by 
estimating the likely savings from ideas that they had obtained — sometimes assisted by CI 
personnel — from front-line employees and middle managers in brainstorming sessions.  
In total, McKinsey's consultants projected a $200-300 million reduction in costs from the 
PEP initiative.  But whenever the McKinsey consultants' analyses did not make sense, DTE 
Energy’s employees were afraid to challenge them.  For example, one manager reported 
how McKinsey tried to apply FTE-per-megawatt staffing ratios from other utilities like TVA 
to DTE Energy’s power plants, ignoring important differences in coal-fired unit 
technologies and practices, such as TVA’s use of contractors instead of employees for ash 
removal. 
DTE Energy’s employees did not protest against McKinsey’s unrealistic 
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recommendations for two reasons.  First, there was a lot of fear in the organization.  
Employees reported that the “PEP” acronym was ubiquitous at the time — it could be 
heard often and everywhere, uttered with trepidation.  McKinsey’s engagement was the 
first time DTE Energy’s front-line employees had endured such scrutiny and interaction 
with outside consultants.  “People were afraid to disagree with anything McKinsey said for 
fear of being fired or something,” said one employee.  Second, employees didn’t believe 
that DTE Energy’s senior executives were going to follow through and implement 
McKinsey’s recommendations.  “A lot of people thought McKinsey would make their 
presentation, DTE Energy would put it on a shelf, and that would be it,” said a manager.  
Instead, when the senior executives asked their subordinate managers to formulate 
detailed cost-reduction plans, “everyone panicked.”  Senior executives holding managers 
responsible for rapidly improving DTE Energy’s poor operating costs would have 
precipitated stress in any case, but the tension in the company was even higher because 
those targets were unrealistic. 
DTE Energy’s senior executives created a new Enterprise Performance Management 
(EPM) group to track the PEP initiative.  Members of the EPM group were former 
consultants and high-potential employees who would later become managers and 
directors of strategic planning, quality assurance, and power plant operations.  The EPM 
members viewed their group’s approach as philosophically different from the CI initiative.  
“I felt it was a political struggle between CI ruling the roost and the financial/McKinsey 
approach,” said one member.  “It was a bake-off, in my mind: Which one works better?”  
Another EPM member agreed, “It was certainly a bake-off.  The prevailing belief at the 
time with the EPM group was that CI was not working and needed to be replaced with a 
better system that would hold leaders accountable for savings goals.”  He continued, “We 
put some of the better thinkers in the company on the team....  We focused solely on 
savings.  We crafted a strategy to track savings and assured that all progress would be 
rigorously tracked to plan.” 
The EPM group was responsible for tracking business units’ progress against the three 
main components of the PEP plan: (1) meeting reduced budgets, (2) achieving savings 
from specific projects, and (3) meeting targets for reducing headcount.  EPM personnel 
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reported the company's progress toward these targets to DTE Energy’s senior executives 
every month.  The business units’ budgets were cut for the 2006 fiscal year.  Savings from 
projects expected to take longer than one year were reflected in the budgets for 2007 and, 
in a few cases, for 2008.  Oddly, contract labor was not part of McKinsey’s headcount 
scrutiny.  (As we shall see, DTE Energy did not scrutinize contract labor until late 2008.)  
Consequently, many business-unit managers used the following tactic to meet their targets 
for budget and headcount: Replace employees with contractors and then attempt to cut 
costs elsewhere to compensate for their higher contract-labor expense.  One employee 
said, “It worked.  Our budgets were slashed and people did whatever they needed to do to 
come in as close to budget as they could.” 
DTE Energy's CI personnel were co-opted by the PEP initiative, helping the business 
units meet these targets.  Michele Hieber explained how the McKinsey consultants used 
the OSSG personnel: “The way the PEP process worked was the McKinsey person took the 
department into the room and asked them for improvement ideas.  They brainstormed and 
wrote them all down.  Then for the next couple of weeks...they looked at the organization 
and said if they thought the department was too big or too small.  They also looked at 
what the efforts were.  Then they would call us in, as OSSG’ers, to say, ‘Okay, can you do 
a kaizen on this area to try to get this money out here?  And can you help there?’  They 
saw us as the hands and the feet of McKinsey...the people to help them drive this.” 
It is remarkable that the OSSG — an expensive corporate department of uncertain 
benefit — was not eliminated during the PEP initiative.  An OSSG member recalled some 
senior executives challenging the OSSG: “What have you guys been doing?  Do we even 
need you?  We brought in a consulting company to do the work that you guys should 
have done.  We're not even sure that we even need a continuous improvement group.  If 
we can bring in consultants to do the work you should be doing, then we're not so sure 
you belong.”  Employees cited several reasons for the CI initiative’s persistence.  Many 
employees throughout the company believed in CI’s value, despite its dubious savings 
numbers.  Former CI manager Emmett Romine said, “The people who were involved with 
it, at the time, had a deep belief that it was the right thing to do, so they didn't let go.  I 
don't think they would have let go of it.”  Many employees thought that pro-CI executives 
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Dave Meador and Bob Richard defended the CI initiative.  Second, the CI initiative had 
enough CI proponents and institutionalized practices to acquire its own inertia.  “You 
can't call the initial [CI] efforts a failure because there was momentum there,” said one 
manager.  “[The] momentum that was there had a culture behind it.”  Third, various senior 
executives had their own reasons for keeping the initiative going.  “I don't think you had 
complete consensus at the senior levels that [CI] was a bad thing.  I think there were some 
people that saw value in it...as a tool that they could use to keep their career moving,” 
said a former CI manager.  It would have been a gamble for senior executives to eliminate 
the CI initiative and support the PEP initiative exclusively.  “There would be risks to doing 
that: [What] if I cut one off and I chose the wrong one?  This way, I could still play both 
sides,” another manager said. 
For their part, OSSG members defended the CI approach by saying that the aim of 
PEP’s “improvement” projects was only to reduce costs, rather than improving any 
dimension of organizational capability.  An OSSG member said, “If you look at the two 
ways to do savings, you either do the process work, you define what potential savings 
there are, and you take it out, or you take it out and then make people scramble around to 
do the job without it.  ...Unfortunately, when people are scrambling around trying to 
operate in crisis mode, there's not a lot of continuous improvement going on.  There's just 
survival going on.  ...[C]hanging your process so you can operate without those resources 
doesn't happen very much.” 
When the PEP initiative put about 1200 positions on the chopping block, the unions 
mobilized to fight the layoffs.  Reportedly, Local 223 president Jim Harrison told Gerry 
Anderson, “You're getting exactly the union you're asking for.  I believe in continuous 
improvement and all the other stuff, but when you do these sorts of things, I have to 
react.”  In June 2006, the unions sought to interfere with DTE Energy’s open case with the 
MPSC, compelling DTE Energy’s senior executives to negotiate a settlement.  They agreed 
to workforce reductions through “voluntary separations” only and postponed discussion of 
all other issues until they negotiated Local 223’s next contract in 2007.  About 400 
employees took buy-out packages to leave the company.  Over the 2-year period 2006-
2007, DTE Energy reduced its number of employees by 11 percent (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 
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37). 
PEP’s proposed layoffs and buy-outs were shocking to DTE Energy employees 
accustomed to job security.  “It was like they saw the company as Uncle DTE — he's 
always going to be there, he's always going to take care of me,” described one manager.  
“People were shocked that they were being given packages to leave.  ...It went against the 
culture big time.  People couldn't believe it.”  Consequently, the PEP initiative damaged 
employee morale and commitment to the company.  An EPM employee said, “[PEP] was a 
hard program to go through.  People didn't like it because it was headcount-oriented.  
Culturally, it was a difficult way of doing business — in terms of morale and tension with 
the unions.  It was difficult from that point of view.”  One manager recalled Anderson’s 
reaction to Gallup’s employee-survey results: “Our Gallup scores went down dramatically 
and he was surprised.  It was rumored that he said, ‘I can't believe this hurt our Gallup 
scores this bad.’  We [thought], ’You don’t understand people felt their jobs were 
threatened?’” 
The fight over layoffs also hurt the struggling CI initiative.  Lemont explained how 
DTE Energy’s employees implicitly carried over Tony Earley’s commitment of employment 
security from the kaizen program to the Operating System: “That thinking was all part of 
the whole continuous-improvement evolution that we were able to piggy-back on and tell 
people, ‘This is not about cutting your job. This is about making your job better and 
making the company better.’  Nobody got laid off, so people started believing it.”  
Because the PEP initiative co-opted CI personnel, however, that trust was undermined.  An 
OSSG member recalled, “John [Weiss] was trying to sidestep the layoffs and not have that 
get any mud on us.  We didn't want them to say that they lost their jobs because they 
were continuously improved out of their jobs.” 
Many front-line employees thought PEP was the next incarnation of CI, because 
McKinsey’s brainstorming sessions for cost-reduction ideas seemed similar to the early 
kaizen workshops facilitated by Achievement Dynamics in 1998.  This association was 
strengthened when Black Belts participated.  A Black Belt working in DO during PEP said, 
“I went to the locations and did activity-value analysis workshops with people.  ...[P]eople 
came back to me and said, ‘Boy, you asked us for how I spend my day.  What happens to 
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that data is it gets bubbled up and now, all of a sudden, three of my peers get let go and 
we don't do this piece of the work anymore.’” 
Opinions among OSSG members differed on whether employees believed the CI 
initiative was guilty by association.  On one hand, an OSSG manager thought that the CI 
initiative was not blamed, “because everybody knew that McKinsey had done the cuts.”  
He said, “We were there to try to help them live after the ax had fallen.  We were first aid, 
first responders sent in to help them.”  On the other hand, he acknowledged that front-line 
employees at the plants “hated Black Belts because they were tied to the PEP stuff.”  
Ultimately, the OSSG personnel could not overcome front-line employees’ confusion and 
inability to tell PEP and CI apart.  “What PEP did was put that element of doubt in their 
minds [because] of buy-out programs and all the stuff that went on during PEP for the sake 
of saving dollars.  They linked that saving of dollars and continuous improvement together 
and said, ‘This must be the new phase of the Operating System: to cut people's heads.’  
There was some damage there,” said Lemont.  “I think we're still trying to come out of 
that.”  A pro-CI director described how PEP created disincentives for front-line employees 
to participate in CI: “Employee morale was shot and people started tagging the Operating 
System: ‘Well, if this is all it is — it's just a big outsourcing drive or a big layoff drive and 
I'm going to lose my job — why should I get engaged in this?’” 
John Weiss found it difficult to lead the CI initiative during this period.  Patterson 
said, “John [Weiss] wasn't doing a good job of playing well with the McKinsey guys.  He 
had an opportunity he didn't seize.  He let McKinsey run this thing and he tried to 
distance himself from it.  It was a really tough year and a half.”  By trying to keep a low 
profile, however, Weiss hurt himself and the CI initiative in the eyes of the senior 
executives.  An OSSG manager said, “John [Weiss] was a really smart guy, but something 
happened and he got on the bad side of the vice presidents.  We didn't know what had 
happened.  All we knew was, over the next two years [2005-2006], they stopped inviting 
him to meetings, they stopped including him in the strategic thinking.  ...We felt like [CI] 
things were slowly grinding to a halt.  ...All of us [in the OSSG said], ‘This [initiative] 
could die on the vine here.’” 
The OSSG continued to train during the PEP initiative, but suffered high attrition.  
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“We kept the Black Belt program going, because it was now corporate wide.  People were 
still being asked to go through it,” said a plant director.  “You've got to have people 
trained to be the experts.  You can't do [CI] without someone having a very intimate 
knowledge of what they're working on or what they're talking about.  I think having that 
class and that accreditation is a good thing.  They kept that going.”  However, only a 
handful (18) of over 130 Black Belt candidates earned their certification during PEP.  
Similarly, OSSG personnel trained 600 OS Specialists in 2005 but only 370 in 2006 (see 
Figure 4, p.91).  About 450 employees — 25 percent of all enrollees — who started the 
OS Specialist course never finished it.  Due to PEP, the OSSG personnel canceled their 
planned train-the-trainer endeavor for training 4000 front-line employees on CI basics. 
Whatever difficulties the CI initiative may have experienced, employees had no 
trouble using CI tools to make improvements under PEP.  For example, Monroe power 
plant director Frank Wszelaki said that his employees brainstormed projects and visually 
tracked their progress by posting 4-Block summaries on walls.  They made soot-blower 
improvements and reduced the size of their coal piles, reducing inventory from its 
previous level of 150-180 days.  Another project was to reduce fuel costs by blending 
more expensive eastern coal with less expensive western coal.  (Eastern coal has higher 
heat content than western coal, but also has higher ash and sulfur content.) 
Reported savings associated with these projects were approximately $160 million in 
2006 and $125 million in 2007, with “soft” savings accounting for only 30 percent of 
these totals (see Figure 3, p.48).  However, the EPM group did not differentiate between 
PEP savings and CI savings when they compiled and presented results to the senior 
executives.  Hieber said, “The problem that we were having during PEP was we were 
keeping track of what our Black Belts were doing and the money that we were saving, but 
it was the same money that the business units were claiming.  There was overlap.  When 
we said, ‘We did this project and we saved a million and a half,’ they would roll their eyes 
and say, ‘Yeah, where?  It doesn't affect the bottom line.’  They had already claimed it and 
taken it out of their budget, or whatever.  We've had that problem for a while.” 
Opinions about PEP differed among DTE Energy's employees.  Front-line employees 
evaluated PEP’s outcomes harshly.  One employee said, “Everybody finally figured out 
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PEP was a very bad idea — very misdirected and poorly implemented.  ...A lot of the 
projects were great, but a lot of the projects were bad.  Lost a lot of good people.  It was 
just slash and burn, cut the cost.  Very painful.  ...Messed up a lot of processes.”  As 
painful as DTE Energy’s front-line employees found PEP, however, some managers with 
prior experience at other companies thought that PEP was “a very soft-handed approach” 
compared to similar initiatives in other industries.  Contrary to the ill feelings on the front 
line, several managers felt PEP was successful: It had a consistent message and it fixed 
many of DTE Energy's cost-structure problems by holding everyone accountable to clear 
targets. 
In the end, state governments did not deregulate the utility industry as much as the 
utilities had feared.  However, DTE Energy's relationship with the state regulators at the 
MPSC was not business as usual.  One director observed, “[Utility commissions] got a lot 
smarter.  The MPSC got better at scrutinizing DTE’s books.”  In October 2005, for 
example, the MPSC ordered DTE Energy to explain why its administrative and general 
expenses were so much higher, per customer and per megawatt-hour, than those of the 
other major Michigan utility, Consumers Energy (MPSC Case No. U-14666).  DTE Energy 
was compelled to hire accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to conduct an 
analysis, which DTE Energy submitted to the MPSC on February 1, 2006.  Following that 
filing, the MPSC ordered DTE Energy, in March 2006, to “show cause why its retail 
electric rates should not be reduced,” particularly given the anticipated savings from the 
PEP initiative (MPSC Case No. U-14838).  An employee summarized the change of focus 
these events made on everyone: “We're kind of on the same page now: We want to get 
cheaper, [the MPSC] want us to get cheaper, and we need to get cheaper because we're 
not competitive.  ...Before, there was no incentive.  The big thing was maximizing our 
earnings.  ...Now we're not thinking about earnings anymore because the cost-
competitiveness thing has really taken front seat in terms of our goals.” 
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3.7. Wave Two Summary 
Unstressed First Phase — 2001-2005 
As I stated in Chapter 1, the meaningful difference I draw between a Lean approach 
and a Six Sigma approach to CI is whether a company trains its front-line employees or its 
dedicated experts as the main perpetrators of CI activities.  The OSSG did not formally 
adopt Six Sigma until after John Weiss and Bob Richard joined DTE Energy in 2003, but I 
consider its 2002 CI implementation plan to have been already "Six Sigma" because it 
specified demonstration projects by trained CI experts.  Conspicuous by its absence in 
these plans was any concrete practice like kaizen events for involving front-line 
employees and middle managers in their own CI activities. 
Whether a company wants its regular employees to allocate a fraction of their 
workweeks to CI activities, instead of consigning CI to specialists like internal consultants 
or industrial engineers, is a valid strategic question with pros and cons specific to each 
case.  I find no evidence in DTE Energy's history, however, to indicate that the switch from 
front-line kaizen events in the first wave to CI expert-run projects in the second wave was 
made strategically on the basis of such trade-offs.  Instead, the OSSG's leaders seemed to 
emphasize demonstration projects by CI experts because they were the best way to 
achieve large gains most convincing to DTE Energy's senior executives (and to everyone 
else).  The OSSG's first CI plan anticipated "full implementation" after two years, but 
provided no details for how regular employees, the non-experts, would become involved.  
I think the OSSG's leaders hoped that DTE Energy's regular employees would naturally 
want to replicate the perceived project successes of the CI experts or, at least, that DTE 
Energy's enthusiastic middle managers would coerce their subordinates to attempt such 
replication. 
Learning lines were an important exception to what I claim was the OSSG's Six 
Sigma focus during this wave.  Each learning line was led by a team of CI experts, but they 
also involved heavy participation by front-line employees.  The initial learning lines were 
successful, but they were resource intensive.  Each learning line required a few CI experts 
for an extended duration and a high degree of involvement and support from managers 
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and executives.  The later learning lines were less successful because they lacked the 
necessary managerial involvement and support.  I believe that the OSSG could not 
replicate learning lines as a standard CI activity because DTE Energy's executives were not 
willing to support a whole team of CI experts disrupting operations at a service center or 
power plant for an extended period of time.  This unwillingness persisted, I believe, 
through the rest of DTE Energy's history.  Schulist's attempts to reintroduce learning lines 
as "beachheads" in 2008-2009 (see section 4.5) met the same resistance. 
The CI experts' projects in the second wave were more successful than the first 
wave's kaizen events at convincing DTE Energy's senior executives and middle managers 
— at first.  Unfortunately, these CI experts undermined their own credibility by reporting a 
lot of CI "savings" that could not be verified or believed. 
I claim this erosion of credibility was caused by two factors.  First, DTE Energy's CI 
experts were narrowly focused initially on achieving the OSSG's targets for projects and 
savings as specified by the 2002 plan.  This behavior was understandable; the OSSG had 
to justify its existence and budget.  By 2004, however, I believe the OSSG personnel felt 
that their department had become a permanent fixture in DTE Energy's corporate 
structure.  In its 2004 plan, the role of the OSSG was primarily a department for training 
Black Belts, rather than for fostering organizational change.  The 2004 plan's lack of 
specific targets for projects and savings per project supports this hypothesis. 
The second factor for the CI initiative's erosion of credibility was the relative poor 
quality of DTE Energy's Black Belt program (see Appendix B for an assessment).  As the 
GE-trained Black Belt in section 3.5 complained, "It was like we weren't taking it 
seriously."  The direction and content of DTE Energy's Black Belt program was determined 
mostly by the OSSG's single Master Black Belt.  As we saw in section 3.5, however, the 
Master Black Belt position was a revolving door and not always filled with the best-
qualified candidates.  The OSSG's leaders or DTE Energy's senior executives decided that 
hiring a consulting firm like Six Sigma Academy to design and start its Black Belt program 
was unnecessary.  Perhaps they believed that they could start the program adequately 
themselves, or that the expense of a firm like SSA was unjustified, or both. 
The OSSG personnel failed to advance the CI initiative to its next logical stage after 
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they had convinced the senior executives — with kaizen events and demonstration 
projects — to invest in it.  That next stage should have been training employees at all 
levels of the company hierarchy to employ CI methods to improve DTE Energy’s core 
processes.  The OSSG personnel advanced to this next stage in the third wave. 
Stressed Second Phase — 2005-2006 
The cost pressures faced by DTE Energy, peaking in 2005 when Gerry Anderson 
became the new COO, raised expectations for the CI initiative.  It is possible that DTE 
Energy's senior executives would have been more forgiving of the CI initiative's 
shortcomings if the CI personnel had not been reporting large CI "savings" at a time when 
the company needed those savings to improve its financial performance quickly and 
directly. 
The PEP initiative both damaged and helped DTE Energy's CI initiative.  On the 
negative side, the PEP initiative reinforced the Black Belts' role as internal consultants, 
working alongside (or under) the McKinsey consultants, who were not focused on 
developing the skills of front-line employees by coaching them.  Many front-line 
employees — perhaps those who had never participated in any CI activities — could not 
tell the difference between the Black Belts and the McKinsey consultants.  All nonroutine 
work being done for the PEP initiative was aimed at cutting costs in a forced-survival 
manner, pushing the focus away from sound process design and employees' problem-
solving capabilities.  Furthermore, PEP's downsizing lowered front-line employees' 
morale, making them resistant to anything outside of their normal routine work. 
On the positive side, PEP was a wake-up call for the CI initiative.  PEP's focus on 
verifiable results forced the OSSG personnel to confront the CI initiative's shortcomings.  
As an OSSG member said (in section 4.1), they needed to think like the Operating System, 
but achieve results like PEP.  They made good progress toward that goal in the third wave, 
as described in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Wave Three — 2007-2009 
 
4.1. CI Initiative Revival — 2007-2008 
The aftermath of the PEP initiative created an opportunity for the CI initiative.  
Because it wasn’t eliminated, the CI initiative remained in DTE Energy’s repertoire of 
organizational practices.  Consequently, Gerry Anderson reconsidered it.  “Quite honestly, 
we wouldn't have needed [PEP] if we were much further along with the Operating System 
work," said Patterson  "Toyota doesn't need to do a big spring cleaning; they look for 
incremental improvement.”  He continued, “The silver lining in that story is Gerry 
[Anderson] came out of it shaken up around what occurred.  I don't think he expected this 
incredible backlash from the organization around how PEP went, around the morale being 
torpedoed in the organization.  I think he came out of it a different person around 
commitment to continuous improvement and the Operating System.  ‘This is not going to 
be my legacy — that every five years we're going to clean this organization up in some 
massive hack-and-slash sort of a move.’”  Stories circulated among employees about 
Anderson’s change of mind.  One employee said, “Local myths are that he hired 
McKinsey to do [cost-cutting] because he had done it before when he was a 
consultant,...but this was the first time that he had to stay behind and see what happens to 
the organization in the aftermath, once McKinsey goes home — and it was ugly.”  Several 
employees thought that Anderson did not want to be remembered as “the PEP guy.” 
At an upper-management retreat in mid-2007, Anderson publicly acknowledged 
PEP’s negative ramifications to his peers.  He argued that it had been necessary, however, 
because “the Operating System failed” to address DTE Energy’s financial problems.  Dave 
Meador had interjected, “It didn’t actually fail, it was too slow.  We failed it, not it failed 
us.”  Anderson said that he could hire consultants periodically for corporate 
housecleaning, if necessary, but he admitted that another approach might be preferable.  
Anderson was interested in fostering a “culture of excellence” at DTE Energy, so in 
 88   
preparation for this retreat, Anderson, CEO Tony Earley, and DTE Energy's vice president 
for human resources met with Edgar Schein in Boston to discuss his research on corporate 
culture (Schein, 1999) and on New York utility Con Edison.  According to Patterson: 
When we were up at Traverse City at our big leadership conference, he spoke 
very candidly around how wrong he was, how he hadn't been the type of 
leader he should have been in promoting the Operating System, that this is 
going to be part of the legacy of who he is as a leader in this company, that 
continuous improvement – having an Operating System – is critically important 
to us, and was really clear on why it needed to be done. 
 
He has always been on the Operating Council.  He wants it.  He definitely 
wants it.  I think he's skeptical about how to do it.  I don't think he knows what 
his role exactly is.  [In mid-2008], I think he's still searching.  And I think he's 
open.  If you sat down with him, he'd say, “Yeah, I'm still learning how to be 
the kind of leader that I need to be to really make this happen.” 
 
Problem is, he probably doesn't dedicate enough time to that pursuit.  I look at 
Koenigsaecker and [Ford CEO] Alan Mulally and how much time they spend.  
...George Koenigsaecker was the guy who led the Danaher Business System.  If 
you read his story, his account, about how much time he personally spent 
learning and studying, [he] became such a zealot around this that [Danaher] 
had no choice.  Gerry still hasn't gotten to that point.  The question is, does he 
need to? 
 
Managers were impressed with Anderson’s forthrightness.  “Gerry was humble 
enough to step back, look at PEP, and say, ‘You know what?  I did it, I had to do it, but we 
can't continue to go on like this.  This isn't a sustainable model.’  He was humble enough 
to do that,” said one manager.  “I give him a lot of respect for listening to the system and 
realizing that he couldn't continue to operate that way.  It was something they had to do 
in the short-term, but they couldn't continue to operate that way.” 
The senior executives agreed to recommit to the CI initiative.  During the first three 
quarters of 2008, the EPM group continued to track the business units’ progress toward the 
$204 million in residual cost cuts specified by PEP.  The CI initiative did not have its own 
targets; everyone assumed that all CI activity would be aimed at helping achieve these 
cost reductions.  DTE Energy's managers carried this assumption over into 2009.  An 
OSSG member explained: “The concept is we need to think like [the OS framework], but 
achieve like [PEP].  That's where we are now.  Whether we're able to do that or not is still 
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up for grabs.  ...They're trying to merge these two things together.  [They] say, ‘There's 
good things about both of them; let's see if we can't make that work.’  ...In fact, one of the 
slides in the [CILW] presentation talks about continuous improvement moving forward, 
taking PEP and Operating System and merging the best of the two things together.” 
Jason Schulist, who had collaborated on the second CI implementation plan in 2004, 
replaced John Weiss as OSSG director.  Schulist, an adherent of Jeffrey Liker's research on 
the Toyota Production System (Liker, 2004; Liker & Meier, 2006), wanted to revitalize the 
CI initiative by reemphasizing Lean concepts and tools.  He believed that Lean’s emphasis 
on what he called “problem solving at the point of activity” was needed to engage front-
line employees in CI work, instead of leaving that work to a select cadre of Black Belts.  
To do so, Schulist sought the advice of Jeffrey Liker at the University of Michigan; his 
fellow LFM alumnus Jamie Bonini, who was working at Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
Kentucky (TMMK); and Steve Spear, who was developing Lean courses for the Bluegrass 
Automotive Manufacturing Association (BAMA), a consortium of suppliers for TMMK.  
Reportedly, Anderson told the OSSG group, “Show me that CI is the way we need to go.”  
When Schulist asked Anderson why he thought that the Operating System had "failed", 
Anderson enumerated the following reasons: 
1. It was not implemented top down.  There was no tension. 
2. Leaders were not committed. 
3. It wasn't focused properly on quality and cost. 
4. All the improvement work was done on the fringe, not “in the belly of the beast.” 
5. DTE Energy did not have a culture of honest self-appraisal. 
6. Employees did not understand it or know how to deploy it.  The language used by 
the OSSG personnel was “too fancy.” 
One of Schulist’s first hurdles was dispelling the belief, even among some of his CI 
managers, that 4G9S projects were the only way to do CI properly.  Schulist and a few 
other CI managers argued for many other types of CI activity — such as 5S and Just Do It 
(JDI) work (see Glossary for definitions) — as long as these other approaches were 
managed as rigorously as 4G9S projects.  In early 2007, Schulist asked one of his few 
union CI experts to lead a year-long project to establish 5S practices in all of DTE Energy’s 
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68 garages.  This expert told Schulist that he wouldn’t mind the 5S project, but he was 
more interested in doing a project requiring statistics because he had recently earned his 
Black Belt certification.  Schulist reassured him that the project would be worthwhile: 
“Here’s the deal: I think we're going to be leaning mostly towards Lean in the next couple 
of years anyway.” 
In 2007, Schulist addressed the union fallout from PEP by meeting with Local 223 
president Jim Harrison.  Harrison agreed, in principle at least, that involvement in CI 
would provide union members with opportunities to expand their skills, making them 
more valuable employees.  By 2008, however, Local 223’s leaders were resisting the CI 
initiative.  They prohibited OSSG personnel from surveying their members about ways to 
improve how they engage front-line employees in CI activities.  They told Schulist, in 
August 2008, that they were resisting the CI initiative because it helped only 
“management’s agenda”.  By the end of the year, after Local 223's elections, president Jim 
Harrison’s position on CI was neutral, “not resistant, but not engaged either,” according to 
Schulist. 
Schulist inherited the CI initiative without an implementation plan; the previous one 
for 2005-2006 had been forestalled by the PEP initiative.  Through 2007, he followed the 
core of Patterson’s original design: Training Black Belts and OS Specialists to do 
improvement projects in their business units.  The rate at which the OSSG trained and 
certified Black Belts slowed during the period 2006-2007 (see Figure 4 below).  One 
reason for this slowdown was the disruption and diversion of attention away from CI 
caused by the PEP initiative.  More important for the CI initiative, however, was a 
tightening of the requirements for Black Belt certification.  An OSSG manager claimed that 
Weiss, eager to get the Black Belt program started quickly, had lax criteria for certification 
at the beginning.  She said, “John Weiss okayed some Black Belt projects that no one else 
would have okayed.”  When a new Master Black Belt was hired in late 2005, she “put a 
stake in the ground” and imposed stricter certification-project criteria.  By the time that 
Master Black Belt left DTE Energy in November 2007, she had certified fewer than 20 new 
Black Belts (bringing the total to 75), but had accumulated a large number of Black Belt 
candidates struggling to complete their projects.  The number of uncertified candidates at 
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the end of 2007 is uncertain, but there were at least 130 and possibly as many as 250.  
Black Belt candidates earning their certifications rebounded to 45 in 2008.  Similarly, only 
about 160 OS Specialists were training in 2007, but the 2008 total reached about 400.  
OSSG personnel had developed a draft CI Champion course for leaders, as specified by 
the 2005 implementation plan, but it wasn’t used.  Schulist admitted, “We’ve always 
espoused the Champion training, but never really systematically introduced it.” 
 
Figure 4. DTE Energy Employees Trained in CI Courses 
Schulist believed that a major defect of the CI initiative was that responsibility for it 
was not shared broadly.  “Historically,” Schulist said, “everyone called on Shawn’s group 
of about 10 FTEs for OS expertise.”  He set about correcting this defect in 2007 with three 
tactics.  First, he convinced DTE Energy’s leaders to experiment with Business Plan 
Deployment (BPD) — GM’s version of hoshin kanri (Akao, 1991), or policy deployment 
(see Glossary) — to link CI activities to DTE Energy’s strategic objectives.  The business-
unit managers resisted the experiment and Schulist later admitted that it had been too 
early to attempt it.  Without a culture that supports learning from failures, “we would use 
0 
220 
440 
660 
880 
1100 
1320 
1540 
1760 
1980 
2200 
0 
25 
50 
75 
100 
125 
150 
175 
200 
225 
250 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Em
pl
oy
ee
s T
ra
in
ed
 
Black Belts, total OS Experts 
Black Belts, hired OS Specialists (right scale) 
 92   
[BPD] as a way to beat people down,” Schulist said.  Second, he decentralized the CI 
managers, situating them within their assigned business units with only a “dotted line” 
reporting relationship to himself.  This structural change coincided with personnel 
changes: All four of DTE Energy’s major business units — Fos Gen, DO, MichCon, and 
Customer Service — got new CI managers soon after Schulist took over as OSSG director.  
One of MichCon’s Black Belts said, “We got CI managers.  That was a big thing, starting to 
consolidate and reorganize it.  That was a big help.”  However, DO’s newly decentralized 
CI manager, Emmett Romine, said he had difficulty getting DO’s directors involved in CI 
projects, a problem also reported in DTE Energy’s other business units.  They kept “trying 
to outsource...CI to the CI person.” 
For his third tactic, Schulist felt it was crucial to mimic Patterson’s personal efforts to 
influence and teach the senior executives about CI.  His goal was to get the senior 
executives to own the CI initiative, instead of delegating it to the OSSG.  About Schulist’s 
efforts, Patterson observed: “He operates well from the principle that it needs to be owned 
by the leaders.  He doesn't do anything foolish to take that jurisdiction from them: ‘I can 
tell you what's going to happen if you decide to behave that way, but at the end of the day 
it's your choice.  I'm not going to jump in.  ...You've got to own it.  I'll advise you on what 
I think you need to do, but here's what you're going to have to do to do it.’  Which is 
good.  He also operates from the principle that [CI] has to look like this for business 
reasons.  This isn't just an interesting little culture thing so we can all feel good; this is so 
we can be a viable business and all that that means.”  An OSSG manager agreed: “He 
worked hard to mesh well with the various vice presidents: met them in many different 
ways, sold it in different ways to the different people, tried to match [their styles].” 
After becoming the new OSSG director, Schulist met with Gerry Anderson and Guy 
Harris, the new director of the EPM group, to convey his perception of how DTE Energy's 
executives had been handling the CI initiative.  For the CI initiative to be financially 
worthwhile, Schulist believed that certain ingredients, enumerated by Jeffrey Liker and 
others, were required in addition to simply pushing employees through CI training 
courses.  Without those ingredients, DTE Energy's CI personnel were at risk of failing to 
save more money than their salaries cost the company. 
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When I started my job, I had a meeting with him [Gerry Anderson] and Guy 
[Harris].  I asked Gerry if he played Texas Hold ‘em poker.  He said yeah.  
Okay, if you take the ninety-some (maybe it's less than [that]) people who are a 
dotted-line or a straight-line [subordinate of] my org [the OSSG], it's about an 
eighteen million dollar bet every year.  So I said, “Are you all in?”  I call it the 
poker analogy.  We're basically placing an eighteen million dollar ante, not 
looking at our cards, and folding every year.  And then doing the same thing 
again [the following year].  So we're not serious about playing the cards, we're 
just kind of playing. 
 
He asks, “Well, what cards do I have?” 
 
I said, “Well Gerry, you kind of own the deck.  You can pick whatever cards 
you want and play them in whatever order you want.  In some ways, you can 
stack the deck.  You own it.  It's just a matter of whether or not you want to 
play.”  That's how I set the context. 
 
He said, “Okay, then how would I play?” 
 
So then we started talking about [it].  Here is the aspiration: Every person is a 
problem solver at the point of activity.  I took a lot of Jeff Liker's Toyota Way 
work and said, “Here are the things they consider when they want to do 
something sustainable.  These are things we might want to consider too.  It's 
not misaligned with our Operating System at all.  It's very aligned to it.  As you 
can see, all these things are related.  But this is how they would do it, so we 
should consider and think about these types of things.” 
 
He said, “Okay, let's proceed.  I'll get back to you and talk some more about 
how we might deploy it.” 
 
Schulist’s way of convincing the senior executives was to persuade them to attend 5-
day executive courses on Lean conducted by the Toyota Production System Support 
Center (TSSC).  Steve Spear and Jamie Bonini developed these executive courses for TSSC 
based on Spear's prior work at Alcoa and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (as 
part of the Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative for improving health care safety and 
quality).  The aim of these courses was to train executives to be Lean coaches in their 
respective organizations.  In 2007, Schulist took Steve Kurmas, senior vice president for 
Fos Gen, and Vince Dow, vice president for DO, to a course at one of Autoliv’s airbag 
manufacturing facilities in Utah.  Next, he took CFO Dave Meador and MichCon 
president Jerry Norcia to a course at one of TMMK’s suppliers in Georgetown, Kentucky.  
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Schulist recalled: 
We went to some courses.  Steve Kurmas, Vince [Dow], and I all went out to 
the airbag course in Utah.  We all went through it together.  Steve and Vince 
came back on fire saying, “We can do this!  We can get our people engaged!”  
Their boss, Bob Buckler, said, “Wow, they're on fire!  I've never seen them on 
fire like this about anything continuous improvement before!” 
 
Bob is very interested in Toyota's methodologies.  He's a University of 
Michigan alum.  He's on the [School of Engineering’s advisory] board.  He 
knows Jeff Liker's Toyota Way work.  We had Liker in once, and [Bob] was all 
excited, an advocate: “Finally, we're doing the right thing in this CI stuff.  I 
want to get involved and go to [it].” 
 
...The two of them [Steve Kurmas and Vince Dow] were on fire.  Dave 
[Meador] sees that and he says, “Wow, this is good!  We're on fire!”  ...Then 
we sent Dave [Meador] and Jerry Norcia to an external class in Kentucky, and 
they both come back on fire.  So this class is doing something good for our 
leadership. 
 
Schulist had convinced Gerry Anderson and Detroit Edison president Bob Buckler to 
attend such a training course in San Antonio, Texas, in February 2008.  Unfortunately, 
both executives had to cancel.  Instead, Schulist took Paul Fessler, who was later 
promoted to Fos Gen vice president, and Heather Koenders, DO’s operations director for 
all of DTE Energy’s geographically scattered service centers. 
These TSSC-run courses were successful at converting DTE Energy’s senior 
executives to a Toyota-style CI vision, as Schulist had hoped.  They returned from these 
courses convinced of the need for a mile-wide approach (in contrast to the OSSG’s “mile-
deep” plan in 2002).  Steve Kurmas, who later succeeded Bob Buckler as president of 
Detroit Edison in December 2008, said: “It was eye-opening.  Seeing what they were 
doing with CI compared to what we were doing — it fundamentally changed my 
perspective.  We came back and wanted to instill that mindset and culture in our 
employees.  We began to implement what we learned, and to engage people at the front 
line.  We could see that continuous improvement is not a project or a process, it’s a 
culture.  It’s about looking for smaller incremental changes in every element of every 
process, and getting the employees actively involved in that” (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 33).  A 
union member said, “I'm seeing a fundamental change in the senior leadership of this 
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company that's unbelievable.  ...I'm seeing things happen [since] last year, from a senior 
leadership standpoint, that I didn't see happen in the first nine.” 
BAMA-member companies, working with Steve Spear, began developing their own 
TSSC-style workshops for their executives, called CI Leadership Workshops (CILW), in late 
2007.  One of the leaders of this experiment was Bob Hemrick at Dana Corporation, one 
of BAMA’s member companies.  Hemrick had been the instructor for the TSSC-sponsored 
workshops that Schulist and several of DTE Energy’s executives had attended in San 
Antonio and in Georgetown, Kentucky.  Schulist cold-called Hemrick at Dana for his 
workshop materials so he could create CILWs for DTE Energy.  DTE Energy's CILW is a 5-
day workshop consisting of 8-12 hours of teaching CI concepts and tools, and two 
participant teams each attempting to identify, implement, and assess 50 countermeasures 
for an operations problem (see CILW in the Glossary).  DTE Energy's employees completed 
about 21 CILWs in 2008, a completion rate exceeding that of any BAMA company.  In 
September 2008, Schulist and Meador hired Hemrick to be (in effect) co-director of the 
OSSG; Schulist said that they “poached” him for his CI expertise. 
Schulist's target audience for CILWs comprised DTE Energy's 40 senior executives 
and 100 directors, those both responsible for and able to coordinate process redesign.  He 
intended each CILW to be led by a trained senior executive with assistance from a CI 
expert.  In this way, DTE Energy's leaders would jointly learn and practice CI skills with 
their subordinates.  Schulist described the CILW approach as “a way to introduce 
leadership to their role in engaging employees in problem solving at the point of activity.  
It [creates] a top-down awareness, because the top needs to engage the bottom in making 
this happen.  That’s the way I think of it.”  In early 2008, Schulist held an off-site meeting 
with his OSSG staff at which they assessed each senior executive’s understanding of and 
willingness to support the CI initiative.  They wanted the pro-CI executives to be the 
teachers in the early CILWs so they could convince their peers.  Fos Gen was the most 
aggressive business unit at training its leaders: All of its leaders had attended a CILW by 
mid-2008.  Bob Richard set a goal for all of MichCon’s leaders to attend a CILW by the 
end of the year (MichCon’s year-end percentage was 77).  Throughout 2008, about 25 
senior executives attended a CILW each quarter, prompting Schulist to estimate that 
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CILWs would be needed through mid-2009 to train everyone.  (The OSSG extended its 
CILW-completion goal to October 2009, however, after DTE Energy's senior executives 
added middle managers to the CILWs’ target audience.)  Schulist also worked to convince 
the contenders for Buckler’s soon-to-be-open position of Detroit Edison president that 
supporting the CI initiative could only help one’s prospects for promotion. 
Unsurprisingly, some executives and middle managers were reluctant to embrace the 
CILW approach.  One business-unit manager observed, “For the first half of the year, there 
were a lot of people, in leadership as well, that just kept their head down, waiting for this 
thing to blow over, because they've seen it in the past.  Keep your head low, this wave is 
going to blow over, then you can slip back into your coma and not worry about it.”  
Eventually, however, the CILWs successfully convinced senior executives of CI’s potential 
value by creating forums in which improvements to DTE Energy’s processes could be 
made and seen first hand.  CILWs got senior executives out of their offices and conference 
rooms and onto the front line.  (As we shall see, however, Anderson wasn’t completely 
converted until mid-December 2008.)  MichCon senior vice president Richard said, “This 
reminds me of back when I started as a frontline engineer, where I actually could solve 
problems, and here I am — I can see what’s going on, I’m starting to understand my 
problems, and I’m helping to unleash people to solve them. We all got into operations and 
manufacturing because we love to build things and make things and solve problems — 
solve customers’ problems. When you get a chance to do that, it’s energizing. And it’s 
good for leaders to see what their folks contend with every day” (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 35). 
Unlike kaizen events and Black Belt projects, CILWs defined a clear CI role for 
executives, which they could not delegate without undermining the purpose of the 
workshop.  MichCon president Jerry Norcia said, “When you go and observe and see 
what’s happening, you quickly realize all the obstacles that are in our employees’ way of 
doing their job.  It’s easy to sit in your executive office and say, ‘We’ve got to drive 
productivity,’ but unless you get down to where the work is actually done by the hands 
that do it, it’s very difficult to discern why you’re not getting the productivity you desire” 
(Wilhelm, 2009, p. 38).  Similarly, DO vice president Vince Dow said, “Spending five 
whole days at one location is great. Although it’s a huge time commitment, you really start 
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understanding the operation and the barriers that get in the way of us being as efficient 
and customer friendly as we want to. You start seeing barriers and eliminating them. It’s 
valuable for executives to get there on the shop floor, with the shop floor people, working 
on the issues with them and freeing them up” (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 36).  An employee 
remarked how beneficial it was for DO’s vice president to run the CILW that he attended: 
“Having Vince [Dow] come and spend a week at a service center — that’s very big.  [The 
employees] appreciated it and it changed some viewpoints, I think, right off the bat.” 
Many CI personnel credit Schulist’s political skill with shaping senior executives’ 
perceptions of what CI can accomplish and what is needed to realize its potential.  One 
manager said, “I give [Jason] most of the credit.  [He] sold the concept that we’re in now 
really well.  [He] got the ear of Dave Meador and Gerry Anderson, who have been the 
primary backers of the whole [CI] effort.”  An OSSG member thought Schulist’s and 
Patterson’s political skills were similar: “A lot of this stuff has to do with who you know, 
how you can stroke their egos and help them see the vision, such that they can see how 
it's going to help them or help their organization.  Jason is really good at that.  ...He's very 
credible with them; they believe in him.  Shawn did that also....  Shawn is a great 
salesman; he has that enthusiasm.  There’s a little bit of charisma about both of them that 
is similar.” 
The CILWs were intended to train DTE Energy's leaders only, so the CI initiative 
needed a similar workshop for front-line employees.  The OSSG personnel reintroduced 
kaizen events to fill this need, but with a few important differences.  Their guiding vision 
was a utility analog of Toyota's on-the-spot problem solving by assembly-line employees 
and their team leaders after someone pulls an andon cord, signaling a problem.  These so-
called swarm events (see Glossary) were to be led by middle managers and to include a 
few hours of instruction on CI concepts and tools.  Mirroring the CILWs, front-line 
employees and middle managers were expected to learn and practice CI skills together, 
thereby promoting CI down the hierarchy.  Schulist explained: “The model is to train 
leaders who will then train the employees in their respective areas.”  Even though the 
OSSG introduced swarm events in 2008, they were used infrequently until 2009 for two 
main reasons.  First, DTE Energy’s processes were not designed with what Schulist called 
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embedded tests, the mechanisms that would signal abnormal conditions and trigger 
swarm events.  Second, DTE Energy’s senior executives were slowly being exposed to CI 
through the CILWs, but it took a while before they started requiring their subordinate 
managers to use swarm events. 
Approximately 120 of DTE Energy’s directors and senior executives attended an 
upper-management retreat in Traverse City in July 2008, just as they had done the 
previous year.  Schulist surveyed the attendees — anonymously and on-the-spot with 
electronic clickers — about their perceptions of the CI initiative.  Anderson was surprised 
that 62 percent believed CI would be displaced by a new initiative within five years.  (One 
CI manager believed this result reflected the fraction of directors who were still unfamiliar 
with CI.)  Anderson announced: “I take it on as a personal challenge that CI is not a flavor 
of the month.”  He said DTE Energy needs to be able to cut costs sustainably, not 
episodically — a conviction that would be reflected four months later in his 2009 strategic 
plan.  In late August, Schulist discussed the retreat’s survey with Local 223’s leaders.  
Seventy-five percent of these leaders were skeptical about the value of the CI initiative and 
they were unanimous in their belief that DTE Energy will have moved to a new initiative 
within five years. 
It became clear to all retreat attendees that the CI initiative’s lack of a documented 
implementation plan was causing confusion.  Some managers believed that the CI 
initiative now consisted only of CILWs, but Anderson corrected this misconception: “The 
CI workshop is an education strategy, not a deployment strategy.  We haven’t defined the 
way to do CI yet.  ...We don’t have a deployment strategy right now and, to some extent, 
we shouldn’t have one yet — but we’ll have one soon.”  Despite their conversion to the CI 
philosophy, DTE Energy’s senior executives still looked to Schulist and the OSSG to 
formulate the CI initiative’s implementation plan, just as they had Patterson and his 
colleagues do in 2002 and again in 2004.  Schulist said, “My motto has been that this is 
not Jason's CI deployment plan; this is Gerry & Company's CI deployment plan.  But 
they're waiting for the answer from the OSSG versus exploring it and attacking it 
themselves.  I don't think I'm going to get what I want...so I'm going to have to develop 
this [plan] that I can give to them and say, ‘This is what we want to do.  This is what I 
  99 
need you to advocate and own.’” 
Schulist presented a draft implementation plan to the CI managers at a staff meeting 
in late July.  It enumerated the OSSG-sanctioned CI practices already in use, as well as a 
few that Schulist wanted to reintroduce.  CILWs and swarm events were designed to 
simultaneously train and influence down the hierarchy while fixing process problems 
along the way.  CI personnel embedded in the business units were assumed to initiate or 
facilitate projects of either the 4G9S or JDI variety.  The OSSG expected other CI tools to 
be used as needed, such as 5S or AARs.  To this portfolio of practices, Schulist also 
wanted to reintroduce practices that had previously failed to catch on: learning lines 
(renamed 'beachheads' to avoid the prior name’s stigma) and BPD (see Glossary).  One of 
the CI managers objected to this draft plan because it did not feature value-stream 
mapping (VSM) prominently as a way to concentrate CI efforts on DTE Energy’s core 
processes.  Schulist defended the omission of VSM from his list of main “methods” — 
4G9S projects, JDI projects, swarm events, and DNA building — by saying he didn’t want 
to further complicate the CI initiative for the senior executives. 
Schulist held a meeting with Anderson and other senior executives in late August to 
discuss the CI initiative’s implementation plan.  Rather than discuss these details, 
Anderson — still not completely sold on CI — wanted to hear about Fos Gen’s recent 
work on a “leadership model” (specific leader behaviors) for motivating employees.  As I 
discuss in section 4.3, Fos Gen had created its own training program called Performance 
Leadership, which was getting more attention than the CI initiative in the power plants.  
Anderson did not take a leading role in defining a CI-related plan until the economic crisis 
reached a critical point in October 2008. 
Decentralizing the CI managers and Black Belts made it more difficult for the OSSG 
to control and monitor the CI initiative.  After the business units began running CILWs and 
swarm events in 2008, Schulist repeatedly begged the CI managers to share any beneficial 
changes that they made to the OSSG’s training materials and to submit project summaries 
for posting on the OSSG website (as a way to share knowledge) — requests that were 
more often ignored than heeded.  During PEP, the EPM group had appropriated the 
OSSG’s previous accounting of projects and savings reported by DTE Energy's business-
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unit managers.  Since 2005, the OSSG had neither consistently nor rigorously measured 
the CI initiative’s performance other than tracking the numbers of trained Black Belts and 
OS Specialists. 
 
4.2. CI Activities at MichCon — 2007-2008 
Unsurprisingly, MichCon employees retained their own culture and sense of 
independence from the DTE Energy corporate parent after the merger.  One of MichCon’s 
station managers told me that DTE Energy’s senior executives had originally intended to 
reduce overhead by consolidating MichCon’s and DO’s service stations, but they 
abandoned that plan in the face of daunting logistical and political barriers.  Even though 
MichCon’s senior vice president had requested help from Marcia Jackson, a MichCon 
veteran, for the service station learning lines in 2004, he otherwise resisted interference 
from the OSSG at corporate headquarters.  This senior vice president used PEP’s 
headcount reductions as a way to eliminate MichCon’s OSSG-based CI manager.  In 
October 2006, DTE Energy's executive-development scheme prompted a shuffling of 
senior executives among its business units.  Bob Richard moved from Fos Gen to become 
senior vice president of MichCon.  He was the first outsider to hold the position, so 
MichCon’s employees were understandably apprehensive, not knowing what to expect.  
Richard immediately reversed his predecessor’s purge of CI personnel.  He requested 40 
CI positions and was granted 12 Black Belts and a new CI manager. 
A station manager reported that, until 2007, MichCon did not feel the need to 
improve, despite returning three or four percent on equity — far below the MPSC-
authorized 11 percent.  He said, “Even when their stock was down, even when they were 
dragging DTE Energy down shortly after the merger — because their return was a third or 
less of what it should be — they didn't feel the tension and the need to get better.  That's 
something that Bob [Richard] brought with him and said: ‘Come on, guys.  There's money 
lying around on the ground out there.  Let's go pick it up.’”  One of MichCon’s few Black 
Belts at the time recalled Richard’s arrival: 
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Celebrated that day quite a bit, actually.  That was a good day for continuous 
improvement.  We knew about him from Fos Gen: being trained from GE and 
the steel industry, and being a Black Belt himself.  It was refreshing to say, "Ah! 
Now we've got a guy at the top that might have a different idea of continuous 
improvement, accept us for who we are, and let us do our job in a different 
way."  And he did.  He certainly made it easier for us. 
 
I would say continuous improvement was on the decline in Gas.  The Black 
Belt four-gate nine-step was definitely on the outs in Gas, 'cuz it wasn't 
working.  ...When he came in, he reenergized it and said, "We're doing this."  
...He started fixing the problems, taking out roadblocks, and in short order, the 
Black Belts were meeting with Bob on a regular basis.  Once a month, alone — 
Black Belts and the vice president.  That was huge.  That gave them a wide 
breadth of exposure, responsibility, and encouragement. 
 
Schulist hired Mike Baum from Johnson Controls in mid-2007 to be MichCon’s new 
CI manager.  Baum had to address many of the Black Belt program’s shortcomings: lack of 
clear goals and expectations, poor project selection, poor measurement of results, and 
skepticism by finance personnel (see also Appendix B).  Baum urged his Black Belts with 
director-assigned, non-financial projects (like improving customer satisfaction) to 
collaborate with Black Belts working on projects with large potential savings.  By the end 
of 2008, Baum’s 12 Black Belts had exceeded Richard’s $12 million goal by $2 million.  
Baum related the story: 
When I came here to DTE, Jason said, "Here's the org chart.  Here are your 
twelve Black Belts.  Go continuously improve."  Once I got into the mix and 
saw what was going on, we weren't doing anything.  We had a bunch of 
people working on a bunch of different projects, who continually allowed the 
scope to creep and creep and creep to where all of the projects were this big 
behemoth thing.  We had a lot of people who were doing a lot of work and 
they were netting zero results from a cost-structure standpoint.  They were 
fixing some process things along the way, but it was extremely ineffective. 
 
You had the naysayers and the stone-throwers on the outside saying, "We're 
making this investment in Black Belts.  It's a big waste of money.  They're not 
yielding any results.  Their numbers are just fictional.  It's just happy talk; it's 
not real."  So I tried to focus on that aspect to start: (1) to show people what we 
were capable of, and (2) actually to achieve some results. 
 
...January of '08 was my first crack at establishing goals for my group.  I put in 
[my CI plan] that they had a minimum task of five hundred thousand dollars 
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hard savings in O&M each.  A minimum expectation.  I let them know.  I said, 
"The waste is just dripping off the vines here.  That's not a stretch goal." 
 
Of course, they were shocked: What is this insurmountable thing that you've 
just thrown around my shoulders?  They knew there was opportunity there, but 
they weren't held to any kind of expectations.  They didn't excel in quantifying 
their efforts: what is the impact, what am I saving, how do I prove it. 
 
...Some of the biggest stone-throwers were the finance community, so we 
implemented a system where we had finance sign off on individual projects 
prior to the Black Belts being able to claim that savings and get credit for it on 
their EAS [annual performance review].  The lead financial analyst at the time 
was [hired from] Ford Motor Company.  She was in tune with the controllers 
signing off on Black Belt projects before you can claim it because the 
automotive industry worked through the fictitious CI [savings] numbers years 
ago.  They got wise to the fact that I'm reporting twenty-two million dollars in 
savings, but my costs went up this year.  She was in tune with that and she was 
very supportive of it.  It took us a few months to work together through a system 
with the Black Belts, to get them comfortable with sitting down and reviewing 
their projects: their assumptions, their fixes, their results, the data before and 
after.  [They] had to show correlation — that what they implemented was why 
the numbers moved.  Then finance felt comfortable and they would sign off on 
a form, as would the Black Belt and their ops director. 
 
...I arrived at the five hundred thousand dollar hard minimum as three times 
their annual wage (loaded).  [I] wanted to demonstrate to the organization — 
and wanted the [Black Belts] to demonstrate — that they were more than 
paying for themselves and they were reaping additional savings.  With twelve 
CI folks...there's six million dollars — which I thought was a good start.  Bob 
Richard said, "Sounds great, but I need twelve million from you...."  We took 
our orders and charged up the hill smartly.  We actually ended up exceeding 
that by a bit.  I think we came in at about fourteen million dollars for 2008, so 
that was good.  That really quieted the naysayers a bit because we had finance 
sign-off, we had a 4-Block that included all of the savings, and we had all the 
back-up detail to go along with that. 
 
One of MichCon’s Black Belts described how their CI efforts began slowly as they 
acquired data and worked to engage the front-line employees who had the expertise they 
needed.  After this early groundwork, the Black Belts were able to accelerate their 
progress: 
It was so much stuff to do, all you can do is just take a bite and start fixing.  
Fixing and fixing — everything.  You can't even quantify it because it was so 
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much.  You just say: people have more time, it wastes less, there is less over-
processing, there is less repetitive work.  It started to rapidly eliminate waste.  
Then the real improvements started coming up, system fixes. 
 
It took us a while to dig through the quagmire of understanding data, getting to 
the people who understood the data, getting them to understand what we're 
talking about, getting on the same page.  Then we got a rapid succession of 
improvements, because we got through all the low-hanging fruit. 
 
We were writing Crystal reports and getting databases organized differently.  
Now IT is in tune with the way we want to see data in Gas Ops.  They 
started...asking questions of clients the right way.  They're proliferating some 
ideas to other parts of the organization that don't know them: "If I'm going to 
write that report, should we try it this way?  Because I think you'll want it this 
way in the end."  Then light bulbs start kicking on.  Think of that throughout the 
organization.  ...We've still got tons of things to do today. 
 
An example of a Black Belt project requiring such involvement from IT was a home-
start program initiated in 2008.  A Black Belt sought to reduce MichCon’s non-productive 
time by shortening field workers’ first-arrival times.  (First-arrival time is the time it takes 
for a service truck to arrive at the first customer job each day.)  He was able to introduce a 
practice that had been rejected by union members when Marcia Jackson’s team first 
proposed it during the learning line in 2004: By taking their trucks home at night, field 
workers could leave directly for their first job the next day without first having to commute 
to their respective service stations.  Presenting this project at an OSSG off-site meeting, the 
Black Belt quipped, “Bob Richard is very supportive.  Some people might say he's too 
supportive!”  Improvements in first-arrival times from 2007 to 2008 were as follows: 62 to 
30 minutes in southeast Michigan, and 74 to 44 minutes in greater Michigan.  The Black 
Belt tracked first-arrival times on control charts, but finance personnel required statistically 
significant t-tests before they would certify these gains. 
After Schulist started CILWs in February 2008, Richard enthusiastically latched onto 
CILWs as a way of pushing for improvements.  He wanted to hold one in MichCon every 
six weeks.  Additionally, he wanted to run all the initial workshops at Michigan Avenue 
Service Center in Ypsilanti to establish a “model station” whose CI successes could be 
copied elsewhere.  MichCon’s executives and CI personnel ran four CILWs at Michigan 
 104   
Avenue in 2008.  These CILWs at Michigan Avenue were highlighted in an article on DTE 
Energy’s CI initiative in the Association for Manufacturing Excellence’s Target magazine 
(Wilhelm, 2009).  The article quotes a union member’s summary of their countermeasures 
that dramatically improved getting each service truck to its first job as quickly as possible: 
“Some guys can now go to their first job in the morning right from their house, so that 
eliminated some of the vans that were here, and we got more parking.  We moved all our 
heavy equipment down to the far end, so that’s out of the way.  Everyone has assigned 
parking now, so the stock guys know exactly where your truck is and they bring your 
stock right out and put it on the back of the truck.  The stock guys working the 4 p.m. to 
midnight shift fuel all the equipment when it comes in.  Everything is more efficient now” 
(Wilhelm, 2009, p. 39).  In early 2009, Michigan Avenue reported a 40 percent reduction 
in operating costs, although some executives outside of MichCon were a little skeptical of 
this claim. 
Schulist, for his part, was looking for a culture change such that station employees 
would engage in CI activity routinely.  He did not see such change happening: 
It's been used as a poster child, but it's not really working the way we think: 
We're not building this new culture, we're just running courses there.  How do 
we change that approach? 
 
[MichCon president] Jerry Norcia is supposed to go and spend a week there to 
figure out what's really going on — see if we're holding countermeasures and 
making sure things are sustaining — because every time I go there, I can see 
they're not.  It's episodic. 
 
Then Bob Richard gets upset with my assessment because I am not seeing the 
culture change and he is seeing the metrics improve.  All I'm trying to do is say, 
“It's not you, it’s not Michigan Avenue, it's not anybody.  We just haven't 
figured out how to change the culture and engage everyone at the point of 
activity, every day, to make things better.  We haven't cracked the nut on this.” 
 
Baum was promoted to station manager at Michigan Avenue in late December 2008.  
He shared Richard, Schulist, and Hemrick’s desire to have his employees experiment with 
various CI activities to make Michigan Avenue a “model station”.  However, he felt that 
he needed the help of OSSG personnel to construct a structure to respond adequately to 
front-line employees’ improvement requests.  He was afraid that inadequate responses to 
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such requests would disappoint his front-line employees, causing them to disengage from 
the CI initiative.  (Baum’s fear was well-founded: Morrison (2003) documented these 
dynamics at a vehicle manufacturer trying to implement Lean.)  With the OSSG personnel 
busy with DTE Energy’s organizational response to the 2008 economic crisis, plans for a 
model station were put on hold in 2009. 
We are beginning to draw information out of the field as far as defects and 
things like that.  What I would like the OSSG group to help with is a good 
infrastructure in place to effectively deal with the defects that are coming out of 
the field.  I've been hesitant.  I don't want to ask the field, "Send me your 
problems," because I'm going to get a wave.  Whoosh!  If I don't have an 
effective way to deal with that then I'm going to lose credibility with the folks, 
we're going to flounder.  We'll make some improvements, but it certainly won't 
be as good as if we go into it in a bit more organized fashion.  That's what I 
would like to have as the first focus. 
 
Jamie Bonini came out here and met with us.  We got the chance to sit and 
chat with him for a few hours, which was good.  He even sort of reiterated that.  
He said, "You need to begin pulling all this information out of the field.  And 
when you start that, be ready because you're going to get more than what you 
are able to handle."  He said, "Working hard, knocking down these issues — it 
levels off over time.  Then it's more manageable, sustainable."  He said, "But 
the initial rush could be impressive."  ...And that's exactly what I fear will 
happen, so I haven't asked them to open the floodgates up yet. 
 
4.3. CI Activities at Fossil Generation — 2008-2009 
Patti Poppe, director over the Belle River and St. Clair power plants, launched an 
initiative in August 2008 to address Fos Gen’s culture.  In designing this new initiative, 
Poppe was heavily influenced by Rayona Sharpnack, a consultant and founder of the 
Institute for Women's Leadership.  DTE Energy's plant leaders — all of whom were Black 
Belts because of Bob Richard’s earlier influence — held an off-site managers’ meeting for 
each of Fos Gen’s two geographic areas.  A plant manager at Monroe had come to DTE 
Energy from AES Corporation where CEO Dennis Bakke was a strong proponent of 
Douglas McGregor’s (1960) Theory Y style of management (see Theory X and Theory Y in 
the Glossary).  Fos Gen's culture-change efforts therefore became a blend of Sharpnack's 
(2007) "Trade Up!" and Bakke’s (2005) “Joy at Work” philosophies.  The meeting 
 106   
attendees worked to articulate their perceptions of Fos Gen’s prevailing culture and what 
kind of culture they desired (which they called their “Trade Up Culture”).  These culture 
descriptions, with clear parallels to McGregor’s Theories X and Y, are presented in Table 2 
below. 
Prevailing Culture Trade Up Culture 
We do not trust each other to do what is 
good for the whole organization. 
We are trusted to make decisions every 
day. 
Too many and constantly changing 
priorities results in lack of progress in any 
direction. 
Based on a clearly communicated 
business plan, we know what to do 
because we understand how our work 
supports our organizational priorities. 
We have been given limited resources, 
therefore we can only provide limited 
results. 
We generate value by using our resources 
efficiently and creatively in our alignment 
with our goals. 
Everyone focuses on today’s crisis so no 
one is looking forward. 
We look ahead and prepare to serve the 
future energy needs of our region by 
aligning our daily decisions with our long-
term goals. 
We don’t feel respected and valued 
because management does not ask for my 
input nor explain their decisions. 
All employees are respected and 
appreciated for their contribution to our 
success through ownership, pride, and 
innovation. 
I just do what I’m told because no one 
listens. 
We enjoy an environment where shared 
learning is encouraged and open 
communication creates common 
understanding to achieve desired results. 
Table 2. Descriptions of Fos Gen's Prevailing and Desired Cultures 
Fos Gen’s managers held similar meetings with their respective plant personnel.  
Monroe power plant director Frank Wszelaki said, “We brought in people from the plants 
and we did the same sort of thing — did the same kind of exercise — and came up with 
the same answers, so we knew it was real.  Now that you know it's real, how do you 
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change it?”  The core of Fos Gen’s culture-change strategy was for its managers to teach 
their employees and coach them in their CI activities. 
Managers at DTE Energy’s nuclear power plant, Fermi 2, had taught their employees 
in a series of sessions called “Leading and Learning.”  When vice president Paul Fessler 
joined Fos Gen from Fermi before PEP, he brought Fermi’s training program with him.  In 
2004, it comprised 11 sessions on conflict resolution and collaboration, on the Operating 
System and CI, and on “Business 101” for Fos Gen’s power plants.  The training program 
was suspended during the PEP initiative, but Fos Gen’s managers and union leaders 
restarted a shorter, 7-session version in October 2007 called “Performance Leadership.”  A 
Training Advisory Group (TAG) was formed to manage the program.  Fos Gen’s vice 
presidents and directors were trained first.  The TAG reorganized the program into four 
modules, incorporating Poppe’s culture-change work: (1) roles and responsibilities, (2) 
goals and metrics, (3) Trade Up Culture, and (4) C1-C4.  Performance Leadership training 
was attended by plant managers and supervisors in 2008, and by staff personnel and other 
business-units’ employees in 2009. 
Power plant managers developed different forums at their respective plants for 
expanding the scope of Performance Leadership.  At Riven Rouge power plant, for 
example, a voluntary Performance Leadership advisory group met monthly at to develop 
training sessions for the plant employees.  River Rouge’s managers conducted the session 
three times each month to ensure that employees on all shifts had a chance to attend.  At 
the smaller Greenwood power plant, in contrast, managers held town-hall-style meetings 
to build trust with front-line employees by soliciting and discussing their improvement 
ideas. 
By late 2008, CI activities at Fos Gen’s power plants exhibited many of the features 
that the OSSG personnel wanted to foster across the company, yet these activities were 
somewhat disconnected from the corporate CI initiative.  Fos Gen’s middle managers 
encouraged CI work that the Black Belts and front-line employees did not always do as 
part of OSSG-sanctioned 4G9S projects, CILWs, or swarm events.  Such experimentation 
— like the Coolidge learning line or the intended “model station” work at Michigan 
Avenue (presented in the next section) — was beneficial for figuring out how to adapt CI 
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to a particular context.  But the OSSG’s leaders were worried about their ability to develop 
a company-wide approach to CI because they did not have systematic (and enforceable) 
ways of collecting, evaluating, and disseminating the results of Fos Gen’s CI experiments. 
Below, I provide examples of CI activities at Fos Gen’s power plants that illustrate 
the OSSG’s goal of instilling “problem solving at the point of activity.” 
1. CI coaching by middle managers 
Poppe, hired from GM during the PEP initiative, was unafraid of experimenting with 
new ways of managing her power plants.  Schulist said that she took his advice in early 
2008 to “consider realigning and reorganizing her power plant along value streams, 
instead of around the organizational functions that she has.”  Patterson, promoted to 
director of Corporate Services in late 2008, admired her efforts to give her employees the 
“vehicles” to figure out how to work smarter: 
She has rallied around this Operating System principle of driving decision 
making closest to the point of activity: How do I create systems and structures 
for that to happen?  She's doing some awesome work. 
 
She creates a daily checkbook for her plant, breaks it out to the lowest level she 
possibly can.  “Here's our everyday run rate.  We can't spend any more than 
this.  Now, you make the decisions — purchasing, materials, overtime, what 
have you — but this is all we have to spend.”  She has a variance on it on a 
daily basis.  I haven't seen it yet, but she talks about how it has totally driven 
people's mindset around paying attention to what things cost and how [they] 
can do things differently.  She's given them an infrastructure and a vehicle to 
bring some creativity to work. 
 
She has set up a conference room as their new war room.  Before, Central 
Engineering would tell them what work orders they're going to work on to keep 
[up] their plant availability.  The idea was we can look across all the units and 
decide [how] we'll deploy our capital to the most costly stuff.  She said, “But 
you guys are missing a big thing: You've got workers out here executing these 
projects mindlessly.  You don't know everything that they know.  They 
probably don't know everything that you know.  How do we bridge that?”  So 
she created this war room.  It prioritizes things based on what Central 
Engineering says, but then [the front-line employees] get the chance to make 
the final decision: I agree, I disagree, or here is something that was number ten 
on the list that I really think should be number one because it's going to cause 
this kind of a problem.  She has broken the teams up into responsibilities 
around the units.  This is where she has given them some vehicles to start 
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bringing some continuous-improvement thinking to the organization, so you 
don't have to wait for a [CILW].  Every day they can see how they're 
contributing and get some feedback on how they're contributing, which I think 
is pretty awesome work. 
 
Employees at River Rouge power plant created and maintained a whiteboard 
summary list of their CI activities without management coercion.  A surprised OSSG 
member asked one of River Rouge’s Black Belts how the plant’s managers fostered such a 
climate, something that the OSSG personnel had not been able to do.  Fos Gen’s 
employees credit plant manager Brian Rice, a charismatic and well-respected Black Belt 
with over 30 years of experience in Fos Gen operations.  One of the managers explained 
that he is adept at teaching and reinforcing CI concepts to front-line employees subtly — 
“in the moment” — and he does so at every opportunity. 
After the OSSG’s laminated posters of the DTE Energy Operating System disappeared 
from the company’s walls about 2004, front-line employees at Trenton Channel power 
plant had trouble understanding what the CI initiative was all about.  Plant manager Dan 
Braker, a Black Belt from GE Plastics, worked with his employees to create posters 
explaining how the pieces of the CI initiative fit together.  Their diagrams visually 
demonstrated how Braker expected his front-line employees to use the OSSG’s problem 
solving methods — 4G9S projects, JDI projects, swarm events, AARs, and root-cause 
analyses — to address the following CI opportunities: (1) process improvement “quick 
hits”, (2) performance shortfalls relative to budget, (3) external pressures, and (4) problems 
uncovered by process audits. 
2. Improvement of core processes 
Fos Gen’s managers had little trouble applying CI to certain core processes within 
the power plants, like outages and planned equipment maintenance.  “The critical path is 
always going to get CI’ed,” said Monroe’s Wszelaki.  After each improvement, he said, 
“we're going to go after the next critical path, which may be somebody else.”  For 
example, Monroe’s employees were persistently trying to streamline the scheduling and 
management of the outage process.  The Northeast Blackout on August 14, 2003, 
prompted Fos Gen’s personnel to create a standardized procedure for handling forced 
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outages, modeled after Wszelaki’s periodic outage handbook.  Wszelaki recalled: 
If we have a forced outage, we're not making megawatts, we're not making 
money, so you've got to spin these around as quick as you can. 
 
We were sitting in the command center.  We were trying to get the units back 
on.  The plants would talk to each other on a daily basis about when we would 
run.  After we had the blackout, there were certain things you would need to 
know, because we had never started up our [power-plant] fleet in a blackout 
situation.  ...I don't know what time it was — we had been working some 
ungodly amount of hours.  We were trying to get ready for our next call with 
the plants.  The SOC [System Operations Center] and those people were trying 
to [determine] what [coal-fired] units were coming on.  How could we tell you 
what units would be available at what periods of time?  What we came up with 
was kind of neat.  It was really simple, too.  It was just a set of milestones that 
were consistent, up and down the fleet, for what we would look at for bringing 
back a unit.  ...Like first air release.  Every unit's got to do it.  ...When do you 
think your first established coal fire is going to be?  When will you have your 
hydro performed?  All those sequenced steps.  ...It had never dawned on us, in 
a way, because we had never had to start up X amount of units at one time.  
...We said, "Man, we do it every day with each unit, if we have to start it up or 
shut it down.  So what's the sequence that you use?  How do you share it?"  So 
we came up with some major milestones,...developed the way we structured 
the call, and built this template. 
 
After we got into it, we started expanding it.  If you look at the handbook and 
the template, it talks about manpower.  It's simplified, but it gets into that level 
of detail....  We put in cost, we put in safety, and other things that they have to 
look at to make sure they're staying on track.  Kind of neat. 
 
I think we've become a leader in forced-outage reduction.  We have a very 
good forced-outage process now within our group.  It's pretty much 
consistently done up and down the river, if you talk to the guys.  They have an 
approach that they make.  Each plant, each unit, and all the plants are not 
created equal when it comes to material and how the designs are, but the 
basics are there.  It's another project-management tool that they're using.  It 
hones their skill and they become very good at it. 
 
With standardized project-management templates in place for both periodic and 
forced outages, Fos Gen’s Black Belts had a base from which they could work with front-
line employees to make incremental improvements.  Wszelaki described how their outage 
planning was more rigorous than in the past, thanks to such improvements: 
  111 
I think maybe we're getting spoiled, because we have Black Belts now.  I have 
one here at the plant.  There's also one in the south projects group and one in 
the north.  [These] Black Belts’ assignment is to reduce time in an outage....  
They're the professionals who can take you through the [improvement] process.  
We ended up taking the turbine guys to sit in a room for a couple days to 
[brainstorm countermeasures for improving] their area.  ...We tell the guys: 
"...Make it practical.  Make it real.  Don't just throw stuff out there to throw it 
out there."  I think the acceptance has been pretty good.  Now it's part of our 
DNA, it's part of our [improvement] process.  We do it. 
 
Five years ago, you would get this rolling of the eyes and "I can't talk about it."  
And: "I don't know what you're talking about, kid.  Just give me the money, tell 
me I got four weeks.  You'll be happy in four weeks.  Come back in the fifth 
[week] and you'll see the units [running]."  ...I think guys had done so many 
outages [that] planning was more like, "Outage is in three weeks?  Okay.  The 
day before the outage, I'll walk out there and take a look around and 
whatever."  It wasn't planned as well as it could have been.  I'm not saying we 
changed that when I came — 'cuz there were people planning outages.  Don't 
get me wrong.  It's [a question of] how much rigor was around it. 
 
Wszelaki also described how the PEP initiative’s focus on cost reduction prompted 
the personnel at Monroe to innovate new ways of making work assignments within the 
plant.  He said, “Maybe you don't have to have a dedicated person for that [outage].  They 
can multitask.  [That’s] the next thing we've been looking at.  Periodics is just a piece of 
the daily operation: day-to-day operation, forced outage, and periodics.  With our 
workforce, you want to have the workforce be flexible: You might have to go from forced, 
daily, to periodic — wearing all three hats — but know where you're priorities are.  You 
can have three resources on each major task, [but] if you can cut it down to two, then go 
to one, now you're going after additional labor cost and not costing yourself time....  
We're having foremen and other individuals get outage assignments in line with their daily 
assignments.  That's been somewhat of a challenge, but it reduces headcount.” 
3. Collaboration between Black Belts and front-line employees 
Black Belts and front-line employees used value-stream mapping (VSM) to identify 
ways of shortening durations of periodic outages for planned maintenance.  Employees at 
one power plant used VSM to cut the time needed to replace a main-unit transformer from 
30 days to 17 days.  Another example was the coal-mill group at Monroe requesting a 
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Black Belt to help them improve their process for rebuilding the coal mills.  Monroe’s 
plant manager recounted the story: 
Our coal-mill group call themselves "The Elite Force".  If you go into the coal-
mill shop, they have it on their door.  They have some pretty aggressive 
supervisors and they have a very onerous group of people that work in there.  
They take care of our coal mills.  There's twenty to twenty-four guys in there.  
They work well together. 
 
They took on themselves how to improve rebuilds of coal mills.  We had put a 
CI person in there a few years ago.  They went through and mapped it out, tried 
to understand how do they get better. 
 
One of the reasons they were fearful: Rumor got out that we were looking at 
contracting coal mills out.  They don't want to lose coal-mill work.  Sometimes 
it's not a bad idea to see what your competitor can do.  They took it on: "Wait a 
minute!  There is nobody better than us!  You could bring B&W [Babcock & 
Wilcox] or whoever you think you want to bring in here and they ain't going to 
do it faster, they ain't going to do it better, and the quality's not going to be 
there." 
 
I said, "Okay, let's prove some of this stuff out, 'cuz you guys don't make your 
dates.  Sometimes the quality isn't there.  Every time it's Friday at three o'clock, 
it won't be till Saturday, so we got to work Saturday.  Why is that?"  It was like: 
"Okay, prove it." 
 
Over time — things take time — they developed a pretty good team down 
there.  They did it pretty good.  We had a CI person [who] got with them, sat 
down, went through the process so that they could see it.  A year or two later, 
we had an engineer planner go back through it, kind of re-look at it, see how 
their plans and schedules go.  Now I rarely worry about their plans or 
schedules — knock on wood.  They do pretty good. 
 
4. Collaboration between managers and front-line union employees 
Even though the Union Management Partnership was folded into the CI initiative in 
2002, Fos Gen’s managers could not improve their outage cycle times without engaging 
the union employees in the process.  One plant manager explained that only the union 
employees could properly evaluate their work packages and identify impediments: 
We bring in a number of building trades to work during a periodic [outage].  
We have a host of maintenance folks that work the outage — they're full-time 
[Local] 223 guys.  We’re trying to build on our union partnership.  If I brought 
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in an ironworker, a welder, a pipefitter, an electrician, and an INC [instrument 
controls] guy, then we're going to talk about areas of work.  We won't get into 
the details of the job, but we'll start by saying: "Okay, what do you think when 
you're in an outage and you're working on an FD [forced-draft] fan?"  Or, "You 
have to go out and repair these valves on the turbine, what's been your 
experience?"  "What should be our cadence of direction that you think you 
need in the field?  Not planning the work package for you, but when you go 
out there?" 
 
We did a lot of work on ‘what's in it for me’.  I remember having what's-a-
good-day-look-like meetings up and down the river.  ...That's when we 
[realized] certain [work] packages need to be walked down by the craft 
[employees].  We'd have a unit team take the work packages and they'd walk 
down to work.  They'd make sure the sequence was there.  We'd take one 
almost from start to finish, unwind the whole package, look at it, and say, 
"Okay, it's a major job.  Do they have all the right step text in there?  If I have a 
maintenance procedure I have to use, is it correct?  Are the parts the best 
parts?"  ...That's why I wanted to get the union involved.  They're the hands-on 
guys.  "Look, we're not worried about you trying to understand what a schedule 
hammock is, or how a level-one schedule compares to a level-three....  We 
want you to look at our sequence.  When we give you the job, are the hand-
offs there when you go to the warehouse and get the part?  Do we set up 
staging areas for you?  If we do, where do we set them up?" 
 
A lot of groups were doing that, but we honed our skills by having those kinds 
of discussions.  At the end of the day, no one wants to be frustrated, you want 
to get your job done, and you want to do it correctly. 
 
Many CI projects would not have been successful without the expertise of the front-
line union employees.  For example, managers at St. Clair power plant attempted biomass 
cofiring — burning wood chips with coal — but did not succeed until they included front-
line employees in the project.  In another example, several union employees designed a 
process for sending out the power plant’s circulation water-pump motors for maintenance.  
Their manager recalled, “These circ’ water-pump motors are huge and they need to get 
sent out every five or six years.  We have to take the roof off and bring in a Laramie truck.  
It used to take us weeks to do it.  We used to just fiddle around with it, didn't have a good 
sequence.  The parking lot would be all messed up.  You hardly don't even hear about it 
now.  An iron worker and a good rigger got together with the foreman who enjoys doing 
the work and they followed the [CI] process.  In a few days, those guys can have the roof 
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off, the pump and the motor removed, decoupled, on trucks to go to where they need to 
be repaired.  You wouldn't get that if you didn't have the union involvement.” 
At one plant, the managers held a swarm event in early 2009 to resolve 
discrepancies between their engineers’ and their coal-mill employees’ recommendations 
for coal mill rebuilds.  Coal mills were typically rebuilt — replacing the motor and 
grinding zone — after 100 thousand hours of run time.  But the swarm team discovered 
that they might be able to run a coal mill for 120-150 thousand hours before needing to 
rebuild it, depending on how and how often routine inspections were done.  Based on the 
team’s findings, the plant’s managers increased the frequency of inspections from every 
five thousand running hours to every four thousand.  One of the managers said, “They 
were able to define what things they look at for recommending — and it's done with the 
group now, not just the engineer.  You drive it down that way; you get some camaraderie 
and it works out.” 
5. Collaboration with contractors 
In addition to fostering effective collaboration with front-line union employees, some 
plant managers also solicited the help of their contracted suppliers.  Fos Gen had a 
partnership with Washington Group International (WGI3) as its major constructor.  
Employees at one of Fos Gen’s plants, with assistance from WGI, replaced 2000 square 
feet of waterwall tubes in 8 weeks.  But WGI reported that a plant at another utility did the 
same replacement in 6 weeks.  With that competitive benchmark, WGI and Fos Gen’s 
employees worked to reduce their waterwall-tube replacement time to 3.5 weeks.  The 
plant’s manager remarked, “You can only go so far with certain things because physics — 
heat and pressure — will affect you sometimes.  But the drive to be better is out there.” 
WGI also assisted a plant team improving their cycle time for replacing reheater 
pendants.  Their first replacement took 77 days.  For the next replacement, the team set a 
goal of 67 days and actually completed the job in 59 days.  “Now they know that they can 
do it even better,” said their plant manager.  “They'll look at their areas, like how much 
                                            
3 WGI was acquired by URS Corporation in November 2007. 
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fetal weld do you have to provide and are you doing it automatically or a person manually 
doing it.” 
6. Improvements initiated by front-line employees 
The Holy Grail of any organization’s CI initiative is to create a culture in which all 
front-line employees monitor their (already well-designed) work processes and take the 
initiative to fix problems that arise.  I present a few examples that demonstrate Fos Gen’s 
movement toward that ideal. 
Example 1: Pendant Tube Replacement 
A periodic-outage team took 13 weeks to replace a secondary superheated outlet 
pendant tube.  After deciding to improve this cycle time, they used CI tools to improve 
their process during the plant’s next three periodic outages.  The team was able to cut the 
cycle time to 8.5 weeks. 
Example 2: Precipitator Circuit Board 
A plant had a problem with its precipitator controller overheating.  A young 
electrician discovered the controller’s circuit board would fail every 18-24 months.  “He 
decided he was going to try to figure out how the board functioned,” said the plant 
manager.  “He did.  There's a fifty-cent resistor on there that would fail.  I think it was 
something like that.  He can repair these boards now.  He did his own process review, 
looked at the thing, taught his electrician buddies how to do it.”  The electrician’s repairs 
saved the plant $1600 for each circuit board and the labor needed to replace them. 
Example 3: Weld Sheets 
Welders at one plant were frustrated because they never seemed to receive the weld 
sheets they needed on time, so they asked their manager to help them flowchart the 
process.  “They pushed us to do a process map of how many people touch a weld sheet,” 
said the manager.  “We were shocked: twelve people!  Why are twelve people touching a 
weld sheet, from the start to the finish, by the time it goes out to the welder who's signing 
his name on the weld?!  They got it down to just a handful, the right information, 
modernized it.  There was a process improvement.  They got frustrated and then they 
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[fixed it].  That's the kind of stuff we want.” 
Example 4: Coal Conveyor 
The fuel supply area at Monroe power plant needed to replace the large conveyor 
belt they used for unloading coal trains.  The belt was a mile long and 6-feet wide.  
Wszelaki explained their approach when it was replaced 12 years prior: “Okay, we need 
to do the belt.  Hire the contractor.  What do you think we gotta do?  It's going to take 
twelve to fourteen days.  Someone SWAG'ed it.  ...Come to work; it's going to be fourteen 
days.  They do it in fourteen days.”  The fuel supply team were confident they could beat 
the contractor’s past performance: “What do you think you can do it in?  How quickly can 
it be done?  If you've got some roadblocks out there, what are they?  Let's figure them 
out.”  They researched how the contractor had replaced the belt and what it cost in 1997 
and they were able to replace the conveyor belt faster and cheaper themselves in 2009. 
 
4.4. Response to the Economic Crisis — 2008-2009 
The U.S. economy sharply deteriorated in the fourth quarter of 2008 after a 
speculative bubble in subprime mortgages popped.  A critical point was reached in 
September when investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed and the U.S. Federal 
Reserve extended about $123 billion in credit to American International Group to prevent 
its collapse.  On October 3, the U.S. Congress passed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, authorizing the U.S. Treasury to spend up to $700 billion to 
purchase mortgage-backed securities and to prop up banks' beleaguered balance sheets 
by giving them cash.  As measures of the stock market’s performance during the quarter, 
the S&P 500 index fell about 22 percent and the broadly representative Wilshire 5000 
index fell about 9 percent.  (These indexes finished the year 37 percent and 19 percent 
lower, respectively.)  Companies found it increasingly difficult to borrow money as banks 
drastically reduced their lending. 
This economic crisis affected DTE Energy primarily through its effects on DTE 
Energy’s industrial customers.  Detroit’s car companies and their first- and second-tier 
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suppliers comprise 20 percent of DTE Energy’s sales.  Detroit Edison’s annual electricity 
generation dropped 2.5 percent in 2008 and 5.8 percent in 2009.  By the end of 2008, 
half of DTE Energy’s industrial customer accounts were 60 days or more past due.  For 
Detroit Edison, these unpaid bills totaled $239 million, $87 million of which DTE Energy’s 
executives believed was uncollectible.  For the whole company, uncollectible bills were 
$213 million in 2008 and $171 million in 2009.  Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection in April 2009 and GM followed two months later. 
DTE Energy’s senior executives began formulating what they called an economic-
crisis response (ECR) in October 2008.  Like PEP, the ECR plan was a cost-cutting 
initiative.  Since PEP, one of the senior executives’ long-term goals for the company was to 
reduce DTE Energy’s operating and maintenance (O&M) expenses to within the 25th 
percentile of its (self-defined) peer group of utilities (see Appendix E).  The senior 
executives referred to this goal as “first-quartile performance”.  The ECR plan was their 
chance to push the company toward this goal rapidly.  One of DTE Energy’s board 
members told the executives, “Don’t waste this crisis.”  At an off-site meeting for CI 
personnel in September 2009, DTE Energy’s vice president for regulatory affairs said that 
DTE Energy's senior executives expected continued consolidation in the utility industry, 
but not until corporate borrowing becomes easier — perhaps in three to five years. 
DTE Energy's executives had already formulated their 2009 budgets, with reductions 
from their 2008 levels, when the economic crisis became apparent.  They determined that 
they needed to save an additional $130 million in 2009 and to boost DTE Energy’s cash 
reserves by $20 million.  (DTE Energy's front-line employees viewed these goals as a 
single $150 million target.)  Overall cost reductions from 2008 levels totaled about $250 
million.  The $130 million ECR cost-reduction target was allocated among DTE Energy’s 
entities to close a portion of each entity’s gap to first-quartile operating-cost performance.  
These allocations were as follows: $63 million to Detroit Edison (40 percent of its gap), 
$13 million to MichCon (68 percent of its gap), and $54 million to Corporate Services (76 
percent of its gap).  MichCon’s 2009 goal was increased to $20 million to account for a 
cost-reduction shortfall of $7 million in 2008. 
It was a fortunate coincidence that Anderson led the formulation of DTE Energy’s 
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ECR plan in October 2008 concurrent with his personalized CI training (which had been 
scheduled months before the economic crisis occurred).  In late September, Schulist had 
said, “Gerry [Anderson] has never been to a class.  He's been to one or two report-outs.  
In October, I have him for five days, so I'm going to take him through his Karate Kid4 
journey over those five days and hopefully convert him.  I believe that the result of that 
[journey] doesn't make or break but changes the future path of continuous improvement 
in the company.  If he gets it and he's converted like most, we go one way.  If he thinks 
it's a crock,” he said laughing, “we are doomed forever!” 
Schulist taught Anderson’s individually tailored CI course one-on-one, spread out 
between October and mid-December 2008.  They discussed the Jack Smith (Spear, 2004b, 
2004c; Spear & Purrington, 2004) and TMMK (Mishina, 1995) Harvard Business School 
case studies, and Anderson completed a practicum — implementing 20 improvement 
ideas in six days — at Trombly cable plant.  Schulist reported that Anderson didn’t find CI 
compelling at first because he didn’t understand how all its pieces fit together.  It took a 
few weeks before Anderson told Schulist that “the pieces are coming together” in his 
head.  Steve Kurmas, Detroit Edison’s new pro-CI president, also influenced Anderson’s 
thinking.  An OSSG manager observed, “Jason [Schulist] has had this tremendous boost 
because of the downturn in the economy and that feeling of a burning platform.” 
By mid-December, Anderson and Kurmas were promoting CI themselves.  Kurmas 
said, “When it was done successfully, it was our job to congratulate and reward them.  
The mindset we have now is that it’s our responsibility to lead that effort, by hands-on 
demonstration” (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 33).  By February 2009, Anderson had “drunk the 
Kool-Aid,” according to Schulist, and was “charging ahead with the CI strategy.”  One 
manager noticed the senior executives talking about CI a lot more, which she said “sends 
signals to middle management that this stuff is important.”  A MichCon employee said, 
“Bob Richard, still to this day, is out doing swarm events — which is huge.  That’s 
probably the biggest help of all: to have a vice president that will put on a darn hard hat, 
                                            
4 Schulist is referring to the 1984 film starring Ralph Macchio and Pat Morita; see 
Glossary. 
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go out in the trenches, and walk around with you....”  Richard explained, “All the 
directors, managers, and supervisors have to go through a swarm event with me.  They 
spend a week with me, listening to me talking about how important it is, but they can see 
it’s not just me telling them to do it.  It’s me teaching them how to do it” (Wilhelm, 2009, 
p. 39). 
DTE Energy’s senior executives did not want the ECR plan to create the same 
employee backlash that the PEP initiative did, so COO Gerry Anderson announced that 
they would guarantee employment security for employees.  He said, “We will lead from 
the front and with heart.”  Consequently, employees would have to make the $130 million 
in cost cuts to DTE Energy’s $778 million of overtime and non-labor O&M expenditure 
(see Table 3 below for a breakdown by category).  In this respect, DTE Energy and Toyota 
used the same strategy: Employ a large number of “temporary” contractors who can be cut 
easily in an economic downturn without damaging regular employees’ morale.  One 
director said, "The ECR plan was the first time that DTE went after contractors."  
Nevertheless, several managers believed that the employment guarantee would have been 
impossible without the PEP initiative’s downsizing and cost cutting in 2006.  As we saw in 
section 3.6, many managers had trimmed their employee ranks to meet PEP's headcount 
target, shifting their work to contractors who had no employment guarantee. 
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Expense Category 
Category 
Reduction 
($ millions) 
Category 
Reduction 
(%) 
Overtime 18 25 
Contractors and 
consultants 
50 21 
Outside services 23 14 
Materials 4 5 
Other 26 12 
Global items 9 - 
Total: 130 17 
Table 3. ECR Cost-Reduction Targets by Expense Category 
The ECR plan’s employment-security guarantee restored a necessary component for 
engaging union employees in CI activities.  Throughout 2008, employment security had 
continued to be a problem for union members.  Schulist had proposed several strategies to 
avoid future layoffs: 
1. Attrition — not replacing people who leave the company. 
2. Reassignment, or “redeployment” — moving people to new jobs, which might 
require retraining. 
3. Insource — having employees make products instead of purchasing them and 
provide services themselves instead of hiring contractors. 
4. Kaizen float team5 — create a roving team of CI experts who can be deployed where 
needed. 
Labor relations and union participation in CI improved when DTE Energy’s senior 
executives agreed that attrition and redeployment of employees would be used to handle 
                                            
5 Schulist noted that a kaizen float team would require close oversight to ensure that 
managers looking for ways to get rid of low-performing employees do not use this team as 
a convenient dumping ground. 
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excess labor created by CI improvements in 2009.  One senior executive said, “We’ve 
told people that, while we’ll all be doing different jobs in the future and work will 
continue to change, we have plenty of work for our employees to do.  Jobs may change, 
but I think employment will be enhanced by these kinds of activities” (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 
40).  DTE Energy’s 2009 budget estimated excess labor of 50-100 people only.  One 
manager felt that front-line union members’ participation in swarm events in 2009 was 
their first serious engagement in CI work since the UMP teams of 1999. 
To reach first-quartile performance, the senior executives wanted to ensure that DTE 
Energy’s business units didn’t just reduce expenses temporarily.  When at risk of going 
over budget, for example, DO employees would reduce their clearing of power lines and 
Fos Gen’s employees would defer planned and preventive maintenance.  DTE Energy's 
senior executives therefore insisted that cost reductions in 2009 not reduce service levels 
or what they called “core business” processes (like preventive maintenance).  Instead, they 
wanted all employees to use CI to eliminate waste and “challenge our ways of doing 
business.”  A manager in Fos Gen said, “There's an easier way to cut budgets: Whatever 
you had last year, now you got ninety percent, you got eighty-five.  That's a horrible way.  
It's better to do it smart and try to leverage the [CI] tools.”  One senior executive said, “We 
need to go after some DNA.”  A middle manager perceived this approach as the only 
alternative in the face of the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies: 
With major companies filing for bankruptcy — these are our biggest customers 
— boy, you'd better have a whole bag of tricks.  They're all CI tricks — that's 
all we have. 
 
We can't change our plants.  They're between thirty and fifty years old.  
They're not getting any newer.  We can't change our rates — that takes 
legislation.  ...If you threaten to leave me, I can't say, "Woah!  What's your best 
price?  I'll undercut [it]."  I can't; my rates are locked.  I'm capped by the Public 
Service Commission.  I don't have that flexibility.  We can't change our 
customer base — and it's eroding.  There's no doubt about it.  We're locked in 
to the price of coal, we're locked in to the price of gas.  You start running out 
[of alternatives].  What do you got left?  You got people.  Okay, can I get rid of 
people?  I'm going to try — eventually.  But can I maybe be smarter about how 
I do things?  Can I improve all my processes?  Absolutely.  It's the only thing left 
when you look at our company. 
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The ECR plan prompted Anderson and the other senior executives to make a few 
structural changes that reflected a different emphasis from PEP.  They appointed a new 
director of the EPM group and shuffled the group’s personnel.  Anderson wanted greater 
attention paid to non-financial metrics, so EPM’s new director began working on a 
company-wide Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992).  DTE Energy’s finance 
controller said, “The plan is not to have fifty thousand projects tracked centrally, but to 
track KPI’s [key performance indicators] only.”  Schulist explained that the senior 
executives called this approach “trust and verify.”  The CI initiative gained prominence 
when Anderson brought the OSSG out from under the EPM group and assumed direct 
oversight of it himself. 
The senior executives wanted all employees’ use of CI to be serious and earnest in 
making cost reductions.  Speaking to a group of Detroit Edison’s CI personnel about their 
cost-reduction target, president Steve Kurmas said, “We’re not going to 5S our way to 
sixty-three million dollars.”  He continued, “You need to get comfortable asking front-line 
workers for improvement opportunities, and the front-line workers need to get comfortable 
answering.  We've never had the opportunity to use the tools that you've been practicing 
for the last five years as we do now.”  Schulist recommended to Anderson that he insist a 
fraction of the $130 million in cost reductions be “sustainable” — lasting improvements to 
processes instead of temporary cuts or deferred expenses.  Anderson selected a 
sustainability target of 80 percent, to be achieved gradually by year end (see Figure 5 
below).  Echoing the skepticism about the CI initiative’s savings numbers before PEP, 
Schulist warned Anderson “about the dangers of other executives snowing him, or even 
Gerry snowing himself about what’s being achieved.” 
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Figure 5. ECR Cost-Reduction Plan 
Leading the ECR plan’s implementation, the senior executives acknowledged that the 
company needed to avoid the following possible pitfalls: 
1. Lack of leadership commitment. 
2. Lack of employee commitment. 
3. Not thinking outside the box and challenging assumptions. 
4. Unintended consequences from the lag in realizing gains from CI efforts. 
5. Coordination problems among business units. 
6. Communication problems among business units. 
7. Making cost cuts that are unsustainable. 
In November 2008, Anderson created a video that was distributed company-wide in 
which he explained the ECR plan to all employees, including the employment guarantee, 
a hiring freeze, a freeze of non-union salaries, the 2009 budget cuts, and his expectations 
for process improvements. 
DTE Energy’s annual budgeting process was already well underway when the senior 
executives began formulating their ECR plan.  The senior executives had already reviewed 
the business units’ budgets, called S2 plans, but had not closely examined their 
operational plans intended to “close the performance gaps.”  Anderson and other 
executives, therefore, held an all-day review of these S2 plans in December 2008 to 
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scrutinize the details.  Anderson wanted to understand what fraction of the proposed cost-
reductions would be permanent. 
Fos Gen’s CI personnel formed and facilitated small teams at each power plant to 
brainstorm and assess the feasibility of cost-reduction ideas.  To meet Fos Gen’s $43 
million cost-reduction target, they identified $18.5 million in permanent cuts, $18.2 
million in one-time cuts, and $6.2 million in scope reductions.  Fos Gen’s personnel 
planned to perform the same amount of preventive maintenance in 2009 as they did in 
2008, but they deferred any needed maintenance above that amount.  One of Fos Gen’s 
employees explained that they usually did not have data on equipment mean-failure 
times, so they guessed when equipment needed to be replaced.  During a budget crunch, 
they simply stretched out their guesses.  In June 2009, Fos Gen vice president Paul Fessler 
reported that his employees had completed 97 percent of all planned maintenance so far 
during periodic outages.  (The target for planned maintenance was always less than 100 
percent because unexpected work always arises during a periodic outage.) 
Contract labor, mostly untouched during the PEP initiative, became the first area to 
be scrutinized by business-unit personnel.  For example, the IT department’s managers 
quickly cut 145 of its 245 contractors, reducing its contract-labor expense by $22 million 
annually.  But their CI expert admitted that they eliminated these contractors without a 
plan to get the contractors’ work done.  The “continuous improvement” aspect of this 
reduction was finding ways to redistribute the work among employees and remaining 
contractors, or to stop it entirely.  The CI expert said, “There have to be scope cuts.  IT 
went to the business units and said, ‘Here's a list of the work that we're doing.  We no 
longer have the contractors to get all this work done.  Pick the most important items on 
this list, and the rest will get dropped for now.’”  A middle manager in Fos Gen confessed 
to using the same pattern: cut contractors, reassign their work to DTE Energy employees, 
find extra time for those employees by reducing waste elsewhere in their work processes 
or dropping low-priority work. 
Several CI employees thought that the economic crisis came “at the perfect time” for 
the CI initiative because it created “a sense of urgency.”  They noticed that employees 
were willing to make changes that they would have resisted otherwise.  However, they 
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also worried that the senior executives’ haste to cut costs would have unintended 
consequences.  A MichCon Black Belt said, “Because this [crisis] is big, we have to really 
clamp down.  That brings you back to short-term, real fixes fast.  Sometimes that is tough 
to manage along with a long-term, quality-oriented continuous-improvement solution.  
...Right now I need to show it on the balance sheet or it needs to be something in the 
ground out in the field.  ...It's definitely ‘What’s broken today?’  We'll replace that piece 
with a better piece, a bigger piece, or two pieces to fix that one problem.  Once that one 
problem’s fixed, you forget about it.  Then you’ve got four other problems that stem from 
it, because you didn't think about it hard enough.  That‘s kind of how we're playing, 
because there’s lots of training and evolution that has to happen before people see process 
linkages, or even have processes defined well enough.”  Emmett Romine, DO’s former CI 
manager, said, “We're doing lots of cost-cutting now.  We may benchmark pretty well 
because we had to cut so much, relative to the rest of the industry, just because Michigan 
is in such bad shape.  ...This time they went after the contractors.  Will this be a 
sustainable benchmark?  We'll get there, probably, but will it be sustainable?  Did we put 
the processes in place?  ...I don't know.  We'll see.  Call to action is like this.  Burning 
platforms sometimes create that kind of a momentum, so we'll see what happens.” 
Between February and May 2009, Schulist taught CI to CEO Tony Earley one-on-
one, as he did for Anderson in late 2008.  Earley completed his CI practicum at Customer 
Service’s Southfield service center, improving how the CS representatives handle high-bill 
events.  He presented his project at the 2nd-quarter board meeting as a way of teaching 
DTE Energy’s board of directors about CI concepts.  Schulist reported that the board 
members received it very well and even gave their own advice for the CI initiative.  One 
of the board members recommended, “Don’t make it a fad.”  Earley announced that he 
wanted every manager always working on a CI-related project.  “That’s now part of your 
job as management,” he said.  Inevitably, some managers, looking to further their careers, 
“repositioned themselves to look like they are part of the [CI] action,” even if they did not 
believe in CI’s value.  Schulist said, “We talk about creating a safe culture.  Now people 
feel as if it's not safe to be seen not being part of CI.” 
A former CI manager who became an operations manager suggested to Earley, 
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Anderson, and Meador that all managers should have specific CI goals added to their 
annual performance review (called EAS at DTE Energy).  He believed, like many other 
managers I interviewed, that middle managers would not take CI seriously otherwise.  A 
CI manager explained that managers are not penalized for ignoring the CI initiative: “Why 
would they bother?  It's just more work for them.  There's not a CI mindset.  They don't 
care about continuously improving.”  One executive said, ”One of our biggest challenges 
in the next year or two at DTE Energy is making sure that all of our supervisors and 
managers see value in this, and that they are measured on whether or not they are 
utilizing it — in terms of promotion, performance, and pay. If people really see that this 
isn’t some intellectual exercise but it is the way we’re going to run the business, I think 
they’ll respond to that” (Wilhelm, 2009, pp. 39-40).  Arguing against this suggestion, 
Meador said, “I don't think this organization is ready for that level of tension.”  But most 
departments were given mandates by their senior executives to hold a specific number of 
swarm events in 2009. 
In August 2008, Schulist had failed to get Anderson and the other senior executives 
to define a vision for the CI initiative, called True North.  (Schulist adopted this term from 
Toyota.)  Over the next six months, therefore, Schulist defined it himself.  He presented 
this “CI True North” to all of DTE Energy’s CI personnel in March 2009 at an off-site 
retreat: 
1. Perpetual annual improvement in safety, productivity, cost, quality, and customer 
service. 
2. All processes are defined and mapped, and include embedded tests. 
3. All employees know and exhibit CI capabilities (C1-C4). 
4. Immediately responding to embedded tests and improving processes are both done 
at the point of activity. 
5. Improvements made in one area are spread throughout the company. 
6. All leaders spend equal amounts of time on (i) developing people, (ii) developing 
strategy, and (iii) responding to embedded tests. 
OSSG co-director Bob Hemrick agreed with Schulist’s stressing this True North 
vision statement.  As a relative newcomer to the company, he praised DTE Energy for 
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retaining its Operating System since 2002 but he felt the company had neither gained a 
deeper understanding of CI nor elaborated the Operating System to reflect such an 
understanding.  The senior executives had become involved in the CI initiative because of 
the ECR plan, but Hemrick feared they would “become disenchanted and start looking for 
the next big thing” after the crisis subsided. 
As a result of having to run a certain number of swarm events, managers increased 
their requests for assistance from DTE Energy’s CI experts.  An OSSG manager said, “As 
we continue down this path, we’re still being seen as people who can help you train your 
people, improve your processes, map your processes, find mistakes, find defects....  We’re 
still seen as helpers.”  One of DTE Energy’s few Local 223 Black Belts said, “The biggest 
thing I'm starting to see is a pull for me.  When the organization starts to pull you, that's 
good.  It's good [for] CI.  It's not good that I've only got so many hours in a day!  ...I'm not 
saying it's a huge pull, but I am seeing more of that.  I think these workshops are leaving 
people with a taste of, ‘Hey, this is pretty cool.  This definitely can improve things.’  And it 
doesn't hurt to have the vice president running the workshop!” 
Schulist adopted two conceptual frameworks from Steven Spear's work on executive 
workshops, but he wasn't able to translate them into concrete organizational practices at 
DTE Energy until 2009.  Spear had collaborated with TSSC president Hajime Ohba to 
develop those executive workshops based on his TPS research and on his experiences 
training managers on TPS at Alcoa and at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
(UPMC).  Spear later conducted these workshops for BAMA member companies, 
including Hemrick's former employer Dana Corporation.  The first framework was an 
early version of Spear’s (2009) four capabilities of “operationally outstanding companies”: 
(C1) process design, (C2) problem solving, (C3) knowledge sharing, and (C4) leaders as 
teachers.  DTE Energy’s CI personnel have stressed these four capabilities in swarm events 
so much that many front-line employees and middle managers use the terms “swarm” and 
“C1-C4” interchangeably.  In March 2009, Hemrick led a committee that revised DTE 
Energy’s Operating System diagram, the first revision since 2005, to include these four 
capabilities and to make it more graphical by reducing the amount of text (see Appendix 
C).  (Surprisingly, this committee cut the previously ballyhooed 12 Operating Principles, 
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replacing them with DTE Energy’s list of "corporate values" and four additional “guiding 
principles”: (1) identify and eliminate waste, (2) be data driven, (3) be accountable, and (4) 
build collaboration.)  The second framework that Schulist adopted from the TSSC 
workshops was a set of process-design elements based on the 'DNA rules' of the Toyota 
Production System (Spear & Bowen, 1999).  Four elements represent the components of 
swimlane flowcharts: outputs, pathways, connections, and activities (OPCA).  To this list, 
Schulist added a few other elements from TPS: prespecified work (called SWI at DTE 
Energy), embedded tests to signal abnormalities, and escalation procedures for addressing 
such abnormalities. 
Schulist admitted that before he attended the TSSC workshops, he had 
underestimated the importance of designing processes such that front-line employees can 
tell easily when something goes wrong.  Such process design requires SWIs (to define 
what is normal performance) and embedded tests (to signal abnormal conditions).  
Schulist said, “The [CILW] course and talking to people like [Jeffrey] Liker, [Steven] Spear, 
and [people at] Dana have taught me.  I've changed my mental models on a lot of things.  
We would have put the pieces together, but it still would have been a system that wasn't 
making work self-diagnostic.  It would have been just more Lean tools to close gaps.”  A 
CI manager emphasized the importance of embedded tests over behavioral interventions: 
“Sure, training is always an element of a solution, but never the solution itself, right?  
Training is fleeting.  It is necessary to put controls in place to prevent errors from 
occurring.  At the very least, make sure that when a defect happens, we detect it.”  A 
Black Belt said that this emphasis on embedded tests is a culture change for DTE Energy’s 
managers: “We rely solely on behavioral change: ‘You did it wrong, so you do it right next 
time.’  And I will have that same conversation, slightly different, with the next guy who 
does it wrong — never figuring out how you guys were both trained in it wrong and 
reorganizing that, nor putting in controls to prevent it from ever happening again (unless, 
of course, there's a gas or electric safety thing).” 
DTE Energy’s senior executives gave the OSSG a few more positions in 2009.  One 
of these positions was filled by Deborah Meyers, who joined the OSSG from the HR 
department’s Organizational Learning group to be in charge of creating materials for 
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knowledge sharing (C3) and for training executives as CI coaches (C4).  (The other 
positions were two additional CI managers: one for the finance organization, and one for 
company-wide improvement projects like time entry and payroll, contract administration, 
and the requisition-to-check process.)  After Meyers joined the OSSG in January 2009, she 
began creating CI materials for the senior executives.  She restarted development of the CI 
Champion training course that had been abandoned in 2005.  She also created a 
standardized template that DTE Energy’s senior executives could use to diagnose and 
coach the C1-C4 capabilities during departmental site visits.  The OSSG personnel 
originally called these site visits “executive go-and-see events” but — because they were 
closer to HP’s practice of MBWA — they later renamed them “CI capability assessments” 
(see both Go-and-See and MBWA in the Glossary).  Earley first tested this template in 
February on a site visit to the IT department.  An OSSG leader reported what he called the 
“yellow-brick-road problem”: Everyone in the IT department was calling each other 
frantically, trying to figure out which areas Earley would visit (the yellow brick road) so 
they could “whitewash” those areas in advance.  The OSSG personnel noted that such 
whitewashing — indicating fear of embarrassment, blame, and punishment — distorts the 
executives’ assessments.  Schulist recommended that the executives make surprise visits, 
although he acknowledged that only the executives’ behavior over time would alleviate 
the fear in the company. 
According to Schulist and Hemrick, the rationale for teaching employees C1-C4 and 
OPCA is to promote common terminology and shared mental models for designing 
processes and solving problems.  ”It’s not about closing gaps — it’s about developing 
people who close gaps,” said Schulist (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 40).  He also reported that the 
teaching portions of CILWs and swarm events had “created an in-crowd that speaks a 
special language, with [president] Steve Kurmas as its Pope.”  A manager in Fos Gen 
perceived this growing familiarity with CI terms and concepts as the beginning of culture 
change: 
We're mapping things and it's amazing.  When I run into my counterparts in 
other parts of the company: "Oh, we're doing the same thing!"  You get that 
we're-in-this-together kind of thing.  Almost like religion, fervor, or whatever it 
is.  People say it's a cult.  Not quite, but there's some semblance of that.  It's a 
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critical mass.  They call it “DNA Building” in OSSG — when everybody's using 
the same tools together and you're pulling in the same direction.  Someone 
says, "Yeah I did a kaizen on that," and you know what they're talking about.  
Or, "We had a swarm event," and you know.  That's starts to help.  It's catchy, 
it really is.  It's almost infectious — that's the word I was looking for.  It works 
well, it really does.  People say, "He's not coming here to eliminate my job, 
he's coming here to help me."  We're working together to make a process 
better or improve something. 
 
By early 2009, DTE Energy employed a total of 120 certified Black Belts, the second 
CI implementation plan’s target for 2006.  About whether this number was adequate, one 
manager said, “It’s not a lot, but it’s plenty if they’re deployed appropriately.  Skilled Black 
Belts working successful projects that matter to their internal customers can have an 
impact.  You could get a swell of conversion if you did it that way, but that’s not how 
we’re doing it, unfortunately.”  After 2006, the OSSG personnel were no longer trying to 
grow the Black Belt population to any particular size, but a few OSSG managers believed 
DTE Energy should strive to reach George Koenigsaeker’s guideline of three to four 
percent of the total workforce (Koenigsaecker, 2009, p. 69).  By the end of 2009, DTE 
Energy employed 139 certified Black Belts, about 1.3 percent of DTE Energy's workforce. 
Managers and executives believed that the CI initiative helped the business units 
reach their 2009 financial targets.  One middle manager said, “In the two areas I've been 
in lately, Fos Gen and Marketing, the people at the very top know who's working on Black 
Belt projects, they see the results.  ...[Employees] are using the tools.  They're 
implementing small, incremental changes, getting a lot of base hits.  ...[T]he company 
challenged us to reduce our O&M budget by a hundred and fifty million dollars this year, 
because they know our revenues are going to be down.  You can see it: The numbers are 
coming down, the savings are there.  It wasn't magic.  ...They used the tools to identify 
where things could be cut, they looked to improve things.  They're measuring this stuff.  
It's not accidental, I tell you.  ...We're doing more with less and the only way you do it is 
if you do it smarter.” 
DTE Energy met its company-wide budget in 2009, including the ECR cost-reduction 
targets.  Certain operations and maintenance (O&M) costs — like pensions, healthcare, 
and environmental costs — increased from 2008 levels, but cost reductions more than 
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compensated for these increases.  DTE Energy’s net change in O&M expenses was $85 
million lower.  COO Anderson attributed some of this performance to the CI initiative.  He 
said, “Our people worked hard to apply these tools to keep our company healthy in 2009.  
But we still have a long way to go to build excellence into every one of our processes.” 
 
4.5. The CI Initiative's Future — Beyond 2009 
The OSSG's leaders were aware of some shortcomings in the CI initiative that they 
needed to fix going forward if they were to achieve their vision of every DTE Energy 
employee solving problems "at the point of activity".  One shortcoming was the poor 
quality of CI training for front-line employees.  Another shortcoming was the lack of 
effective channels for employees to share relevant learnings from their CI work with other 
employees who might benefit from that knowledge (Spear's capability C3, knowledge 
sharing).  Finally, Schulist and Hemrick believed that swarm events were not going to be 
sufficient for achieving the kind of change they envisioned (for many of the reasons I 
enumerate in Appendix B). 
The OSSG trained only about 140 OS Specialists in 2009, down from about 400 in 
2008 (see Figure 4, p.91).  I attribute this low number to two factors.  First, swarm events 
supplanted the OS Specialist course as the primary means of introducing front-line 
employees to CI.  Second, I believe that managers began to perceive that training OS 
Specialists was a waste of time and money.  One manager said, “A lot of people have the 
Specialist training, but there's no requirement or even expectation to use the tools that 
they learned.  We send people to training just to put a check in a box.  ...To some people, 
it's just a trip downtown from the north or south area.  I'm being too honest.  They come 
and sit through the six-hour class — it was a good day, had a good lunch, and then go 
back.”  Another manager agreed: “You go in, you get out, you’re a Specialist — go have 
fun.  Last you ever hear of them.  ...They’re not seen any differently in the organization.  
You’re supposed to bring all these cool ideas to your group, but in all honestly — looking 
at those ideas and knowing the culture — that would be difficult.  ...They end up not 
doing it.  No one ever checks on them, no one ever gives them support, so — Poof! — it’s 
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gone.”  Also, a Black Belt blamed the OSSG’s course for not explaining how to apply the 
CI tools to real-world problems: “Lot's of tools in place, but no one knows how to use the 
tools.  They're just tools.  If I give my twelve-year-old a hammer, he knows how it works.  
He can use the tool.  [But] he might cost me thousands of dollars in damages when he's 
trying to drywall the bathroom.” 
In early 2009, Hemrick observed swarm-event teams persistently making the same 
errors when using the OSSG’s countermeasure worksheet for problem solving (see 
Countermeasure Worksheet in the Glossary).  For example, they would use a symptom as 
a problem statement, not link their desired outcome to their problem statement, and rush 
to implement countermeasures before they understood their problem’s root cause(s).  
Consequently, one of the OSSG's managers collaborated with Raytheon consultants to 
design and create a training course on problem solving with the scientific method.  Other 
evidence of poor training prompted Schulist to acknowledge that there was still “too big a 
gap” between the OS Specialist course and the Black Belt course.  He began exploring the 
feasibility of creating “a rainbow of belts”: turning the OS Specialist training into a White 
Belt, inserting a Yellow Belt and a Green Belt before the Black Belt, and creating an 
Executive Belt for CI “champions”. 
Schulist, Hemrick, and Meyers recognized the need for mechanisms to share CI 
knowledge across departments and business units, but they were at a loss for what these 
mechanisms should be.  Schulist was already pestering DTE Energy’s CI personnel to 
furnish him with A3 Reports (see Glossary) for each CILW, but he also wanted to store all 
Black Belt certification-project materials and swarm-event flowcharts in an OSSG 
database accessible from the OSSG’s internal website.  He had difficulty getting them to 
comply; Fos Gen and DO were trying to create their own flowchart repositories.  Schulist 
had DTE Energy’s Corporate Communications department begin publishing CI success 
stories in DTE Energy’s internal newsletter, but many CI experts suspected that such 
broadcasting was received by employees as “noise” rather than knowledge sharing.  In 
late 2009, Meyers conducted focus groups and interviews with CI managers and 
executives to solicit their suggestions for sharing CI lessons.  Schulist and Hemrick 
discussed the need for networks of employees, or communities of practice (Lave & 
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Wenger, 1991), formed around solving problems of particular types.  Schulist 
contemplated holding a quarterly CI conference, with presentations, panel discussions, 
and break-out sessions.  At the end of 2009, the OSSG personnel had not implemented 
any of these ideas. 
Schulist had failed to revive the learning-line approach in 2009 — renamed 
“beachheads” — as he had wanted to do since he became the OSSG's director in January 
2007.  At a CI managers’ meeting, Hemrick explained that the purpose of a beachhead is 
for front-line employees and their supervisors to figure out how to make CI work within a 
particular context or business-unit location.  “Like a military beach landing, the boats drop 
you off and withdraw, so there is no going back,” he said.  During the fourth quarter of 
2008, Schulist and Hemrick tried monthly to convince the senior executives to adopt this 
approach.  In the midst of DTE Energy’s economic-crisis response, most of the business 
units’ vice presidents felt they could not devote the necessary attention, resources, and 
effort to establish a beachhead in their areas.  The one exception was Bob Richard.  As we 
saw in section 4.2, he had already decided that Michigan Avenue Service Center would 
be MichCon’s model location.  However, a new station manager was appointed to 
Michigan Avenue in January 2009 and he requested a delayed start of four months while 
he learned his new role.  By September 2009, no beachhead was underway anywhere in 
the company, but Hemrick was still promoting the idea and asking the OSSG veterans 
about the details of Coolidge’s 2004 learning line.  Hemrick said, “We’ve been only 
scratching the surface.  We’re still looking for the right recipe.” 
Jason Schulist, like Shawn Patterson before him, was promoted into an operational 
position in May 2010.  He passed the leadership of the OSSG, subsequently renamed as 
the Continuous Improvement Strategy Group (CISG), to Bob Hemrick.  Hemrick believed 
strongly that instilling a culture of CI at DTE Energy was going to take more than discrete 
projects and episodic swarm events.  “Whatever it is,” he said, “it needs to be systemic, 
not just a bunch of swarms.”  Arguing in favor of beachheads at a CI managers’ meeting, 
he said, “We're not going to get there by swarms.  I did swarms at Dana for twenty years 
and they didn't work.”  He also said that DTE Energy’s senior executives need to 
understand that short-term cost cutting isn’t part of the beachhead approach.  TMMK 
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manager Jamie Bonini echoed Hemrick’s opinions when he visited DTE Energy in May 
2009.  He told Schulist that episodic swarm events do not instill the habits of process 
design (C1) and problem solving (C2) “in the moment” on the front line; instilling those 
habits requires persistent coaching by managers. 
Employees across DTE Energy’s business units and at every level of the hierarchy 
agreed that the difference between the CI initiative in 2009 and what came before was the 
direct participation of the company’s leaders.  One of Local 223’s UMP facilitators 
observed how DTE Energy’s CI initiative was fulfilling the UMP initiative’s goal from 1999: 
“The perfect leader is the type of leader that facilitates the success of the team, gives them 
the tools and materials and skills — very much what we're teaching now around leaders 
as teachers [C4].  If you look at our C1-C4: ‘Engaging my employees and giving them the 
skills to be effective problem solvers.’  That was the goal ten years ago with the 
Partnership.”  DO vice president Vince Dow said, “What’s always enlightening is finding 
what the roadblock is and trying to figure out how a decision, even one I made, filters 
down and comes out causing a problem.  You made a decision but you never even 
thought about all the impacts.  So you find these things and get them fixed.”  He went on 
to say, “I have well over 3000 people I’ve got to get [CI] to, and until you actually touch it 
and do it, you don’t get it.  ...[U]ntil I get to every location with it, they won’t get it.  And 
I’ve got hundreds of locations.  ...I think this is one of those things you either get deterred 
because it’s so huge, or you say, ‘It may just take me a little longer but I’ve got to keep 
going’” (Wilhelm, 2009, pp. 39-40). 
DTE Energy has begun attracting interest from other organizations for its CI initiative.  
The Council for Six Sigma Executives, a group convened by The Conference Board to 
share CI best practices, visited DTE Energy in November 2009 to learn about its CI 
initiative.  Then DTE Energy won the “Best Improvement Program” category of the 2010 
North American Process Excellence Awards given by the International Quality and 
Productivity Center (IQPC) in January.  The judging panel comprised Lean Six Sigma 
professionals from a broad cross-section of industries.  In April 2010, DTE Energy hosted 
an event jointly organized by the Michigan Lean Consortium (MLC) and Oakland 
University's Pawley Lean Institute to present its CI initiative to MLC members and other 
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Michigan companies.  Anderson and Meador spoke at length on the topic of executive 
leadership for CI.  At the beginning of 2010, DTE Energy's CI initiative seemed to enjoy a 
high degree of senior executive support and involvement, and was gaining traction with 
the front-line employees.  Anderson said, "While we made a lot of progress around 
continuous improvement last year, the reality is we've barely started to scratch the surface.  
We've got a long way to go.  And that's why expanding our use of CI is one of our key 
priorities." 
 
4.6. Wave Three Summary 
Unstressed First Phase — 2007-2008 
As the newly appointed OSSG director, Schulist's first job in 2007 was to get the CI 
initiative back on track, so he did not change the design of the CI initiative right away.  
Even though McKinsey's consultants had left, DTE Energy's business units were still 
required to achieve their PEP targets for 2007.  However, Schulist restarted Patterson's 
executive development and Black Belt-led Lean projects in some of DTE Energy's service 
stations. 
Schulist's major breakthrough was taking key executives to TSSC's week-long Lean 
workshops where they could learn about Lean in a hands-on manner with executives from 
other companies.  He astutely realized the potential of running such workshops internally: 
They could (1) convince the executives, (2) train employees in a learn-by-doing fashion, 
and (3) promote a CI mindset in the company — and do all three simultaneously.  For the 
most part, Schulist successfully achieved these three aims with CILWs in 2008 and 2009 
(on the other hand, see Appendix B for an assessment of CILW problems). 
In Chapter 3, I claimed that the OSSG personnel paid insufficient attention to the 
quality and rigor of its Black Belt training since its inception (see also Appendix B).  Each 
Master Black Belt's overhaul of the Black Belt course and short tenure indicate 
inconsistency and high variability in the training content over time.  The OSSG personnel 
did improve the Black Belt program by promulgating stricter certification criteria and 
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making other reforms.  Mike Baum's experience as MichCon's CI manager (see section 
4.2) demonstrates the tremendous difference made by the right focus: Each of MichCon's 
Black Belts verifiably saved more than $1 million in 2008 as compared to uncertain and 
doubted savings in 2007.  Despite these improvements, however, the Black Belt program 
still had flaws in 2009 (see Appendix B). 
Stressed Second Phase — 2008-2009 
Swarm events were the logical extension of CILWs, aimed at training and convincing 
middle managers and front-line employees.  Fortunately for the CI initiative, the economic 
crisis of October 2008 occurred when the OSSG personnel were trying to introduce 
swarm events.  DTE Energy's senior executives, newly convinced by CILWs, vigorously 
promoted swarm events as a viable response to the crisis. 
The senior executives' push for CI activities, therefore, propagated down the 
company hierarchy.  I perceive that DTE Energy's executives had adequately developed 
their own skill with CI for supporting this push, but they did not adequately assess the skill 
levels of their subordinates.  Whether DTE Energy's employees undertook CI activities in 
earnest or just "went through the motions" for the ECR plan depended on how much prior 
exposure and practice they had with CI techniques, as well as how much assistance they 
received from DTE Energy's Black Belts. 
The executives' push for swarm events in 2009 was not the only pressure for CI 
activities.  As section 4.3 shows, convinced middle managers in Fos Gen were trying to 
foster a CI culture, sometimes without top-down mandates for savings, projects, or 
workshops.  These activities in DTE Energy's power plants and in other locations 
demonstrate how the shift in culture is a numbers game, training and convincing enough 
middle managers and front-line employees such that routine work behaviors change. 
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Chapter 5: Simulation Model 
A principle aim of this simulation model was to investigate the dynamics of CI 
implementation arising from the interaction among levels of the company hierarchy.  For 
this aim, I divide the company hierarchy into the following three levels: (1) the senior 
executive level (SE), which includes the CEO, COO, CFO, and all the presidents and vice 
presidents of the various business units; (2) the middle manager level (MM), which 
includes directors and managers; and (3) the front-line level (FL), which includes managers 
with no subordinates, supervisors, and front-line employees. 
Most of the equations in this model are defined with the level subscript to represent 
each of these three levels: 
 
level: SE,MM,FL 
 
This model divides the company's workforce at each level into the following six 
states: Believers (Bel), Neutrals (Neu), Skeptics (Ske), Black Belt Trainees (BBt), Black Belt 
Candidates (BBc), and certified Black Belts (BB).  Some equations are defined for a specific 
state; in such cases the employee state will appear in the variable name.  In other 
equations, however, I found it more convenient to use subscripts to write these equations 
compactly.  Each of these subscripted equations might apply to all six employee states or 
to a subset of them, so I have defined the following nested subscript ranges to handle all 
possibilities: 
 
regEmployees: Bel,Neu,Ske,BBt 
 
nonBlackBelts: regEmployees,BBc 
 
contributor: nonBlackBelts,BB 
 
 
5.1. Employee Belief States 
This model has six employee states, each of which is represented by a stock 
(actually, a stock vector).  Three of these stocks represent regular employees' three 
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possible belief states: 
 
Believers[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Program Believers Dropout Rate[level] 
 + BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt[level] 
 + Believers Hiring Rate[level] 
 + Neutrals Convincing Rate[level] 
 + Skeptics Convincing Rate[level] 
 - Believers BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level] 
 - Believers Attrition Rate[level] 
 - Believers Disillusioning Rate[level] 
 - Believers Reversion Rate[level] 
 , Initial Believers[level]) 
Units: Person 
 
Neutrals[level]= INTEG( 
 + Believers Reversion Rate[level] 
 + Neutrals Hiring Rate[level] 
 + Skeptics Reversion Rate[level] 
 - Neutrals BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level] 
 - Neutrals Attrition Rate[level] 
 - Neutrals Convincing Rate[level] 
 - Neutrals Disillusioning Rate[level] 
 , Initial Neutrals[level]) 
Units: Person 
 
Skeptics[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Program Skeptics Dropout Rate[level] 
 + Believers Disillusioning Rate[level] 
 + Neutrals Disillusioning Rate[level] 
 + Skeptics Hiring Rate[level] 
 - Skeptics Attrition Rate[level] 
 - Skeptics Convincing Rate[level] 
 - Skeptics Reversion Rate[level] 
 , Initial Skeptics[level]) 
Units: Person 
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Figure 6. Model Diagram of Employee Belief States 
To make the formulations for CI Work Rate and Cost Cutting Work Rate (in section 
5.6, p.163) more manageable, I define Level Contributors as a convenient matrix of all 
employee states (see section 5.12, p.199, for the definitions of the Black Belt states): 
 
Level Contributors[level,Bel]= Believers[level] 
Level Contributors[level,Neu]= Neutrals[level] 
Level Contributors[level,Ske]= Skeptics[level] 
Level Contributors[level,BBt]= Black Belt Trainees[level] 
Level Contributors[level,BBc]= Black Belt Candidates[level] 
Level Contributors[level,BB]= Black Belts[level] 
Units: Person 
 
I compute a vector of employees by level and a scalar employee total by summing 
<BB
Promotion
Rate to
Mgmt>
Neutrals
Believers
Skeptics
Skeptics
Convincing
Rate
Believers
Disillusioning
Rate
Neutrals
Convincing Rate
Believers
Reversion Rate
Neutrals
Disillusioning Rate
Skeptics
Reversion Rate
Neutrals
Hiring
Rate
Neutrals
Attrition
Rate
Believers
Hiring Rate
Believers
Attrition Rate
Skeptics
Hiring
Rate
Skeptics
Attrition
Rate
<Level
Employees
Believers
Fraction>
<Level
Attrition
Rate>
+
+
<Level
Employees
Skeptics
Fraction>
+
+
<Level
Attrition
Rate>
+
<Level
Employees
Neutrals
Fraction>
+
BB Trainee
Enrolling Rate
Believers BB Trainee
Enrolling Rate
Neutrals
BB Trainee
Enrolling
Rate
<BB Program
Believers
Dropout Rate>
<BB Program
Skeptics
Dropout Rate>
<Indicated Believer BB
Trainee Enrolling Rate>
+
<Maximum Believer BB
Trainee Enrolling Rate>
+
<Indicated
Neutral BB
Trainee
Enrolling
Rate>
+
<Maximum Neutral
BB Trainee
Enrolling Rate>
+
<Skeptics Indicated
Convincing Rate>
+
<Skeptics Maximum
Convincing Rate>
+
<Neutrals Indicated
Convincing Rate>
+
<Neutrals Maximum
Convincing Rate>
+
<Believers
Indicated
Disillusioning
Rate>
+
<Believers
Maximum
Disillusioning
Rate>
+
<Neutrals Indicated
Disillusioning Rate>
+
<Neutrals Maximum
Disillusioning Rate>
+
Skeptics Avg
Reversion Time
+-
Believers Avg
Reversion Time
+
-
<Merger
Neutrals>
+
<Merger
Pulse>
<Merger
Believers>
+
<Merger
Pulse>
<Merger Pulse>
<Merger
Skeptics>
+
<BB Promotion
Rate from
Black Belts>
+
 140   
the elements of the Level Contributors matrix: 
 
Total Level Employees[level]= SUM(Level 
Contributors[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Person 
 
Total Employees= SUM(Level Contributors[level!,contributor!]) 
Units: Person 
 
Total Regular Level Employees[level]= SUM(Level 
Contributors[level,regEmployees!]) 
Units: Person 
 
Regular Level Employees Contributors Fraction[level, 
regEmployees]= ZIDZ(Level Contributors[level,regEmployees], 
Total Regular Level Employees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
During the 12 years of history that I studied, DTE Energy's workforce shrunk because 
attrition exceeded hiring.  Therefore, I formulate hiring rates mainly to represent increases 
in DTE Energy's employee stocks from Detroit Edison's merger with MichCon in 2001.  I 
formulate this workforce increase as a discrete pulse, on the merger's closing date, using a 
Dirac delta function.  Under conditions of no downsizing, I keep the number of 
employees at each level in equilibrium by replacing promoted Black Belts with hired 
neutrals. 
 
Believers Hiring Rate[level]= Merger Believers[level]*Merger Pulse 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Neutrals Hiring Rate[level]= Merger Neutrals[level]*Merger Pulse + 
BB Promotion Rate from Black Belts[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Hiring Rate[level]= Merger Skeptics[level]*Merger Pulse 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Merger Pulse= PULSE(Merger Close Date, TIME STEP)/TIME STEP 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
Under conditions of no downsizing, I keep the number of employees at each level in 
equilibrium by assuming that hired and promoted Black Belts replace employees who 
have left the company.  (Note that the formulation for Indicated Level Attrition Rate, 
however, implies that hired and promoted Black Belts "push" these replaced employees 
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out.)  The use of Maximum Level Attrition Rate in the formulation for Level Attrition Rate 
ensures first-order control on employee-attrition outflows. 
 
Level Attrition Rate[level]= MIN(Indicated Level Attrition 
Rate[level], Maximum Level Attrition Rate[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Indicated Level Attrition Rate[level]= Level Downsizing 
Rate[level] + BB Hire Rate[level] + BB Promotion Rate to 
Mgmt[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Maximum Level Attrition Rate[level]= Total Level 
Employees[level]/Minimum Attrition Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Because Level Attrition Rate is defined for an entire level of the company hierarchy, I 
allocate a fraction of this outflow to each of the employee-state stocks, proportional to 
each stock's size relative to the total size of the level. 
 
Level Employees Believers Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Believers[level], 
Total Level Employees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Level Employees Neutrals Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Neutrals[level], 
Total Level Employees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Level Employees Skeptics Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Skeptics[level], 
Total Level Employees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Believers Attrition Rate[level]= Level Attrition Rate[level]*Level 
Employees Believers Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Neutrals Attrition Rate[level]= Level Attrition Rate[level]*Level 
Employees Neutrals Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Attrition Rate[level]= Level Attrition Rate[level]*Level 
Employees Skeptics Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
I assume that believers and skeptics abandon their attitudes toward CI after a long 
period, reverting to neutrals, if no CI activities are being conducted.  For simplicity, I 
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represent this belief-abandonment process as first-order exponential decay and do not 
exclude the active CI participants from the numerators. 
 
Believers Reversion Rate[level]= Believers[level]/Believers Avg 
Reversion Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Reversion Rate[level]= Skeptics[level]/Skeptics Avg 
Reversion Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Employees from the stocks of Believers and Neutrals may enroll in Black Belt training 
as the first step toward becoming certified Black Belts.  See section 5.15 (p.215) for the 
definitions of these enrolling rates. 
Black Belts can be promoted up the company hierarchy (see also section 5.12, 
p.199).  By definition, someone cannot be "promoted" to the front-line level.  Additionally, 
senior-executive Black Belts cannot be promoted to a higher level, so I assume that they 
stay at their level. 
 
BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt[SE]= BB Promotion Rate from Black 
Belts[MM] + BB Promotion Rate from Black Belts[SE] 
BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt[MM]= BB Promotion Rate from Black 
Belts[FL] 
BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt[FL]= 0 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Employees who drop out of the Black Belt program (instead of being promoted) 
return either to the stock of Believers or to the stock of Skeptics.  See section 5.12 (p.199) 
for the definitions of these dropout rates. 
Senior executives and middle managers who are proponents of the CI initiative 
generate positive word of mouth about CI (section 5.10, p.189) and want their 
subordinates to attend Green Belt training (section 5.19, p.228). 
 
CI Proponents[level]= Believers[level] + BB Program 
Participants[level] 
Units: Person 
 
CI Proponents Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(CI Proponents[level], Total 
Level Employees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
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Span of Control[SE]= Total Level Employees[MM]/Total Level 
Employees[SE] 
Span of Control[MM]= Total Level Employees[FL]/Total Level 
Employees[MM] 
Span of Control[FL]= 0 
Units: Person/Person 
 
FL Subordinates of CI Proponents= CI Proponents[SE]*Span of 
Control[SE]*Span of Control[MM] 
Units: Person 
 
The total number of employees who join DTE Energy via the merger is required to 
compute Baseline Routine Work Level FTEs in section 5.4 (p.152) and Monthly Routine 
Work from Merger in section 5.5 (p.158). 
 
Total Level Employees from Merger[level]= Merger Believers[level] 
+ Merger Neutrals[level] + Merger Skeptics[level] 
Units: Person 
 
Parameters for Employee Belief States 
I was able to estimate the distribution of DTE Energy's employees across the three 
levels of the company hierarchy after the merger.  MichCon had approximately 3000 
employees before the merger, so I assume that MichCon had the same distribution of 
employees across its levels.  While not accurate, I assume for simplicity that all employees 
start as neutrals, except for the few senior executives at Detroit Edison who started the CI 
initiative. 
 
Initial Believers[level]= 3,0,0 
Units: Person 
 
Initial Neutrals[level]= 27,430,7040 
Units: Person 
 
Initial Skeptics[level]= 0,0,0 
Units: Person 
 
Believers Avg Reversion Time= 60 
Units: Month 
 
Skeptics Avg Reversion Time= 60 
Units: Month 
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Merger Believers[level]= 0,0,0 
Units: Person 
 
Merger Neutrals[level]= 10,170,2820 
Units: Person 
 
Merger Skeptics[level]= 0,0,0 
Units: Person 
 
Merger Close Date= 52 
Units: Month 
 
Minimum Attrition Time= 0.25 
Units: Month 
 
5.2. Employee CI Experience Co-flow 
The model includes a co-flow structure, which mirrors the employee-states structure 
in section 5.1 (p.137), to account for the aggregate person-hours of CI experience 
associated with each employee stock: 
 
Believers CI Experience[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Program Believers Dropout Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt CI Experience[level] 
 + Believers CI Experience Gain Rate[level] 
 + Believers Hiring Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + Neutrals Convincing Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + Skeptics Convincing Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Believers Attrition Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Believers BB Trainee Enrolling Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Believers CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level] 
 - Believers Disillusioning Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Believers Reversion Rate CI Experience[level] 
 , 0) 
Units: Person*Hours 
 
Neutrals CI Experience[level]= INTEG( 
 + Believers Reversion Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + Neutrals CI Experience Gain Rate[level] 
 + Neutrals Hiring Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + Skeptics Reversion Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Neutrals BB Trainee Enrolling Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Neutrals Attrition Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Neutrals CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level] 
 - Neutrals Convincing Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Neutrals Disillusioning Rate CI Experience[level] 
 , 0) 
Units: Person*Hours 
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Skeptics CI Experience[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Program Skeptics Dropout Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + Believers Disillusioning Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + Neutrals Disillusioning Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + Skeptics CI Experience Gain Rate[level] 
 + Skeptics Hiring Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Skeptics Attrition Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Skeptics CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level] 
 - Skeptics Convincing Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - Skeptics Reversion Rate CI Experience[level] 
 , 0) 
Units: Person*Hours 
 
 
Figure 7. Model Diagram of Employee CI Experience Co-flow 
This experience co-flow structure is used to compute the average CI experience of 
each type of regular employee.  I assume that each employee possesses the average CI 
experience of his or her state: 
 
<BB Program Skeptics
Dropout Rate CI Experience>
<Skeptics
Reversion Rate>
Believers
Disillusioning
Rate CI
Experience
Skeptics
Convincing
Rate CI
Experience
Neutrals CI Experience
Believers CI Experience
Skeptics CI Experience
Neutrals Convincing
Rate CI Experience
Believers Reversion Rate
CI Experience
Neutrals Disillusioning
Rate CI Experience
Skeptics
Reversion Rate CI
Experience
Neutrals Hiring Rate
CI Experience
Neutrals Attrition Rate
CI Experience
Believers Hiring Rate
CI Experience
Believers
Attrition Rate CI
Experience
Skeptics Hiring Rate
CI Experience
Skeptics
Attrition Rate
CI Experience
Believers
Avg CI
Experience
Skeptics Avg
CI Experience
<Neutrals CI Experience
Gain Rate>
<Believers CI
Experience
Gain Rate>
<Skeptics CI
Experience
Gain Rate>
+
+
<Believers>
-
<Skeptics>
-
<Believers
Attrition Rate>
++
<Believers
Reversion Rate> +
+
<Believers
Disillusioning
Rate>
+
+
<Believers Hiring Rate>
+
Hired Believers Avg CI Experience +
<Skeptics
Attrition
Rate>
++
+
<Skeptics
Convincing
Rate> +
Hired Skeptics Avg
CI Experience
+
<Skeptics Hiring Rate>
++
+
+
+
<Neutrals
Attrition
Rate>
+
<Neutrals
Disillusioning
Rate>
+
Neutrals
Avg CI
Experience
+ <Neutrals
Convincing
Rate>
+
Hired Neutrals Avg
CI Experience
+
<Neutrals
Hiring Rate>
+
Skeptics CI Experience
Obsolescence Rate
CI Experience
Obsolescence
Time
-+
Believers CI Experience
Obsolescence Rate
-+
Neutrals CI Experience
Obsolescence Rate
+
<CI
Experience
Obsolescence
Time>
-
<BB Program Believers
Dropout Rate CI Experience>
+
<Believers BB
Trainee
Enrolling Rate>
+
Believers BB Trainee
Enrolling Rate CI Experience
+
<Neutrals BB Trainee
Enrolling Rate>
+
Neutrals BB Trainee
Enrolling Rate CI
Experience
<Neutrals>
-
+
<BB Promotion Rate to
Mgmt CI Experience>
BB Trainee
Enrolling Rate
CI Experience
 146   
Believers Avg CI Experience[level]= ZIDZ(Believers CI 
Experience[level], Believers[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Neutrals Avg CI Experience[level]= ZIDZ(Neutrals CI 
Experience[level], Neutrals[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Skeptics Avg CI Experience[level]= ZIDZ(Skeptics CI 
Experience[level], Skeptics[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
When employees transition from one state to another, they bring their (average) CI 
experience with them.  These transitions are the rates associated with attrition and 
reversion (section 5.1, p.137), convincing (section 5.10, p.189), disillusioning (section 
5.11, p.195), and enrolling in Black Belt training (section 5.15, p.215). 
 
Believers Attrition Rate CI Experience[level]= Believers Attrition 
Rate[level]*Believers Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals Attrition Rate CI Experience[level]= Neutrals Attrition 
Rate[level]*Neutrals Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics Attrition Rate CI Experience[level]= Skeptics Attrition 
Rate[level]*Skeptics Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Believers Reversion Rate CI Experience[level]= Believers Reversion 
Rate[level]*Believers Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics Reversion Rate CI Experience[level]= Skeptics Reversion 
Rate[level]*Skeptics Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals Convincing Rate CI Experience[level]= Neutrals Convincing 
Rate[level]*Neutrals Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics Convincing Rate CI Experience[level]= Skeptics Convincing 
Rate[level]*Skeptics Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Believers Disillusioning Rate CI Experience[level]= Believers 
Disillusioning Rate[level]*Believers Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
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Neutrals Disillusioning Rate CI Experience[level]= Neutrals 
Disillusioning Rate[level]*Neutrals Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Believers BB Trainee Enrolling Rate CI Experience[level]= 
Believers BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]*Believers Avg CI 
Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals BB Trainee Enrolling Rate CI Experience[level]= Neutrals 
BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]*Neutrals Avg CI 
Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Similarly, hired employees join the company with their (average) 
CI experience (which might be zero). 
 
Believers Hiring Rate CI Experience[level]= Believers Hiring 
Rate[level]*Hired Believers Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals Hiring Rate CI Experience[level]= Neutrals Hiring 
Rate[level]*Hired Neutrals Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics Hiring Rate CI Experience[level]= Skeptics Hiring 
Rate[level]*Hired Skeptics Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
This experience co-flow is non-conserved.  Employees gain additional CI experience 
from participating in training and CI projects.  Also, I assume that employees' CI 
experience becomes obsolete via first-order exponential decay.  Therefore, employees 
must continually replenish their CI experience by participating in CI activities.  I allow for 
the descriptively accurate possibility that CI experience gained from training is not as 
valuable as CI experience gained through hands-on participation in CI projects. 
 
Believers CI Experience Gain Rate[level]= Believers CI Experience 
Gain from Training[level] + Believers CI Experience Gain from 
Projects[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals CI Experience Gain Rate[level]= Neutrals CI Experience 
Gain from Training[level] + Neutrals CI Experience Gain from 
Projects[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
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Skeptics CI Experience Gain Rate[level]= Skeptics CI Experience 
Gain from Training[level] + Skeptics CI Experience Gain from 
Projects[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Believers CI Experience Gain from Training[level]= Believers GB 
Training Rate[level]*CI Experience Value of GB Training 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals CI Experience Gain from Training[level]= Neutrals GB 
Training Rate[level]*CI Experience Value of GB Training + 
Neutrals SE Training Rate[level]*CI Experience Value of SE 
Training 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics CI Experience Gain from Training[level]= Skeptics GB 
Training Rate[level]*CI Experience Value of GB Training + 
Skeptics SE Training Rate[level]*CI Experience Value of SE 
Training 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Believers CI Experience Gain from Projects[level]= CI Work 
Contribution Rate[level,Bel]*CI Experience Value of Projects 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals CI Experience Gain from Projects[level]= CI Work 
Contribution Rate[level,Neu]*CI Experience Value of Projects 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics CI Experience Gain from Projects[level]= CI Work 
Contribution Rate[level,Ske]*CI Experience Value of Projects 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Believers CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level]= Believers CI 
Experience[level]/CI Experience Obsolescence Time 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level]= Neutrals CI 
Experience[level]/CI Experience Obsolescence Time 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level]= Skeptics CI 
Experience[level]/CI Experience Obsolescence Time 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Finally, employees who are promoted into operational roles from the Black Belt 
program (see sections 5.1 and 5.12) bring their (average) CI experience with them. 
 
BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt CI Experience[SE]= BB Promotion Rate CI 
Experience[MM] + BB Promotion Rate CI Experience[SE] 
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BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt CI Experience[MM]= BB Promotion Rate CI 
Experience[FL] 
BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt CI Experience[FL]= 0 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Parameters for Employee CI Experience Co-flow 
For simplicity, I assume that hired employees have no CI experience. 
 
Hired Believers Avg CI Experience[level]= 0,0,0 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Hired Neutrals Avg CI Experience[level]= 0,0,0 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Hired Skeptics Avg CI Experience[level]= 0,0,0 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
I assume that the CI experience gained from training is less than the CI experience 
gained from CI projects. 
 
CI Experience Value of GB Training= 0.1 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
CI Experience Value of SE Training= 0.2 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
CI Experience Value of Projects= 1 
Units: Fraction [1,1] 
 
CI Experience Obsolescence Time= 6 
Units: Month 
 
5.3. CI Skill 
I use the same equation for skill with CI tools and methods for all employees.  It is 
convenient, therefore, to represent the average CI experience associated with all employee 
states in matrix form: 
 
Contributors Avg CI Experience[level,Bel]= Believers Avg CI 
Experience[level] 
Contributors Avg CI Experience[level,Neu]= Neutrals Avg CI 
Experience[level] 
Contributors Avg CI Experience[level,Ske]= Skeptics Avg CI 
Experience[level] 
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Contributors Avg CI Experience[level,BBt]= BB Trainee Avg CI 
Experience[level] 
Contributors Avg CI Experience[level,BBc]= BB Candidate Avg CI 
Experience[level] 
Contributors Avg CI Experience[level,BB]= BB Avg CI 
Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
I formulate skill from CI experience using the classic learning-curve function (Teplitz, 
1991; Wright, 1936; Yelle, 1979).  The Progress Ratio defines the percentage increase in 
skill for every doubling of normalized CI experience (the Learning Rate defines the 
marginal percentage increase).  CI experience is normalized with the CI Experience 
Threshold parameter (see below).  The shape of the learning-curve function is determined 
by the Experiential Learning Parameter, based on the Progress Ratio.  I assume that every 
employee has the same non-zero Baseline Minimum Skill — i.e., basic problem solving — 
and that every employee has the same Learning Rate. 
 
Contributors Skill[level,contributor]= Baseline Minimum Skill + 
Reference Skill*(Contributors Avg CI 
Experience[level,contributor]/CI Experience 
Threshold)^Experiential Learning Parameter 
Units: Fraction 
 
Experiential Learning Parameter= LN(Progress Ratio)/LN(2) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Progress Ratio= 1 + Learning Rate 
Units: Fraction 
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Figure 8. Model Diagram of CI Skill 
The variable FL Projects Fractional Skill Gap, a measure of how unskilled are front-
line employees compared to the Black Belts coaching them on their CI projects, is 
required to determine the effect of such coaching on project results in section 5.7 (p.172). 
 
Avg BB Skill= SUM(Contributors Skill[level!,BB]*BB Level 
Fraction[level!]) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
FL Projects Skill Gap[level,regEmployees]= MAX(Avg BB Skill - 
Contributors Skill[level,regEmployees], 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
FL Projects Fractional Skill Gap[level,regEmployees]= FL Projects 
Skill Gap[level,regEmployees]/Contributors 
Skill[level,regEmployees] 
Units: Fraction 
 
I compute the average skill level of regular employees (excluding Black Belts and 
Black Belt candidates) as an output measure. 
Regular Employees Avg Skill[level]= SUM(Contributors 
Skill[level,regEmployees!]*Regular Level Employees 
Contributors Fraction[level,regEmployees!]) 
Units: Fraction 
 
Parameters for CI Skill 
I define Reference Skill to be the skill level of newly certified Black Belts, who are 
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expected to save $250 thousand with a 3-month project (480 person-hours of CI work).  
CI Experience Threshold defines the amount of CI experience, measured in person-hours, 
equal to Reference Skill.  It comprises 160 person-hours of Black Belt training, discounted 
by CI Experience Value of BB Training (section 5.13, p.204), plus an assumed 1040 
person-hours of CI work to complete and defend two certification projects. 
 
Reference Skill= 1 
Units: Dmnl 
 
CI Experience Threshold= 1088 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Baseline Minimum Skill= 0.01 
Units: Dmnl 
 
The Learning Rate defines the marginal percentage increase in skill for every 
doubling of normalized CI experience. 
 
Learning Rate= 0.3 
Units: Fraction 
 
5.4. Routine Work 
I model employees' completion of routine work using the standard labor-
capacitated-process structure from section 14.2 in Sterman (2000, pp. 563-569).  
Employees complete tasks from the stock of Routine Work To Do while striving to achieve 
the goal of Routine Work Standard Completion Time.  This striving forms two parallel 
balancing-feedback loops in which employees lengthen their Work Month and shorten 
their Time per Task to meet their goal. 
 
Routine Work To Do[level]= INTEG( 
 + Routine Work Release Rate[level] 
 - Routine Work Completion Rate[level] 
 , Monthly Routine Work[level]*Routine Work Standard Completion 
Time) 
Units: Tasks 
 
Routine Work Release Rate[level]= Monthly Routine Work[level] 
Units: Tasks/Month 
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Level Routine Work Desired Completion Rate[level]= Routine Work To 
Do[level]*Time per Task Standard[level]/Routine Work Standard 
Completion Time 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
 
Figure 9. Model Diagram of Routine Work 
For simplicity, I assume an aggregate stock of Routine Work To Do for each level of 
the company hierarchy, which must be completed by Routine Work Contributor FTEs at 
that level.  Each Black Belt is less than one routine-work full-time equivalent (FTE) 
employee because all Black Belts are expected to complete CI projects (which I define as 
nonroutine work). 
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Routine Work BB FTEs[level]= Black Belts[level]*(1-BB Nonroutine 
Work Fraction) 
Units: Person 
 
Because Level Routine Work Desired Completion Rate is defined for an entire level, I 
allocate a fraction of this work rate to each of the employee-state stocks, proportional to 
each stock's size relative to the total. 
 
Routine Work Level FTEs[level]= SUM(Routine Work Contributor 
FTEs[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Person 
 
Routine Work Level FTEs Contributor Fraction[level,contributor]= 
ZIDZ(Routine Work Contributor FTEs[level,contributor], Routine 
Work Level FTEs[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Contributors Desired Routine Work Completion 
Rate[level,contributor]= ZIDZ(Level Routine Work Desired 
Completion Rate[level]*Routine Work Level FTEs Contributor 
Fraction[level,contributor], Routine Work Contributor 
FTEs[level,contributor]) 
Units: (Person*Hours/Month)/Person 
 
Employees adjust the length of their workweeks and the extent to which they cut 
corners (reducing both their time per task and task quality) based on the schedule pressure 
they feel: the ratio of how many work-hours they must do to the time in which they are 
expected to do them. 
 
Contributors Desired Total Work Completion 
Rate[level,contributor]= Contributors Desired Routine Work 
Completion Rate[level,contributor] + Avg CI Work Rate per 
Contributor[level,contributor] + Avg Cost Cutting Work Rate 
per Contributor[level,contributor] 
Units: (Person*Hours/Month)/Person 
 
Schedule Pressure[level,contributor]= Contributors Desired Total 
Work Completion Rate[level,contributor]/Standard Work Month 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Time per Task[level,contributor]= Time per Task 
Standard[level]*Effect of Schedule Pressure on Time per Task 
Fn(Schedule Pressure[level,contributor]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Task 
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Work Month[level,contributor]= Standard Work Month*Effect of 
Schedule Pressure on Work Month Fn(Schedule 
Pressure[level,contributor]) 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
Contributors Indicated Routine Work Completion 
Rate[level,contributor]= Work Month[level,contributor]/Time 
per Task[level,contributor] 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person 
 
Level Routine Work Indicated Completion Rate[level]= 
SUM(Contributors Indicated Routine Work Completion 
Rate[level,contributor!]*Routine Work Contributor 
FTEs[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Tasks/Month 
 
The use of Routine Work Maximum Completion Rate in the formulation for Routine 
Work Completion Rate ensures first-order control on this outflow from the Routine Work 
To Do stock. 
 
Routine Work Completion Rate[level]= MIN(Level Routine Work 
Indicated Completion Rate[level], Routine Work Maximum 
Completion Rate[level]) 
Units: Tasks/Month 
 
Routine Work Maximum Completion Rate[level]= Routine Work To 
Do[level]/Routine Work Minimum Completion Time 
Units: Tasks/Month 
 
I assume that employees use their assessment of their recent schedule pressure to 
decide how much time they want to devote to CI work (section 5.6, p.163) and to CI 
training of all types (sections 5.17, p.220; 5.20, p.225; and 5.21, p.234).  For simplicity, I 
assume that employees' assessment of their recent schedule pressure is adequately 
represented by first-order exponential smoothing.  An average of recent schedule pressure 
across all employees of a given level is required to determine the Effect of Schedule 
Pressure on Work Scope Increase in section 5.6 (p.163). 
 
Recent Schedule Pressure[level,contributor]= SMOOTHI(Schedule 
Pressure[level,contributor], Schedule Pressure Averaging Time, 
1) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Recent Schedule Pressure Level Avg[level]= SUM(Recent Schedule 
Pressure[level,contributor!]*Routine Work Contributor 
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FTEs[level,contributor!])/SUM(Routine Work Contributor 
FTEs[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
The baseline number of contributor FTEs at each level, updated when the merger 
occurs, is required to compute Baseline Monthly Routine Work (section 5.5, p.158) and 
the improvement half-lives for productivity and operating costs (sections 5.22, p.237, and 
5.23, p.241, respectively). 
 
Baseline Routine Work Level FTEs[level]= STEP(Routine Work Level 
FTEs[level], INITIAL TIME) + STEP(Total Level Employees from 
Merger 
[level], Merger Close Date) 
Units: Person 
 
Parameters for Routine Work 
In this model, I assume that each work month comprises four 40-hour workweeks.  
Sensibly, employees should take one month to complete each month's routine work. 
 
Standard Work Month= 160 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
Routine Work Standard Completion Time= 1 
Units: Month 
 
These lookup functions for the effects of employees' schedule pressure on their time 
per task and their work month were taken from Sterman (2000, pp. 571-572), based on 
Oliva's (1996) study of service quality at NatWest Bank. 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Time per Task Fn([(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,1.4),(0.2,1.37),(0.4,1.32),(0.6,1.24),(0.8,1.14),(1,
1),(1.2,0.89),(1.4,0.79),(1.6,0.7),(1.8,0.65),(2,0.62),(2.2,0.
61),(2.4,0.6),(2.6,0.6)) 
Units: Dmnl 
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Figure 10. Lookup Function: Effect of Schedule Pressure on Time per Task Fn 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Work Month Fn([(0,0.5)-
(2,1.5)],(0,0.75),(0.25,0.79),(0.5,0.84),(0.75,0.9),(1,1),(1.2
5,1.09),(1.5,1.17),(1.75,1.23),(2,1.25)) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
 
Figure 11. Lookup Function: Effect of Schedule Pressure on Work Month Fn 
 
I assume that the shortest amount of time for an employee to complete a task is equal 
to the Minimum Time per Task divided by the Standard Work Month.  But this duration is 
shorter than the simulation’s Time Step, so I use this Time Step instead. 
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I assume employees' expectations for their schedule pressure in the near future are 
equal to their schedule pressures over the preceding six weeks. 
 
Schedule Pressure Averaging Time= 1.5 
Units: Month 
 
5.5. Routine Work Allocation 
For simplicity, I assume that the baseline monthly routine work at each level consists 
of one task per work-hour per employee at that level.  In other words, each employee is 
expected to take one hour to complete one task per hour for all 160 work-hours per 
month. 
 
Baseline Routine Work per FTE[level]= Standard Work Month/Baseline 
Time per Task 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person 
 
Baseline Monthly Routine Work[level]= Baseline Routine Work Level 
FTEs[level]*Baseline Routine Work per FTE[level] 
Units: Tasks/Month 
 
The Routine Work Release Rate in section 5.4 (p.152) is determined by the total 
monthly routine work allocated to all employees at each level of the company hierarchy.  
I model this monthly routine work as a stock, subject to work-scope increases and work-
scope cuts. 
 
Monthly Routine Work[level]= INTEG( 
 + Work Scope Increase Rate[level] 
 - Work Scope Cutting Rate[level] 
 , Baseline Monthly Routine Work[level]) 
Units: Tasks/Month 
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Figure 12. Model Diagram of Routine Work Allocation 
I assume that a level's scope of work can be cut to save money on (variable) 
operating costs (see section 5.23, p.241) — such as deferring preventive maintenance on 
equipment or deferring clearance of overhead power lines — but only up to a minimum 
amount.  I model the work-scope-cutting process with the same half-life formulation that I 
use to model improvements in productivity and operating costs in sections 5.22 (p.237) 
and 5.23 (p.241), respectively (see section 5.22, p.237, for explanation). 
 
Work Scope Cutting Rate[level]= (Potential Work Scope 
Cuts[level]/Work Scope Cutting Time)*Work Scope Cutting 
Intensity[level] 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Month 
 
Work Scope Cutting Time= Work Scope Cutting Half Life*Half Life 
Conversion Factor 
Units: Month 
 
Potential Work Scope Cuts[level]= MAX(Monthly Routine Work[level] 
- Minimum Monthly Routine Work[level], 0) 
Units: Tasks/Month 
 
Minimum Monthly Routine Work[level]= Baseline Monthly Routine 
Work[level]*Minimum Monthly Routine Work Fraction 
Units: Tasks/Month 
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Work Scope Cutting Intensity[level]= ZIDZ(Level Cost Cutting Work 
Rate[level], Reference Nonroutine Work Rate[level]) 
Units: Fraction 
 
The stock of Monthly Routine Work must be increased on the merger closing date to 
account for the routine work associated with the merged employees.  The Work Scope 
Increase Rate from Merger is therefore a necessary component of the Work Scope Increase 
Rate.  (Note: If the Merger Close Date is set equal to the simulation's INITIAL TIME, 
however, then the Monthly Routine Work from Merger is already included in the 
calculated initial value of the stock Monthly Routine Work.)  I also include the possibility 
that DTE Energy's managers will increase the front line's scope of work — which DTE 
Energy's managers did primarily by insourcing work previously done by contractors — 
when productivity improvements reduce the front-line employees' schedule pressure 
below the normal value of 1.  If the Work Scope Increase Switch is turned on, such 
insourcing forms a balancing-feedback loop in which work scope is increased until 
employees' schedule pressure is back to its normal value of 1. 
 
Work Scope Increase Switch= STEP(1, Work Scope Increase Start 
Date) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Work Scope Increase Rate[level]= Work Scope Increase Rate from 
Merger[level] + Maximum Work Scope Increase Rate[level]*Effect 
of Schedule Pressure on Work Scope Increase[level]*Work Scope 
Increase Switch 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Month 
 
Work Scope Increase Rate from Merger[level]= IF THEN ELSE(Merger 
Close Date > INITIAL TIME, Monthly Routine Work from 
Merger[level]*Merger Pulse, 0) 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Month 
 
Monthly Routine Work from Merger[level]= Total Level Employees 
from Merger[level]*Baseline Routine Work per FTE[level] 
Units: Tasks/Month 
 
Maximum Work Scope Increase Rate[level]= Monthly Routine 
Work[level]*Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Month 
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Effect of Schedule Pressure on Work Scope Increase[level]= Effect 
of Schedule Pressure on Work Scope Increase Fn(Recent Schedule 
Pressure Level Avg[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
I assume that the company's managers do not consider the contract labor associated 
with insourced work as avoided labor costs forever.  Instead, they gradually revise their 
expectations for how much routine work each employee should do every month.  For 
simplicity, I model this expectation-revision process using first-order exponential 
smoothing.  However, I assume that DTE Energy managers’ expectation revisions exhibit a 
ratchet effect: they are quick to revise workload standards upward, but very slow to revise 
them downward. 
 
Routine Work per FTE[level]= Monthly Routine Work[level]/Total 
Level Employees[level] 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person 
 
Routine Work per FTE Standard[level]= INTEG( 
 + Routine Work per FTE Standard Increase Rate[level] 
 - Routine Work per FTE Standard Decrease Rate[level] 
 , Baseline Routine Work per FTE[level]) 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person 
 
Routine Work per FTE Standard Increase Rate[level]= Work Standard 
Additions[level]/Work Standard Increase Time 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person/Month 
 
Work Standard Additions[level]= MAX(Routine Work per FTE[level] - 
Routine Work per FTE Standard[level], 0) 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person 
 
Routine Work per FTE Standard Decrease Rate[level]= Work Standard 
Reductions[level]/Work Standard Decrease Time 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person/Month 
 
Work Standard Reductions[level]= MAX(Routine Work per FTE 
Standard[level] - Routine Work per FTE[level], 0) 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person 
 
Extra Routine Work[level]= Extra Routine Work per FTE[level]*Total 
Level Employees[level] 
Units: Tasks/Month 
 
I initially formulated Extra Routine Work per FTE as follows: 
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Extra Routine Work per FTE[level]= MAX(Routine Work per FTE[level] 
- Routine Work per FTE Standard[level], 0) 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person 
 
However, I was compelled to replace it with the formulation below because the 
division in Routine Work per FTE was creating tiny nonnegative artifacts in this 
subtraction. 
 
Extra Routine Work per FTE[level]= IF THEN ELSE(Routine Work per 
FTE[level] - Routine Work per FTE Standard[level] > 0.002 , 
Routine Work per FTE[level] - Routine Work per FTE 
Standard[level], 0) 
Units: (Tasks/Month)/Person 
 
Parameters for Routine Work Allocation 
I express the minimum amount to which Monthly Routine Work can be cut as a 
fraction of Baseline Monthly Routine Work. 
 
Minimum Monthly Routine Work Fraction= 0.7 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Work Scope Cutting Half Life= 1 
Units: Month 
 
DTE Energy did not start insourcing until the ECR plan began in October 2008.  I 
assume that DTE Energy’s employees got to keep their productivity gains until then.  For 
simplicity, I assume that managers reduce their rate of insourcing linearly from Maximum 
Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate to zero as employees' schedule pressure increases 
from 0 to 1. 
 
Work Scope Increase Start Date= 141 
Units: Month 
 
Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate= 0.1 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Work Scope Increase Fn([(0,0)-
(1.5,1)],(0,1),(1,0),(1.5,0)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
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Figure 13. Lookup Function: Effect of Schedule Pressure on Work Scope Increase Fn 
 
DTE Energy’s managers will increase employees’ workload standard more readily 
than they will decrease it. 
 
Work Standard Increase Time= 2 
Units: Month 
 
Work Standard Decrease Time= 12 
Units: Month 
 
5.6. Nonroutine Work 
I assume that all employees have a maximum fraction of their work month that they 
can feasibly devote to nonroutine work; their routine work of running the company must 
take priority, after all. 
 
Maximum Nonroutine Work[level,nonBlackBelts]= Standard Work 
Month*Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[level] 
Maximum Nonroutine Work[level,BB]= Standard Work Month*BB 
Nonroutine Work Fraction 
Units: Hours/Month 
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Figure 14. Model Diagram of Nonroutine Work 
 
Employee Pull for Nonroutine Work 
I assume that employee pull for nonroutine work consists only of desired CI work by 
employees who believe in CI (that is, by believers and Black Belt program participants).  
These believing employees, however, reduce their desired CI work as their schedule 
pressure increases because their routine work takes priority over nonroutine work.  I also 
assume that senior executives and middle managers curtail their desired CI work in direct 
proportion to the fraction of their subordinates who are not CI proponents. 
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Units: Hours/Month 
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Units: Hours/Month 
 
Combined Effects on Employee Desired CI Work[level,contributor]= 
MIN(Effect of Schedule Pressure on Employee Desired CI 
Work[level,contributor], Effect of Subordinate Belief on 
Employee Desired CI Work[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Employee Desired CI 
Work[level,contributor]= Effect of Schedule Pressure on 
Employee Desired CI Work Fn(Recent Schedule 
Pressure[level,contributor]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on BB Desired CI Work[level]= Effect 
of Schedule Pressure on BB Desired CI Work Fn(Recent Schedule 
Pressure[level,BB]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Effect of Subordinate Belief on Employee Desired CI Work[SE]= 
Effect of Subordinate Belief on Employee Desired CI Work Fn(CI 
Proponents Fraction[MM]) 
Effect of Subordinate Belief on Employee Desired CI Work[MM]= 
Effect of Subordinate Belief on Employee Desired CI Work Fn(CI 
Proponents Fraction[FL]) 
Effect of Subordinate Belief on Employee Desired CI Work[FL]= 1 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Boss Push for Nonroutine Work 
I define two types of "boss pushes" in this model: (1) a push for CI work specifically, 
and (2) a push for cost reductions with nonroutine work, which may be satisfied with CI 
work or with cost-cutting work.  If managers' push for CI work is less than their push for 
cost reductions, then they implicitly expect the difference to be addressed with cost-
cutting work.  Obviously, these boss pushes felt by employees at a given level of the 
company hierarchy are determined by their bosses one level above them. 
I assume that the financial stress faced by the company (which, in this model, is 
exogenous) constitutes the "boss push" for cost reductions felt by the senior executives.  I 
further assume that the push for cost reductions arising from this financial stress is 
transferred unaltered down the company hierarchy. 
 
Financial Stress= Exogenous Financial Stress 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
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Boss Push for Cost Reductions[SE]= Financial Stress 
Boss Push for Cost Reductions[MM]= Boss Push for Cost 
Reductions[SE] 
Boss Push for Cost Reductions[FL]= Boss Push for Cost 
Reductions[MM] 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
The push for CI work that managers exert on their subordinates arises from their 
belief in CI.  The overall push for CI work that all managers at a given level exert on their 
subordinates increases as more managers at that level become believers.  For simplicity, I 
assume that senior executives are not pushed for CI work by anyone, and that middle 
managers exert the larger of their push or their bosses' push for CI on their front-line 
subordinates.  I also assume that DTE Energy’s managers reduce their push for CI work 
when distracted by, for example, the MichCon merger.  For testing purposes, I allow for 
the push for CI work to be set at a constant value, instead of being determined 
endogenously from managers' belief states. 
 
Push for CI Work from Belief[level]= Push for CI Work from Belief 
Fn(Level Employees Believers Fraction[level])*(1-Constant Push 
for CI Work Switch) + Constant Push for CI Work*Constant Push 
for CI Work Switch 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Push for CI Work[SE]= Push for CI Work from Belief[SE]*Effect of 
Distractions on Push for CI Work[SE] 
Push for CI Work[MM]= MAX(Push for CI Work from Belief[MM], Push 
for CI Work[SE])*Effect of Distractions on Push for CI 
Work[MM] 
Push for CI Work[FL]= 0 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Effect of Distractions on Push for CI Work[level]= 1-Exogenous 
Distractions Index[level] 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Boss Push for CI Work[SE]= 0 
Boss Push for CI Work[MM]= Push for CI Work[SE] 
Boss Push for CI Work[FL]= Push for CI Work[MM] 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Employees might experience both a push for reducing costs and a push for CI work 
from their bosses simultaneously.  They must reconcile these two pushes when 
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determining how much nonroutine work to do.  Because employees can meet their 
bosses' demand for cost reductions with CI work, I assume that they consider the larger of 
these two pushes as their bosses' push for nonroutine work. 
 
Boss Push for Nonroutine Work[level]= MAX(Boss Push for Cost 
Reductions[level], Boss Push for CI Work[level]) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
I assume that as Boss Push for Nonroutine Work increases from 0 to 1, the average 
amount of nonroutine work that managers expect from each of their subordinates 
increases from zero to Maximum Nonroutine Work.  Black Belts, however, are an 
exception.  Because Black Belts are specially trained CI experts, I assume that managers 
always want them to be contributing the most nonroutine work possible. 
 
Boss Desired Nonroutine Work[level,nonBlackBelts]= Maximum 
Nonroutine Work[level,nonBlackBelts]*Boss Push for Nonroutine 
Work[level] 
Boss Desired Nonroutine Work[level,BB]= Maximum Nonroutine 
Work[level,BB] 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
Employees must also reconcile their bosses' push for nonroutine work and their own 
pull for nonroutine work (which is always pull for CI work).  Because employees reduce 
their desired nonroutine work in the face of high schedule pressure, I assume that 
managers allow their subordinates to do their desired nonroutine work if it is larger than 
the managers' demanded nonroutine work, because employees' desired nonroutine work 
indicates a certain amount of slack.  Otherwise, employees are compelled to do their 
managers' demanded nonroutine work, regardless of their schedule pressure. 
 
Nonroutine Work[level,contributor]= MAX(Boss Desired Nonroutine 
Work[level,contributor], Employee Desired Nonroutine 
Work[level,contributor]) 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
After employees determine how much nonroutine work they will do, they must 
determine how much of that nonroutine work is CI work and how much of it is cost-
cutting work.  To do so, they must reconcile their bosses' desired CI work with their own 
desired CI work.  Because they must do this nonroutine work regardless of their prevailing 
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schedule pressure, I assume that they choose the larger of these desired amounts of CI 
work.  The fraction of employees' nonroutine work that remains is their cost-cutting work.  
Again, Black Belts are an exception: I assume that their bosses always want them to be 
using their CI expertise doing CI work. 
 
Boss Desired CI Work[level,nonBlackBelts]= Maximum Nonroutine 
Work[level,nonBlackBelts]*Boss Push for CI Work[level] 
Boss Desired CI Work[level,BB]= Maximum Nonroutine Work[level,BB] 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
Avg CI Work Rate per Contributor[level,contributor]= MAX(Boss 
Desired CI Work[level,contributor], Employee Desired CI 
Work[level,contributor]) 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
CI Work Rate[level,contributor]= Level 
Contributors[level,contributor]*Avg CI Work Rate per 
Contributor[level,contributor] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Avg Cost Cutting Work Rate per Contributor[level,contributor]= 
MAX(Nonroutine Work[level,contributor] - Avg CI Work Rate per 
Contributor[level,contributor], 0) 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
Cost Cutting Work Rate[level,contributor]= Level 
Contributors[level,contributor]*Avg Cost Cutting Work Rate per 
Contributor[level,contributor] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
I assume that all cost-cutting work consists of cutting work scope (see the equation 
for Work Scope Cutting Intensity in section 5.5, p.158), which reduces the company's 
variable operating costs. 
 
Level Cost Cutting Work Rate[level]= SUM(Cost Cutting Work 
Rate[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
The following sums of CI work by regular employees, by Black Belt candidates, and 
by certified Black Belts are needed to compute required management support in section 
5.8 (p.179). 
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FL Projects Work Rate[level]= SUM(CI Work 
Rate[level,regEmployees!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Candidate Projects Work Rate[level]= CI Work Rate[level,BBc] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Projects Work Rate[level]= CI Work Rate[level,BB]*(1-BB 
Coaching Fraction) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
The total amount of CI-project work being done by front-line employees, and 
associated support work by their managers, is needed to compute required Black Belt 
coaching in section 5.14 (p.209).  This coaching work by Black Belts is a fraction of their 
total CI work. 
 
FL Projects Total Work Rate= SUM(CI Work 
Rate[level!,regEmployees!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Total CI Work Rate= SUM(CI Work Rate[level!,BB]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Parameters for Nonroutine Work 
I assume that employees and managers agree on the maximum fraction of their 
workweeks that could possibly be devoted to nonroutine work. 
 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[level]= 
0.2,0.2,0.2 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
BB Nonroutine Work Fraction= 1 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Parameters for Employee Pull for Nonroutine Work 
In the absence of schedule-pressure effects, I assume that employees who believe in 
CI — believers and Black Belt program participants — want to devote the maximum 
nonroutine-work fraction of their workweeks to CI work.  I assume that neutrals and 
skeptics do not want to do any CI work.  As schedule pressure increases, however, all 
types of employees reduce their desired CI work, giving priority to their routine work. 
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Employee Desired Nonroutine Work CI Fraction[level,Bel]= 1,1,1 
Employee Desired Nonroutine Work CI Fraction[level,Neu]= 0,0,0 
Employee Desired Nonroutine Work CI Fraction[level,Ske]= 0,0,0 
Employee Desired Nonroutine Work CI Fraction[level,BBt]= 1,1,1 
Employee Desired Nonroutine Work CI Fraction[level,BBc]= 1,1,1 
Employee Desired Nonroutine Work CI Fraction[level,BB]= 1,1,1 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Employee Desired CI Work Fn([(0,0)-
(1.25,1)],(0,1),(1,0.63),(1.05,0.55),(1.2,0.02),(1.25,0)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 15. Lookup Function: Effect of Schedule Pressure on Employee Desired CI Work 
Fn 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on BB Desired CI Work Fn([(0,0)-
(2,1.5)],(0,1),(1,1),(1.25,0.5),(1.5,0),(2,0)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
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Figure 16. Lookup Function: Effect of Schedule Pressure on BB Desired CI Work Fn 
 
DTE Energy’s managers reduce their desired CI work in direct proportion to the 
fraction of their subordinates who are not CI proponents.  In other words, they will only 
provide the management support demanded by their CI-proponent subordinates. 
 
Effect of Subordinate Belief on Employee Desired CI Work 
Fn([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(1,1)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 17. Lookup Function: Effect of Subordinate Belief on Employee Desired CI Work 
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Parameters for Boss Push for Nonroutine Work 
As more managers at a given level believe in CI, their aggregate push for CI work 
increases from 0 to 1. 
 
Push for CI Work from Belief Fn([(0,0)-(1,1),(0,0),(1,1)], 
(0,0),(0.25,0.025),(0.5,0.1),(0.75,0.25),(0.9,0.5),(1,1)) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 18. Lookup Function: Push for CI Work from Belief Fn 
 
Exogenous Financial Stress :HOLD BACKWARD::= GET XLS DATA(Excel 
File Name, Excel File Scenario Name, Excel File Time Row, 
'C18') 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Exogenous Distractions Index[level] :HOLD BACKWARD::= GET XLS 
DATA(Excel File Name, Excel File Scenario Name, Excel File 
Time Row, 'C21') 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Constant Push for CI Work Switch= 0 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Constant Push for CI Work= 0.05 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
5.7. Improvement Work Effectiveness 
My theory of CI work holds that CI activities do not yield gains proportional to the 
time that employees spend on them.  Why would this be the case?  First, managers might 
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coerce their subordinate employees to do CI work.  In such a scenario, employees would 
put in the necessary CI work hours, but they would not make an earnest effort.  They 
would conform only ceremonially with their bosses' directive6.  Employees' effort 
earnestness, therefore, depends on their belief in CI.  Second, employees reduce their 
effort earnestness when they feel they do not have adequate job security, management 
support, and coaching from CI experts.  For simplicity, I assume that employees determine 
their effort earnestness from whichever of these three possible demotivating factors has the 
largest prevailing effect.  Finally, the gains that employees achieve depend on their skill 
with CI tools and methods.  Coaching by CI experts, if provided adequately, can 
ameliorate any shortfall in employees' CI skill. 
 
CI Work Contribution Rate[level,nonBlackBelts]= CI Work 
Rate[level,nonBlackBelts]*CI Effort 
Earnestness[level,nonBlackBelts] 
CI Work Contribution Rate[level,BB]= BB Projects Work 
Rate[level]*CI Effort Earnestness[level,BB] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
CI Effort Earnestness[level,contributor]= Baseline Effort 
Earnestness from Belief[level,contributor]*Combined 
Demotivator Effects on Effort[level,contributor] 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Combined Demotivator Effects on Effort[level,contributor]= 
MIN(MIN(Effect of Job Security on Effort[level,contributor], 
Effect of Mgmt Support on Effort[level,contributor]), Effect 
of BB Coaching on Effort[level,contributor]) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
                                            
6 Williamson (1975, 1985) calls such behavior “perfunctory cooperation”. 
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Figure 19. Model Diagram of Improvement Work Effectiveness 
I assume that the effect of low job security on effort applies to regular front-line 
employees only.  (I assume that Black Belts and Black Belt candidates believe they are 
indispensable employees because of their CI expertise.) 
 
Effect of Job Security on Effort[level,contributor] :EXCEPT: 
[FL,regEmployees]= 1 
Effect of Job Security on Effort[FL,regEmployees]= Job 
Security[FL] 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Employees are extremely sensitive to their bosses not "walking the talk".  I assume, 
therefore, that they will reduce their effort in direct proportion to any perceived 
inadequacy in management support.  I assume that Black Belts and Black Belt candidates, 
confident in their own CI expertise, have no such effect on their effort.  (A lack of 
management support will, however, affect the results they can achieve.) 
 
Effect of Mgmt Support on Effort[level,regEmployees]= 
MIN(Perceived Mgmt Support Adequacy[level], 1) 
Effect of Mgmt Support on Effort[level,BBc]= 1 
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Effect of Mgmt Support on Effort[level,BB]= 1 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
I assume that regular employees and Black Belt trainees reduce their effort in direct 
proportion to any perceived inadequacy of coaching by Black Belts.  This effect does not 
apply to Black Belt candidates, who are coached by the Master Black Belts, or to certified 
Black Belts, who are able to do CI work independently. 
 
Effect of BB Coaching on Effort[level,regEmployees]= MIN(Perceived 
BB Coaching Adequacy[level,regEmployees], 1) 
Effect of BB Coaching on Effort[level,BBc]= 1 
Effect of BB Coaching on Effort[level,BB]= 1 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Employees' effective CI work contribution overall reflects their level of skill with CI 
tools and methods.  Their effective CI work on front-line projects, specifically, also reflects 
their bosses' amount of management support and the amount of coaching they receive 
from Black Belts. 
 
CI Work Effective Contribution Rate[level,contributor]= CI Work 
Contribution Rate[level,contributor]*Contributors 
Skill[level,contributor] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
FL Projects Effective Completion Rate= SUM(CI Work Effective 
Contribution Rate[FL,regEmployees!]*Effect of BB Coaching on 
FL Projects[FL,regEmployees!]*Effect of MM Support on FL 
Projects) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Effect of MM Support on FL Projects= Effect of Boss Support on CI 
Effectiveness Fn(FL Projects MM Support Adequacy) 
Units: Fraction 
 
Black Belt coaching (section 5.14, p.209) closes the skill gap, if any, between the 
assisting Black Belts and the regular employees working on front-line CI projects. 
 
Effect of BB Coaching on FL Projects[level,regEmployees]= 1 + FL 
Projects Fractional Skill Gap[level,regEmployees]*Effect of BB 
Coaching on FL Projects Fn(BB Coaching 
Adequacy[level,regEmployees]) 
Units: Fraction 
 
The effectiveness of Black Belts' CI project work is reduced if management support is 
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inadequate. 
 
BB Projects Effective Completion Rate[level]= CI Work Effective 
Contribution Rate[level,BB]*Effect of Boss Support on BB 
Projects[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Effect of Boss Support on BB Projects[level]= Effect of Boss 
Support on CI Effectiveness Fn(BB Projects Boss Support 
Adequacy[level]) 
Units: Fraction 
 
The effectiveness of Black Belt candidates' CI project work is reduced if either 
management support (section 5.8, p.179) or Master Black Belts' mentoring (section 5.18, 
p.225) is inadequate.  The rate at which Black Belt candidates complete their CI projects 
determines how fast they earn their Black Belt certifications (see section 5.12, p.199). 
 
BB Candidate Projects Effective Completion Rate[level]= CI Work 
Effective Contribution Rate[level,BBc]*Effect of MBB Mentoring 
on BB Candidate Projects*Effect of Boss Support on BB 
Projects[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Effect of MBB Mentoring on BB Candidate Projects= Effect of MBB 
Mentoring on BB Candidate Projects Fn(MBB Mentoring Adequacy) 
Units: Fraction 
 
The total amount of improvement work being done comprises front-line CI projects, 
Black Belt projects, and Black Belt candidates' certification projects. 
 
Improvement Work Effective Completion Rate= FL Projects Effective 
Completion Rate + SUM(BB Projects Effective Completion 
Rate[level!]) + SUM(BB Candidate Projects Effective Completion 
Rate[level!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Regular employees' average CI effort earnestness influences how much time Black 
Belts want to devote to coaching (see section 5.14, p.209).  This average is computed by 
weighting contributors' CI Effort Earnestness by their respective CI Work Rate. 
 
Contributors Avg CI Effort Earnestness= ZIDZ(SUM(CI Work 
Rate[level!,regEmployees!]*CI Effort 
Earnestness[level!,regEmployees!]), FL Projects Total Work 
Rate) 
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Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
As a performance measure for the CI initiative as a whole, I compute the ratio of 
employees’ actual CI contributions in person-hours (before adjusting for their skill) to their 
maximum possible CI contributions. 
 
Level CI Work Contribution Rate[level]= SUM(CI Work Contribution 
Rate[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Level Maximum CI Work Contribution Rate[level]= SUM(Level 
Contributors[level,contributor!]*Maximum Nonroutine 
Work[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
CI Contribution Percentage[level]= ZIDZ(Level CI Work Contribution 
Rate[level], Level Maximum CI Work Contribution Rate[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Parameters for Improvement Work Effectiveness 
In the absence of any demotivating factors, I assume that believers and Black Belt 
program participants put forth their full effort toward CI work.  I assume that neutrals put 
forth 50-percent effort and skeptics put forth 10-percent effort. 
 
Baseline Effort Earnestness from Belief[level,Bel]= 1 
Baseline Effort Earnestness from Belief[level,Neu]= 0.5 
Baseline Effort Earnestness from Belief[level,Ske]= 0.1 
Baseline Effort Earnestness from Belief[level,BBt]= 1 
Baseline Effort Earnestness from Belief[level,BBc]= 1 
Baseline Effort Earnestness from Belief[level,BB]= 1 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
I assume that the effect of boss-support adequacy is the same for all three types of CI 
projects: front-line projects, Black Belt projects, and Black Belt candidate projects.  I 
assume the effect is asymmetric, as follows.  When boss support is inadequate, employees' 
effectiveness is gradually reduced to 60 percent.  When boss support is more than 
adequate, their effectiveness is increased, but only up to a maximum of 5 percent above 
the exactly adequate level. 
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Effect of Boss Support on CI Effectiveness Fn([(0,0)-
(2.5,2)],(0,0.6),(0.25,0.63),(0.5,0.7),(0.75,0.8),(1,1),(1.25,
1.03),(1.5,1.045),(2,1.05)) 
Units: Fraction 
 
 
Figure 20. Lookup Function: Effect of Boss Support on CI Effectiveness Fn 
 
The relative amount of coaching provided by Black Belts to regular employees closes 
a fraction of the skill gap, if any, between those Black Belts and regular employees. 
 
Effect of BB Coaching on FL Projects Fn([(0,0)-
(4,1)],(0,0),(1,0.75),(2,0.9),(3,0.95),(4,1)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 21. Lookup Function: Effect of BB Coaching on FL Projects Fn 
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I assume that Master Black Belt mentoring helps Black Belt candidates complete their 
certification projects faster than they would without mentoring.  When mentoring is zero, 
Black Belt candidates take four times as long to complete a project.  I assume that Black 
Belt candidates take the minimum amount of time per project — two months — when 
their mentoring is 300 percent of the exactly adequate level. 
 
Effect of MBB Mentoring on BB Candidate Projects Fn([(0,0)-
(3,2)],(0,0.25),(1,1),(2,1.35),(3,1.5)) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
 
Figure 22. Lookup Function: Effect of MBB Mentoring on BB Candidate Projects Fn 
 
5.8. Management Support 
I assume that all employees require a certain amount of management support, 
measured in person-hours of attention, from their bosses for every hour that they spend 
working on their respective types of CI projects (front-line projects, Black Belt candidate 
projects, and Black Belt projects). 
 
FL Projects Required MM Support= FL Projects Work Rate[FL]*FL 
Projects Required Fractional MM Support 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Projects Required MM Support= (BB Candidate Projects Work 
Rate[FL] + BB Projects Work Rate[FL])*BB Projects Required 
Fractional MM Support 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
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Required MM Support Total= FL Projects Required MM Support + BB 
Projects Required MM Support 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
 
Figure 23. Model Diagram of Management Support 
Middle managers may not be willing to provide all of the management support 
demanded by their subordinates for Black Belt and front-line CI projects.  Whatever 
support they do provide, I assume that they allocate it proportionally according to each 
project type's fraction of the total support demanded.  I also assume that middle managers, 
if their skill is low, require a minimal amount of Black Belt coaching to make their support 
of front-line CI projects fully effective. 
 
MM Support FL Projects Fraction= ZIDZ(FL Projects Required MM 
Support, Required MM Support Total) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
MM Support BB Projects Fraction= ZIDZ(BB Projects Required MM 
Support, Required MM Support Total) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
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FL Projects MM Support= SUM(CI Work Effective Contribution 
Rate[MM,regEmployees!]*MM Support FL Projects Fraction*Effect 
of BB Coaching on Mgmt Support[MM,regEmployees!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Effect of BB Coaching on Mgmt Support[level,regEmployees]= Effect 
of BB Coaching on Mgmt Support Fn(BB Coaching 
Adequacy[level,regEmployees]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
BB Projects MM Support= SUM(CI Work Effective Contribution 
Rate[MM,regEmployees!]*MM Support BB Projects Fraction) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
I assume that middle managers supporting front-line CI projects in turn require 
support from their senior-executive bosses.  Similarly, middle-manager Black Belts require 
support from their senior-executive bosses just like front-line Black Belts require support 
from their middle-manager bosses.  These equations for senior executive support, 
therefore, parallel the equations for middle manager support. 
 
FL Projects Required SE Support= FL Projects Work Rate[MM]*FL 
Projects Required Fractional SE Support 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Projects Required SE Support= (BB Candidate Projects Work 
Rate[MM] + BB Projects Work Rate[MM])*BB Projects Required 
Fractional SE Support 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Required SE Support Total= FL Projects Required SE Support + BB 
Projects Required SE Support 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
SE Support FL Projects Fraction= ZIDZ(FL Projects Required SE 
Support, Required SE Support Total) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
SE Support BB Projects Fraction= ZIDZ(BB Projects Required SE 
Support, Required SE Support Total) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
FL Projects SE Support= SUM(CI Work Effective Contribution 
Rate[SE,regEmployees!]*SE Support FL Projects Fraction*Effect 
of BB Coaching on Mgmt Support[SE,regEmployees!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Projects SE Support= SUM(CI Work Effective Contribution 
Rate[SE,regEmployees!]*SE Support BB Projects Fraction) 
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Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
The adequacy of management support is simply the ratio of the support provided by 
one's boss to the support demanded by oneself.  However, there are a few subtleties.  I 
assume that the effectiveness of middle managers' support of front-line CI projects 
depends on the adequacy of the support that they receive, in turn, from their senior-
executive bosses.  For simplicity, I assume that this effect is the same as the effect of 
middle managers' support adequacy on the effectiveness of front-line employees' CI work 
(see section 5.7, p.172).  Finally, I assume that senior-executive Black Belts do not require 
any management support. 
 
FL Projects SE Support Adequacy= XIDZ(FL Projects SE Support, FL 
Projects Required SE Support, 1) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
BB Projects SE Support Adequacy= XIDZ(BB Projects SE Support, BB 
Projects Required SE Support, 1) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
FL Projects Effective MM Support= FL Projects MM Support*Effect of 
Boss Support on CI Effectiveness Fn(FL Projects SE Support 
Adequacy) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
FL Projects MM Support Adequacy= XIDZ(FL Projects Effective MM 
Support, FL Projects Required MM Support, 1) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
BB Projects MM Support Adequacy= XIDZ(BB Projects MM Support, BB 
Projects Required MM Support, 1) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
BB Projects Boss Support Adequacy[SE]= 1 
BB Projects Boss Support Adequacy[MM]= BB Projects SE Support 
Adequacy 
BB Projects Boss Support Adequacy[FL]= BB Projects MM Support 
Adequacy 
Units: Dmnl 
 
For simplicity, I assume that employees at each level perceive the overall adequacy 
of management support at their level.  I use first-order exponential smoothing to represent 
the process of employees' perceiving and updating their assessments of management-
support adequacy. 
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Perceived Mgmt Support Adequacy[SE]= 1 
Perceived Mgmt Support Adequacy[MM]= SMOOTHI(FL Projects SE 
Support Adequacy, Mgmt Support Adequacy Perception Time, 1) 
Perceived Mgmt Support Adequacy[FL]= SMOOTHI(FL Projects MM 
Support Adequacy, Mgmt Support Adequacy Perception Time, 1) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Parameters for Management Support 
The number of hours that front-line employees require from their middle-manager 
bosses for every hour they spend on FL projects: 
 
FL Projects Required Fractional MM Support= 0.1 
Units: (Person*Hour)/(Person*Hour) 
 
The number of hours that middle managers require from their senior-executive 
bosses for every hour they spend supporting FL projects: 
 
FL Projects Required Fractional SE Support= 0.125 
Units: (Person*Hours)/(Person*Hour) 
 
The number of hours that front-line Black Belts require from their middle-manager 
bosses for every hour they spend on BB projects: 
 
BB Projects Required Fractional MM Support= 0.075 
Units: (Person*Hours)/(Person*Hour) 
 
The number of hours that middle-manager Black Belts require from their senior-
executive bosses for every hour they spend on BB projects: 
 
BB Projects Required Fractional SE Support= 0.075 
Units: (Person*Hours)/(Person*Hour) 
 
As the adequacy of Black Belt coaching of middle managers and senior executives 
approaches zero, their support effectiveness is reduced from 100 percent to 25 percent. 
 
Effect of BB Coaching on Mgmt Support Fn([(0,0)-
(2,1)],(0,0.25),(1,1),(2,1)) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
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Figure 24. Lookup Function: Effect of BB Coaching on Mgmt Support Fn 
 
Mgmt Support Adequacy Perception Time= 1 
Units: Month 
 
5.9. Job Security 
This formulation of the entire Job Security structure, as described in this section, is an 
adaptation of the Job Security formulation in the Analog Devices model (Repenning & 
Sterman, 1994b, pp. 92-94; Sterman, Repenning, et al., 1997c, p. 509).  While this 
construct should be properly called "employment security" in the case of DTE Energy, I 
keep the Analog Devices' name "job security" for continuity and because it is less 
cumbersome.  Job Security is defined as an index variable, ranging from zero to one, 
indicating the degree to which front-line employees feel they are safe from the possibility 
of being laid off or being pressured to take a voluntary buy-out.  Employees derive this 
feeling of (in)security from their perception of the prevailing rate of downsizing throughout 
the company.  In this model, I assume that middle managers and senior executives never 
feel job insecurity. 
 
Job Security[FL]= Job Security from Downsizing Fn(Memory of 
Downsizing[FL]/Reference Fractional Downsizing Rate) 
Job Security[MM]= 1 
Job Security[SE]= 1 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
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Figure 25. Model Diagram of Job Security 
Changes to employees' aggregate Memory of Downsizing stock reflect a ratchet 
effect.  Employees' memory of downsizing, like distrust, fades only when there is no 
downsizing for a long period of time.  I define employees' Old Downsizing Memories as 
the amount, if any, by which their Memory of Downsizing exceeds their perception of the 
company's current (fractional) downsizing rate.  I model employees' forgetting these old 
memories with first-order exponential decay. 
 
Memory of Downsizing[level]= INTEG( 
 + Downsizing Memory Build Rate[level] 
 - Downsizing Memory Forgetting Rate[level] 
 , Initial Perceived Fractional Downsizing Rate[level]) 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
Downsizing Memory Forgetting Rate[level]= Old Downsizing 
Memories[level]/Downsizing Memory Forgetting Time 
Units: (Fraction/Month)/Month 
 
Old Downsizing Memories[level]= MAX(Memory of Downsizing[level] - 
Perceived Fractional Downsizing Rate[level], 0) 
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Units: Fraction/Month 
 
By contrast, employees are extremely quick to increase their Memory of Downsizing 
to their perception of the company's current (fractional) downsizing rate if the current rate 
is higher.  I define employees' New Downsizing Memories as the amount, if any, by which 
their perception of the current (fractional) downsizing rate exceeds their Memory of 
Downsizing.  I model employees' building these new memories with first-order 
exponential smoothing. 
 
Downsizing Memory Build Rate[level]= New Downsizing 
Memories[level]/Downsizing Memory Build Time 
Units: (Fraction/Month)/Month 
 
New Downsizing Memories[level]= MAX(Perceived Fractional 
Downsizing Rate[level] - Memory of Downsizing[level], 0) 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
I assume that senior executives decide to use downsizing to cut costs as a response 
to the financial stress on the company.  DTE Energy's senior executives made such a 
decision only once in the 12-year span that I studied, and it lasted for only a short 
duration.  For simplicity, I assume that employees, somewhat unrealistically, perceive the 
company-wide downsizing rate rather than the downsizing rate local to their respective 
power plants, service stations, or other business locations.  I model this perception process 
with first-order exponential smoothing. 
 
Downsizing Switch= PULSE(Downsizing Start Date, Downsizing 
Duration) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Effect of Financial Stress on Downsizing= Effect of Financial 
Stress on Downsizing Fn(Financial Stress) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Fractional Downsizing Rate[level]= Maximum Fractional Downsizing 
Rate[level]*Effect of Financial Stress on 
Downsizing*Downsizing Switch 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
Perceived Fractional Downsizing Rate[level]= SMOOTHI(Fractional 
Downsizing Rate[level], Downsizing Perception Time, Initial 
Perceived Fractional Downsizing Rate[level]) 
Units: Fraction/Month 
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The downsizing rate is one component of the employee attrition rate defined in 
section 5.1 (p.137). 
 
Level Downsizing Rate[level]= Total Level 
Employees[level]*Fractional Downsizing Rate[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Parameters for Job Security 
This lookup function for employees' job security, arising from their (normalized) 
memory of downsizing, was taken from Repenning and Sterman (1994b, p. 93).  
(Repenning and Sterman called it "Company Commitment to Job Security".) 
 
Job Security from Downsizing Fn([(0,0)-
(10,1)],(0,1),(1,0.38),(2,0.18),(3,0.085),(4,0.045),(5,0.025),
(6,0.01),(7,0.005),(8,0),(9,0),(10,0)) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 26. Lookup Function: Job Security from Downsizing Fn 
 
Reference Fractional Downsizing Rate= 0.001 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
These time constants for the building and forgetting of downsizing memory were also 
taken from Repenning and Sterman (1994b, p. 94). 
 
Downsizing Memory Forgetting Time= 90 
Units: Month 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 188   
 
Downsizing Memory Build Time= 1 
Units: Month 
 
Downsizing Perception Time= 3 
Units: Month 
 
Downsizing Start Date= 108 
Units: Month 
 
Downsizing Duration= 12 
Units: Month 
 
Initial Perceived Fractional Downsizing Rate[level]= 0,0,0 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
I assume that as the financial stress faced by the company increases from 0 to 1, the 
senior executives are willing to increase the fractional downsizing rate from zero to the 
Maximum Fractional Downsizing Rate. 
 
Effect of Financial Stress on Downsizing Fn([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,0),(0.5,0.03),(0.75,0.14),(0.9,0.4),(1,1)) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 27. Lookup Function: Effect of Financial Stress on Downsizing Fn 
 
Maximum Fractional Downsizing Rate[level]= 0,0.004,0.004 
Units: Fraction/Month 
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5.10. Convincing Rates 
At its core, this model is a diffusion model.  Its main dynamics arise from neutral and 
skeptical employees having experiences that convince them to become believers 
(described in this section), and believers and neutrals having experiences that disillusion 
them to become skeptics (described in section 5.11, p.195). 
In this model, I include three different mechanisms whereby neutral and skeptical 
employees are convinced to become believers.  Two of these mechanisms, positive word 
of mouth (PWOM) and training, are analogous to the two mechanisms7 that constitute the 
classic Bass diffusion model (Bass, 1969).  I add a third mechanism: Employees forming an 
opinion about CI for the first time after participating in their first CI activity.  I call their 
rate of forming these first impressions their "CI trials" rate.  (Because of a small non-zero 
rate of believers and skeptics reverting to neutrals (see section 5.1, p.137), these 
employees can have another "first" experience with CI.  In other words, the CI proponents 
do have another chance to make a "first" impression.) 
                                            
7 Bass (1969, p. 217) calls these two mechanisms "imitation" and "innovation", 
respectively. 
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Figure 28. Model Diagram of Convincing Rates 
The use of maximum convincing rates in the formulations for Neutrals Convincing 
Rate and Skeptics Convincing Rate ensures first-order control on the convinced-employee 
outflows from the stocks of Neutrals and Skeptics, respectively. 
 
Neutrals Indicated Convincing Rate[level]= Neutrals Convincing 
Rate from CI Trials[level] + Neutrals Convincing Rate from 
PWOM[level] + Neutrals Convincing Rate from Training[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Indicated Convincing Rate[level]= Skeptics Convincing 
Rate from CI Trials[level] + Skeptics Convincing Rate from 
PWOM[level] + Skeptics Convincing Rate from Training[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Neutrals Convincing Rate[level]= MIN(Neutrals Indicated Convincing 
Rate[level], Neutrals Maximum Convincing Rate[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Convincing Rate[level]= MIN(Skeptics Indicated Convincing 
Rate[level], Skeptics Maximum Convincing Rate[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
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Neutrals Maximum Convincing Rate[level]= Neutrals[level]/Minimum 
Convincing Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Maximum Convincing Rate[level]= Skeptics[level]/Minimum 
Convincing Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
I assume that all regular employees form their own initial opinions about CI after 
participating in CI activities themselves for a certain duration.  For simplicity, I assume that 
this duration is the same for every employee, no matter their belief state or level. 
 
CI Trials Completion Rate[level,contributor]= CI Work 
Rate[level,contributor]/CI Trial Avg Completion Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Neutrals Convincing Rate from CI Trials[level]= CI Trials 
Completion Rate[level,Neu]*Neutrals Convincing Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Convincing Rate from CI Trials[level]= CI Trials 
Completion Rate[level,Ske]*Skeptics Convincing Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
I assume that the convincing function is the same for all employees and takes the 
form Y = 1 - e^(-s*X), where Y is the probability of an employee being convinced, X is 
employees' (normalized) perception of their CI work improvement results, and s is how 
sensitive they are to the magnitude of their improvement results.  Skeptics are less 
sensitive to a given level of improvement results than neutrals are, which means that they 
are harder to convince.  I assume that front-line employees and managers care about 
different types of improvement results.  Front-line employees care about only the rate at 
which their jobs get easier through improvements in process efficiency.  Senior executives 
and middle managers care about only the CI savings (as a fraction of total costs) that hit 
the company's bottom line.  I model employees' perceptions of these (average) 
improvement results using first-order exponential smoothing. 
 
Neutrals Convincing Fraction[SE]= MAX(1-EXP(-Neutrals Convincing 
Sensitivity*Normalized CI Savings Fraction), 0) 
Neutrals Convincing Fraction[MM]= MAX(1-EXP(-Neutrals Convincing 
Sensitivity*Normalized CI Savings Fraction), 0) 
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Neutrals Convincing Fraction[FL]= MAX(1-EXP(-Neutrals Convincing 
Sensitivity*Normalized Time per Task Fractional Improvement 
Rate[FL]), 0) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Skeptics Convincing Fraction[SE]= MAX(1-EXP(-Skeptics Convincing 
Sensitivity*Normalized CI Savings Fraction), 0) 
Skeptics Convincing Fraction[MM]= MAX(1-EXP(-Skeptics Convincing 
Sensitivity*Normalized CI Savings Fraction), 0) 
Skeptics Convincing Fraction[FL]= MAX(1-EXP(-Skeptics Convincing 
Sensitivity*Normalized Time per Task Fractional Improvement 
Rate[FL]), 0) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Normalized CI Savings Fraction= Perceived CI Savings 
Fraction/Reference CI Savings Fraction 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Perceived CI Savings Fraction= SMOOTH(CI Savings Fraction, 
Improvement Perception Time) 
Units: Fraction 
 
Normalized Time per Task Fractional Improvement Rate[level]= 
Perceived Time per Task Fractional Improvement 
Rate[level]/Reference Time per Task Fractional Improvement 
Rate 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Perceived Time per Task Fractional Improvement Rate[level]= 
SMOOTH(Time per Task Fractional Improvement Rate[level], 
Improvement Perception Time) 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
My formulation for the convincing rates from positive word of mouth (PWOM) 
mirrors the classic infection-rate formulation typically used in models of disease 
epidemiology (see Sterman, 2000, p. 302).  For example, neutral employees (the 
susceptible population) come into contact with other employees at a certain rate (the 
contact rate).  A fraction of those contacts will be with employees who are CI proponents 
(the infectious population).  The probability that a CI proponent convinces (infects) a 
neutral employee is the convincing fraction (infectivity).  Note that this formulation 
implies perfect mixing of employees: each employee has an equal probability of coming 
into contact with any other employee.  I adopt this perfect-mixing assumption for 
convenience, despite its descriptive inaccuracy.  For simplicity, I use the same convincing 
fractions from the CI trial convincing rates above.  My usage of these same convincing 
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fractions, however, implies specific definitions of the contact rates: they are interactions 
among employees where their communication is effective enough to be equivalent to a CI 
trial. 
 
Neutrals Convincing Rate from PWOM[SE]= Neutrals[SE]*Effective 
Mgmt Contact Rate*CI Proponents Mgmt Fraction*Neutrals 
Convincing Fraction[SE] 
Neutrals Convincing Rate from PWOM[MM]= Neutrals[MM]*Effective 
Mgmt Contact Rate*CI Proponents Mgmt Fraction*Neutrals 
Convincing Fraction[MM] 
Neutrals Convincing Rate from PWOM[FL]= Neutrals[FL]*Effective FL 
Contact Rate*CI Proponents FL Fraction*Neutrals Convincing 
Fraction[FL] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Convincing Rate from PWOM[SE]= Skeptics[SE]*Effective 
Mgmt Contact Rate*CI Proponents Mgmt Fraction*Skeptics 
Convincing Fraction[SE] 
Skeptics Convincing Rate from PWOM[MM]= Skeptics[MM]*Effective 
Mgmt Contact Rate*CI Proponents Mgmt Fraction*Skeptics 
Convincing Fraction[MM] 
Skeptics Convincing Rate from PWOM[FL]= Skeptics[FL]*Effective FL 
Contact Rate*CI Proponents FL Fraction*Skeptics Convincing 
Fraction[FL] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Based on my case study of DTE Energy, I model the possible PWOM CI proponents 
for the front-line employees differently from the possible PWOM CI proponents for the 
middle managers and senior executives.  Managers can be convinced by CI proponents — 
believers and Black Belt program participants (see section 5.1, p.137) — from both of their 
two levels of the company hierarchy.  Front-line employees, on the other hand, are 
convinced only by their believer colleagues.  They disregard any positive word of mouth 
from management or from Black Belt program participants. 
 
PWOM CI Proponents Mgmt Fraction= ZIDZ(CI Proponents[SE] + CI 
Proponents[MM], Total Level Employees[SE] + Total Level 
Employees[MM]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
PWOM CI Proponents FL Fraction= ZIDZ(CI Proponents[FL] - BB 
Program Participants[FL], Total Level Employees[FL]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
The rate at which employees are convinced by training is analogous to their 
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convincing rate from CI trials.  The fraction of trainees convinced by training is equal to 
the ratio of the training hours required to convince one employee to the number of hours 
of a typical training course.  Note that the senior executive training rates are, by definition, 
zero for the other levels of the company hierarchy (see section 5.21, p.234). 
 
Neutrals Convincing Rate from Training[level]= Neutrals GB 
Training Rate[level]/GB Training to Convince Neutrals + 
Neutrals SE Training Rate[level]/SE Training to Convince 
Neutrals 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics Convincing Rate from Training[level]= Skeptics GB 
Training Rate[level]/GB Training to Convince Skeptics + 
Skeptics SE Training Rate[level]/SE Training to Convince 
Skeptics 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Parameters for Convincing Rates 
 
Minimum Convincing Time= 0.25 
Units: Month 
 
This parameter defines how many hours of CI work, on average, an employee must 
complete before he or she develops an opinion about CI, either favorable or unfavorable. 
 
CI Trial Avg Completion Time= 96 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
I assume that skeptics are twice as hard to convince as neutrals.  Equivalently, 
skeptics require improvement results that are twice as good to be convinced at the same 
rate as neutrals. 
 
Neutrals Convincing Sensitivity= 1 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Skeptics Convincing Sensitivity= 0.5 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Reference CI Savings Fraction= 0.002 
Units: Fraction 
 
Reference Time per Task Fractional Improvement Rate= -0.0005 
Units: Fraction/Month 
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Improvement Perception Time= 1 
Units: Month 
 
These contact-rate parameters represent employee interactions that are equivalent to 
a CI trial, rather than raw contact rates. 
 
Effective Mgmt Contact Rate= 0.1 
Units: (Person/Person)/Month 
 
Effective FL Contact Rate= 0 
Units: (Person/Person)/Month 
 
I assume that the number of training hours required to convince an employee of a 
certain belief state is the same across all three levels of the company hierarchy.  (Note, 
however, that only senior executives can receive SE training.) 
 
GB Training to Convince Neutrals= 3200 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
GB Training to Convince Skeptics= 1e+06 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
SE Training to Convince Neutrals= 100 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
SE Training to Convince Skeptics= 200 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
5.11. Disillusioning Rates 
The formulations for believers' and neutrals' disillusioning rates mirror those for the 
convincing rates in section 5.10 (p.189), but with a few minor differences.  I assume that 
training can never disillusion employees.  Only negative first experiences with CI — i.e., 
disappointing CI trials — and negative word of mouth (NWOM) from skeptics can 
disillusion employees. 
 
Believers Indicated Disillusioning Rate[level]= Believers 
Disillusioning Rate from CI Trials[level] + Believers 
Disillusioning Rate from NWOM[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
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Neutrals Indicated Disillusioning Rate[level]= Neutrals 
Disillusioning Rate from CI Trials[level] + Neutrals 
Disillusioning Rate from NWOM[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
 
Figure 29. Model Diagram of Disillusioning Rates 
The use of maximum convincing rates in the formulations for Believers Disillusioning 
Rate and Neutrals Disillusioning Rate ensures first-order control on the disillusioned-
employee outflows from the stocks of Believers and Neutrals, respectively. 
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Rate[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Believers Maximum Disillusioning Rate[level]= 
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Neutrals Maximum Disillusioning Rate[level]= 
Neutrals[level]/Minimum Disillusioning Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
I assume that all the neutrals who were not convinced by their CI trials are 
disillusioned.  In other words, employees form a definite opinion about CI after their CI 
trial activity, becoming either a believer or a skeptic; they do not remain neutral.  I define 
employees' disillusioning fraction as the fractional complement of their convincing 
fraction. 
 
Believers Disillusioning Rate from CI Trials[level]= CI Trials 
Completion Rate[level,Bel]*Believers Disillusioning 
Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Neutrals Disillusioning Rate from CI Trials[level]= CI Trials 
Completion Rate[level,Neu]*(1-Neutrals Convincing 
Fraction[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
I define the believers' disillusioning fraction to be the fractional complement of the 
convincing fraction in section 5.10 (p.189): Y = e^(-s*X), where Y is the probability of an 
employee being disillusioned, X is employees' (normalized) perception of their CI work 
improvement results, and s is how sensitive they are to the magnitude of their 
improvement results.  I assume that it is equally as hard for CI detractors to disillusion 
believers as it is for CI proponents to convince skeptics. 
 
Believers Disillusioning Fraction[SE]= MIN(EXP(-Believers 
Disillusioning Sensitivity*Normalized CI Savings Fraction), 1) 
Believers Disillusioning Fraction[MM]= MIN(EXP(-Believers 
Disillusioning Sensitivity*Normalized CI Savings Fraction), 1) 
Believers Disillusioning Fraction[FL]= MIN(EXP(-Believers 
Disillusioning Sensitivity*Normalized Time per Task Fractional 
Improvement Rate[FL]), 1) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
I formulate negative word of mouth (NWOM) the same way as I formulated positive 
word of mouth in section 5.10 (p.189).  The difference, of course, is employees coming 
into contact with CI detractors — all of whom are skeptics — who induce them to become 
skeptics themselves. 
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Believers Disillusioning Rate from NWOM[SE]= 
Believers[SE]*Effective Mgmt Contact Rate*CI Detractors Mgmt 
Fraction*Believers Disillusioning Fraction[SE] 
Believers Disillusioning Rate from NWOM[MM]= 
Believers[MM]*Effective Mgmt Contact Rate*CI Detractors Mgmt 
Fraction*Believers Disillusioning Fraction[MM] 
Believers Disillusioning Rate from NWOM[FL]= 
Believers[FL]*Effective FL Contact Rate*CI Detractors FL 
Fraction*Believers Disillusioning Fraction[FL] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Neutrals Disillusioning Rate from NWOM[SE]= Neutrals[SE]*Effective 
Mgmt Contact Rate*CI Detractors Mgmt Fraction*(1-Neutrals 
Convincing Fraction[SE]) 
Neutrals Disillusioning Rate from NWOM[MM]= Neutrals[MM]*Effective 
Mgmt Contact Rate*CI Detractors Mgmt Fraction*(1-Neutrals 
Convincing Fraction[MM]) 
Neutrals Disillusioning Rate from NWOM[FL]= Neutrals[FL]*Effective 
FL Contact Rate*CI Detractors FL Fraction*(1-Neutrals 
Convincing Fraction[FL]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Just as with positive word of mouth (section 5.10, p.189), I assume that senior 
executives and middle managers are influenced by each other but not by front-line 
employees.  Front-line employees, for their part, are influenced only by their front-line 
colleages, not their bosses. 
 
NWOM CI Detractors Mgmt Fraction= ZIDZ(Skeptics[SE] + 
Skeptics[MM], Total Level Employees[SE] + Total Level 
Employees[MM]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
NWOM CI Detractors FL Fraction= ZIDZ(Skeptics[FL], Total Level 
Employees[FL]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Parameters for Disillusioning Rates 
 
Minimum Disillusioning Time= 0.25 
Units: Month 
 
I assume that it is equally as hard for CI detractors to disillusion believers as it is for 
CI proponents to convince skeptics. 
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Believers Disillusioning Sensitivity= 2 
Units: Dmnl 
 
5.12. Black Belt States 
The definitions for three of the six employee stocks were given in section 5.1 (p.137).  
The remaining three stocks pertain to the Black Belt program: 
 
Black Belt Trainees[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level] 
 - BB Trainee Attrition Rate[level] 
 - BB Trainee Dropout Rate[level] 
 - BB Training Completion Rate[level] 
 , 0) 
Units: Person 
 
Black Belt Candidates[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Training Completion Rate[level] 
 - BB Candidate Attrition Rate[level] 
 - BB Candidate Dropout Rate[level] 
 - BB Certification Rate[level] 
 , 0) 
Units: Person 
 
Black Belts[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Certification Rate[level] 
 + BB Hire Rate[level] 
 - BB Attrition Rate[level] 
 - BB Dropout Rate[level] 
 - BB Promotion Rate from Black Belts[level] 
 , Initial Black Belts[level]) 
Units: Person 
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Figure 30. Model Diagram of Black Belt States 
Because Level Attrition Rate is defined for an entire level of the company hierarchy, I 
allocate a fraction of this outflow to each of the employee-state stocks, proportional to 
each stock's size relative to the total. 
 
Level Employees BB Trainee Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Black Belt 
Trainees[level], Total Level Employees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
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Candidates[level], Total Level Employees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Level Employees BB Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Black Belts[level], Total 
Level Employees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
BB Trainee Attrition Rate[level]= Level Attrition 
Rate[level]*Level Employees BB Trainee Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
BB Candidate Attrition Rate[level]= Level Attrition 
Rate[level]*Level Employees BB Candidate Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
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BB Attrition Rate[level]= Level Attrition Rate[level]*Level 
Employees BB Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Employees may drop out of the Black Belt program at any of its three stages. 
 
BB Fractional Dropout Rate= Exogenous BB Fractional Dropout 
Rate*(1-Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch) + Constant BB 
Fractional Dropout Rate*Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
BB Trainee Dropout Rate[level]= Black Belt Trainees[level]*BB 
Trainee Fractional Dropout Rate 
Units: Person/Month 
 
BB Candidate Dropout Rate[level]= Black Belt Candidates[level]*BB 
Candidate Fractional Dropout Rate 
Units: Person/Month 
 
BB Dropout Rate[level]= Black Belts[level]*BB Fractional Dropout 
Rate 
Units: Person/Month 
 
BB Program Dropout Rate[level]= BB Trainee Dropout Rate[level] + 
BB Candidate Dropout Rate[level] + BB Dropout Rate[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
I assume that employees who drop out of the Black Belt program have definite 
attitudes toward CI; that is, they do not become neutrals.  I also assume that the fraction of 
believer dropouts is the same across all three types of Black Belt program participants 
(trainees, candidates, and certified Black Belts). 
 
BB Program Believers Dropout Rate[level]= BB Program Dropout 
Rate[level]*BB Program Believers Dropout Fraction 
Units: Person/Month 
 
BB Program Skeptics Dropout Rate[level]= BB Program Dropout 
Rate[level]*(1-BB Program Believers Dropout Fraction) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Employees from the stocks of believers and neutrals may enroll in Black Belt training 
as the first step toward becoming certified Black Belts.  See section 5.15 (p.215) for the 
definitions of these enrolling rates. 
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BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]= Believers BB Trainee Enrolling 
Rate[level] + Neutrals BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
The rate at which Black Belt candidates become Black Belts depends on the rate at 
which they complete their certification projects (see the equations for Indicated BB 
Candidate Certification Rate and Minimum BB Candidate Certification Time in section 
5.18, p.225).  The use of Maximum BB Candidate Certification Rate in the formulation for 
BB Candidate Certification Rate ensures first-order control on this outflow from the Black 
Belt Candidates stock. 
 
BB Certification Rate[level]= MIN(Indicated BB Candidate 
Certification Rate[level], Maximum BB Candidate Certification 
Rate[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Maximum BB Candidate Certification Rate[level]= Black Belt 
Candidates[level]/Minimum BB Candidate Certification Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
When Black Belts are promoted up the company hierarchy, they leave the stock of 
Black Belts at their former level (as specified by the equation below) and join the stock of 
believers at one level higher (see the equation for BB Promotion Rate to Mgmt in section 
5.1, p.137). 
 
BB Promotion Rate from Black Belts[level]= Black Belts[level]*BB 
Fractional Promotion Rate[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Certified Black Belts are hired from other companies after the start of the Black Belt 
program. 
 
BB Hire Rate[level]= Exogenous BB Hire Rate[level]*(1-Constant BB 
Hire Switch) + Constant BB Hire Rate[level]*Constant BB Hire 
Switch 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Constant BB Hire Switch= 0 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Constant BB Hire Rate[level]= 0,0,0.54 
Units: Person/Month 
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The average time that Black Belt trainees take to complete their training course is 
required to determine the rate at which they accumulate CI experience from it (see section 
5.13, p.204).  I compute this average completion time using Little's Law (Little, 1961), 
which I acknowledge is strictly true only in equilibrium. 
 
BB Trainee Avg Completion Time[level]= ZIDZ(Black Belt 
Trainees[level], BB Training Completion Rate[level]) 
Units: Month 
 
The following variables are various counts of Black Belt program participants used 
elsewhere in the model or for output. 
 
BB Program Participants[level]= Black Belts[level] + Black Belt 
Candidates[level] + Black Belt Trainees[level] 
Units: Person 
 
Total BB Program Participants= SUM(BB Program 
Participants[level!]) 
Units: Person 
 
Total Black Belt Trainees= SUM(Black Belt Trainees[level!]) 
Units: Person 
 
Total Black Belt Candidates= SUM(Black Belt Candidates[level!]) 
Units: Person 
 
Total Black Belts= SUM(Black Belts[level!]) 
Units: Person 
 
BB Level Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Black Belts[level], Total Black 
Belts) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Parameters for Black Belt States 
 
Initial Black Belts[level]= 0,0,0 
Units: Person 
 
BB Trainee Fractional Dropout Rate= 0.01 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
BB Candidate Fractional Dropout Rate= 0.1 
Units: Fraction/Month 
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Exogenous BB Fractional Dropout Rate :HOLD BACKWARD::= GET XLS 
DATA(Excel File Name, Excel File Scenario Name, Excel File 
Time Row, 'C12') 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch= 0 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Rate= 0 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
I assume that the fraction of believer dropouts is the same across all three types of 
Black Belt program participants (trainees, candidates, and certified Black Belts).  By 
definition, dropouts who are not believers are skeptics; I assume that dropouts are not 
neutral on CI. 
 
BB Program Believers Dropout Fraction= 0.5 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
I assume Black Belts are only promoted into middle management.  Senior executive 
and middle manager Black Belts return to operational roles at their respective levels by 
dropping out of the Black Belt program. 
 
BB Fractional Promotion Rate[level]= 0,0,0.0046 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
Certified Black Belts are hired from other companies after the start of the Black Belt 
program. 
 
Exogenous BB Hire Rate[level] :HOLD BACKWARD::= GET XLS DATA(Excel 
File Name, Excel File Scenario Name, Excel File Time Row, 
'C5') 
Units: Person/Month 
 
5.13. Black Belt CI Experience Co-flow 
This model includes a co-flow structure, which mirrors the Black Belt program 
participants structure in section 5.12 (p.199), to track the aggregate person-hours of CI 
experience associated with each employee stock: 
 
Black Belt Trainees CI Experience[level]= INTEG( 
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 + BB Trainee CI Experience Gain Rate[level] 
 + BB Trainee Enrolling Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB Trainee Attrition Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB Trainee CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level] 
 - BB Trainee Dropout Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB Training Completion Rate CI Experience[level] 
 , 0) 
Units: Person*Hours 
 
Black Belt Candidates CI Experience[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Candidate CI Experience Gain Rate[level] 
 + BB Training Completion Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB Candidate Attrition Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB Candidate CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level] 
 - BB Candidate Dropout Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB Certification Rate CI Experience[level] 
 , 0) 
Units: Person*Hours 
 
Black Belts CI Experience[level]= INTEG( 
 + BB Certification Rate CI Experience[level] 
 + BB CI Experience Gain Rate[level] 
 + BB Hire Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level] 
 - BB Attrition Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB Dropout Rate CI Experience[level] 
 - BB Promotion Rate CI Experience[level] 
 , Initial Black Belts CI Experience[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours 
 
Initial Black Belts CI Experience[level]= Initial Black 
Belts[level]*Initial BB Average CI Experience 
Units: Person*Hours 
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Figure 31. Model Diagram of Black Belt CI Experience Co-flow 
This experience co-flow structure is used to compute the average CI experience of 
each type of Black Belt program participant.  I assume that each participant possesses the 
average CI experience of all participants at the same stage of the Black Belt program: 
 
BB Trainee Avg CI Experience[level]= ZIDZ(Black Belt Trainees CI 
Experience[level], Black Belt Trainees[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
BB Candidate Avg CI Experience[level]= ZIDZ(Black Belt Candidates 
CI Experience[level], Black Belt Candidates[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
BB Avg CI Experience[level]= ZIDZ(Black Belts CI 
Experience[level], Black Belts[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
When Black Belt program participants transition from one stage to the next, or back 
to the regular employee states of section 5.1 (p.137), they bring their (average) CI 
experience with them. 
 
BB Trainee Attrition Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Trainee 
Attrition Rate[level]*BB Trainee Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
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BB Candidate Attrition Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Candidate 
Attrition Rate[level]*BB Candidate Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Attrition Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Attrition 
Rate[level]*BB Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Trainee Dropout Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Trainee Dropout 
Rate[level]*BB Trainee Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Candidate Dropout Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Candidate 
Dropout Rate[level]*BB Candidate Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Dropout Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Dropout Rate[level]*BB 
Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Program Dropout Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Trainee Dropout 
Rate CI Experience[level] + BB Candidate Dropout Rate CI 
Experience[level] + BB Dropout Rate CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Program Believers Dropout Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Program 
Dropout Rate CI Experience[level]*BB Program Believers Dropout 
Fraction 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Program Skeptics Dropout Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Program 
Dropout Rate CI Experience[level]*(1-BB Program Believers 
Dropout Fraction) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Training Completion Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Training 
Completion Rate[level]*BB Trainee Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Certification Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Certification 
Rate[level]*BB Candidate Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Promotion Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Promotion Rate from 
Black Belts[level]*BB Avg CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Similarly, hired Black Belts join the company with their (average) CI experience. 
 
BB Hire Rate CI Experience[level]= BB Hire Rate[level]*BB Hire Avg 
CI Experience 
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Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Hire Avg CI Experience= Exogenous BB Hire Avg CI Experience*(1-
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch) + Constant BB Hire 
Avg CI Experience*Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Both believers and neutrals can enroll in Black Belt training (section 5.15, p.215), so 
both types of employees bring their prior CI experience (see section 5.2, p.144) with them 
to the Black Belt program. 
 
BB Trainee Enrolling Rate CI Experience[level]= Believers BB 
Trainee Enrolling Rate CI Experience[level] + Neutrals BB 
Trainee Enrolling Rate CI Experience[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
This experience co-flow is non-conserved.  Black Belt program participants gain 
additional CI experience from attending training and by doing CI projects.  Also, I assume 
that employees' CI experience becomes obsolete via first-order exponential decay.  
Therefore, employees must continually replenish their CI experience by participating in CI 
activities.  I allow for the descriptively accurate possibility that CI experience gained from 
training is not as valuable as CI experience gained through hands-on participation in CI 
projects. 
 
BB Trainee CI Experience Gain Rate[level]= BB Trainee CI 
Experience Gain from Training[level] + BB Trainee CI 
Experience Gain from Projects[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Trainee CI Experience Gain from Training[level]= ZIDZ(Black 
Belt Trainees[level]*BB Training Classroom Hours*CI Experience 
Value of BB Training, BB Trainee Avg Completion Time[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Trainee CI Experience Gain from Projects[level]= CI Work 
Contribution Rate[level,BBt]*CI Experience Value of Projects 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Candidate CI Experience Gain Rate[level]= CI Work Contribution 
Rate[level,BBc]*CI Experience Value of Projects 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
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BB CI Experience Gain Rate[level]= CI Work Contribution 
Rate[level,BB]*CI Experience Value of Projects 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Trainee CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level]= Black Belt 
Trainees CI Experience[level]/CI Experience Obsolescence Time 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB Candidate CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level]= Black Belt 
Candidates CI Experience[level]/CI Experience Obsolescence 
Time 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
BB CI Experience Obsolescence Rate[level]= Black Belts CI 
Experience[level]/CI Experience Obsolescence Time 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Parameters for Black Belt Experience Co-flow 
 
Initial BB Average CI Experience= 1056 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Exogenous BB Hire Avg CI Experience :HOLD BACKWARD::= GET XLS 
DATA(Excel File Name, Excel File Scenario Name, Excel File 
Time Row, 'C9') 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch= 0 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience= 4160 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
I assume that the CI experience gained from training is less than the CI experience 
gained from CI projects. 
 
CI Experience Value of BB Training= 0.3 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
5.14. Coaching by Black Belts 
To be as effective as high-skill employees, low-skill employees require a certain 
amount of coaching by Black Belts to compensate for their low CI skill.  For simplicity, I 
define this required coaching as a certain number of (fractional) work-hours of Black Belt 
coaching for every employee hour of CI project work.  As their skill increases, employees 
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need fewer work-hours of coaching for each of their CI project work-hours. 
 
FL Projects Required BB Coaching[level,regEmployees]= CI Work 
Rate[level,regEmployees]*FL Projects Baseline Fractional 
Required BB Coaching[regEmployees]*Effect of Contributors 
Skill on Required Coaching[level,regEmployees] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Effect of Contributors Skill on Required 
Coaching[level,contributor]= Effect of Contributors Skill on 
Required Coaching Fn(Contributors 
Skill[level,contributor]/Reference Skill) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Total Required BB Coaching= SUM(FL Projects Required BB 
Coaching[level!,regEmployees!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
 
Figure 32. Model Diagram of Coaching by Black Belts 
Black Belts must decide what fraction of their CI work they will allocate to coaching 
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assume that Black Belts make this allocation decision based on two factors: (1) employees' 
demand for their coaching time relative to their total time available for CI work, and (2) 
their assessment of employees' average CI effort earnestness.  Blacks Belts, as specially 
trained CI experts, typically command a salary premium and, in return, are expected to 
"pay for themselves" with CI project improvement gains.  This incentive means that Black 
Belts have a bias against coaching.  Furthermore, they definitely do not want to coach 
employees who are simply "going through the motions" of CI work with low CI effort 
earnestness.  BB Total CI Work Rate is computed in section 5.6 (p.163) and Contributors 
Avg CI Effort Earnestness is computed in section 5.7 (p.172).  The kaizen facilitators, by 
contrast, dedicated 100 percent of their time to coaching front-line kaizen event teams 
until they were replaced by OS Experts about July 2002. 
 
BB Coaching Demand Supply Ratio= XIDZ(Total Required BB Coaching, 
BB Total CI Work Rate, 1e+06) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Effect of Demand on BB Coaching= Effect of Demand on BB Coaching 
Fn(BB Coaching Demand Supply Ratio) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Effect of CI Effort Earnestness on BB Coaching= Effect of CI 
Effort Earnestness on BB Coaching Fn(Contributors Avg CI 
Effort Earnestness)*CI Effort Earnestness Effect on BB 
Coaching Switch + (1-CI Effort Earnestness Effect on BB 
Coaching Switch) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
BB Coaching Fraction= Maximum BB Coaching Fraction*Effect of 
Demand on BB Coaching*Effect of CI Effort Earnestness on BB 
Coaching*(1-Constant BB Coaching Fraction Switch) + Constant 
BB Coaching Fraction*Constant BB Coaching Fraction Switch 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Constant BB Coaching Fraction Switch= PULSE(Constant BB Coaching 
Start Date, Constant BB Coaching Duration) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
I assume that senior executives and middle managers who are supporting CI work on 
the front lines require coaching time from the Black Belts in the same way that the front-
line employees do.  For simplicity, I assume that Black Belts allocate their coaching time 
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to each employee group according to each group's coaching demand relative to the total 
coaching demand. 
 
BB Coaching Level Demand Fraction[level,regEmployees]= ZIDZ(FL 
Projects Required BB Coaching[level,regEmployees], Total 
Required BB Coaching) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
BB Coaching[level,regEmployees]= BB Total CI Work Rate*BB Coaching 
Fraction*BB Coaching Level Demand Fraction[level,regEmployees] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Black Belt coaching compensates for employees' low CI skill at all three levels of the 
company hierarchy.  I assume, however, that inadequate Black Belt coaching is a 
demotivating factor (see section 5.7, p.172) only for front-line employees.  For simplicity, I 
model employees' perception of the adequacy of the Black Belt coaching they receive 
with first-order exponential smoothing. 
 
BB Coaching Adequacy[level,regEmployees]= XIDZ(BB 
Coaching[level,regEmployees], FL Projects Required BB 
Coaching[level,regEmployees], 1) 
Units: Fraction 
 
Perceived BB Coaching Adequacy[FL,regEmployees]= SMOOTHI(BB 
Coaching Adequacy[FL,regEmployees], BB Coaching Adequacy 
Perception Time, 1) 
Perceived BB Coaching Adequacy[MM,regEmployees]= 1 
Perceived BB Coaching Adequacy[SE,regEmployees]= 1 
Units: Fraction 
 
Parameters for Coaching by Black Belts 
The number of coaching hours that employees with zero CI skill, at any level, 
require from Black Belts for every hour they spend supporting or working on CI projects.  
As employees' CI skill increases from zero to Reference Skill, their required Black Belt 
coaching decreases to zero. 
 
FL Projects Baseline Fractional Required BB 
Coaching[regEmployees]= 0.125 
Units: (Person*Hours)/(Person*Hour) 
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Effect of Contributors Skill on Required Coaching Fn([(0,0)-
(1.5,1)],(0,1),(1,0),(1.5,0)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 33. Lookup Function: Effect of Contributors Skill on Required Coaching Fn 
 
As demand for coaching increases from 0 to 100 percent of Black Belts' total CI work 
time, the fraction that they allocate to coaching increases from 10 percent to their 
Maximum BB Coaching Fraction (assuming no effect from CI effort earnestness). 
 
Effect of Demand on BB Coaching Fn([(0,0)-
(2,1)],(0,0.1),(1,1),(2,1)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 34. Lookup Function: Effect of Demand on BB Coaching Fn 
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Maximum BB Coaching Fraction= 0.5 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
As employees' average CI effort earnestness decreases from 100 to 0 percent, the 
fraction of their total CI work time that Black Belts want to allocate to coaching decreases 
from Maximum BB Coaching Fraction to 50 percent (assuming no effect from coaching 
demand). 
 
Effect of CI Effort Earnestness on BB Coaching Fn([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,0.5),(1,1)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 35. Lookup Function: Effect of CI Effort Earnestness on BB Coaching Fn 
 
Kaizen facilitators dedicated 100 percent of their time to coaching front-line kaizen 
event teams until July 2002. 
 
Constant BB Coaching Fraction= 1 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date= 27 
Units: Month 
 
Constant BB Coaching Duration= 39 
Units: Month 
 
For testing purposes, I allow for the possibility that Black Belts ignore employees' CI 
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effort earnestness when deciding how much coaching to provide. 
 
CI Effort Earnestness Effect on BB Coaching Switch= 1 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
BB Coaching Adequacy Perception Time= 0.25 
Units: Month 
 
5.15. Black Belt Program Enrolling 
DTE Energy's managers set a target for Black Belts expressed as a fraction of the 
company's total workforce.  They planned to reach this target after two years of training.  
Note that this definition for Desired BB Trainee Enrolling Rate implies that DTE Energy's 
managers are always able to recruit their desired number of employees to Black Belt 
training.  In DTE Energy's case, this is a reasonable assumption because enough 
employees considered Black Belt certification as valuable professional development.  
Consequently, DTE Energy's Master Black Belts never had difficulty filling their Black Belt 
training courses.  For the equations below, Total Employees is computed in section 5.1 
(p.137), Total BB Program Participants is computed in section 5.12 (p.199), and BB 
Training Maximum Capacity is computed in section 5.17 (p.220). 
 
BB Target= Total Employees*Target BB to Workforce Ratio 
Units: Person 
 
Target BB to Workforce Ratio= Exogenous Target BB to Workforce 
Ratio*(1-Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch) + BB 
Target Switch*Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio*Constant 
Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch 
Units: Person/Person 
 
BB Target Switch= STEP(1, BB Target Start Date) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
BB Shortfall= MAX(BB Target - Total BB Program Participants, 0) 
Units: Person 
 
Desired BB Trainee Enrolling Rate= BB Shortfall/BB Shortfall 
Correction Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Feasible BB Trainee Enrolling Rate= MIN(Desired BB Trainee 
Enrolling Rate, BB Training Maximum Capacity) 
Units: Person/Month 
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Figure 36. Model Diagram of Black Belt Program Enrolling 
An employee from any level of the company hierarchy may enroll in Black Belt 
training.  Almost all Black Belt trainees, however, enroll from the front-line level.  I define 
the rates of middle managers and senior executives enrolling in Black Belt training relative 
to the enrolling rate of these front-line employees using odds ratios.  I assume that skeptics 
never enroll in Black Belt training. 
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Units: Person 
 
Potential BB Trainees[level]= Potential Believer BB 
Trainees[level] + Potential Neutral BB Trainees[level] 
Units: Person 
 
Total Potential BB Trainees= SUM(Potential BB Trainees[level!]) 
Units: Person 
 
It is possible that demand for Black Belt training might exceed the company's 
training capacity.  The actual enrolling rate, therefore, must be the lesser of the desired 
rate and the feasible rate determined from the company's training capacity.  I allocate the 
actual enrolling rate among the believers and neutrals at all three levels proportionally 
according to each group's demand relative to the total demand.  This allocation requires 
two marginal distributions — across levels, and across believers/neutrals — which I 
multiply together to compute the joint distribution. 
 
Potential BB Trainees Level Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Potential BB 
Trainees[level], Total Potential BB Trainees) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Potential BB Trainees Believer Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Potential 
Believer BB Trainees[level], Potential BB Trainees[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
BB Trainee Enrolling Believers Fraction[level]= Potential BB 
Trainees Level Fraction[level]*Potential BB Trainees Believer 
Fraction[level] 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
BB Trainee Enrolling Neutrals Fraction[level]= Potential BB 
Trainees Level Fraction[level]*(1-Potential BB Trainees 
Believer Fraction[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Indicated Believer BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]= Feasible BB 
Trainee Enrolling Rate*BB Trainee Enrolling Believers 
Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Indicated Neutral BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]= Feasible BB 
Trainee Enrolling Rate*BB Trainee Enrolling Neutrals 
Fraction[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
The use of maximum enrolling rates in the formulation for Believers BB Trainee 
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Enrolling Rate and Neutrals BB Trainee Enrolling Rate ensures first-order control on these 
outflows from the stocks of Believers and Neutrals, respectively. 
 
Believers BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]= MIN(Indicated Believer 
BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level], Maximum Believer BB Trainee 
Enrolling Rate[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Neutrals BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]= MIN(Indicated Neutral 
BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level], Maximum Neutral BB Trainee 
Enrolling Rate[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Maximum Believer BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]= 
Believers[level]/Minimum BB Trainee Enrolling Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Maximum Neutral BB Trainee Enrolling Rate[level]= 
Neutrals[level]/Minimum BB Trainee Enrolling Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Parameters for Black Belt Program Enrolling 
I assume that DTE Energy's managers always expected that it would take two years to 
reach "full implementation" of the CI initiative. 
 
Exogenous Target BB to Workforce Ratio :HOLD BACKWARD::= GET XLS 
DATA(Excel File Name, Excel File Scenario Name, Excel File 
Time Row, 'C15') 
Units: Person/Person 
 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch= 0 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio= 0.02 
Units: Person/Person 
 
BB Target Start Date= 12 
Units: Month 
 
BB Shortfall Correction Time= 24 
Units: Month 
 
These odds ratios specify the probability of a senior executive or middle manager 
becoming a Black Belt relative to a front-line employee. 
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BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio= 0.125 
Units: Fraction 
 
BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio= 0 
Units: Fraction 
 
Minimum BB Trainee Enrolling Time= 1 
Units: Month 
 
5.16. Master Black Belts 
I model the stock of Master Black Belts separately from the other employee stocks for 
three reasons: (1) it is much simpler; (2) DTE Energy's CI department, with one short-lived 
exception, hired its Master Black Belts from outside the company; and (3) DTE Energy 
never employed more than about 1.5 Master Black Belt full-time equivalent (FTE) 
employees at any time during its 12-year history with its CI initiative. 
 
Master Black Belts= INTEG( 
 + MBB Hire Rate 
 - MBB Attrition Rate 
 , Initial Master Black Belts) 
Units: Person 
 
 
Figure 37. Model Diagram of Master Black Belts 
By default, I assume a constant number of Master Black Belts.  However, I allow for 
the possibility of adjusting the number of Master Black Belts upward endogenously to 
meet the demand for their training and mentoring. 
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Units: Person 
 
MBB Target= MBB Demand*MBB Target Switch + Initial Master Black 
Belts*(1-MBB Target Switch) 
Units: Person 
 
MBB Shortfall= MAX(MBB Target - Master Black Belts, 0) 
Units: Person 
 
MBB Hire Rate= MBB Shortfall/MBB Avg Hiring Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
For simplicity, I assume no Master Black Belt attrition or effects of schedule pressure. 
 
MBB Attrition Rate= Master Black Belts*Fractional MBB Attrition 
Rate 
Units: Person/Month 
 
MBB Work Rate= Master Black Belts*Standard Work Month 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Parameters for Master Black Belts 
 
Initial Master Black Belts= 1 
Units: Person 
 
MBB Target Switch= 0 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
MBB Avg Hiring Time= 2 
Units: Month 
 
Fractional MBB Attrition Rate= 0 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
5.17. Black Belt Training 
Just as Black Belts must divide their time between coaching and working on their 
own CI projects (section 5.14, p.209), Master Black Belts must divide their time between 
training Black Belt trainees and mentoring Black Belt candidates who are working on their 
certification projects.  In general, I assume that Master Black Belts allocate their time 
according to the relative demand for each type of work, with a possible bias for training. 
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Figure 38. Model Diagram of Black Belt Training 
I assume that Black Belt trainees want to complete the Black Belt course at the 
normal rate, but they will delay attending classes if their schedule pressure becomes too 
high. 
 
BB Training Level Demand[level]= Black Belt 
Trainees[level]/Desired BB Training Completion Time[level] 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Desired BB Training Completion Time[level]= Normal BB Training 
Completion Time*Effect of Schedule Pressure on BB Training 
Time[level] 
Units: Month 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on BB Training Time[level]= Effect of 
Schedule Pressure on BB Training Time Fn(Recent Schedule 
Pressure[level,BBt]) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
The demand on Master Black Belts for training depends on how many trainees attend 
each course and how much work each course entails.  The model formulation allows for 
one change to the training program, which I use to model the OSSG’s switch from training 
kaizen facilitators to training OS Experts. 
 
BB Training Total Demand= SUM(BB Training Level Demand[level!]) 
Units: Person/Month 
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MBB Training Demand= BB Training Total Demand*MBB Work per BB 
Trainee 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
MBB Work per BB Trainee= ZIDZ(MBB Training Work per Course, BB 
Trainees per Course) 
Units: (Person*Hours)/Person 
 
MBB Training Work per Course= First MBB Training Work per 
Course*(1-BB Training Change Switch) + Second MBB Training 
Work per Course*BB Training Change Switch 
Units: Person*Hours/Course 
 
BB Trainees per Course= First BB Trainees per Course*(1-BB 
Training Change Switch) + Second BB Trainees per Course*BB 
Training Change Switch 
Units: Person/Course 
 
BB Training Change Switch= STEP(1, BB Training Change Date) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Normal BB Training Completion Time= First Normal BB Training 
Completion Time*(1-BB Training Change Switch) + Second Normal 
BB Training Completion Time*BB Training Change Switch 
Units: Month 
 
I assume that Master Black Belts allocate their time based on the relative demand for 
training and for mentoring, but with a possible bias for training. 
 
MBB Training Fraction= XIDZ(MBB Training Demand*MBB Training 
Relative Weight, MBB Training Demand*MBB Training Relative 
Weight + MBB Mentoring Demand, 0.5) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
MBB Training Work Rate= MBB Work Rate*MBB Training Fraction 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
The rate at which Black Belt trainees complete their training depends primarily on 
the rate at which Master Black Belts teach their courses.  I assume that Black Belt trainees 
from the three levels of the company hierarchy all attend their courses at the same rate.  
The use of Maximum BB Training Completion Rate in the formulation for BB Training 
Completion Rate ensures first-order control on the outflow from the Black Belt Trainees 
stock. 
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Indicated BB Training Completion Rate= ZIDZ(MBB Training Work 
Rate, MBB Work per BB Trainee) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
BB Training Level Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(BB Training Level 
Demand[level], BB Training Total Demand) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
BB Training Completion Rate[level]= MIN(Indicated BB Training 
Completion Rate*BB Training Level Fraction[level], Maximum BB 
Training Completion Rate[level]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Maximum BB Training Completion Rate[level]= Black Belt 
Trainees[level]/Minimum BB Training Completion Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Minimum BB Training Completion Time= First Minimum BB Training 
Completion Time*(1-BB Training Change Switch) + Second Minimum 
BB Training Completion Time*BB Training Change Switch 
Units: Month 
 
Master Black Belts' maximum capacity for Black Belt training is used in section 5.15 
(p.215) to limit the enrolling rate of Black Belt trainees. 
 
BB Training Maximum Capacity= ZIDZ(MBB Work Rate, MBB Work per BB 
Trainee) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
The Black Belt course's number of classroom hours is used in section 5.13 (p.204) to 
compute BB Trainee CI Experience Gain from Training. 
 
BB Training Classroom Hours= First BB Training Classroom Hours*(1-
BB Training Change Switch) + Second BB Training Classroom 
Hours*BB Training Change Switch 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Parameters for Black Belt Training 
I assume that the kaizen facilitators received two weeks of training spread over one 
month.  DTE Energy's Black Belt course, by contrast, was designed to be four weeks of 
training spread over four months.  The OSSG personnel made this switch about July 2002. 
 
BB Training Change Date= 66 
Units: Month 
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First BB Training Classroom Hours= 80 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Second BB Training Classroom Hours= 160 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
First Normal BB Training Completion Time= 1 
Units: Month 
 
Second Normal BB Training Completion Time= 4 
Units: Month 
 
I assume that Black Belt trainees will take the normal amount of time to complete 
their training when their schedule pressure is between 0 and 1.  As their schedule pressure 
increases to 200 percent of normal, they extend their Black Belt training completion time 
to 300 percent of normal. 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on BB Training Time Fn([(0,0)-
(2,6)],(0,1),(1,1),(1.25,2),(1.5,3),(2,3)) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
 
Figure 39. Lookup Function: Effect of Schedule Pressure on BB Training Time Fn 
 
First MBB Training Work per Course= 160 
Units: Person*Hours/Course 
 
Second MBB Training Work per Course= 320 
Units: Person*Hours/Course 
 
First BB Trainees per Course= 4.15 
Units: Person/Course 
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Second BB Trainees per Course= 25 
Units: Person/Course 
 
The following parameter defines the degree to which Master Black Belts weigh 
demand for training over demand for mentoring.  A weight of 1 means that they weigh 
these two demands equally. 
 
MBB Training Relative Weight= 1.1 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Because the Black Belt course was four weeks of training, the minimum feasible 
completion time is two months.  I assume that the minimum feasible completion time for 
kaizen facilitators was two weeks. 
 
First Minimum BB Training Completion Time= 0.5 
Units: Month 
 
Second Minimum BB Training Completion Time= 1 
Units: Month 
 
5.18. Mentoring by Master Black Belts 
Black Belt candidates require mentoring by Master Black Belts for their certification 
projects in the same way that regular employees require coaching by Black Belts.  For 
simplicity, I define this required mentoring as a certain number of (fractional) work-hours 
of Master Black Belt mentoring for every hour that Black Belt candidates spend on project 
work.  Black Belt candidates need fewer work-hours of mentoring for each of their project 
work-hours as their CI skill increases.  I assume that this skill-related reduction in 
mentoring demand follows the same function as employees' skill-related reduction in 
Black Belt coaching demand (see section 5.14, p.209). 
 
MBB Mentoring Demand= SUM(Perceived BB Candidate Projects 
Completion Rate[level!]*BB Candidate Projects Baseline 
Required Fractional MBB Mentoring*Effect of Contributors Skill 
on Required Coaching[level!,BBc]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
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Figure 40. Model Diagram of Mentoring by Master Black Belts 
To assess Black Belt candidates' demand for mentoring, Master Black Belts must 
perceive the rate at which those Black Belt candidates are completing their projects.  I use 
first-order exponential smoothing to represent the process of Master Black Belts assessing 
the Black Belt candidates' project completion rate.  (The stock included in the model for 
Perceived BB Candidate Projects Completion Rate is also necessary to resolve 
simultaneous equations: the amount of Master Black Belt coaching and the rate of Black 
Belt candidate project completions are mutually determined.) 
 
Perceived BB Candidate Projects Completion Rate[level]= SMOOTHI(BB 
Candidate Projects Effective Completion Rate[level], BB 
Candidate Projects Completion Rate Perception Time, 0) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
MBB Mentoring Rate= MBB Work Rate*(1-MBB Training Fraction) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
MBB Mentoring Adequacy= ZIDZ(MBB Mentoring Rate, MBB Mentoring 
Demand) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
The model allows for one change to both Certification Projects per BB Candidate and 
BB Candidate Avg Project Size on the BB Certification Start Date.  I use this single change 
to model DTE Energy’s switch from OS Experts, who were not required to complete 
certification projects, to Black Belts. 
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BB Certification Switch= STEP(1, BB Certification Start Date) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Certification Projects per BB Candidate= First Certification 
Projects per BB Candidate*(1-BB Certification Switch) + Second 
Certification Projects per BB Candidate*BB Certification 
Switch 
Units: Project/Person 
 
BB Candidate Avg Project Size= First BB Candidate Avg Project 
Size*(1-BB Certification Switch) + Second BB Candidate Avg 
Project Size*BB Certification Switch 
Units: Person*Hours/Project 
 
Indicated BB Candidate Certification Rate[level]= BB Candidate 
Projects Effective Completion Rate[level]/(Certification 
Projects per BB Candidate*BB Candidate Avg Project Size) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Minimum BB Candidate Certification Time= First Minimum BB 
Candidate Certification Time*(1-BB Certification Switch) + 
Second Minimum BB Candidate Certification Time*BB 
Certification Switch 
Units: Month 
 
Parameters for Mentoring by Master Black Belts 
The number of mentoring hours that Black Belt candidates with zero CI skill, at any 
level, require from Master Black Belts for every hour they spend on their Black Belt 
certification projects. 
 
BB Candidate Projects Baseline Required Fractional MBB Mentoring= 
0.05 
Units: (Person*Hours)/(Person*Hour) 
 
BB Candidate Projects Completion Rate Perception Time= 1 
Units: Month 
 
The following parameters partially determine how fast Black Belt candidates earn 
their Black Belt certifications.  Prior to the start of the Black Belt program, there was no 
candidate stage, so I define an arbitrary, small project size to move the CI expert trainees 
to the CI expert stock quickly. 
 
BB Certification Start Date= 90 
Units: Month 
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First Certification Projects per BB Candidate= 1 
Units: Project/Person 
 
Second Certification Projects per BB Candidate= 2 
Units: Project/Person 
 
First BB Candidate Avg Project Size= 1 
Units: Person*Hours/Project 
 
Second BB Candidate Avg Project Size= 480 
Units: Person*Hours/Project 
 
First Minimum BB Candidate Certification Time= TIME STEP 
Units: Month 
 
Second Minimum BB Candidate Certification Time= 4 
Units: Month 
 
5.19. Green Belt Training Target 
I assume that believer senior executives want all of their front-line subordinates to 
attend Green Belt training.  Of course, Black Belt program participants are excluded from 
this target population. 
 
GB Training Unadjusted FL Target= MAX(FL Subordinates of CI 
Proponents - BB Program Participants[FL], 0) 
Units: Person 
 
 
Figure 41. Model Diagram of Green Belt Training Target 
I divide the Green Belt training target across the regular-employee stocks according 
to each stock's size relative to the total. 
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GB Training Target Believers Fraction[level]= 
ZIDZ(Believers[level], 
Believers[level]+Neutrals[level]+Skeptics[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
GB Training Target Neutrals Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Neutrals[level], 
Believers[level]+Neutrals[level]+Skeptics[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
GB Training Target Skeptics Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Skeptics[level], 
Believers[level]+Neutrals[level]+Skeptics[level]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
GB Training FL Believers Target= GB Training Unadjusted FL 
Target*GB Training Target Believers Fraction[FL]*Effect of 
Believers CI Experience on GB Training Demand[FL] 
Units: Person 
 
GB Training FL Neutrals Target= GB Training Unadjusted FL 
Target*GB Training Target Neutrals Fraction[FL]*Effect of 
Neutrals CI Experience on GB Training Demand[FL] 
Units: Person 
 
GB Training FL Skeptics Target= GB Training Unadjusted FL 
Target*GB Training Target Skeptics Fraction[FL]*Effect of 
Skeptics CI Experience on GB Training Demand[FL] 
Units: Person 
 
For simplicity, I avoided building another co-flow structure to track the fraction of 
employees in each stock who are alumni of the Green Belt training course.  Instead, I 
assume that demand for Green Belt training decreases as employees' (average) CI skill 
increases.  For this skill-dependent reduction in Green Belt training demand, I use the 
power-law function Y = b^(-X), where Y is the fraction of full demand; X is employees' 
average CI experience, normalized with the CI experience that they would gain from 
Green Belt training; and b is a parameter that determines the steepness of their demand 
curve.  For simplicity, I assume that all employees have the same demand curve. 
 
Effect of Believers CI Experience on GB Training Demand[level]= CI 
Experience Effect on GB Training Demand Parameter^(-Believers 
Avg CI Experience[level]/GB Training CI Experience) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Effect of Neutrals CI Experience on GB Training Demand[level]= CI 
Experience Effect on GB Training Demand Parameter^(-Neutrals 
Avg CI Experience[level]/GB Training CI Experience) 
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Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Effect of Skeptics CI Experience on GB Training Demand[level]= CI 
Experience Effect on GB Training Demand Parameter^(-Skeptics 
Avg CI Experience[level]/GB Training CI Experience) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Parameters for Green Belt Training Target 
 
CI Experience Effect on GB Training Demand Parameter= 1.1 
Units: Dmnl 
 
5.20. Green Belt Training 
Demand for Green Belt training arises from two sources: (1) believer senior 
executives want their front-line subordinates to attend the training (see section 5.19, 
p.228), and (2) believers at all levels of the company hierarchy want to attend Green Belt 
training if their CI skill is low.  I assume that believers want to complete Green Belt 
training faster than the senior executives want their subordinates to do so. 
 
FL Believers Target GB Training Rate= GB Training FL Believers 
Target/GB Training SE Target Completion Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Believers Own GB Training Demand[level]= Believers[level]*Effect 
of Believers CI Experience on GB Training 
Demand[level]/Believers Desired GB Training Completion Time 
Units: Person/Month 
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Figure 42. Model Diagram of Green Belt Training 
I assume that all potential Green Belt trainees, just like Black Belt trainees (section 
5.17, p.220), will delay attending classes if their schedule pressure becomes too high. 
 
Believers GB Training Demand[SE]= Believers Own GB Training 
Demand[SE]*Effect of Schedule Pressure on GB Training 
Demand[SE,Bel] 
Believers GB Training Demand[MM]= Believers Own GB Training 
Demand[MM]*Effect of Schedule Pressure on GB Training 
Demand[MM,Bel] 
Believers GB Training Demand[FL]= MAX(FL Believers Target GB 
Training Rate, Believers Own GB Training Demand[FL])*Effect of 
Schedule Pressure on GB Training Demand[FL,Bel] 
Units: Person/Month 
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Neutrals GB Training Demand[MM]= 0 
Neutrals GB Training Demand[FL]= GB Training FL Neutrals 
Target*Effect of Schedule Pressure on GB Training 
Demand[FL,Neu]/GB Training SE Target Completion Time 
Units: Person/Month 
 
Skeptics GB Training Demand[SE]= 0 
Skeptics GB Training Demand[MM]= 0 
Skeptics GB Training Demand[FL]= GB Training FL Skeptics 
Target*Effect of Schedule Pressure on GB Training 
Demand[FL,Ske]/GB Training SE Target Completion Time 
Units: Person/Month 
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Training Demand Fn(Recent Schedule 
Pressure[level,contributor]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Total GB Training Demand= SUM(Believers GB Training Demand[level!] 
+ Neutrals GB Training Demand[level!] + Skeptics GB Training 
Demand[level!]) 
Units: Person/Month 
 
It is possible that demand for Green Belt training might exceed the company's 
training capacity.  The actual Green Belt training rate, therefore, must be the lesser of the 
demanded rate and the feasible rate.  I allocate the actual Green Belt training rate among 
the employee groups at all three levels proportionally according to each group's demand 
relative to the total demand. 
 
GB Training Switch= STEP(1, GB Training Start Date) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Feasible GB Training Rate= MIN(Total GB Training Demand, GB 
Training Maximum Capacity)*GB Training Classroom Hours*GB 
Training Switch 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
GB Training Believers Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Believers GB Training 
Demand[level], Total GB Training Demand) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
GB Training Neutrals Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Neutrals GB Training 
Demand[level], Total GB Training Demand) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
GB Training Skeptics Fraction[level]= ZIDZ(Skeptics GB Training 
Demand[level], Total GB Training Demand) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Believers GB Training Rate[level]= Feasible GB Training Rate*GB 
Training Believers Fraction[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Neutrals GB Training Rate[level]= Feasible GB Training Rate*GB 
Training Neutrals Fraction[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics GB Training Rate[level]= Feasible GB Training Rate*GB 
Training Skeptics Fraction[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
To determine the effect of employees' CI experience on their demand for Green Belt 
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training in section 5.19 (p.228), the amount of CI experience gained from Green Belt 
training is used to normalize employees' average CI experience. 
 
GB Training CI Experience= GB Training Classroom Hours*CI 
Experience Value of GB Training 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Parameters for Green Belt Training 
Believers want to complete Green Belt training faster than the senior executives want 
their subordinates to do so. 
 
GB Training SE Target Completion Time= 24 
Units: Month 
 
Believers Desired GB Training Completion Time= 12 
Units: Month 
 
I assume that employees will attend Green Belt training as long as their schedule 
pressure is between 0 and 0.95.  As their schedule pressure increases to 125 percent of 
normal, the fraction of employees who will attend Green Belt training classes drops to 
zero. 
 
Effect of Schedule Pressure on GB Training Demand Fn([(0,0)-
(1.5,1)],(0,1),(0.95,1),(1.25,0),(1.5,0)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
 
Figure 43. Lookup Function: Effect of Schedule Pressure on GB Training Demand Fn 
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GB Training Start Date= 76 
Units: Month 
 
GB Training Maximum Capacity= 100 
Units: Person/Month 
 
DTE Energy's Green Belt training course was designed to be four days of classes 
taken over a period of three weeks. 
 
GB Training Classroom Hours= 32 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
5.21. Senior Executive Training 
The leaders of the CI initiative sought to train DTE Energy's senior executives via 
networking and discussions with pro-CI executives from other companies and with 
leading CI researchers from academia. 
 
SE Training Rate[SE]= Total Level Employees[SE]*SE Training Rate 
per Person*SE Training Switch 
SE Training Rate[MM]= 0 
SE Training Rate[FL]= 0 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
SE Training Switch= STEP(1, SE Training Start Date) 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
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Figure 44. Model Diagram of Senior Executive Training 
The CI initiative's leaders could only commandeer a certain (average) amount of 
each senior executive's time for such CI training.  I assume that as the number of skeptical 
senior executives increases, the harder it becomes for the CI leaders to train everyone 
because most of this training was done in the context of senior executive meetings.  
Additionally, I assume that the senior executives will not make time for CI training if they 
are distracted by, for example, the MichCon merger (see Parameters for Boss Push for 
Nonroutine Work, p.172).  For testing purposes, I allow for the possibility of a constant 
amount of senior executive training. 
 
SE Training Rate per Person= Maximum SE Training Rate per 
Person*Combined Effects on SE Training*(1-Constant SE Training 
Rate Switch) + Constant SE Training Rate per Person*Constant 
SE Training Rate Switch 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
Combined Effects on SE Training= MIN(Effect of Skeptics Fraction 
on SE Training, Effect of Distractions on SE Training) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
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Effect of Skeptics Fraction on SE Training= Effect of Skeptics 
Fraction on SE Training Fn(Level Employees Skeptics 
Fraction[SE]) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Effect of Distractions on SE Training= 1-Exogenous Distractions 
Index[SE] 
Units: Dmnl [0,1] 
 
Even though most senior executives at DTE Energy received CI training in the context 
of meetings, I assume that only the neutral and skeptical executives gain CI experience 
and are potentially convinced from it (because the believer senior executives do not need 
convincing). 
 
Neutrals SE Training Rate[level]= SE Training Rate[level]*Level 
Employees Neutrals Fraction[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Skeptics SE Training Rate[level]= SE Training Rate[level]*Level 
Employees Skeptics Fraction[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Parameters for Senior Executive Training 
 
SE Training Start Date= 12 
Units: Month 
 
Maximum SE Training Rate per Person= 4 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
Constant SE Training Rate Switch= 0 
Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
 
Constant SE Training Rate per Person= 4 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
As the fraction of senior executive skeptics increases from 0 to 100 percent, the 
amount of senior executive training that the CI leaders can deliver decreases from the 
Maximum SE Training Rate per Person to zero. 
 
Effect of Skeptics Fraction on SE Training Fn([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.25,0.5),(0.5,0.25),(0.75,0.1),(1,0)) 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
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Figure 45. Lookup Function: Effect of Skeptics Fraction on SE Training Fn 
 
5.22. Improvements in Productivity 
The number of hours that employees need to complete their monthly routine work 
reflects the efficiency of their work procedures and process design.  The following 
structure for Required Work Hours, therefore, is a co-flow of the Monthly Routine Work 
structure in section 5.5 (p.158).  This co-flow is necessary to compute employees' 
prevailing standard time per task. 
 
Required Work Hours[level]= INTEG( 
 + Required Work Hours Erosion Rate[level] 
 + Required Work Hours Increase Rate[level] 
 - Required Work Hours Improvement Rate[level] 
 - Required Work Hours Reduction Rate[level] 
 , Baseline Routine Work Rate[level]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Baseline Routine Work Rate[level]= Baseline Routine Work Level 
FTEs[level]*Standard Work Month 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Time per Task Standard[level]= Required Work Hours[level]/Monthly 
Routine Work[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Task 
 
0 
0.25 
0.5 
0.75 
1 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
 238   
 
Figure 46. Model Diagram of Improvements in Productivity 
When the scope of employees' monthly routine work is cut, then the currently 
required work hours associated with those cuts — given by Time per Task Standard — 
must be removed from the stock of Required Work Hours. 
 
Required Work Hours Reduction Rate[level]= Work Scope Cutting 
Rate[level]*Time per Task Standard[level] 
Units: (Person*Hours/Month)/Month 
 
By contrast, when the scope of employees' monthly routine work is increased, I 
assume that employees' efficiency doing that new work starts at the unimproved, baseline 
level. 
 
Required Work Hours Increase Rate[level]= Work Scope Increase 
Rate[level]*Baseline Time per Task 
Units: (Person*Hours/Month)/Month 
 
Engaging in CI work, employees may boost their productivity by improving the 
efficiency of their work procedures or the design of their work processes.  I assume that 
these improvements will gradually erode over a long period of time if they are not 
sustained.  For simplicity, I model this improvement erosion with first-order exponential 
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decay. 
 
Baseline Required Work Hours[level]= Monthly Routine 
Work[level]*Baseline Time per Task 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Potential Required Work Hours Erosion[level]= MAX(Baseline 
Required Work Hours[level] - Required Work Hours[level], 0) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Required Work Hours Erosion Rate[level]= Potential Required Work 
Hours Erosion[level]/Required Work Hours Erosion Time 
Units: (Person*Hours/Month)/Month 
 
In a few cases, some CI work at DTE Energy improved the work processes of middle 
managers and senior executives.  However, the majority of CI projects improved the 
company's front-line work.  For simplicity, I assume that all productivity improvements are 
made on the front lines. 
I use Schneiderman's (1988) exponential formulation for improvement in which, for 
any target process characteristic, 50 percent of the potential improvement gap remaining 
is closed when a "legitimate QIP [quality improvement process]" is applied for a duration 
equal to the process' improvement half-life.  Schneiderman defines "legitimate QIP" as "a 
process that achieves a benchmark rate of continuous improvement" (Schneiderman, 
1988, p. 53).  Schneiderman estimates improvement half-lives for a broad range of process 
types and target characteristics, but unfortunately he leaves this "benchmark rate" of CI 
work unspecified.  Obviously, Schneiderman's half-life estimates are not commensurable 
unless the same benchmark CI work rate was used for each process; a lower CI work rate 
would yield a longer improvement half-life.  I adapt Repenning and Sterman's (1994b) 
extension to Schneiderman's model to accommodate a possibly varying CI work rate by 
defining a CI work intensity based on a reference work rate. 
 
Required Work Hours Improvement Rate[SE]= 0 
Required Work Hours Improvement Rate[MM]= 0 
Required Work Hours Improvement Rate[FL]= (Potential Required Work 
Hours Improvement[FL]/Productivity Improvement 
Time)*Productivity Improvement Work Intensity 
Units: (Person*Hours/Month)/Month 
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Potential Required Work Hours Improvement[level]= MAX(Required 
Work Hours[level] - Minimum Required Work Hours[level], 0) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Minimum Required Work Hours[level]= Monthly Routine 
Work[level]*Minimum Time per Task 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Productivity Improvement Work Intensity= ZIDZ(Productivity 
Improvement Work Completion Rate, Reference Nonroutine Work 
Rate[FL]) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Reference Nonroutine Work Rate[level]= Baseline Routine Work 
Rate[level]*Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work 
Fraction[level] 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
I assume that all employees' CI work improves either productivity or variable 
operating costs (see section 5.23, p.241).  I define the fraction allocated to each type of 
improvement exogenously. 
 
Productivity Improvement Work Completion Rate= Improvement Work 
Effective Completion Rate*Productivity Improvement Work 
Fraction 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
I determine the productivity improvement half-life from the amount of improvement 
work required of every employee to cut everyone's time per task in half.  Then I compute 
the productivity improvement time constant from this half-life. 
 
Productivity Improvement Half Life Required Work= Productivity 
Improvement Half Life Required Work per FTE*Baseline Routine 
Work Level FTEs[FL] 
Units: Person*Hours 
 
Productivity Improvement Half Life= XIDZ(Productivity Improvement 
Half Life Required Work, Reference Nonroutine Work Rate[FL], 
1e+06) 
Units: Month 
 
Productivity Improvement Time= Productivity Improvement Half 
Life*Half Life Conversion Factor 
Units: Month 
 
Front-line employees must perceive improvement results to become convinced (or 
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disillusioned) of CI's benefits (sections 5.10, p.189, and 5.11, p.195).  I adapt Repenning 
and Sterman's (1994b) formulation for employees' perception of results, which assumes 
that employees assess and are influenced by the fractional rate of improvement relative to 
a standard.  However, employees also update their assessment of the standard, which I 
represent, for simplicity, with first-order exponential smoothing. 
 
Recent Time per Task[level]= SMOOTHI(Time per Task 
Standard[level], Time per Task Updating Time, Baseline Time 
per Task) 
Units: Person*Hours/Task 
 
Time per Task Fractional Improvement Rate[level]= (Time per Task 
Standard[level] - Recent Time per Task[level])/(Recent Time 
per Task[level]*Time per Task Updating Time) 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
Parameters for Improvements in Productivity 
 
Baseline Time per Task= 1 
Units: Person*Hours/Task 
 
Required Work Hours Erosion Time= 120 
Units: Month 
 
Minimum Time per Task= 0.5 
Units: Person*Hours/Task 
 
Productivity Improvement Work Fraction= 0.5 
Units: Fraction [0,1] 
 
Productivity Improvement Half Life Required Work per FTE= 100 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Time per Task Updating Time= 3 
Units: Month 
 
5.23. Improvements in Operating Costs 
For simplicity, I include only variable operating costs in this model because I assume 
that the company's fixed operating costs cannot be improved.  Like the structure for 
Required Work Hours in section 5.22 (p.237), this structure for Operating Costs is a co-
flow of the Monthly Routine Work structure in section 5.5 (p.158).  Consequently, this 
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structure mirrors the Required Work Hours structure in every other respect. 
 
Operating Costs= INTEG( 
 + Operating Costs Erosion Rate 
 + Operating Costs Increase Rate 
 - Operating Costs Improvement Rate 
 - Operating Costs Reduction Rate 
 , Baseline Operating Costs) 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
Baseline Operating Costs= Monthly Routine Work[FL]*Baseline 
Operating Costs per Task 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
Operating Costs per Task= Operating Costs/Monthly Routine Work[FL] 
Units: Dollars/Task 
 
 
Figure 47. Model Diagram of Improvements in Operating Costs 
When the scope of employees' monthly routine work is cut, the company then saves 
the current variable operating costs associated with that eliminated work. 
 
Operating Costs Reduction Rate= Work Scope Cutting 
Rate[FL]*Operating Costs per Task 
Units: (Dollars/Month)/Month 
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When the scope of employees' monthly routine work is increased, I assume that the 
variable operating costs associated with that new work start at the unimproved, baseline 
level. 
 
Operating Costs Increase Rate= Work Scope Increase 
Rate[FL]*Baseline Operating Costs per Task 
Units: (Dollars/Month)/Month 
 
Employees can reduce the variable operating costs of their routine work by engaging 
in CI work.  Like productivity improvements (section 5.22, p.237), I assume that such 
improvements in variable operating costs will gradually erode over a long period of time if 
they are not sustained.  For simplicity, I model this improvement erosion with first-order 
exponential decay. 
 
Potential Operating Costs Erosion= MAX(Baseline Operating Costs - 
Operating Costs, 0) 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
Operating Costs Erosion Rate= Potential Operating Costs 
Erosion/Operating Costs Erosion Time 
Units: (Dollars/Month)/Month 
 
I formulate the rate of improvement in variable operating costs by adapting 
Repenning and Sterman's (1994b) extension of Schneiderman's (1988) improvement half-
life model.  (See section 5.22, p.237, for an explanation of this formulation.) 
 
Operating Costs Improvement Rate= (Potential Operating Costs 
Improvement/Operating Costs Improvement Time)*Operating Costs 
Improvement Work Intensity 
Units: (Dollars/Month)/Month 
 
Potential Operating Costs Improvement= MAX(Operating Costs - 
Minimum Operating Costs, 0) 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
Minimum Operating Costs= Monthly Routine Work[FL]*Minimum 
Operating Costs per Task 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
Operating Costs Improvement Work Intensity= ZIDZ(Operating Costs 
Improvement Work Completion Rate, Reference Nonroutine Work 
Rate[FL]) 
Units: Dmnl 
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I assume that employees' CI work time not spent improving productivity (section 
5.22, p.237) is spent improving variable operating costs. 
 
Operating Costs Improvement Work Completion Rate= Improvement Work 
Effective Completion Rate*(1-Productivity Improvement Work 
Fraction) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
I determine the improvement half-life for operating costs from the amount of 
improvement work required of every employee to cut the variable operating costs of 
everyone's monthly routine work in half.  Then I compute the operating-costs 
improvement time constant from this half-life. 
 
Operating Costs Improvement Half Life Required Work= Operating 
Costs Improvement Half Life Required Work per FTE*Baseline 
Routine Work Level FTEs[FL] 
Units: Person*Hours 
 
Operating Costs Improvement Half Life= XIDZ(Operating Costs 
Improvement Half Life Required Work, Reference Nonroutine Work 
Rate[FL], 1e+06) 
Units: Month 
 
Operating Costs Improvement Time= Operating Costs Improvement Half 
Life*Half Life Conversion Factor 
Units: Month 
 
I assume that DTE Energy’s managers do not consider operating-cost reductions as 
savings forever, but rather revise their expectations for variable operating costs.  I model 
this expectation-revision process using first-order exponential smoothing. 
 
Operating Costs per Task Standard= SMOOTHI(Operating Costs per 
Task, Operating Cost Standard Adjustment Time, Baseline 
Operating Costs per Task) 
Units: Dollars/Task 
 
Parameters for Improvements in Operating Costs 
 
Baseline Operating Costs per Task= 28 
Units: Dollars/Task 
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Operating Costs Erosion Time= 120 
Units: Month 
 
Minimum Operating Costs per Task= 14 
Units: Dollars/Task 
 
Operating Costs Improvement Half Life Required Work per FTE= 100 
Units: Person*Hours/Person 
 
Operating Cost Standard Adjustment Time= 3 
Units: Month 
 
5.24. CI Savings Rate 
The financial gains from CI work are two-fold.  First, if employees improve their 
productivity, they are able to take on more work without increasing the company's labor 
costs.  In many companies, such expansion would require an increase in sales or 
diversification.  DTE Energy employed a large number of contractors, so DTE Energy’s 
managers could enact work-scope increases for regular employees (see section 5.5, p.158) 
by cutting contractors and insourcing those contractors' work.  For simplicity, I assume 
that DTE Energy's amount of outsourced work is larger than any amount that could be 
potentially insourced, and that DTE Energy's employees have the ability to perform any 
insourced work. I also assume that DTE Energy's contractors are paid the same hourly 
wages as DTE Energy's regular employees. 
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Figure 48. Model Diagram of CI Savings Rate 
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The second source of financial gains from CI work is the direct reduction in variable 
operating costs. 
 
Operating Cost Savings per Task= MAX(Operating Costs per Task 
Standard - Operating Costs per Task, 0) 
Units: Dollars/Task 
 
Operating Cost Savings= Routine Work Completion Rate[FL]*Operating 
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Units: Dollars/Month 
 
I assume that the company's senior executives and middle managers are convinced 
(or disillusioned) of CI's benefits by comparing these financial savings from CI work to the 
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costs). 
 
Total CI Savings= Avoided Labor Costs + Operating Cost Savings 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
CI Savings Fraction= ZIDZ(Total CI Savings, Total Costs) 
Units: Fraction 
 
Total Costs= Total Labor Costs + Operating Costs Incurring Rate 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
Operating Costs Incurring Rate= Routine Work Completion 
Rate[FL]*Operating Costs per Task 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
Total Labor Costs= SUM(Level Employees Labor Costs[level!]) 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
I account for the extra pay earned by front-line employees for any overtime that they 
work, which increases labor costs. 
 
Level Employees Labor Costs[level]= (Level Employees Regular Wage 
Work Rate[level] + Level Employees Overtime Work 
Rate[level]*Level Employees Overtime Wage 
Multiplier[level])*Level Employees Hourly Wage[level] 
Units: Dollars/Month 
 
Level Employees Regular Wage Work Rate[level]= SUM(Level 
Contributors[level,contributor!]*Regular Wage Work 
Month[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Regular Wage Work Month[SE,contributor]= Standard Work Month 
Regular Wage Work Month[MM,contributor]= Standard Work Month 
Regular Wage Work Month[FL,contributor]= MIN(Work 
Month[FL,contributor], Standard Work Month) 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
Level Employees Overtime Work Rate[level]=SUM(Level 
Contributors[level,contributor!]*Contributors 
Overtime[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Person*Hours/Month 
 
Contributors Overtime[level,contributor]= MAX(Work 
Month[level,contributor] - Standard Work Month, 0) 
Units: Hours/Month 
 
In Chapter 7 I search for the optimal values of policy parameters.  I use the net-
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present value of each simulation’s entire stream of CI savings as the payoff function for 
these optimization routines. 
 
CI Savings NPV= NPV(Total CI Savings, Monthly Discount Rate, 0, 1) 
Units: Dollars 
 
Monthly Discount Rate= Annual Discount Rate/Months per Year 
Units: Fraction/Month 
 
Final CI Savings NPV= IF THEN ELSE(Time > (FINAL TIME - TIME 
STEP/2), CI Savings NPV, 0) 
Units: Dollars 
 
Parameters for CI Savings Rate 
 
Level Employees Avg Annual Labor Costs[level]= 250000,90000,45000 
Units: Dollars/Person/Year 
 
Level Employees Overtime Wage Multiplier[level]= 1,1,1.5 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Annual Discount Rate= 0.11 
Units: Fraction/Year 
 
5.25. Service Quality 
The quality of service being provided is made up of two components, task quality 
and work quantity.  Service quality decreases (increases) when employees complete less 
(more) work — such as preventive equipment maintenance and clearance of overhead 
power lines — than their baseline work.  Service quality also decreases (increases) when 
employees spend less (more) time per task as a result of schedule pressure. 
 
Service Quality Index[level]= Monthly Routine Work 
Ratio[level]*Level Time per Task Ratio[level] 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Monthly Routine Work Ratio[level]= Routine Work Completion 
Rate[level]/Baseline Monthly Routine Work[level] 
Units: Fraction 
 
  249 
Level Time per Task Ratio[level]= SUM(Contributors Time per Task 
Ratio[level,contributor!]*Routine Work Level FTEs Contributor 
Fraction[level,contributor!]) 
Units: Fraction 
 
Contributors Time per Task Ratio[level,contributor]= Time per 
Task[level,contributor]/Baseline Time per Task 
Units: Fraction 
 
5.26. Other Parameters 
The Half Life Conversion Factor converts an improvement half-life duration into a 
first-order exponential-decay time constant (which is also called the "mean lifetime"). 
 
Half Life Conversion Factor= 1/LN(2) 
Units: Dmnl 
 
Months per Year= 12 
Units: Month/Year 
 
The following Excel spreadsheet contains the model’s exogenous time series data.  A 
separate worksheet holds the data for each simulation scenario. 
 
Excel File Name :IS: 'DTEdata2.xls' 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario6' 
 
Excel File Time Row :IS: '2' 
 
The simulation model is set up to run from January 1997 (Month 0) to January 2012 
(Month 180). 
 
INITIAL TIME= 0 
Units: Month 
 
FINAL TIME= 180 
Units: Month 
 
TIME STEP= 0.0078125 
Units: Month [0,?] 
 
SAVEPER= 0.1 
Units: Month [0,?] 
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Chapter 6: Simulation Analysis 
My approach to analyzing DTE Energy's experience with its CI initiative over the 12-
year period 1997-2009 consisted of simulating six scenarios.  Each scenario divides this 
12-year period into two portions.  The first portion of each scenario represents DTE 
Energy's actual experience until a certain cut-off date.  The end of each of the six phases 
that I describe in Chapters 2-4 is the cut-off date for each of the six scenarios, respectively.  
The second portion of each scenario is a counterfactual history during which I allow the 
simulation of each scenario to proceed until January 2012 with all model parameters 
unchanged from the cut-off date.  In this way, each successive scenario adds one more 
phase to the portion representing DTE Energy's actual experience.  The counterfactual 
portions enable me to assess how the CI initiative would have unfolded with no changes 
in policy or circumstances beyond each scenario's cut-off date. 
The six simulation scenarios are defined according to the timing of significant 
changes either in the design of the CI initiative, enacted by DTE Energy's OSSG personnel, 
or in the directives given by DTE Energy's senior executives in response to the exigencies 
faced by the company.  Because my formal model represents the structures of DTE Energy 
in such a stylized fashion, these changes in CI initiative design and in executive directives 
are formulated as exogenous parameter changes or exogenous time series.  The 
parameters for each of the six scenarios are given in Table 4 (p.253), and the exogenous 
time series are given in Table 5 (p.255). 
The cut-off dates for each of the six scenarios are defined as follows.  Scenario 1 
represents DTE Energy's actual history from January 1997 (the start of the simulation), 
through the April 1999 start of the CI initiative in earnest, until April 2000 when the 
distractions of the MichCon merger would have diverted upper management's attention 
away from CI.  Instead, no merger occurs and the strategy of conducting (only) kaizen 
events continues. 
Scenario 2 adds the actual 13 months of merger trouble and the merger's close in 
May 2001.  In Scenario 2's counterfactual portion beyond May 2001, I assume that the 
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kaizen facilitator training resumes and facilitators stop dropping out of the CI initiative. 
Scenario 3 adds the many significant changes to the CI initiative enacted by the 
OSSG personnel until the start of the PEP initiative in August 2005.  These changes 
included replacing the kaizen facilitators with OS Experts in July 2002, the inception of 
Green Belt training in May 2003, and replacing OS Experts with Black Belts in July 2004.  
The counterfactual portion of Scenario 3 is important because it shows the outcome of 
what would later be the enduring core features of the CI initiative but in the absence of 
any financial stress. 
Scenario 4 adds the financial stress and associated cost cutting and downsizing of 
the PEP initiative from August 2005 onward.  Scenario 4's counterfactual portion is less 
instructive because it reflects how DTE Energy's history would have unfolded if the 
company's financial stress and the PEP initiative had continued indefinitely. 
Scenario 5 adds the abatement of the company's financial stress and concomitant 
return to the CI initiative's Lean Six Sigma strategy in January 2007.  Scenario 5's 
counterfactual portion begins in October 2008 when the economic crisis would have 
happened but does not in this scenario. 
Scenario 6 adds the financial stress of this economic crisis and DTE Energy's ECR 
plan, which lasted through the end of 2009.  The one significant change in the actual 
portion of Scenario 6 was the tactic of eliminating contractors, instead of downsizing the 
employee workforce, and insourcing those contractors' work.  My case study ends in 
January 2010 with the passing of the economic crisis, but I continue to simulate the effects 
of DTE Energy's managers continuing to insource contract labor through the end of 2011. 
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6.1. Scenario 1: Kaizen Events 
A few senior executives were CI believers at the start of the simulation in January 
1997.  Without any CI activities during 1997 to produce results, aggregate senior 
executive belief eroded slowly (Figure 51) until the CCI personnel began training DTE 
Energy's executives in January 1998 (Figure 49).  This senior executive training was 
necessary to keep executive belief from eroding to zero. 
 
Figure 49. Scenario 1: Senior Executive Training Rate 
The model structure reflects the assumption that senior executive believers always 
push their subordinates for CI work.  This assumption implies a small push for CI work in 
1997 even though DTE Energy had no CI initiative yet.  This push created a "disillusioning 
machine".  Employees attempted a small number of CI activities but with no training from 
the CI personnel or support from managers or CI experts, all of these CI activities failed, 
producing only skeptical middle managers and front-line employees. 
The CCI personnel began training kaizen facilitators in April 1999.  These kaizen 
facilitators' CI skill was low because their training was short and they were not required to 
complete their own CI projects before coaching others (see Figure 50 below).  Front-line 
employees' effort earnestness was boosted by the coaching provided by these kaizen 
facilitators after April 1999, but not by enough for them to achieve convincing results.  Put 
simply, everyone in the company lacked sufficient CI skill to trigger a reinforcing feedback 
process of good results convincing employees to participate enough to build their CI skill. 
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Figure 50. Scenario 1: Average CI Skill 
The number of senior executive believers peaked in March 1999 (Figure 52), right 
before the start of kaizen facilitator training in April.  At this point, the senior executives' 
disillusioning rates from poor CI results began to outpace their convincing rates from their 
training (Figure 52).  The growing number of senior executive and middle manager 
skeptics gave rise to two forces that accelerated the disillusioning of upper management: a 
reduction in senior executive training (Figure 49) and an increase in negative word of 
mouth. 
 
Figure 51. Scenario 1: Believers Fraction 
This scenario excludes actual events from April 2000 onward, when the MichCon 
merger would have distracted DTE Energy's senior executives from the CI initiative and 
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halted kaizen facilitator training.  Instead, a counterfactual history unfolds in which senior 
executives and middle managers became largely anti-CI from negative word of mouth 
(Figure 52).  Front-line employees, less susceptible to the effects of negative word of 
mouth, mostly revert to being neutral. 
 
Figure 52. Scenario 1: Skeptics Fraction 
 
6.2. Scenario 2: MichCon Merger 
The merger negotiations between Detroit Edison and MichCon became contentious 
and difficult from April 2000 until the merger's eventual close in May 2001 (Table 5, 
p.255).  I model four effects of the merger trouble during this 12-month period: (1) it 
distracted senior executives from their CI training (Figure 53), (2) it distracted both senior 
executives and middle managers from pushing for CI work, (3) it caused the CCI personnel 
to suspend their goal for training a certain number of kaizen facilitators and, consequently, 
(4) the existing kaizen facilitators began dropping out of the CI initiative because they 
believed it would not last (Figure 54). 
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Figure 53. Scenario 2: Senior Executive Training Rate 
 
 
Figure 54. Scenario 2: Front-Line Black Belts 
The overall trajectory of this scenario is similar to Scenario 1’s trajectory.  Several 
senior executives, convinced of CI's benefit by the CCI group's training, unwittingly 
created a disillusioning machine by pushing for CI work without ensuring that front-line 
employees were receiving the skilled coaching that they needed from the kaizen 
facilitators.  Skepticism of CI mounted as before (Figure 56).  During the 12 months of 
merger trouble, however, senior executive believers became disillusioned at a faster rate 
because senior executive training was cut back (Figure 53), but negative word of mouth 
from skeptics remained unchanged.  On the other hand, the distraction of upper 
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management helped reduce the number of skeptical front-line employees.  How?  
Distracted managers did not push for as much CI work, resulting in fewer front-line 
employees being pushed through the disillusioning machine. 
 
Figure 55. Scenario 2: Believers Fraction 
When the merger closed in May 2001 (Table 4, p.253), DTE Energy experienced a 
sudden step-wise increase in neutral employees as all of MichCon's employees joined the 
company (Figure 56).  But the same end-state equilibrium was reached: about 82 percent 
of upper management and about 5 percent of front-line employees became skeptical 
through negative word of mouth.  In this scenario, the CI initiative fails because 
employees never accumulate enough skill to produce convincing CI results. 
 
Figure 56. Scenario 2: Skeptics Fraction 
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6.3. Scenario 3: Six Sigma 
The primary flaw in the CI initiative's design through 2001 was the kaizen 
facilitators' relatively low skill (Figure 50).  Furthermore, the kaizen facilitators were 
dedicated completely to coaching (Figure 57); they were not responsible for achieving CI 
results that would have slowed the rate of senior executive and middle manager 
disillusioning. 
 
Figure 57. Scenario 3: Black Belt Coaching Fraction 
The OSSG's first and second CI implementation plans corrected this primary flaw.  
The first plan called for training OS Experts who would focus on completing their own CI 
projects concurrently with coaching employees.  The OSSG personnel began training OS 
Experts in July 2002 (Table 4, p.253).  Between the first and second plans, DTE Energy 
formally added Six Sigma elements to its CI initiative.  In the second plan, therefore, OS 
Experts were renamed Black Belts and their training was strengthened in July 2004 to 
require two certification projects (Table 4, p.253; Figure 59).  When it became clear that 
DTE Energy was going to adopt Six Sigma practices, managers began hiring certified Six 
Sigma Black Belts from outside the company.  Such hiring began aggressively between 
January and December 2004 before settling to a stable rate (Table 5, p.255).  These 
experienced Black Belts further boosted the average skill of DTE Energy's coaching experts 
(Figure 58). 
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Figure 58. Scenario 3: Average Skill 
With a growing cadre of Black Belts in the company, the OSSG leaders replaced 
kaizen events with Black Belt-led CI projects as DTE Energy's principle way of enacting CI.  
When the MichCon merger extinguished managers' willingness to hold kaizen events, 
DTE Energy's kaizen facilitators simply stopped their CI activities.  They were never 
recalled to CI duty after the merger, so this scenario reflects a high kaizen facilitator 
dropout rate between April 2000 and May 2001 (Table 5, p.255; Figure 59). 
 
Figure 59. Scenario 3: Front-Line Black Belt Program Participants 
In addition to improving the OS Expert and Black Belt training, the OSSG personnel 
also began training front-line employees as OS Specialists (ostensibly equivalent to Six 
Sigma Green Belt training; see Figure 60).  The OSSG personnel sporadically set loose 
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0 4 4
4
4
4
4
4
4 4 4 4 4 4
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1997-01 1998-07 2000-01 2001-07 2003-01 2004-07 2006-01 2007-07 2009-01 2010-07 2012-01
Fr
ac
tio
n
SE 1 1 1 1 1 1
MM 2 2 2 2 2
FL 3 3 3 3 3 3
BB 4 4 4 4 4 4
200
150
100
50
0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1997-01 1998-07 2000-01 2001-07 2003-01 2004-07 2006-01 2007-07 2009-01 2010-07 2012-01
Pe
rs
on
Black Belts 1 1 1 1 1 1
Black Belt Candidates 2 2 2 2 2
Black Belt Trainees 3 3 3 3 3
 264   
goals for training Green Belts but, realistically, employees would enroll in Green Belt 
training only if (1) their senior executive was a believer and pushed for it, or (2) they 
became convinced through their participation in a CI project and wanted to learn more 
about CI tools and methods.  Green Belt training helped promote awareness of DTE 
Energy's CI initiative among the front-line employees but its payoff in higher employee 
skill was minimal (Figure 58).  Employees acquired much more applicable CI experience 
working on CI projects with Black Belts.  Consequently, Green Belt training did not affect 
the CI initiative's adoption (and abandonment) dynamics substantially. 
 
Figure 60. Scenario 3: Front-Line Green Belt Training Rates 
This simulation scenario reproduces DTE Energy's actual history until August 2005, 
beyond which the simulation is counterfactual.  In many respects, this counterfactual 
future is desirable: Black Belt and Green Belt training was underway, Black Belts were 
achieving notable results with CI projects, and DTE Energy's aggregate workforce CI skill 
and belief were both increasing.  So what went wrong?  As we shall see in the next 
section, DTE Energy experienced mounting financial stress in 2005, which raised the 
senior executives' expectations for the CI initiative to a level its participants could not 
meet. 
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Figure 61. Scenario 3: Believers Fraction 
As Figure 58 and Figure 61 indicate, it took a long time for DTE Energy's employees 
to build their belief and skill.  This process was inhibited by downward pressures from 
several reinforcing feedback loops.  All employees require good results to become 
convinced; unconvinced employees conform only ceremonially to their bosses' push for 
CI work, thereby reducing their chances of success and trapping themselves in a skeptical 
state.  Unconvinced managers do not allocate enough time to supporting their 
subordinates' CI efforts, thereby also reducing their subordinates' effort earnestness (Figure 
62).  Black Belts, under pressure to justify their salaries, have a bias toward completing 
their own CI projects rather than coaching front-line employees (Figure 57), a bias which 
is exacerbated by low effort earnestness by front-line employees. 
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Figure 62. Scenario 3: CI Contribution Percentage 
In this scenario, Black Belts must carry the CI torch long enough for the employees' 
collective accumulations of belief, participation, effort earnestness, and CI skill to 
overcome these downward pressures.  This model suggests that the Black Belts need to 
carry the CI torch for 4-5 years before regular employees gain traction with their CI work.  
DTE Energy's senior executives couldn't wait that long. 
 
6.4. Scenario 4: Performance Excellence Process (PEP) 
When DTE Energy’s financial stress mounted in August 2005 (Table 5, p.255), the 
senior executives demanded an all-hands-on-deck approach in which every employee 
was expected to perform the maximum 32 hours per month of nonroutine work to 
reducing costs.  I assume that employees who were CI believers or those pushed by their 
bosses to do so would attempt to reduce costs with CI work.  Any difference between 
upper management's total push for cost reductions and employees' aggregate desired CI 
work is, by definition, cost-cutting work (Figure 63).  The model reflects the assumption 
that costs are cut through two mechanisms, both of which reduce variable operating costs: 
layoffs and reductions in the scope of work performed. 
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Figure 63. Scenario 4: Cost Cutting Work Rate per Employee 
Employees began cutting the scope — and thereby the quality — of their work in 
August 2005.  One immediate consequence of this work-scope cutting was a drop in each 
employee's monthly routine work (Figure 64). 
 
Figure 64. Scenario 4: Monthly Routine Work per FTE 
Variable operating costs were reduced but labor costs remained high (Figure 65).  
Because the model includes no downsizing at the senior-executive level, DTE Energy's 
senior executives enjoyed a smaller workload after the scope of the company's operations 
were cut.  Employees lower in the company hierarchy also enjoyed a smaller workload 
but only until downsizing began.  After layoffs started in January 2006 (Table 4, p.253), 
the monthly routine work per employee began to climb back up.  But it had not reached 
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its pre-August 2005 level by the end of this simulation because DTE Energy employees' 
labor unions constrained how aggressively DTE Energy's senior executives could 
downsize the workforce. 
 
Figure 65. Scenario 4: Monthly Operating Costs 
The model reflects the assumption that upper management's expectations for the 
appropriate amount of monthly routine work per employee were adaptive (although I do 
formulate these adaptive expectations with a ratchet effect: managers increase workload 
standards more readily than they reduce them).  Although monthly routine work per 
employee did not reach its pre-August 2005 level by January 2012 (Figure 64), it did 
breach upper management's changing workload standard in February 2008 (14 months 
after the beginning of this simulation scenario's counterfactual portion in January 2007).  
From February 2008 onward, layoffs increased the monthly routine work per employee 
faster than work-scope cutting decreased it.  This net increase in monthly routine work per 
employee created apparent avoided labor costs as employees' workload increased above 
upper management's standard (Figure 66). 
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Figure 66. Scenario 4: Extra Monthly Routine Work 
These labor "savings" were commingled with the results from employees' CI work, 
which increased the convincing rate of the senior executives and middle managers, but 
not the front-line employees (Figure 67). 
 
Figure 67. Scenario 4: Neutrals Convincing Fraction 
In this simulation scenario, the fractional rate at which senior executives and middle 
managers were convinced exceeded that of the front-line employees (Figure 68).  CI 
savings and the addition of apparent avoided labor costs from February 2008 onward kept 
increasing the numbers of upper management believers.  In the counterfactual portion of 
this scenario, the fraction of believer middle managers exceeded that of senior executives 
in January 2011 because of Black Belts promoted into middle management.  The 
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fractional improvement rate of their productivity perceived by front-line employees 
peaked in April 2005 after dramatic increases in the 33 months since July 2002.  As this 
improvement rate decreased, so did the rates at which front-line employees became 
convinced. 
 
Figure 68. Scenario 4: Believers Fraction 
Front-line employees' job security was drastically reduced when layoffs started in 
January 2006 (Table 4, p.253), which implied a large reduction in their effort earnestness.  
In these scenarios, however, the inadequacy of management support for CI work was 
always the primary demotivator (Figure 69). 
 
Figure 69. Scenario 4: Effect of Management Support on Effort Earnestness 
The chronic inadequacy of management support derives from the imbalance in 
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support required by employees, measured in person-hours of manager attention, 
compared to the maximum amount of time managers are willing to spend on CI work.  For 
every hour they spent on CI work, front-line employees require 0.1 hours from their 
managers, and middle managers require 0.125 hours from their executives (see Parameters 
for Management Support, p.183).  An employee believer can spend, at most, 32 hours per 
month on CI work, which implies 3.2 hours per month of support required by front-line 
employees and 4 hours per month of support required by middle managers.  Following the 
MichCon merger, DTE Energy's average spans of control were 16.43 front-line 
subordinates per middle manager and 15 middle managers per senior executive.  Each 
believer middle manager can spend a maximum of 32 hours per month on CI work, which 
is only about 61 percent of the 52.6 hours per month demanded by 16.43 believer 
subordinates.  Similarly, each believer senior executive's maximum of 32 hours per month 
devoted to CI work is only 53 percent of the 60 hours per month demanded by 15 
believer subordinates. 
 
6.5. Scenario 5: Lean Six Sigma 
The counterfactual portion of scenario 4 — from January 2007 onward — was 
unrealistic because the company's financial stress did not stay high in actuality; 
employees' cost-reduction work alleviated it.  In this scenario, by contrast, DTE Energy’s 
financial stress was high only from late 2005 through 2006, while the McKinsey 
consultants were actively engaged at DTE Energy.  It dropped to a lower level in 2007 
after the consultants had left and only a few of DTE Energy's business units still had cost-
reduction targets to meet (Figure 70).  The PEP initiative was over by the end of 2007 
(Table 5, p.255). 
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Figure 70. Scenario 5: Cost Cutting Work Rate per Employee 
This simulation scenario's trajectories of believers and skeptics are essentially the 
same as those of scenario 4 prior to February 2008 because there were no effects that 
would have caused different CI results during that period.  This simulation scenario 
represents DTE Energy's actual history until October 2008.  During this history, 
downsizing was in effect only during 2006 (Table 4, p.253), which was not long enough 
for changes in employee-workload standards to create the apparent avoided-labor 
"savings" seen in the counterfactual portion of scenario 4.  Instead, employees' monthly 
routine work settled to a new, lower level following the cuts to their scope of work (Figure 
71). 
 
Figure 71. Scenario 5: Monthly Routine Work per FTE 
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Without these avoided-labor "savings", the convincing rates for senior executives and 
middle managers were not boosted after February 2008.  With a shorter duration of 
downsizing, the convincing rates for front-line employees were higher than in scenario 4, 
although they were still declining after April 2005 as before. 
 
Figure 72. Scenario 5: Neutrals Convincing Fraction 
The demotivating effect of inadequate management support superseded any effect of 
inadequate Black Belt coaching on employees' effort earnestness, but Black Belt coaching 
still influenced the CI results achieved by employees (Figure 73).  The model's parameters 
reflect the assumption that all unskilled employees, regardless of their level in the 
company hierarchy, require 0.125 hours of Black Belt coaching for every hour they spend 
doing CI work (see Parameters for Coaching by Black Belts, p.212).  Each unskilled 
employee devoting the maximum 32 hours per month to CI work would require 4 hours 
per month of Black Belt coaching.  Of course, the model also reflects the assumption that 
employees require progressively less coaching as they acquire more skill.  From July 2004 
onward, DTE Energy's number of Black Belts stabilized at between 124 and 127.  These 
Black Belts were performing roughly 20 thousand hours of CI work per month.  If 126 
Black Belts spent 50 percent of their time coaching, which I assume to be their maximum 
coaching fraction, then they can adequately support 2,500 unskilled employees.  In other 
words, these Black Belts could adequately support only 24 percent of DTE Energy's 
workforce, at best. 
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3
3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1997-01 1998-07 2000-01 2001-07 2003-01 2004-07 2006-01 2007-07 2009-01 2010-07 2012-01
Fr
ac
tio
n
SE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MM 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
FL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
 274   
 
Figure 73. Scenario 5: Effect of Black Belt Coaching on CI Project Results 
If DTE Energy achieved its goal of training two percent of its (post-merger) 10,500 
employees as Black Belts, then 50 percent of those Black Belts' monthly work represents 
16,800 hours per month of coaching.  If the remaining 10,290 employees were all 
unskilled believers, they would require 41,160 hours per month of coaching from the 
Black Belts.  Like management support, Black Belt coaching was chronically inadequate.  
The detrimental effects of this coaching inadequacy would be reduced with three possible 
situations.  The total amount of coaching that employees require from the Black Belts 
would be lower if employees acquired skill quicker or if they became convinced slower.  
Thirdly, Black Belts could potentially devote a greater fraction of their work time to 
coaching, but then they would be at risk of not producing enough CI savings to meet the 
company's targets and to justify their salaries. 
 
6.6. Scenario 6: Economic Crisis Response (ECR) 
The economic crisis began (for DTE Energy) in October 2008.  The company 
experienced another period of high financial stress, which I assume lasted only through 
the end of 2009 (Table 5, p.255).  As they did during the PEP initiative, DTE Energy's 
senior executives once again pushed aggressively for cost reductions.  The main difference 
between the push for cost reductions in this scenario and the push for cost reductions in 
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scenario 4 was insourcing.  Having seen the damage to employee morale caused by the 
PEP initiative's downsizing, DTE Energy's senior executives sought to reduce labor costs 
by eliminating contractors, who could not expect job security.  Upper management also 
pushed for cost reductions via CI work and cost-cutting work, as before (Figure 74).  This 
combination of CI work, cost-cutting work, and insourcing produced dynamics that were 
much more complicated during DTE Energy's ECR plan than during the PEP initiative. 
 
Figure 74. Scenario 6: Cost Cutting Work Rate per Employee 
From the start of DTE Energy's ECR plan in October 2008, employees' monthly 
routine work was simultaneously increasing from insourcing and decreasing from work-
scope cutting, both of which were intended to reduce costs (Figure 75).  Employees 
stopped cutting their scope of work when the ECR plan came to a close at the end of the 
2009 fiscal year, but I assume that they continued to eliminate contractors and insource 
those contractors' work where possible (Table 4, p.253). 
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Figure 75. Scenario 6: Monthly Routine Work per FTE 
DTE Energy employees' schedule pressure was high while the senior executives were 
pushing them to reduce costs because they were each compelled to perform the 
maximum amount of nonroutine work per month.  With a heavier workload than normal, 
they were unable to take on as much insourced contractor work as they would have taken 
on otherwise.  Employees' cost cutting work produced economic gains that boosted the 
convincing rates of middle managers and senior executives, but only temporarily.  These 
executives and managers soon perceived diminishing returns to these efforts.  When DTE 
Energy's economic crisis plan ended, employees were no longer compelled to devote so 
much time to nonroutine work, so they absorbed more work from eliminated contractors.  
The economic gains from this insourcing were much larger than the gains from work-
scope cutting, so the convincing rates for middle managers and senior executives 
rebounded quickly to a high level (Figure 76). 
200
175
150
125
100
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3
3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1997-01 1998-07 2000-01 2001-07 2003-01 2004-07 2006-01 2007-07 2009-01 2010-07 2012-01
(T
as
ks
/M
on
th
)/P
er
so
n
SE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MM 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
FL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
  277 
 
Figure 76. Scenario 6: Neutrals Convincing Fraction 
The model formulation reflects the assumption that front-line employees are 
convinced when they perceive their own productivity improving rather than by CI savings.  
During the 15 months of DTE Energy's ECR plan, front-line employees became 
disillusioned because they were unable to complete enough CI work to sustain their 
previous rate of productivity increases.  Their amount of CI work was insufficient for two 
reasons: (1) their bosses' high pressure for cost-cutting work crowded out their CI work, 
and (2) the work they acquired from eliminated contractors diluted their productivity gains 
for their monthly routine work.  These two effects caused front-line employees' 
productivity to worsen from May 2009 onward (Figure 77). 
 
Figure 77. Scenario 6: Front-Line Time per Task Fractional Improvement Rate 
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When upper management stopped their push for cost reductions at the end of 2009, 
the front-line employees were no longer compelled to perform such a large amount of 
nonroutine cost-cutting work.  This drop in workload created capacity for the front line to 
absorb even more contractor work.  Because this contractor work was never subjected to 
CI, I assume that employees' acquired this work at the baseline time per task.  Their 
productivity worsened at a faster rate until their CI work halted the accelerating decline in 
productivity in March 2010 and began producing productivity gains again in June 2010.  
Ironically, this period of front-line productivity deterioration was beneficial for the CI 
initiative.  Because front-line employees notice percentage increases in their productivity, 
a period of productivity decline restores their ability to achieve high improvement rates 
(which, of course, cannot last forever). 
The final three years of this simulation scenario illustrate how the information signals 
received by upper management and by the front line regarding the success of the CI 
initiative can be contradictory (Figure 76).  Cost cutting disillusioned the front line while it 
convinced upper management.  The senior executives and middle managers were 
enthusiastic about the immediate gains from insourcing, but front-line employees were 
disillusioned until they began to make inroads improving the efficiency of their newly 
acquired work (Figure 78). 
 
Figure 78. Scenario 6: Believers Fraction 
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Chapter 7: Policy Analysis 
I took a three-step approach in searching for those policies that would maximize my 
payoff function, which I defined to be DTE Energy's net present value (NPV) of all CI 
savings over a 15-year period (see section 5.24, p.245).  In all three steps, I used the 
optimization routine, based on Powell's method (Powell, 1964; Press, Teukolsky, 
Vetterling, & Flannery, 1992), that is included in the Vensim simulation software (in the 
Pro and DSS versions only).  I performed a sensitivity analysis following each optimization 
in which I assessed the change in my payoff function for a 10-precent increase and a 10-
percent decrease in each optimized parameter.  (If a parameter has an optimal value of 
zero, Vensim tests an increase and decrease of 0.1 instead of +/- 10 percent.)  My Vensim 
files for these optimization scenarios are provided in Appendix G. 
In each of the three steps, which I describe in the sections that follow, I search for 
the best parameter values under two different conditions: with and without DTE Energy's 
three organizational crises.  These crises are (1) the MichCon merger's trouble in 2000, (2) 
the financial stress that precipitated the PEP cost-cutting initiative in 2005 and 2006, and 
(3) the financial stress that precipitated DTE Energy's economic-crisis response initiative in 
2008. 
My first step was to cast a wide net by searching over every model parameter that 
could potentially be a candidate for a managerial policy intervention.  I defined each 
parameter's allowable range as broadly as seemed possible, if not plausible, in the real 
world.  After running the optimizer, I investigated the reasons for each parameter's optimal 
value by examining my model equations and by using additional simulations and causal 
tracing.  I present the results of this first step in section 7.1. 
I discovered that the response surface formed by my payoff function over all possible 
values of my policy parameters, within their allowable ranges, was not "well-behaved" in 
all regions.  (Powell's optimization method requires a continuously smooth response 
surface.)  Vensim's optimizer yielded some anomalous parameter values in my first step.  
Consequently, I defined a new optimization scenario in which I re-optimized over these 
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problematic parameters, setting all other parameters to their optimal values.  Additionally, 
I tightened the plausible range of a few parameters.  I report the results of this second step 
in section 7.2. 
Finally, I repeated my re-optimization over the smaller set of parameters with 
anomalous values from step two.  This third step, which I describe in section 7.3, resolved 
the outstanding anomalies in both policy-optimization conditions. 
 
7.1. Wide Policy Optimizations 
The results of the first step of my policy analysis are presented in Table 6 (p.281).  
The policy optimization without the three organizational crises is labeled A1 and the 
policy optimization with the three crises is labeled A2. 
The CI personnel urged DTE Energy's senior executives to provide an employment 
guarantee to the front-line employees because they were aware of the chilling effect that 
downsizing would have on the CI initiative.  The senior executives offered such a 
guarantee explicitly or implicitly throughout the CI initiative's history except for a 1-year 
period during the PEP cost-cutting initiative.  Vensim’s optimizer finds that, with 
downsizing, DTE Energy forgoes more economic gains from CI work than it saves in lower 
labor costs. 
As expected, more Black Belts working to complete CI projects is always better 
because my model does not include any balancing feedback loops that would 
endogenously limit the number of Black Belts based on their labor expense.  
Consequently, it is optimal to train and hire Black Belts as early and as quickly as possible 
(BB Training Change Date as early as possible; BB Shortfall Correction Time as short as 
possible; and the largest possible values for Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio and 
Constant BB Hire Rate[FL]). 
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Black Belts working on CI projects yield larger economic returns than any other 
activity.  Consequently, Black Belts should be dedicated to CI full-time (BB Nonroutine 
Work Fraction = 1).  But two surprising and controversial findings follow from this result.  
First, Vensim’s optimizer finds that Black Belts should not bother coaching front-line 
employees on their CI projects (Maximum BB Coaching Fraction = 0 and, therefore, there 
is no need for any period of constant Black Belt coaching).  One reason for this finding, 
however, is that inadequate management support is the primary determinant of front-line 
employees' low effort earnestness in all simulation scenarios I ran (including those in 
Chapter 6).  In other words, any potential benefit that Black Belt coaching could make on 
front-line employees' effective contributions to CI work is overwhelmed by the dampening 
effect of inadequate management support. 
Second, Black Belts should not be promoted (BB Fractional Promotion Rate[MM] and 
BB Fractional Promotion Rate[FL] should both be zero, although I confirmed that the latter 
in step two).  The reasoning is the same as for why they should not coach front-line 
employees: Black Belts deliver greater economic benefits completing CI projects than they 
do as believer middle managers (or believer senior executives) because Black Belts, unlike 
managers, are dedicated to CI work full-time.  As long as they are working on CI projects, 
it does not matter from which level of the company hierarchy an employee enrolled in the 
Black Belt training, so I set BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio and BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio to 
zero in the later simulations. 
Another surprising and controversial result from this optimization is the policy of not 
requiring certification projects of Black Belt candidates (BB Certification Start Date equal 
to the simulation's final time; i.e., never).  This result is opposite of DTE Energy's 
experience: the CI personnel introduced a certification-project requirement in 2004 to 
ensure that their Black Belt graduates were well trained.  But most of DTE Energy's Black 
Belts were not working on CI projects full-time.  It is possible that there is some threshold 
allocation of time to CI work below which Black Belt candidates, completing certification 
projects with Master Black Belts' mentoring, yield greater economic gains than un-
mentored Black Belts would yield immediately after completing their training.  (With no 
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indicated mentoring, the parameter MBB Training Relative Weight does not matter.) 
The timing and pace of Green Belt training does not matter.  Vensim’s optimizer 
found values for GB Training Start Date and GB Training SE Target Completion Time, but 
the sensitivity analysis for both optimizations A1 and A2 revealed a "flat" payoff function 
response surface around these values.  This result is unsurprising because the CI 
experience gained from Green Belt training is minimal (CI Experience Value of GB 
Training = 0.1).  For simplicity in later simulations, I set the start of Green Belt training to 
coincide with the start of Black Belt training (in month 12) and ensured in each case that 
the default value for GB Training Maximum Capacity did not constrain the Green Belt 
training rate. 
The optimizer’s results for the remaining parameters were equivocal so I included 
them all in the policy re-optimizations presented in section 7.2, but their step one values 
did hint at what some of the best values would be.  It seemed better for Improvement 
Perception Time to be short, the Work Scope Increase Start Date to be early, the upward 
adjustment of management standards for routine work (Work Standard Increase Time) and 
operating costs (Operating Cost Standard Adjustment Time) to be long, and the downward 
adjustment of management standards for routine work (Work Standard Decrease Time) to 
be short.  Of particular interest was the optimal allocation of CI work to improving 
productivity versus improving operating costs (Productivity Improvement Work Fraction) 
because, according to my model's assumptions, the former convinces front-line 
employees but the latter does not. 
As expected, the maximum fraction of their work month that senior executives and 
front-line employees can devote to CI work should be as high as possible (at least up to 
my upper bound of 50 percent).  This result was true also for middle managers in 
optimization A2, but not A1.  The only balancing feedback that limits this allocation of 
time to CI work is an effect of schedule pressure.  My model omits other possible 
balancing feedback effects from service quality and relative marginal financial returns 
from routine work.  I investigated the puzzling value for middle managers' maximum CI 
work allocation in the next steps. 
I was surprised that the optimizer's indicated start date for senior executive training 
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was very late: month 101 in optimization A1 and month 154 in optimization A2.  In both 
cases, this training served to boost senior executives' belief in CI when front-line 
employees most needed a renewed push for CI work from their bosses.  In DTE Energy's 
actual experience, however, the CI personnel trained senior executives for another reason: 
as a way to lobby for resources for the CI initiative, especially during its early days.  I did 
not include this link from senior executive belief to CI initiative resources in my model.  
The payoff function, however, is not sensitive to the start of senior executive training.  In 
fact, the best start date found by Vensim’s optimizer in step three was month 6, close to 
DTE Energy's actual start date. 
 
7.2. Narrow Policy Optimizations 
The results of the second step of my policy analysis are presented in Table 7 (p.287).  
The policy optimization without the three organizational crises is labeled B1 and the 
policy optimization with the three crises is labeled B2. 
The parameters for optimization B2 were slightly different from those for 
optimization B1, but only to verify a few results from the policy optimizations in section 
7.1.  Specifically, I confirmed that there should be no Black Belt promotions (BB Fractional 
Promotion Rate[FL] = 0) or Black Belt certification projects (BB Certification Start Date 
equal to the simulation's final time — that is, never — which renders the value of MBB 
Training Relative Weight irrelevant).  I also confirmed that the Black Belt hiring rate and 
the maximum nonroutine work fractions for senior executives and front-line employees 
should all be as high as realistically possible (Constant BB Hire Rate[FL] = 0.54 and 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction = 0.2 for SE and FL). 
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I confirmed that the best time constants for adjusting management standards for 
routine work and operating costs in optimization B2 match the values found in 
optimization A1.  Specifically, the values for Work Standard Increase Time and Operating 
Cost Standard Adjustment Time should be as large as possible and the value for Work 
Standard Decrease Time should be as small as possible.  These results were expected but 
unrealistic because they imply that DTE Energy's executives should continue to carry 
forward annual CI savings from improvements in productivity and in operating costs by 
not adjusting their baseline expectations for what they consider normal performance.  
Such baselines, however, become obsolete as they get older.  Wall Street analysts 
typically compare DTE Energy's financial performance only to the previous fiscal year's 
performance.  It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that DTE Energy's executives are 
compelled to adjust these standards quickly in response to such external pressures.  In the 
optimization scenarios that follow, I remove these adjustment times as policy levers, 
setting them back to their default values. 
I confirmed some expected results that are consistent across both optimizations B1 
and B2.  Employees work scope should be increased as soon and as quickly as possible 
(Work Scope Increase Start Date = 12 and Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate 
at its upper bound).  Improvements in productivity do not translate into "hard" savings 
unless and until employees fill their increased slack time with more work, such as by 
insourcing contractor work, or the number of employees is reduced via downsizing or 
gradual attrition. 
Similar to the number of Black Belts, the model contains no financial penalty for 
larger numbers of Master Black Belts.  It is sufficient, therefore, to ensure that the number 
of Master Black Belts never constrains the Black Belt training rate.  I verified that this 
condition was met after setting the lower bound on the BB Shortfall Correction Time to a 
more realistic six months.  With no Black Belt candidates, there is no demand for 
mentoring and, therefore, having only one Master Black Belt is sufficient.  (In both 
optimizations B1 and B2, Vensim’s optimizer yields Initial Master Black Belts = 2.25, but 
sensitivity analysis shows the payoff function's response surface is "flat" at this point.) 
Policy optimizations B1 and B2 yielded ambiguous results for five parameters, so I 
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conducted another iteration of my policy optimization analysis.  These parameters 
included the SE Training Start Date, the Maximum SE Training Rate per Person, the 
Improvement Perception Time, and the Productivity Improvement Work Fraction.  The 
maximum fraction of middle managers' nonroutine work was also uncertain. 
 
7.3. Specific Policy Optimizations 
The results of the third step of my policy analysis are presented in Table 8 (p.287).  
The policy optimization without the three organizational crises is labeled C1 and the 
policy optimization with the three crises is labeled C2. 
In my model, there are no negative ramifications of senior executive training.  
Consequently, Vensim’s optimizer finds that senior executive training should be as 
extensive as possible and begin as soon as possible, as expected (SE Training Start Date = 
6 and Maximum SE Training Rate per Person at its upper bound). 
I did not expect the results I obtained for the final three optimization parameters.  
These optimizations suggest that Improvement Perception Time, how quickly employees' 
perceive the results of their CI work, should be as short as possible.  But the sensitivity 
analysis and optimization results for B1 and B2 suggest that the payoff function is 
insensitive to the value of this parameter across its range of plausible values (from 0.5 to 3 
months). 
I expected the result that middle managers should devote as much of their work 
months to nonroutine work as possible, which was what Vensim’s optimizer yielded for 
the senior executives and front-line employees (that is, Regular Employee Maximum 
Nonroutine Work Fraction = 0.2).  This expectation was correct for optimization C2, but 
not for C1.  The effect of middle managers' contribution to CI work in my model, 
however, is small for two main reasons.  First, my model equations reflect the assumption 
that middle managers will push their front-line subordinates for CI work at least as strongly 
as they are being pushed for CI work by their senior executive bosses (see the equation for 
Push for CI Work in section 5.6, p.165).  If this assumption is descriptively accurate, it 
diminishes the importance of middle managers' belief in CI.  Second, as I explained in 
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section 6.4 (p.266), middle managers' support of the front-line employees' CI work was 
chronically inadequate because of middle managers' (average) span of control at DTE 
Energy and the amount of managerial support required for each person-hour of front-line 
CI work.  If middle managers' support is already inadequate, reducing their maximum 
participation in CI work does not harm front-line results much further.  (The sensitivity 
analysis shows the payoff function's response surface to be relatively "flat" along the vector 
defined by the parameter Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[MM].) 
Finally, the allocation of 34 percent of all CI work to improving productivity, with 
the remaining 66 percent allocated to improving operating costs, turns out to be best in 
optimization C1.  The result for optimization C2, however, was surprising: CI work should 
be directed entirely to improving operating costs, with no fraction allocated to improving 
productivity.  With the optimal policy of relying on Black Belts to achieve the lion's share 
of CI savings, this result is understandable.  I assume Black Belts remain believers unless 
they drop out of the Black Belt program.  Front-line employees, for their part, are sensitive 
to changes in their productivity improvement rate.  Cost cutting diverts focus away from 
previous productivity-improvement work, creating disillusionment among front-line 
employees.  It is therefore better to avoid the larger numbers of skeptical employees 
created by cost cutting by disabling that feedback loop entirely.  The difference to the 
payoff function, however, is not large so I simulate different values for the Productivity 
Improvement Work Fraction with the three organizational crises in the next section. 
 
7.4. Optimal Policy Scenarios 
In this section, I simulate the best values for policy parameters found via the 
preceding optimization simulations.  These "optimal" policy scenarios can be compared to 
the simulation scenarios of DTE Energy's actual experiences in Chapter 6.  I simulate 
scenario D1 without the three organizational crises and scenario D2 with the three crises.  
I also simulate a third scenario that includes the three crises and a nonzero Productivity 
Improvement Work Fraction, labeled as D3. 
All three of these simulation scenarios have the following policies in common (see 
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Appendix G for the specific parameter values): 
• Begin the Black Belt program in month 12. 
• Employ one Master Black Belt to train 2 percent of DTE Energy's entire workforce 
as Black Belts within 6 months from the start of the Black Belt program. 
• Recruit Black Belt trainees from the front line only. 
• Do not require certification projects (i.e., no Black Belt candidate step). 
• Hire experienced Black Belts as quickly as possible from the start of the Black 
Belt program. 
• Black Belts work on CI projects full-time; they do not devote any time to 
coaching front-line employees. 
• No Black Belt promotions into upper management. 
• Begin Green Belt training with the start of the Black Belt program. 
• Train senior executives as much as possible beginning at six months prior to the 
start of the Black Belt program. 
• No downsizing. 
• Limit all employees' CI work time to at most 20 percent of their work months. 
• From the start of the Black Belt program, increase work scope as quickly as 
possible when indicated. 
• Shorten all employees' time to perceive improvement results to 2 weeks. 
Except for the three organizational crises, the difference among the three scenarios 
D1, D2, and D3 is the value of the parameter Productivity Improvement Work Fraction.  
Scenarios D1 and D3 test the value of 34 percent from optimization C1 and scenario D2 
tests the value of zero from optimization C2 (see Appendix G). 
The financial parameters in my model were not calibrated to match DTE Energy's 
actual financial data, so only the relative magnitudes of the CI savings NPVs from each 
simulation scenario are important.  These CI savings NPVs are listed in Table 9 below. 
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Scenario 
Org Crises 
Included 
Productivity Improvement 
Work Fraction 
CI Savings NPV 
6 Yes 0.50 $ 6.04 million 
D1 No 0.34 $18.67 million 
D2 Yes 0.00 $19.77 million 
D3 Yes 0.34 $18.25 million 
Table 9. Comparison of Policy Scenarios 
Scenario D1 is not directly comparable to the other scenarios because it alone 
excludes DTE Energy's three organizational crises.  But it serves as a useful baseline for 
assessing the results of scenarios D2 and D3.  Scenario D2 shows that the set of "optimal" 
policies yields an NPV of CI savings that is 227 percent higher than scenario 6's 
reproduction of DTE Energy's actual experiences (see section 6.6, p.274).  Scenario D3's 
CI savings NPV was almost 6 percent higher than scenario D1's CI savings NPV because 
DTE Energy's financial stress created a stronger imperative for nonroutine work — 
including CI work — during certain periods.  Scenario D3 includes the same Productivity 
Improvement Work Fraction of 34 percent as scenario D1.  It exhibits an approximate 7.7 
percent drop in CI savings NPV from scenario D2.  Scenario D3’s performance is only a 
2.25 percent decrease in CI savings NPV as a result of DTE Energy's three organizational 
crises. 
 
Optimal Policy Scenario D1 
Figure 79 shows that the “optimal” set of policies described above is effective 
because it leads to the highest convincing rates.  In scenario D1, DTE Energy builds its 
cadre of Black Belts quickly.  These Black Belts get to work immediately producing 
convincing results.  Their high rate of achieving CI savings cannot last forever: the 
diminishing returns to their constant CI work rate are clearly illustrated in Figure 79. 
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Figure 79. Scenario D1: Neutrals Convincing Fraction 
With high convincing rates, the fraction of believer employees at all levels of the 
company hierarchy climbs rapidly and only begins to fall gradually when later CI projects 
are not as successful as the earlier ones.  Because the CI personnel began training the 
senior executives six months prior to the start of the Black Belt program, Figure 80 shows 
the earlier growth in senior executive Believers. 
 
Figure 80. Scenario D1: Believers Fraction 
Figure 81 shows the steady increase in the front-line employees’ scope of work as a 
result of productivity improvments and subsequent insourcing of contractor work.  Note, 
however, that such insourcing did not start until January 2000.  It took two years of 
persistent improvement work before front-line productivity increases overcame the 
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additional burden that CI work placed on front-line employees. 
 
Figure 81. Scenario D1: Monthly Routine Work per FTE 
Monthly variable operating costs, on the other hand, began to fall as soon as the 
front-line employees started their operating costs improvement work.  This rate of 
improvement accelerated when the number of Black Belts grew dramatically after January 
1998, and decelerated as their improvements exhibited diminishing returns. 
 
Figure 82. Scenario D1: Monthly Operating Costs 
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Optimal Policy Scenario D2 
The effect of the three organizational crises – the MichCon merger’s trouble between 
April 2000 and May 2001, the PEP cost-cutting initiative between August 2005 and 
January 2007 (with lingering effects through January 2008), and the economic crisis 
between October 2008 and January 2010 – are clearly seen in Figure 83 and in Figure 84.  
Each of these crises distracted employees’ attention away from achieving CI results, either 
because upper management lessened their push for CI work or their push for nonroutine 
work crowding out CI work. 
 
Figure 83. Scenario D2: Boss Desired Nonroutine Work 
 
 
Figure 84. Scenario D2: Neutrals Convincing Fraction 
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Because this scenario D2 includes no improvement work for front-line productivity, 
front-line employees are never convinced of CI’s benefits (Figure 84 and Figure 85).  To 
the extent that their bosses push them to engage in CI work (Figure 83), however, they are 
disillusioned and become skeptics (Figure 86). 
 
Figure 85. Scenario D2: Believers Fraction 
 
 
Figure 86. Scenario D2: Skeptics Fraction 
Figure 87 shows the increase in operating costs for DTE Energy as a whole following 
the close of its merger with MichCon in May 2001 and the decrease in operating costs 
from CI work, primarily before August 2005, and from work cost cutting and scope cutting 
after August 2005. 
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Figure 87. Scenario D2: Monthly Operating Costs 
 
Optimal Policy Scenario D3 
Scenario D3 is exactly the same as scenario D2 except that the Productivity 
Improvement Work Fraction was set at 34 percent instead of at zero percent.  This policy 
change exchanges a slightly lower convincing rate for senior executives and middle 
managers for a nonzero convincing rate for front-line employees. 
 
Figure 88. Scenario D3: Neutrals Convincing Fraction 
The dynamics of this scenario are similar to scenario D2.  Each organizational crisis 
disrupts the CI work being done by employees at all levels.  Because my model assumes 
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that all employees are convinced by the rate at which improvements are being made, 
these disruptions cause quick erosion of convincing rates.  Recovering from these 
disruptions take time, particularly for front-line employes. 
 
Figure 89. Scenario D3: Believers Fraction 
Figure 90 shows why scenario D2 has a better payoff than scenario D3.  The 
marginal return to CI work that reduces variable operating costs is higher than the 
marginal return to CI work that enables insourcing.  Allocating front-line employees’ CI 
work to improving their productivity reduces the improvements made to operating costs. 
 
Figure 90. Scenario D3: Monthly Operating Costs 
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Chapter 8: Discussion & Conclusions 
8.1. Discussion 
In its early days, if not later, DTE Energy's CI initiative appeared to be a paragon.  
Several of DTE Energy's influential senior executives were pro-CI.  CEO Tony Earley 
learned about CI from his executive peers at the automotive companies in southeast 
Michigan, who included Rick Wagoner at GM and Dennis Pawley at Chrysler.  A few of 
these executives later joined DTE Energy, including 14-year Chrysler veteran Dave 
Meador.  Senior vice president Bob Richard joined DTE Energy after 13 years at GE where 
he became a certified Black Belt.  Bob Buckler, president of Detroit Edison until 
December 2008, was a member of the Engineering Advisory Council for the University of 
Michigan's College of Engineering, so he was familiar with Jeffrey Liker's research on the 
Toyota Production System. 
DTE Energy's CI initiative enjoyed strong connections with MIT's Leaders for 
Manufacturing (LFM) program and with Peter Senge's Society for Organizational Learning 
(SoL).  Many of the CI initiative's progenitors were LFM alumni: Steve Nagy (LFM '94), 
Shawn Patterson (LFM '94), Jamie Flinchbaugh (LFM '98), Tony Kramer (LFM '97), and 
Jason Schulist (LFM '97).  Dave Meador, Shawn Patterson, and Jason Schulist, during 
different periods, served as members of the Council of Trustees for SoL. 
These leaders of DTE Energy's CI initiative benefitted from the best advice by 
leveraging their social and professional networks.  Their advisors in industry included 
Jamie Bonini (LFM '92), who was first at Chrysler and later at Toyota; Dennis Pawley at 
Chrysler; and Paul O'Neill at Alcoa.  From academia, their advisors included Steve Spear 
at MIT, Kent Bowen at Harvard Business School, and Jeffrey Liker at the University of 
Michigan. 
Despite these advantages, one of DTE Energy's senior executives admitted, "Since we 
started this initiative, we're probably guilty of every [CI] implementation error there is."  I 
related these implementation errors in my case study of DTE Energy's CI initiative in 
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Chapters 2-4 and in Appendix B.  But why did DTE Energy's employees make these errors? 
I argue that these "errors" occurred for three reasons.  First, DTE Energy's CI 
personnel — and their advisors in industry and academia — were unsure what was the 
best recipe for implementing a CI initiative at a regulated utility.  Consequently, they had 
to adapt, experiment with, and learn from different approaches and tactics.  This process 
of experimentation and learning was time-consuming and not always successful, slowing 
the growth trajectory of the CI initiative. 
Table 10 lists the various tactics that DTE Energy's CI leaders used during the various 
phases of the CI initiative.  The CI initiative gained traction in phases 3, 5 and 6, when the 
CI personnel aimed various tactics at all three levels of the company hierarchy.  In 
addition to these tactics, DTE Energy's CI personnel had planned several more.  They had 
begun developing CI Champion training for the senior executives and a CI basics training 
(a “White Belt”) during the end of phase 3, but these were aborted because of the PEP 
initiative in phase 4.  Interestingly, Jason Schulist and Bob Hemrick considered reviving 
the plan for these courses in late 2009 (phase 6) because they perceived that the CI skill of 
DTE Energy's employees was still insufficient.  Similarly, Schulist and Hemrick also 
planned on reviving the learning lines tactic from phase 3 because they perceived that the 
swarm events of phase 6 could not achieve results commensurate with the Black Belts’ CI 
project results. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6
1998-2000 2000-2001 2001-2005 2005-2006 2007-2008 2008-2009
Executive 
training
Executive 
training
Executive 
training
Executive TSSC 
workshops
CILWs for 
executives
CILWs for 
managers
Performance 
Leadership 
sessions
Performance 
Leadership 
sessions
UMP teams
Kaizen events (Kaizen events)
Train OS 
Specialists
(Train OS 
Specialists)
Train OS 
Specialists
Train OS 
Specialists
Learning lines
Swarm events
Train kaizen 
facilitators
Train OS 
Experts
Demo projects
Train and 
certify Black 
Belts
Train and 
certify Black 
Belts
Train and 
certify Black 
Belts
Train and 
certify Black 
Belts
Hire Black 
Belts
Hire Black 
Belts
Hire Black 
Belts
Hire Black 
Belts
BB projects BB projects BB projects BB projects
BB
Table 10. CI Initiative Tactics by Phase
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
SE
MM
FL
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The second reason for DTE Energy's CI implementation problems was its three 
organizational crises.  These crises significantly distracted employees at all levels from the 
CI initiative.  DTE Energy's CI leaders, in the midst of experimenting to find what worked, 
were forced to reformulate the CI initiative in response to other organizational actions 
intended to alleviate DTE Energy's (mostly financial) pressures in the short term.  The most 
prominent example of this reformulation was the supporting role that Black Belts assumed 
during the PEP initiative, helping DTE Energy's business units survive "after the [budgetary] 
ax had fallen". 
Third, I perceived that DTE Energy's CI initiative took on "a life of its own".  After 
Shawn Patterson and Steve Nagy were successful in their lobbying to create the CI 
department, the leaders of the CI initiative found it easier to gradually expand the number 
of centralized and decentralized CI positions under its umbrella.  With the backing of a 
few key senior executives like Dave Meador, Bob Richard, and Steve Kurmas, it would 
have been difficult for detractors to successfully eliminate the initiative in a single action.  
The CI initiative's persistence through the PEP cost-cutting initiative supports this assertion. 
This institutionalization of the CI department and its associated positions in phase 3 
had an important consequence.  After they formally adopted Six Sigma, I believe the CI 
initiative's leaders became complacent during this period.  John Weiss did not experiment 
with different tactics the way Shawn Patterson had before him in phase 1 and the way 
Jason Schulist did after him in phases 5 and 6.  The senior executives, for their part, were 
content to simply monitor reported savings rather than involve themselves in building 
organizational capabilities for problem solving and process design.  Jason Schulist's efforts 
to foster such senior executive involvement in phase 5 is evidence that it had been lacking 
previously. 
 
8.2. Implications for Managers 
Steve Spear’s main point in The High-Velocity Edge (2009) is that high-performing 
companies have developed the capabilities to continually improve what they do, 
especially their core value streams.  Companies need stable, predictable processes, of 
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course, but those stable processes may be inefficient, may produce low quality, and may 
be maladapted to external requirements.  Consequently, companies need mechanisms to 
identify and correct these flaws.  Companies usually attempt to fix these flaws individually 
as special cases — by bringing in consultants or by relying on the professional skills of 
their managers (such as they are).  But such an ad hoc approach is itself inefficient, error-
prone, not always successful, and does not promote organizational learning.  A better 
alternative is to foster a stable, consistent, reliable procedure for fixing problems and 
reexamining process designs.  The main goal of a CI initiative, in contrast to the main goal 
of CI activities, should not be to make specific improvements or to save a certain amount 
of money.  Instead, the main goal of a CI initiative should be to institutionalize codified 
improvement procedures and to develop the skills at all levels of the hierarchy to enact 
them properly. 
The main finding from my policy optimizations in Chapter 7 is that companies 
seeking to improve their performance with CI tools and methods should create and 
maintain positions solely dedicated to it.  Black Belts deliver the highest financial payoff 
when they are highly skilled and work on CI projects full-time.  Many of the certified 
Black Belts at DTE Energy were also engineers.  This finding suggests that companies in 
any industry, not just in manufacturing, should hire industrial engineers to explicitly 
design and redesign their work processes.  It takes too long for front-line employees, 
working on CI projects part-time, to accumulate enough skill to deliver results fast enough 
to sustain upper management's enthusiasm for CI. 
This recommendation runs counter to the approach advocated by Toyota (Liker, 
2004; Spear & Bowen, 1999) and by Deming (1986).  Front-line employees are the experts 
in their jobs because they perform those jobs every day.  They understand what goes 
wrong, how often, and what workarounds are used to circumvent those problems.  They 
often have inklings of what would make their jobs easier, more efficient, more reliable, 
less error prone, less frustrating, and less costly.  Because they know their jobs the best, 
they are the best suited to improve those jobs by diagnosing problems and inventing 
countermeasures.  In doing so, they should be coached by their supervisors.  Front-line 
employees' direct engagement in such improvement work reduces their resistance to 
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change because they helped bring it about. 
Toyota's approach is a numbers game.  If everyone improves their own jobs just a 
little bit every day, week, or month, then those small efforts, aggregated across hundreds 
or thousands of employees, add up to large gains in the company's performance over 
time.  Toyota's theory for CI is that these activities are part of everyone's routine work, not 
"extra" tasks to be done only when employees have slack time available (or when 
managers compel them to do those tasks).  Jason Schulist was trying to foster the adoption 
of this theory of CI at DTE Energy by continually emphasizing the idea of "problem solving 
at the point of activity." 
My finding about the best role for Black Belts alters this conventional wisdom.  First, 
Black Belts or industrial engineers have specialized training for facilitation, advanced data 
analysis, and problem solving.  Training a Black Belt is expensive.  Companies should use 
them sensibly by having them use their special skills, rather than having them return to 
their previous jobs with a certificate.  They should work full-time within their business 
units, close to the core value streams.  They should act like internal consultants.  They are 
the best equipped to facilitate problem solving across functional boundaries and to 
enforce honesty in uncovering and scrutinizing the causes of problems. 
Second, managers of front-line employees must always confront the problem of effort 
allocation, between improvement and throughput.  This trade-off is called the self-
improvement dilemma by Keating and Oliva (2000a, pp. 263-264) and the capability trap 
by Repenning and Sterman (2002, pp. 282-283).  This dilemma is particularly acute for 
unionized employees, such as those at DTE Energy, and for healthcare personnel because 
their highly specialized professional skills make their attention to throughput far more 
valuable than their attention to improvement.  If such front-line employees are going to 
perform improvement activities, they should adhere to the TPS model: fix local problems 
for processes that are already well functioning.  Work processes should already be clearly 
defined, standardized, and predictable.  The mechanisms for signaling errors and 
escalating them to upper management's attention must also be in place and well 
functioning. 
Third, managers should make process “reengineering” the responsibility of their 
 308   
company's Black Belts.  Often, processes have not been explicitly designed but have 
simply evolved over time.  Consequently, costs can be reduced and efficiencies increased 
by “engineering” them in the first place.  As specialized resources, Black Belts are best 
suited for cross-functional, capital-intensive, or way-out-of-the-box process redesign.  Of 
course, they should include front-line employees as appropriate in such work, as experts 
and as the recipients of the new process. 
These points have several implications.  First, the Black Belts require a matrix-style 
organizational structure.  Each Black Belt should be attached to a particular business unit, 
to ensure he or she is close enough to the front-line to understand processes and 
problems, and to develop good working relationships with the front-line employees in that 
unit.  However, one of DTE Energy's Master Black Belts observed that it is beneficial for a 
company's Black Belts to officially report also to a centralized CI department.  Such an 
official reporting relationship helps the Black Belts maintain their objectivity (not getting 
pulled into business-unit cover-ups), ensures that they are not appropriated as “extra” 
resources for the business unit's non-CI projects, and furnishes them with a support 
network should they need assistance. 
Second, executives and managers need a system to compile improvement ideas from 
all sources, whether from employee suggestions or from strategic priorities.  They would 
use such a system to review and sort these improvement ideas by priority and resources 
required, and then assign them to Black Belts or to front-line teams. 
Improving a process involves two stages.  The first stage is to stabilize a process by 
designing it explicitly.  After the process is running smoothly, the second stage is to 
continually and iteratively refine its design.  The segue from the first stage to the second is 
an important transition.  It is likely that a Black Belt needs to direct the first stage, but he or 
she might not be needed in the second stage.  Black Belts should train front-line 
employees on-the-job during the process-design stage, so they are well prepared and 
inclined to perform the ongoing process refinements when the Black Belts move to other 
projects.  This combination of Six Sigma Black Belts and front-line employee problem 
solving is what DTE Energy's CI leaders mean when they call their CI initiative "Lean Six 
Sigma". 
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This approach avoids front-line employee disenchantment that occurs when large 
numbers of them are forced (and often they are forced) through an introductory CI crash 
course with no immediate follow-up.  The pro-CI managers or Black Belts throughout the 
organization are too few in number to involve every newly trained front-line employee in 
some kind of improvement work.  Such a push for broad training is wasteful at best and 
creates a "disillusioning machine" at worst (see, for example, section 6.1, p.257). 
Keating and her colleagues (1999) claim that long-term sustainability of a CI 
initiative requires an organization to make a transition from managerial push for CI work 
to employee pull for CI work, but they do not provide an argument for this claim.  After 
all, why couldn’t managers simply keep up their normative pressure?  Perhaps Keating and 
colleagues thought that persistent managerial push was practically unlikely or structurally 
infeasible.  Annual budgeting as a control mechanism, however, is a counterexample; 
there is no employee pull for it, yet organizations continue the practice.  An alternative 
theory is that managerial incentives keep employees enacting CI behaviors until those 
practices become institutionalized as taken-for-granted social norms.  In such a scenario, 
employees do not need to believe in those practices; they need only to become habituated 
to using them routinely. 
My case study and simulation analysis of DTE Energy's CI initiative confirms 
Repenning's (2002) finding that managers need to stay the course.  Repenning, also using 
a formal System Dynamics simulation model, illustrates how the reinforcing feedback 
processes of convincing from results and from word of mouth operate initially in a 
downward, reversionary direction (i.e., they boost the disillusioning rates).  Managers' 
push for CI work is needed to get workers over a "motivation threshold" beyond which 
these reinforcing feedback loops operate in an upward, regenerative direction (i.e., the 
convincing rates exceed the disillusioning rates).  CI implementation failure occurs when 
managers' push for CI work is too weak or is withdrawn too early to swtich these 
reinforcing feedback loops from their initial vicious direction to their potential virtuous 
direction.  Repenning emphasized the "motivation threshold" because it explains how a CI 
initiative can fail even with employees achieving early successes.  The simulation results 
in Chapter 6 validate Shawn Patterson’s belief that the 6-month phases of the first CI 
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implementation plan should have been 2- to 4-year phases (see section 3.2, p.45).  Such 
persistence is required to convince enough employees and to build their skill to a degree 
where they are achieving results that convince others. 
 
8.3. Model Limitations and Implications for Further Research 
The biggest flaw in my simulation model is the lack of a sector representing DTE 
Energy's finances.  Even though my model includes labor costs and variable operating 
costs, it lacks enough detail of DTE Energy's revenue and cost structure to enable an 
endogenous formulation of a few important aspects of the CI initiative.  Specifically, senior 
executives' belief in CI is required to allocate money to CI consultants, training activities, 
and positions.  The allocation of monies to each of these elements exhibits a different 
amount of inertia: spending on CI consultants and training were increased and decreased 
quickly, positions for CI personnel were adding and eliminated slowly.  My model is 
missing the cost of CI personnel, including the instructors for the Green Belt training 
program and the Master Black Belts.  (It does include the wages for Black Belt program 
participants.)  Modeling the dependence of training capacity for Black Belts and Green 
Belts on senior executives' belief in CI would raise the stakes on convincing them early 
and quickly.  The optimal policy scenarios in section 7.4 (p.291) already include such 
aggressive convincing of the senior executives. 
My lack of a fully elaborated financial model sector means that I had to define 
financial stress as an exogenous time series (see section 5.6, p.165).  Financial stress in the 
model, therefore, does not participate in any feedback loops; it is not alleviated by 
employees achieving CI savings or by the lowering of labor costs through downsizing.  For 
simplicity, I modeled changes in financial stress drastically; for example, it jumps from 
zero to 100 percent at the beginning of the PEP initiative in August 2005 (see Table 5, 
p.255), which implies that DTE Energy's senior executives immediately demanded 32 
hours of nonroutine work, on average, from every employee.  An endogenous formulation 
for financial stress would not exhibit such unrealistic swings. 
When I simulated the scenarios in Chapter 6, I assumed for simplicity that Black 
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Belts were dedicated to CI activities full-time.  Although some of DTE Energy's Black Belts 
were dedicated to CI full-time, in actuality most were dedicated to CI only part-time.  The 
part-time Black Belts could readily curtail their CI activities or even drop out of the Black 
Belt program entirely (by simply halting their CI activities) without much notice paid by 
their supervisors or by other managers.  My model assumes constant dropout rates for 
Black Belts, Black Belt trainees, and Black Belt candidates (see section 5.12, p.203).  The 
Black Belts' dropout rate was zero except for the period between the start of the MichCon 
merger's trouble in April 2000 and the start of the OS Experts training in July 2002 (see 
Table 5, p.255).  Instead, Black Belts should drop out based on their assessment of the CI 
initiative's health, although it is an open empirical question how they would make such 
an assessment. 
I represented the variable Boss Push for CI Work as a pressure ranging from zero to 
100 percent, which employees translate into a certain number of work hours spent on CI 
work per month (see section 5.6, p.165).  In actuality, however, DTE Energy's managers 
also pushed their subordinates to achieve a certain amount of CI savings or to attend CI 
workshops of certain durations.  DTE Energy's OS Experts and full-time Black Belts, in 
particular, were expected to meet CI savings targets.  My model omits the processes by 
which those targets for CI savings or for participation in CI activities were set.  More 
importantly, it also omits increases in the Black Belt dropout rate when Black Belts judge 
their savings targets as unreasonable. 
In my simulation model, CI work is always nonroutine work, added on top of every 
employee's routine workload.  My model does not accommodate the possibility that CI 
work becomes institutionalized as part of everyone's job such that employees will enact 
CI behaviors even if they or their managers no longer believe in CI.  It is not certain how 
much nonroutine work DTE Energy's executives and managers intended their subordinates 
to perform for a given degree of push for cost reductions.  I assumed a fixed maximum 
nonroutine work fraction of 20 percent of an employee's work month (see section 5.6, 
p.169), but such a fixed maximum is unrealistic.  I think it is plausible that employees at 
all levels learn, via a hill-climbing heuristic, how much nonroutine work is acceptable or 
desirable, given the other pressures they feel.  Additionally, employees and their bosses 
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can both form opinions about how much nonroutine work those employees should 
perform — and these opinions do not have to match (and probably won't). 
I make a similar assumption on the employee-pull side.  My simulation model yields 
the result that CI believers experience more schedule pressure than do the neutrals and 
skeptics.  The reason is believers want to engage in CI work in addition to their regular 
routine work (see section 5.6, p.164).  My model reflects the strong assumption that 
managers allow their believer subordinates to engage in CI work to the extent they want.  
My model omits the structure of Repenning and Sterman's (2002) capability trap in which 
managers can increase or decrease the time they permit their subordinates to engage in CI 
work based on their own pressures for throughput (accomplishing the routine work). 
As I explained in the Methods section 1.2 (p.18), I formulated a DTE Energy-specific 
simulation model prior to building the more generalizable version that I present in Chapter 
5.  For parsimony, I excluded from my final model some formulations of my precursor 
model.  One of these exclusions was Black Belts' need for front-line employees' expertise 
and participation in their CI projects.  Without such front-line participation, Black Belts 
find it much harder to achieve and sustain improvement results.  Anecdotal evidence from 
DTE Energy suggests that Black Belts might require as much as double the amount of time 
to solve a problem without front-line employees' participation. 
Another element in my precursor model that I excluded from my final simulation 
model was DTE Energy's CI workshops: the kaizen events of phase 1, the learning lines of 
phase 3, the CI Leadership Workshops (CILWs) of phase 5, and the swarm events of phase 
6.  I assumed instead that person-hours expended in CI workshops was equivalent to 
person-hours expended on CI projects or, in the case of CILWs, to senior executive 
training hours.  But I believe a closer examination of the differences among these types of 
workshops and from CI projects would be fruitful.  Learning lines (when conducted 
properly) and CILWs in particular were effective at convincing all participants, regardless 
of their level in the company hierarchy, in part because they were learning together on the 
front lines.  In contrast, DTE Energy's kaizen events were unsuccessful because they 
represented CI work being delegated to front-line employees with no management 
support, inadequate training, and inadequate coaching.  Swarm events suffered from being 
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viewed by some managers as a quick fix for any problem, even those problems that could 
not possibly fixed within a swarm event's 1-week duration (or shorter). 
The aspects of CI implementation that I perceive would benefit the most from further 
research are (1) how senior executives and middle managers perceive the CI initiative's 
results, (2) how those perceptions shape their beliefs, and (3) how they translate those 
beliefs into specific directives or pressures down the company hierarchy.  The interaction 
of these pressures with employees' beliefs and incentives at each level of the hierarchy is 
also important.  For example, my simulation model demonstrates how a strong senior 
executive push for CI work from the top of the hierarchy may amount to very little 
pressure for CI savings on the front lines after the CI contribution rates for middle 
managers and front-line employees are reduced by their low skill and low effort 
earnestness (see section 5.7, p.172). 
In my DTE Energy case study, I perceived what might be two different types of 
managerial belief in CI or two different points along a spectrum of increasing belief in CI.  
On the one hand, a manager or executive can believe that CI is beneficial for the 
company but think that there is no problem delegating the responsibility for enacting CI to 
his or her subordinates.  On the other hand, a manager or executive can believe that CI is 
beneficial for the company only when he or she is personally involved in orchestrating it.  
Most senior executives at DTE Energy, with the exception of Bob Richard, exhibited only 
the first type of belief in CI until Jason Schulist's introduction of CILWs in 2008. 
At all levels of the hierarchy, employees' perceptions of the CI initiative were shaped 
primarily by how much savings were reported (or not reported) under a CI label rather 
than by what means those savings were achieved.  Also, employees did not pay attention 
to whether such work boosted the company's capabilities for the long term or simply 
reduced its costs in the short term.  For example, CI methods properly applied under the 
rubric of the PEP initiative were not considered by many managers and executives as CI 
work.  But DTE Energy's senior executives continued to support Black Belt projects in 
phase 4 because they could produce short-term gains efficiently.  It is no wonder then that 
many front-line employees — having only heard about CI through word of mouth — 
believed that the PEP initiative was simply the next incarnation of DTE Energy's CI 
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initiative. 
The results of simulation scenario 4 in section 6.4 (p.266) raise the question whether 
managers can correctly perceive, or tease apart, the factors contributing to an overall 
decrease in operating costs.  My model assumes that they cannot do so.  In scenario 4, 
managers engaged in downsizing and in cutting the scope of their subordinates' work, 
which created financial gains that were commingled with CI savings being achieved.  It 
possible that they misperceived the CI initiative to be more beneficial or less beneficial 
than it actually was during different periods. 
As I describe in section 5.10 (p.189), I adopted the assumption from the Analog 
Devices model that employees are convinced by the (continuous) rate of improvement in 
their variable of interest — time per task for front-line employees, CI savings for upper 
management — instead of absolute improvements made over a certain time period.  This 
assumption makes CI results a derivative controller for the convincing rate.  It is an open 
empirical question whether this derivative controller accurately describes how employees 
would respond to diminishing returns to a constant CI work rate (or even if they have the 
ability to perceive those returns diminishing at all). 
My handling of the downsizing rate is simplistic.  DTE Energy's senior executives 
discontinued their attempts at downsizing with layoffs after they observed the damage that 
these attempts made to employee commitment and morale.  This causal mechanism is 
missing from my model.  I also assume unrealistically that downsizing can persist at a 
constant fractional rate, rather than at a diminishing rate as the number of total employees 
approaches a theoretical minimum.  (This theoretical minimum depends on the minimum 
monthly routine work that employees must perform to keep DTE Energy in business.) 
Finally, the other pressing need for further research is investigating how much 
support from their managers and how much coaching from CI experts front-line 
employees require.  My simulation analysis in Chapter 6 suggested that both support by 
managers and coaching by Black Belts always fall short of the amounts required by front-
line employees, given DTE Energy's average span of control and a Black Belt target of 2 
percent of the total workforce (see sections 6.4, p.266, and 6.5, p.271).  This imbalance is 
not as severe as it seems, however, if a company's executives do not expect all its 
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employees to make CI part of their jobs.  It is not clear what fraction of a company's 
workforce should comprise the target audience for CI to become "the way we do things 
around here." 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
Companies do not attempt to train their employees to do their accounting.  They hire 
professional accountants instead.  They view these accountants as a necessary part and 
cost of doing business.  No return-on-investment calculation is needed to hire an 
accountant (assuming, of course, that there is enough accounting work to be done).  Yet 
non-manufacturing companies take this tack when it comes to the design of their work 
processes.  They either assume their middle managers can do it adequately, or they train a 
handful of employees to do it on a part-time basis.  Or, worse, they hand the responsibility 
over to the IT department as it attempts to "automate" the company's processes with 
computer systems.  The alternative is to hire professional industrial engineers or full-time 
certified Black Belts.  The findings from my policy optimization analysis in Chapter 7 
suggest that this approach has merit.  I cannot see how the design of a company's work 
processes is any less important than the accounting of its cash flows. 
“Top-down” and “bottom-up” are adjectives commonly used to describe approaches 
to CI implementation.  I argue that these terms refer to a false dichotomy.  Any successful 
implementation must and does include both, like precipitation and evaporation in the 
water cycle.  The process of CI implementation is governed by a positive feedback loop: 
from results to perceptions, to beliefs, to policies and other managerial actions, to front-
line employee actions, and back to results.  A company's CI leaders might choose to 
emphasize top-down incentives or bottom-up demonstration of results, but nobody can 
separate either one from this overarching feedback process. 
While conducting my fieldwork for this study, I also attended BP's Global 
Operations Conference in late 2008.  BP's executives had dedicated a large portion of this 
conference to BP's CI initiative, which was relatively new at that time.  Andy Inglis, CEO 
of BP's extraction and production business unit, stated that their implementation strategy is 
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not top-down or bottom-up, but a blend of both.  He explained that BP's upper managers 
should expect their subordinates to do improvement work, by applying standard CI tools 
and procedures, but they would not prescribe exactly how to go about it.  Inglis intended 
for each business unit to experiment locally, to adopt so-called "best practices" from other 
business units, and to spread its own findings to others. 
 
Figure 91. Summary of Reinforcing Feedback Loops 
My case study of DTE Energy shows that growing a CI initiative involves more than 
managerial support, local experimentation, and sharing best practices.  For employees at 
any level of the company hierarchy to believe that CI work is worthwhile, they must be 
convinced.  But the results that convince the front-line employees are of a different type 
from those that convince upper management.  Achieving results depends also on 
employees' accumulated skill and effort earnestness, both of which are initially low 
regardless of senior executives' enthusiasm for the CI initiative.  It is for this reason that 
Black Belts' CI projects and coaching are so crucial to building and maintaining necessary 
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levels of employee belief.  As Figure 91 shows, Black Belts' CI activities resolve the 
chicken-or-egg problem created by the interlocking reinforcing feedback loops between 
the front line and upper management. 
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Appendix A: Timeline of Events 
1994 
• (March) Tony Earley leaves Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) and joins DTE 
Energy as COO. 
1995 
• Following the failure of their 1992 contract negotiations, DTE Energy and UWUA 
Local 223 adopt an interest-based bargaining (IBB) approach.  They agree to their first 
4-year contract. 
1997 
• David Meador leaves Chrysler after 14 years and joins DTE Energy as controller and 
treasurer. 
• Steve Nagy is hired from Chrysler for his experience working on the Chrysler 
Operating System. 
1998 
• (August) Tony Earley succeeds John Lobbia as DTE Energy's Chairman and CEO. 
• Steve Nagy hires Lean consulting firm Achievement Dynamics to run kaizen events. 
1999 
• (June) Senior executives visit the U.S. Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 
in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and subsequently adopt the practice of After-Action 
Reviews (AARs) as an organizational-learning tool (Darling, Meador, & Patterson, 
2003). 
• Steve Nagy hires Jamie Flinchbaugh from Chrysler and Shawn Patterson from GM as 
the first full-time employees of the nascent CI initiative. 
• Shawn Patterson becomes manager of DTE Energy's new Center for Continuous 
Improvement (CCI). He expands Nagy’s kaizen program. 
• DTE Energy and UWUA Local 223 negotiate a 5-year contract.  The Office of Labor 
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Management Partnership (OLMP) is created to oversee the new Union Management 
Partnership (UMP) initiative. 
• (October) DTE Energy announces plans to merge with MCN Energy Group, parent 
company of Michigan Consolidated Gas Company (MichCon). 
2000 
• DTE Energy’s merger with MCN Energy dominates senior executives’ attention. 
• (June) Michigan governor John Engler signs Public Act 141 into law, requiring DTE 
Energy to implement the Electric Choice program by January 2002. 
• (October) DTE Energy and IBEW Local 17 negotiate a 5-year contract. 
2001 
• (January) DTE Energy begins implementing the Electric Choice program mandated by 
the Michigan Public Service Comission (MPSC). 
• (May) DTE Energy and MCN Energy formally close their merger. 
• (November) The Operating Council, formed to oversee post-merger integration, 
formally charters the creation of the DTE Energy Operating System. 
• (December) CFO Larry Garberding retires and is succeeded by David Meador. 
2002 
• (May) Shawn Patterson becomes director of DTE Energy’s new Operating System 
Strategy Group (OSSG) and leads the creation of a 2-year strategic plan for the CI 
initiative. 
• Patterson hires Lean expert Michele Hieber to design the OSSG’s training courses. 
Hieber creates the OS Expert course. 
• MichCon’s approximately 1,000 members of SEIU Local 80 vote to become members 
of UWUA Local 223. 
• (September) CEO Tony Earley hires Signet Consulting to facilitate AARs by the 
executive committee to identify and assess lessons from the merger (Darling et al., 
2003). 
• (November) CEO Tony Earley conducts an executive-committee AAR, without 
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consultant assistance, on a substation fire adjacent to DTE Energy’s Detroit 
headquarters (Darling et al., 2003). 
• (December) DTE Energy sells its high-voltage transmission subsidiary, International 
Transmission Company (ITC), to private equity firms Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. 
(KKR) and Trimaran Capital Partners for approximately $610 million in cash. 
2003 
• Michele Hieber creates the OS Specialist course. 
• Bob Richard leaves Bethlehem Steel as vice president of operations and process 
improvement and joins DTE Energy as vice president of Fossil Generation.  Richard 
brings Six Sigma to DTE Energy, having previously become a Six Sigma Master Black 
Belt during a 13-year tenure at GE. 
• John Weiss is hired from Florida Power & Light (FPL) for his Six Sigma expertise.  He 
starts a Black Belt training and certification program within OSSG. 
• Frank Wszelaki leads the development of a periodic outage handbook for Fossil 
Generation’s power plants. 
• (August) Failure of the electricity distribution network in northeastern and mid-western 
states and Canada, causing the largest blackout in U.S. history. 
2004 
• DTE Energy’s first Master Black Belt is hired from Ford to lead the Black Belt program. 
• (Spring) Marcia Jackson leads a 3-month learning line at Coolidge service station, 
improving service-call productivity by 42 percent. 
• (Summer) A second learning line is attempted at Broadway service station. 
• (June) Gerry Anderson is promoted to president of DTE Energy. 
• (July) DTE Energy and UWUA Local 223 negotiate a 3-year contract. 
• Shawn Patterson and John Weiss lead the creation of a new 2-year strategic plan for 
the CI initiative.  Weiss becomes director of OSSG when Patterson moves to 
Distribution Operations. 
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2005 
• A statistician from DTE Energy’s marketing department runs the Black Belt program for 
a few months only. 
• (April) MISO’s day-ahead and real-time energy trading markets go live. 
• (Summer) Gerry Anderson becomes COO and hires McKinsey to design a cost-cutting 
and organizational restructuring initiative called Performance Excellence Process (PEP). 
• A new group called Enterprise Performance Management (EPM) is created to 
orchestrate the PEP initiative. 
• DTE Energy and IBEW Local 17 negotiate a new contract. 
• (October) The MPSC orders DTE Energy to explain why its administrative and general 
expenses compared unfavorably to Michigan utility Consumers Energy. 
• (November) Planned layoffs as part of a project at Pontiac service station poisons the 
learning-line approach to CI. 
2006 
• (March) The MPSC orders DTE Energy to argue why its electric rates should not be 
reduced. 
• (June) The unions successfully resist PEP’s proposed layoffs, but employee morale 
suffers.  Hundreds of non-represented employees take voluntary buy-outs. 
• DTE Energy installs new IT systems SAP and Maximo for administrative processes. The 
project costs over $250 million. 
• (October) Steven Kurmas, former executive vice president of Energy Distribution, 
replaces Bob Richard as the head of Fossil Generation.  Bob Richard becomes senior 
vice president of Gas Operations (MichCon). 
2007 
• (January) Jason Schulist replaces John Weiss as director of OSSG.  He reemphasizes 
Lean concepts and tools in the CI initiative. 
• Jason Schulist hires four new CI managers for DTE Energy’s business units. 
• (July) Gerry Anderson acknowledges at an upper-management retreat the damage that 
the PEP initiative caused to employee morale, marking a return to the CI initiative. 
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• (October) DTE Energy and UWUA Local 223 negotiate a 3-year contract. 
• (October) Fossil Generation’s managers restart a training initiative for power plant 
employees called Performance Leadership. 
• Jason Schulist takes several senior executives to 5-day executive courses on Lean. 
• (November) DTE Energy’s fourth head of the Black Belt program quits, leaving the 
Master Black Belt position vacant for the next 6 months. 
2008 
• (February) Jason Schulist begins CI Leadership Workshops (CILWs). 
• (May) Jason Schulist hires a new corporate Master Black Belt, who revives and 
restructures DTE Energy’s Black Belt certification program. 
• (July) At an upper-management retreat, 62 percent of DTE Energy’s managers believed 
that the CI initiative would be displaced by a new initiative within 5 years. 
• (August) Patti Poppe launches a culture-change initiative in Fossil Generation, called 
Trade Up Culture, and adds it to the Performance Leadership training. 
• (September) Jason Schulist hires Bob Hemrick from Dana to be co-director of OSSG. 
• (October) Credit crisis hits the U.S. economy. 
• (November) Gerry Anderson formulates DTE Energy’s economic-crisis response (ECR) 
and guarantees employment security for employees.  DTE Energy cuts contractors 
instead. 
• (Autumn) Jason Schulist teaches Gerry Anderson CI via one-on-one tutoring.  Anderson 
completes his CI practicum at Trombly cable plant. 
• (December) Detroit Edison president Bob Buckler retires and is succeeded by Steve 
Kurmas.  Paul Fessler becomes Fossil Generation’s new vice president. 
2009 
• (January) Deborah Meyers joins the OSSG from the HR department’s Organizational 
Learning group to develop new CI materials. 
• (Spring) Jason Schulist teaches Tony Earley CI via one-on-one tutoring.  Earley 
completes his CI practicum at Southfield service center.  He presents his project to 
DTE Energy’s board of directors. 
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• Jason Schulist and Bob Hemrick heavily promote swarm events to teach Steven Spear’s 
Four Capabilities (C1-C4) and OPCA. 
• (April) Chrysler files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
• (June) General Motors files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
• (July) Leaders of all 11 divisions of UWUA Local 223 attend a CILW on the union 
grievance process. 
• (October) The Conference Board’s Council for Six Sigma Executives visits DTE Energy 
to learn about its CI initiative. 
2010 
• (January) DTE Energy wins the “Best Improvement Program” category of the Process 
Excellence Awards given by the International Quality and Productivity Center (IQPC). 
• (April) DTE Energy hosts a event jointly organized by the Michigan Lean Consortium 
(MLC) and Oakland University's Pawley Lean Institute.  DTE Energy's executives 
present their CI initiative to MLC members and other Michigan companies. 
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Appendix B: Assessment of CI Activities 
While I was researching the history of DTE Energy's CI initiative, my interviewees 
were also communicative about the various types of CI activities used at DTE Energy.  
Their assessments of these CI activities augment our understanding of how the events of 
DTE Energy's CI initiative unfolded, yet these assessments remain somewhat tangential to 
the main history.  For this reason, I have included these sections in an appendix.  I did not 
exclude this material entirely, however, because I realized that these assessments are of 
equal — if not greater — importance and interest to practicing managers looking to learn 
from DTE Energy's experiences. 
Voicing their frustrations with and perceived shortcomings of these CI activities 
seemed to be cathartic for many interviewees.  We all love to complain, of course, when 
we have an ax to grind and an interested yet neutral listener.  But this fact may worry 
readers concerned about bias: To what extent are these criticisms broadly representative, 
rather than the views of a disgruntled minority?  My purpose for including these 
assessments was to provide a comprehensive list of shortcomings, as perceived by my 
interviewees, so that managers at DTE Energy and elsewhere may be aware of them.  Bias 
and non-representativeness, therefore, aren't a problem: If these shortcomings were 
judged by my interviewees as significant, then they have the potential to hamper or derail 
any company's CI initiative.  Forewarned is forearmed. 
On the other hand, DTE Energy's employees achieved some remarkable successes 
with all of these activities — Black Belt projects, CILWs, and swarm events.  To balance 
out the criticisms presented in this appendix, I have endeavored to provide examples of 
these successes both in the main history in Chapters 2-4 and in the sections below. 
The last section on employee engagement addresses what I consider to be one of the 
most important challenges of implementing a CI initiative.  This examination of DTE 
Energy's efforts with employee engagement is topical rather than chronological, so it did 
not fit my narrative structure of Chapters 2-4.  I emphasize, however, that my relegating 
this section to an appendix does not reflect my opinion of its relative importance. 
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B.1. Black Belt Program 
As DTE Energy’s population of Black Belts grew between 2004 and 2009, the 
fraction of certified Black Belts hired — rather than trained internally — was consistently 
about one-third (see Figure 4, p.91).  These Black Belts were hired from companies like 
GE, Ford, Visteon, Johnson Controls, and Lear.  Because most of these companies had 
hired Six Sigma Academy to launch their Six Sigma programs, Black Belts from these 
companies were critical of DTE Energy’s home-grown Black Belt program.  The 
shortcomings that they reported follow. 
1. Black Belt candidates were (sometimes) selected poorly. 
Black Belts should not only work on projects, but promote structured and rigorous 
ways of approaching operational problems among all employees.  For this reason, 
consulting firm Six Sigma Academy (SSA) recommends that companies select their best 
employees, those with energy and promise for advancement, to become their Black Belts.  
Ford hired Six Sigma Academy and followed this recommendation, at least initially.  One 
of their former Master Black Belts, who later joined DTE Energy, said, “They were 
extracted from the operations, which was painful for us because they were our strongest 
teammates.  However, they were the right people to forge a new path.  You need strong 
people with strong skills to bump up against the culture and resistance to change.  Our 
earliest Black Belt waves were some of our best practitioners.”  The OSSG personnel 
followed this approach with DTE Energy’s first few Black Belt cohorts. 
Over time, however, DTE Energy’s senior executives gradually abandoned this 
strategy of training and promoting Black Belts as change agents.  A manager complained, 
“DTE will train any Tom, Dick, and Harry who signs up for the Black Belt course, as long 
as they have their vice-president’s approval.  ...There's a pretty healthy percentage of 
people whom DTE made the investment in, went to the Black Belt training, and never did 
anything with it.  That's wasteful.  ...Why are you training all these people and certifying 
them if there is no expectation after they certify?  They melt back into the [organization] 
and they're gone — but they got a plaque on their desk.” 
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Fortunately, DTE Energy’s senior executives did not adopt GE’s practice of requiring 
Black Belt certification for promotion to management positions.  (Bob Richard came 
closest to this policy by stating that Black Belt certification was a factor, but not a 
requirement, in Fos Gen’s promotion decisions between 2004 and 2006.)  A CI manager 
who had worked at Ford described Ford’s attempt with such a policy: “Ford experimented 
with that.  It had only short-term success because it encouraged some unexpected 
behavior.  The focus of the new Black Belt candidates shifted from deploying and using 
the methodology to how quickly they were eligible for promotion or stock options.  That 
didn’t work out well.” 
Middle managers sometimes sent their subordinates to Black Belt training for reasons 
other than acquiring skills for CI work.  A few directors who joined DTE Energy from 
companies with strong Six Sigma cultures, like GE, encouraged all of their immediate 
subordinates to earn their Black Belt certifications.  I perceived that these directors created 
disproportionately large clusters of Black Belts in their departments for shared language, 
concepts, and ways of thinking.  Employees felt compelled to attend Black Belt training 
only because their bosses were Black Belts.  Also, several CI managers reported a few 
instances of managers using the Black Belt program as a way to address conflicts with 
subordinates.  For example, a few employees caused trouble when they felt that they 
weren’t advancing as they thought they deserved, so their managers sent them to Black 
Belt training as a way of “throwing them a bone” (as one CI manager put it).  These 
managers implied that Black Belt certification would open doors to new opportunities.  
Consequently, a few Black Belt candidates were seeking a merit badge for their resumes, 
rather than skills for doing CI work. 
2. DTE Energy’s Black Belt training was like Green Belt training elsewhere. 
When one of the CI managers began grooming his replacement in late 2006, he 
wanted her prepared to mentor Black Belt candidates.  Consequently, he asked her to 
attend the OSSG’s classes to become familiar with their content, even though she had 
already earned her Black Belt certification at Ford.  She was unimpressed: “I was surprised 
this was their Black Belt class, because the training that they were providing at the time 
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was less than Green Belt level training.”  MichCon’s CI manager agreed: “I probably had 
better Green Belt training at Johnson Controls than [the training] they certified those initial 
Black Belts with.”  An externally trained Black Belt felt it was a mistake to omit the Green 
Belt prerequisite for Black Belt certification.  She said, “We didn't even provide Green Belt 
level training and we were certifying people as Black Belts.  I brought that up as a concern 
when I was a Project Lead.”  She also felt this lack of rigor hurt the Black Belts themselves: 
“We're not doing the right thing here.  You're providing people a Black Belt certification 
and if, for whatever reason, they go outside [DTE Energy] and try to pursue a Black Belt 
type of job, they will be at a real disadvantage — and the person hiring those individuals 
will be at a disadvantage too — because it's not what a true Black Belt is supposed to do.”  
A MichCon manager confirmed this feeling, saying he wouldn’t hire many of the DTE-
trained Black Belts for a Black Belt position.  Another MichCon manager agreed: “There 
are a lot of people who really want to make this company better and we're sending them 
out to solve problems without the necessary skills.”  Another Black Belt, trained at Ford, 
believed strongly that DTE Energy’s poor Black Belt training was causing more harm than 
good to the CI initiative as a whole: 
We have talented people over there in OSSG that know Lean really well [or] 
know other tools really well.  Rather than training new Black Belts formally, 
they could work projects with small teams and teach through direct experience.  
When those projects are successful, there will be a demand for more.  [Those 
projects'] team members [would be] new practitioners who have project 
experience. 
 
...Sending people through an ineffective training program is damaging to DTE’s 
continuous improvement goals because you send people out as representatives 
of that methodology who don't know what they're doing.  When they fail, the 
people they were trying to help lose faith in the program. 
 
Several CI managers agreed that ill-trained Black Belts failing at important projects 
created negative perceptions of CI among front-line employees.  One Black Belt felt that 
these negative perceptions were so bad that she dissociated herself from the OSSG: “I 
purposefully avoid the CI network and the special language.  When I talk to teams, I don’t 
tell them I am a Black Belt.  I just offer to help them with their process using only the tools 
that help us solve the problem.” 
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3. DTE Energy’s Black Belt candidates were mentored poorly. 
The corporate Master Black Belt position in the OSSG was the only one at DTE 
Energy.  This Master Black Belt was responsible for the design, content, and delivery of the 
Black Belt training course and for mentoring all of DTE Energy’s Black Belt candidates as 
they worked to complete their projects.  With about 140 candidates on the roster as of 
early 2009, the Master Black Belt was stretched thin.  This ratio at DTE Energy contrasts 
with Ford’s ratio of one Master Black Belt mentor for every five or six Black Belt 
candidates. 
4. Most Black Belts did not work on CI full time. 
The OSSG personnel chose to situate Black Belts within DTE Energy’s business units, 
to place them closer to operational problems.  “Embedding them in the business units, 
they get to know the [business unit] people, live with the people, they know the real 
problems that are bothering them,” said an OSSG manager.  This choice reflected other 
companies’ experiences with Six Sigma.  A service center manager hired from the 
automotive industry said: “Johnson Controls, as their continuous-improvement efforts 
evolved, came to the realization that if the operations manager owns continuous 
improvement [personnel], things are probably going to happen.  If [Black Belts] are 
functioning as separate camps, then [CI] is just these guys that keep coming over, bugging 
me (as the ops guy).  They're just an annoyance at that point.  If the task and the 
expectation is squarely the responsibility of the ops manager, then he's going to get things 
done.” 
In contrast to other companies’ practices, however, DTE Energy’s managers generally 
did not put their Black Belts to work on CI full-time.  (The one exception was Bob Richard 
creating positions in Fos Gen and MichCon for Black Belts to work as full-time internal 
consultants.)  Both Johnson Controls and Ford required two years of full-time CI work from 
their newly certified Black Belts.  Most of DTE Energy’s Black Belts kept their operational 
jobs, both during and after earning their certifications.  An OSSG manager explained the 
problem with this practice: 
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One of the problems we've seen here is whenever we certify Black Belts, 
they've got another job.  They're going through the learning process and doing 
their two projects, [but] tacking that on to their regular jobs.  They've [already] 
got a job that consumes a hundred percent of their time.  Because they want 
this on their resume, they're willing to tack on an extra twenty-five percent, 
work some extra hours, to get this certification. 
 
But the business units rarely pull them from that operational role and put them 
in the role of a hundred percent CI: "Now you're going to do continuous 
improvement for me, because you're one of the best problem solvers I've got."  
They don't see that.  They say, "Do this job better.  Do this the way a Lean 
person would do it, or do this the way a Six Sigma person would do it."  I 
would say we've probably got two hundred people in the organization that 
have a CI title.  Probably eighty of them are doing it three-fourths of the time.  
There's always something else you need to do.  That's traditionally what we 
see. 
 
One of DTE Energy’s service center managers agreed: “They had a full-time job 
before they started going to class.  And after the dust settles, they've still got a full-time 
job.  They look at things a bit differently, they understand the tools better, so it's good for 
them developmentally.  But it doesn't do much for the business.” 
Several Black Belts confirmed how difficult they found trying to juggle their CI 
projects and their regular job duties.  One Black Belt said, “It was just a continuing-ed 
thing where you took your class, you became a Black Belt, you went right back to your 
old job.  Then you would try to do projects: You applied some of the tools and you tried 
to work within a very odd, awkward, 4-Gate 9-Step [process] that wasn't quite effective, 
or efficient, or well-managed.  And you still had all your day-to-day stuff to do on top of 
it.” 
Even worse, some managers had no expectation that their Black Belt subordinates 
would continue to work on CI projects after they earned their certifications.  In these 
cases, these subordinates entered the Black Belt program with the assumption that Black 
Belt certification was only personal professional development.  DTE Energy's only return 
on the cost of training these particular Black Belts was whatever gains they produced with 
their two certification projects. 
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5. Black Belt projects were selected poorly. 
At an OSSG staff meeting in mid-2008, the CI managers agreed that many Black Belt 
projects were not connected to DTE Energy’s strategic objectives, so Black Belts needed 
better project-selection criteria.  When front-line employees at Johnson Controls or other 
automotive companies encountered intractable or resource-intensive problems in their 
local CI activities, they would typically submit these ideas to a database of possible Black 
Belt projects.  DTE Energy tried to maintain an employee-suggestion database, but it was 
not the same type of repository of scrutinized Black Belt project ideas. 
Black Belts were paid by their respective business units, not by the OSSG, so they 
took their marching orders from their business-unit managers.  It was sensible for Black 
Belts to address their business units’ priorities.  However, several Black Belts highlighted 
the need for DTE Energy’s managers to understand what was an appropriate project for a 
Black Belt to attempt.  One Black Belt said, “A lot of our projects aren't on processes, they 
are on just a metric.  You know, this metric has to go from here to here and that's it.  You 
miss the whole process approach.”  A Black Belt at MichCon recalled a project that his 
director asked him to do that he said was typical: “It wasn't a project at all; it was run the 
numbers and make sure I saved some money.  Well, that's not a project, that's a financial 
analysis.  How do you gate that?  How do you put any improvements around that, or 
validate it, and how do you sustain that over the long term?” 
Managers who had worked with Black Belts at other companies thought that 
selecting projects properly was not mysterious or hard to understand; DTE Energy simply 
lacked a structure to do so.  A manager who joined MichCon from another company 
explained the criteria: “[Black Belts] would be assigned things that have already been tried 
and failed several times — [problems] sitting in the queue with nobody able to fix them.  
...It's not something that can just be fixed [with] the obvious answer, it's not what the 
executive wants to do [as] a pet project — it actually takes study.  Those were probably 
the biggest criteria.  I’m sure cost, timing, and scope of project are part of that too — 
anything that's longer than a six-month project, [requires] dedicated time, or you need a 
cross-functional team to apply itself.  The Black Belt projects were the way to get those 
done.” 
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Sometimes Black Belts selected improvement projects poorly out of desperation to 
meet annual savings targets.  “You’ve got Black Belts doing incredible things, getting 
stressed out about saving five hundred thousand dollars every year to pay for themselves 
— in a vacuum, with very little help, support, and probably a whole lot of the opposite of 
those,” said a MichCon employee.  As a result, he said ill-trained and unsupported Black 
Belts resorted to “financial-shenanigans projects where numbers become difficult to 
prove....  Lots of ‘soft’ savings.” 
Several employees felt that many of the poorly chosen Black Belt projects underway 
in 2009 should be discontinued, rather than perpetuate the sunk-cost fallacy.  One of 
MichCon’s Black Belts said: 
Projects should be eliminated that aren't going to work much sooner.  [For 
example, those projects] that the finance guys can't figure out what the savings 
are.  [Or] the difficult ones where there's low-hanging fruit that needs to be 
solved first.  [Or those projects that are] an eternal quagmire of issues that a 
Black Belt [employee] can't solve and shouldn't be fussing with...[such as] 
union-issue projects like attendance.  There's always a project trying to 
improve attendance.  It comes down to union...negotiation items that can't be 
argued at a Black-Belt level. 
 
6. Black Belt projects were managed poorly. 
Many employees thought that DTE Energy's 4G9S project-management process was 
too cumbersome and bureaucratic.  Many Black Belts, especially those trained elsewhere, 
greatly preferred Six Sigma's standard DMAIC process as simpler to teach and to use (see 
Glossary for both 4G9S and DMAIC).  An OSSG manager reported that a committee 
debated the 4G9S-versus-DMAIC question almost every year since the Black Belt 
program's inception and each time they decided to keep their home-grown 4G9S process.  
Black Belt candidates were required by the OSSG's Master Black Belt to use 4G9S for their 
certification projects, but all other project teams tried to avoid it if they could.  The CI 
mangers reminded their Black Belts repeatedly that “all the steps should still be there” 
even if they weren’t using the 4G9S template formally.  Without the rigor of a formal 
procedure, several managers complained of projects with scope creep and unintended 
consequences, just like the kaizen events of 1999 had. 
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Several employees said that improvements from projects were often short-lived for 
lack of process owners or other mechanisms to keep them in place.  DTE Energy 
managers’ approach was to publish or revise Standard Work Instructions (SWIs), but 
adherence to these SWIs could be hit-or-miss.  One Black Belt said: “If you can't sustain 
whatever you think is the improvement for more than three months — if you can't prove 
that sustainability through process controls and proper metrics — it's susceptible to being 
lost in the next hot-potato game.  Any gains you did make are gone when the winds 
change.  We don't get to the validation piece at all unless it's just by accident that 
something sticks.  But I've never seen anything validated with a set of SWIs, controls in 
place, the new process [design], communication [such that] this process is self-sufficient 
without the Black Belt being involved again.  That's very rare here.” 
Managers and Black Belts agreed that DTE Energy needed better project 
management to fix these problems.  “We need to go back to a rigorous way of gating the 
projects, eliminating projects that are incorrect, getting [projects] to a Black-Belt level, 
[and] getting those projects pushed through timely.  A lot of those things have challenges,” 
said a MichCon Black Belt.  “Getting back to the process of walking through a project on 
time, in steps with proper inspection, would certainly get us to the path quicker.”  In late 
2008, an OSSG member said that managers of several business units wanted the OSSG to 
become a project-management department because business-unit employees managed 
their improvement projects so poorly. 
7. Sometimes Black Belts did not appropriately engage front-line employees in 
their CI work. 
Black Belts should engage front-line employees in their CI work because front-line 
employees’ expertise is vital.  Ignoring this expertise raises the risk of unintended 
consequences and of poorer outcomes, and creates resistance among front-line 
employees.  A Black Belt reported in mid-2009 that “one of the backlashes that's going on 
a bit in DO right now...is that supervising engineers and principle engineers feel that 
they're playing second fiddle to CI people.  They resent that because, in some cases, they 
feel they have better training and are more experienced.”  An OSSG manager related the 
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following anecdote from Fos Gen: 
They had an outage at...Belle River or St. Clair, I can't remember which.  Bob 
Richard had called his Black Belts and said, "This plant's down.  I want you up 
there.  I want you to figure it out.  I want you to take over the conference room.  
I want you to go up there and do a bang-up job and fix this."  He called them 
on Saturday morning or something. 
 
These couple of Black Belts showed up there.  They had a team of about five or 
six.  They took over the conference room where they had had some sort of 
training planned for that week; they had to cancel that.  They put up a map on 
the wall.  They were trying to map out the way the process is today, doing a 
current-state map, and they were using sticky notes.  In the midst of all this — 
when the unit's down and it's not working — I think it took them about three 
days to map the "is" state, figure out what was going on, and getting it fixed. 
 
The people who were in the control room and the maintenance people think 
that they could have had it up and running in twelve hours.  But (a) Bob 
Richard got involved, and (b) the Black Belts came.  So they had a tremendous 
stigma against them.  And they still do today.  It's hard to go into the plants.  To 
say you’re a Black Belt is not a good thing, so you typically don't say it.  That 
was slightly before PEP.  The good thing is PEP came along and then everybody 
turned their wrath on McKinsey and took the heat off the Black Belts. 
 
8. Black Belts were not held accountable for achieving verifiable results. 
Many companies, like Ford, required a financial analyst to verify project results 
before a Black Belt received credit for the work.  This type of verification was used during 
the PEP initiative on cost-reduction projects, so Schulist’s new CI managers, 
unsurprisingly, began imposing this requirement on their business units’ Black Belts in 
2007 and 2008.  Until then, it was up to each Black Belt to calculate and report his or her 
own project savings.  About the new policy, DO’s CI manager said, “We had lots of 
wrangling, it created a lot of tension, and people didn't like it because we were not 
allowing the old games to get played anymore.” 
9. DTE Energy’s Black Belts were overpaid. 
DTE Energy’s Black Belt salaries were mostly in line with the national average — a 
survey conducted by the website iSixSigma.com found the average Black Belt salary in 
North America in 2004 to be about $79,000 (LeVeque, 2004) — but other DTE Energy 
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employees perceived them as too high for two main reasons.  First, Black Belts had 
difficulty demonstrating that their efforts were worthwhile: They were either not working 
on high priorities or could not quantify their projects’ savings believably.  Second, they 
were not exhibiting the same degree of initiative as similarly paid managers with lots of 
subordinates.  A former plant manager for Johnson Controls, now a station manager at 
DTE Energy, said: 
I was surprised how much we are paying our Black Belts.  Our Black Belts are 
making between eighty-five and a hundred and five thousand dollars.  I 
wouldn't hire many of the Black Belts on the list here — certainly not for that 
wage.  Two Black Belts at a [Johnson Controls] plant saving two and a half, 
three million dollars a year, really hitting it out of the park?  I was paying those 
guys sixty thousand dollars. 
 
I think that has [caused] some frustration in the organization.  Some of that 
frustration is they have Black Belts that are making more than station managers 
with a hundred and twenty people working for them.  These guys have no 
direct reports and...they weren't yielding anything concrete that you could say, 
"Yep, I get it.  I understand." 
 
In summary, the consensus among the externally trained Black Belts was that DTE 
Energy’s poorly trained Black Belts were working part-time on poorly selected projects for 
managers who didn’t understand CI well, yielding disappointing results.  “You've got 
people that aren't given the time to apply themselves.  Once you have a Black Belt, you're 
back to your old job.  If you're not one of these sharp people, the best of the best, you lose 
any ability to apply it, because now you've got a boss who doesn't know it telling you 
what to do,” said a Black Belt trained at Johnson Controls.  “Pretty soon, you're left with a 
bunch of people taking the class, putting a feather in their hats, walking out, and not 
having a clue. ...Now you're wasting millions of dollars in training and that's not cool.  
You're not recouping your costs, because now you're not getting any value.” 
The OSSG leaders’ decision to decentralize DTE Energy’s Black Belts averted some 
problems, but created others.  The Black Belts were better placed to address problems 
with countermeasures that were less likely to be resisted.  But without a formal structure 
for selecting, prioritizing, and supporting project work, Black Belts’ efforts were directed 
by the whim of their managers.  A Master Black Belt from Ford reported that Ford 
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experimented with many organizational structures for its Black Belt program, none of 
which were clearly preferable.  She explained her personal preference for a matrix 
reporting structure:  “Black Belts should report directly to the Master Black Belt because 
that gives the CI team some autonomy.  The Master Black Belt has a leadership role to 
make sure their resources are being used appropriately.  When the Black Belts don't have 
a core manager who can help direct their work, they can become extra people for those 
operational teams, rather than working on focused projects.  ...In addition, sometimes you 
need some political autonomy.  Suppose the Black Belt discovers a process failure that the 
business owner finds professionally embarrassing.  The business owner may not want the 
Black Belt to reveal the process [problem] or even correct it.  The Master Black Belt has 
the overall company goals as a priority and can step in to support both the Black Belt and 
the business owner to resolve the conflict.  It isn’t appropriate to put the Black Belt — 
especially a new Black Belt — in that position.” 
In May 2008, Schulist hired a new corporate Master Black Belt from EDS after the 
position had lain vacant for six months.  Like his predecessors, this new Master Black Belt 
immediately revised the Black Belt training course.  He and Schulist promulgated tougher 
certification requirements in August 2008 aimed at improving the expertise of new Black 
Belts.  These requirements included the following: 
1. Each Black Belt candidate must complete two projects within 18 months. 
2. Each project must save $250 thousand (or make substantial improvements in safety, 
customer satisfaction, or environmental impact).  Each project’s benefits may be 
earned over a 5-year period (i.e., $50 thousand annually). 
3. Each Black Belt candidate must attend a "panel defense" at which she presents her 
two completed projects and demonstrates her expertise before a panel of examiners. 
These reforms enabled the OSSG personnel to begin reducing the sizable backlog of 
uncertified Black Belt candidates by imposing new project deadlines.  (One manager 
complained that some of her Black Belt candidates had been in certification limbo for four 
years.)  Schulist reportedly cut about 100 people from the candidate roster by the end of 
2008. 
In February 2009, MichCon senior vice president Bob Richard complained to the 
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OSSG personnel about certain Black Belt candidates who were not showing progress with 
their projects after three or four months.  He wondered if they were ill-suited for the 
program.  In response, OSSG managers conducted focus groups to solicit opinions about 
the Black Belt program, particularly its coaching and mentoring (or lack thereof).  The 
problems raised by focus-group participants indicated the need for new policies, for better 
communication, and for mentor training.  Consequently, OSSG managers enacted 
additional reforms intended to clarify the Black Belt certification process and fix several 
additional shortcomings.  They flowcharted, redesigned, and published the Black Belt 
certification process, from candidate nomination through panel defense.  This document, 
intended to clarify expectations among Black Belt candidates, their managers, and their 
senior executives, included these additional expectations: 
4. Black Belt candidates are required to identify five areas of potential improvement 
themselves. 
5. Black Belt candidates should dedicate 30-50 percent of their time to CI work. 
6. After they are certified, Black Belts are expected to mentor other candidates. 
Many Black Belts said that DTE Energy’s front-line employees did not welcome them 
initially.  A Black Belt hired from Johnson Controls reported that some improvement 
projects were resisted by front-line employees because past work on those problems was 
abandoned before the problems were fixed: “Gosh, we’ve been through this before!  
We’ve done all this.  Why are we...?  It didn’t work the first time.”  That Black Belt 
continued, “New people at the company, myself included, come in and ask old questions, 
[which] frustrates the long-time employees: ‘New flavor of the month.  You're asking the 
same questions.  I'll answer the same way and we'll be back to doing it the same way I 
always do, getting the work done however I see fit, when I see fit, as efficiently as I can do 
it.’”  However, another Black Belt reported a gradual improvement in front-line 
employees’ willingness to consider the different views of these Black Belts: “I can honestly 
say I’ve felt the difference and it is starting to work.  ...I’ve seen in my own organization 
where the response to that kind of questioning or new ideas has changed over time.  
...Certainly, that’s embedded, front-line culture change.” 
Some of DTE Energy’s most successful use of Black Belts has been when they 
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constituted a whole department dedicated to long-term projects spanning several years.  
To illustrate, I present an example from each of DTE Energy’s main business units, Fos 
Gen, Customer Service, and MichCon. 
 
Fos Gen’s Revenue Sufficiency Guarantee Project 
A Black Belt candidate spearheaded a multi-year project in Fos Gen’s Generation 
Optimization group to reduce the Revenue Sufficiency Guarantee (RSG) fines that DTE 
Energy pays MISO.  Each utility must meet the hourly electricity-generation forecasts that 
it submits to MISO’s day-ahead market.  Deviations above or below a forecast that are not 
requested by MISO result in fines, a mechanism necessary to clear the real-time electricity 
market.  “It’s like a speeding ticket,” explained one of the group’s managers.  “After we get 
all done with the market, there’s this huge thing called settlements.  Trust me, it’s like your 
Visa bill multiplied by a million.  It’s huge.  They’re nasty.”  The Black Belt candidate 
analyzed DTE Energy’s historical data and discovered the most troublesome — and 
therefore the most expensive — times of day: seven to ten o’clock in the morning and six 
to ten o’clock in the evening.  “She found out,” said the manager, “the worst times we get 
penalized is when the load's picking up in the morning, the rate of change is drastic, and 
in the afternoon when all of a sudden people start cooking and stuff when they come 
home.”  The project team used Six Sigma tools to improve load forecasting, 
communication, and coordination among Fos Gen’s plants to meet the day-ahead targets.  
DTE Energy’s RSG charge for 2006 was $13.2 million.  Over the next few years, this 
project cut the fines to $5.3 million in 2007, to $3.2 million in 2008, and to $2.9 million 
in 2009. 
 
Customer Service’s First-Contact Resolution Project 
The Customer Service (CS) business unit had a department called Customer 
Commitment Management Process (CCMP) dedicated to improving DTE Energy’s retail 
processes.  Seven of CCMP’s employees were Black Belts and all of the rest were OS 
Specialists.  One of CCMP’s biggest projects was first-contact resolution (FCR), attempting 
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to resolve a customer’s request or complaint during that customer’s first contact with CS.  
DTE Energy’s FCR percentage was in the 60s and CCMP was working to bring it up to the 
80s.  The manager said, “This project is a hundred percent CI: multiple iterations and lots 
of tool use.  I am proud that my group does the actual improvement implementation, not 
just tracking and facilitation.”  Another CCMP project involved implementing a system to 
defer billing customer accounts whose usage is below a certain threshold, rather than 
automatically bill all accounts every month. 
 
MichCon’s Lost Gas Project 
MichCon personnel had been trying to reduce lost and unaccounted-for gas for 
several years.  MichCon’s losses were about eight billion cubic feet (Bcf) per year, costing 
DTE Energy about $60 million annually.  The main sources of lost gas were theft, 
transmission losses, leaks, and billing problems.  For example, a MichCon manager 
estimated that between five to ten thousand of MichCon’s 1.2 million customers’ meters 
were broken and therefore were not billing correctly.  But these sources of lost gas were 
obscured by variability introduced by MichCon’s accounting practices.  For example, if 
MichCon personnel could not read a meter one month, the billing system would estimate 
the usage based on historical data.  When that meter was read next, any discrepancy 
between the estimated and actual gas usage was resolved.  (In some months, MichCon 
had as many as 16 thousand “net-negative” invoices — those invoices where the 
corrections were such that customers received a credit.)  Similarly, the billing system 
estimated the portion of customers’ monthly usage for which they had not yet been billed.  
Resolving these estimates for “unbilled volume” is bothersome month-to-month, but those 
that spanned fiscal years dramatically affected MichCon’s year-end performance numbers.  
If MichCon’s billing system over-estimated customers’ usage by 0.5 Bcf in December 
2008, then MichCon’s measured lost gas for the year is 0.5 Bcf too low (the total volume 
of gas purchased by MichCon for the entire year is a known quantity).  When these 
unbilled-volume estimates are corrected in January 2009, MichCon’s 2009 fiscal year 
begins with 0.5 Bcf of lost gas that had actually occurred in 2008. 
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After Bob Richard became MichCon’s senior vice president in October 2006, he 
created a department of Black Belts to address the lost gas problem with Six Sigma.  
Richard hired three externally trained Black Belts to lead efforts in the three major 
problem areas: theft, meters, and the accounting measurement system.  When these lost-
gas personnel discovered that the amount of theft was larger than anyone had expected, 
DTE Energy's senior executives approved expanding the department.  These additional 
employees made good progress reducing theft in 2008 and 2009. 
Fixing MichCon’s measurement system for lost gas required a leap of faith by the 
senior executives, because it was an expensive yet necessary prerequisite for making 
improvements.  Catherine Stafford, the Master Black Belt (with a PhD in economics) hired 
for the job, explained: “There was some resistance to spending time on the measurement 
system.  I was asked, ‘Where's the money in that?  How does measuring it better reduce 
lost gas?’  In the short term, it doesn’t.  That can be a hard thing for an executive team to 
invest in when the problem is costing a hundred and fifty thousand dollars per day.  
There's an element of trust required when I explain that if I can measure it appropriately, I 
can understand it, know where the defects are, and really fix it.”  Stafford said that 
MichCon’s senior executives, after years of periodic interventions, were frustrated with 
lost-gas unpredictability and obstinacy, so they committed the necessary resources to the 
problem.  Stafford related how it took time to change how the company thought about the 
problem: 
The first year I was here, I struggled to help some managers understand that 
measuring the problem is relevant.  Our goal is to reduce lost gas but we 
weren't measuring it appropriately.  ...We could have had a two-and-a-half-Bcf 
loss in January or we could have "found" lost gas in January.  The lost gas report 
felt like a random-number generator.  Our measurement system was 
inaccurately measuring lost gas.  However, we would still react to the monthly 
report because we didn’t have anything else to use to monitor it. 
 
I could sense the frustration from the leaders.  They had invested in our team to 
help them remedy the lost-gas problem and they weren’t seeing any results.  In 
spite of the urgency, they continued to support the effort of improving the 
measurement system.  But they also invested in more resources to address theft.  
This was one area we knew caused a significant portion of the lost gas. 
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We started working with Business Analytics to improve the unbilled estimate 
and we developed a second method for calculating lost gas that is slightly more 
correlated to weather.  We still have unexpected volumes but the process 
helped us understand some of the things that can cause the variation. 
 
B.2. CI Leadership Workshops 
The direct involvement of senior executives in CILWs made these events highly 
visible within their respective business units.  This emphasis on CILWs, however, 
diminished attention paid to other forms of CI during 2008 (except Black Belt candidates’ 
projects for certification).  One of the OSSG’s union representatives perceived that CI was 
“happening only in pockets” outside of CILWs.  A few other problems with the CILW 
approach gradually came to light: 
1. Senior executives were not the best teachers for CILW training. 
The promotion of the CI initiative via the use of CILWs by DTE Energy’s senior 
executives highlighted a chicken-or-egg problem.  Steven Spear’s fourth rule of the Toyota 
Production System is: “Any improvement must be made in accordance with the scientific 
method, under the guidance of a teacher, at the lowest possible level in the organization” 
(Spear & Bowen, 1999, p. 98; emphasis added).  According to Spear, these teachers 
should be a company’s executives and managers (Spear, 2004a, 2009).  But how can a 
company’s executives and managers inculcate the principles and methods of CI in their 
subordinates when they are learning the same material themselves?  “If the intention [of 
CILWs] is to teach basic problem solving, you can lay a good foundation in three days,” 
said a Black Belt hired from outside DTE Energy.  “However, this requires teachers who 
are experts in problem solving.  Our executives are excellent leaders, but most of them are 
not experienced continuous improvement experts.  Asking them to teach the workshop is 
a disservice to the executive and the students.  It is taking [the principle of] leaders as 
teachers too literally.” 
2. CILWs were not intended to include front-line employees. 
Senior executives and middle managers were the target population for CILWs, not 
front-line employees.  The CI personnel who facilitated CILWs in the business units, 
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however, quickly realized that excluding the front line was a mistake.  Front-line 
employees knew the details of work processes better than their managers, so their 
expertise was crucial to efficiently diagnosing process problems and developing effective 
solutions.  CI personnel in some business units, therefore, included front-line employees in 
their CILWs as subject-matter experts. 
Additionally, by defining CILWs as management only, the OSSG personnel were 
inadvertently reinforcing a barrier to union involvement in CI activities that they were 
trying to overcome.  One manager believed that Schulist’s intention of having CILW-
trained managers and supervisors coach front-line employees was likely to fail because of 
DTE Energy’s poor labor relations (in some areas). 
3. CILWs were used as vehicles for making improvements. 
During a week-long CILW, attendees divide into two teams, each of which works on 
a problem.  Hemrick had explained to the OSSG personnel that CILWs were intended to 
teach CI concepts and skills, so these problems should be selected for their educational 
value, not for their potential effect on operations.  Significant improvements to a process 
during a CILW should be viewed as a beneficial side effect only, not as a necessity. 
In practice, however, business-unit personnel did not follow Hemrick’s guideline.  
The temptation to exploit the attention of a senior executive and all the relevant middle 
managers and subject-matter experts assembled for a week was too great to ignore.  Many 
business-unit leaders would convene CILWs for the purpose of making operational 
improvements.  A Black Belt hired from outside DTE Energy objected to this use of 
workshops: “I don’t believe you can develop sustainable solutions to difficult problems 
just by putting all the relevant people in a room for three to five days.  Data analysis and 
process mapping often require several iterations to determine the root cause.  It is, 
however, quite productive to have all the players in a room for two or three hours during 
different steps of the problem-solving process; for example, [during] initial process 
mapping or [for] brainstorming when the problem is well understood with data.” 
A few CILWs exhibited one exception to this Black Belt’s criticism: The CILW 
created a forum in which front-line employees could tell their executive about their 
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frustrating workflow barriers — some of which had simple solutions — that their managers 
had previously ignored.  For example, commercial customers routinely wanted to pay 
multiple accounts’ bills on a single credit card.  Both call-center representatives and 
customers were frustrated that the IT system would wipe all credit-card information after 
each account’s bill was entered, requiring tedious retyping.  Because an executive was 
leading this CILW in Customer Service, he had the authority to order the IT department to 
fix the system almost immediately (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 39).  Another instance occurred 
during a CILW involving the IT help desk.  Every employee’s computer login would 
automatically expire after 10 minutes of inactivity, a policy designed to protect everyone’s 
information.  The work of the help-desk support personnel, however, was both computer-
intensive and punctuated by frequent interruptions.  Consequently, each support 
technician would log in dozens of times every day.  Even though they complained, their 
login timeout wasn’t increased to 30 minutes until the problem was raised during the 
CILW. 
When Steve Kurmas (still executive vice president of Fos Gen at the time) ran CILWs 
for the power plant directors and managers, he deviated from the OSSG’s CILW template.  
Instead of having these managers learn CI skills by implementing 50 countermeasures over 
five days, he had them pick important projects in their respective areas to work on over 
the following three months.  Fos Gen’s CI manager was assigned the task of monitoring 
the progress of each project to ensure that the managers were using the tools correctly. 
4. Countermeasures implemented in CILWs were not managed to ensure their 
longevity. 
CILWs were an improvement over DTE Energy’s early kaizen events in that 
participants implemented countermeasures instead of leaving the workshop with long to-
do lists (that were usually never completed).  Because CILWs were designed to teach, 
however, nothing in their design ensured that these countermeasures would stick. 
To correct this problem, the CI manager for Corporate Services began audits of the 
CILW countermeasures a few weeks after each workshop to assess which had been 
sustained, abandoned, or improved.  She explained, “We’ve taken our countermeasure 
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worksheets...gone back out, looked at all the problems we identified.  We decided on a 
green-yellow-red scheme because it’s the easiest thing to look at in terms of visual 
management.  ...It’s green if you go out there and you had evidence that it’s still there and 
it’s being used.  It’s yellow if you see evidence of what was done, but it’s not being used, 
or it’s not updated, or whatever.  It’s red if it was gone, disappeared.  Or it could be red if 
we didn’t implement [it].”  From these post-CILW audits, she learned to insist that her 
CILW teams implement only those countermeasures aligned with the area’s priorities. 
More subtly, however, CILW teams attempting to brainstorm, implement, and test 50 
countermeasures in a week hindered employees' learning about their processes.  They 
were trying too many changes in too short a time.  A Black Belt said rhetorically, “Which 
of those [countermeasures] had any impact?  If you have another problem just like it, you 
would have to implement all fifty countermeasures because you don’t know which one 
[worked].  That sounds like the firefighting-style problem solving that I was trained to 
avoid.” 
5. CILWs created unrealistic expectations. 
One manager observed that CILWs created what many employees called “leadership 
engagement” in the CI initiative very quickly, but this enthusiasm sometimes led to 
unrealistic expectations.  Some middle managers would demand a lot of CI activity from 
their subordinates without first building their subordinates’ ability to make improvements 
effectively.  Other managers would insist on having a Black Belt or other CI expert 
assigned to projects, even if those projects required minimal use of CI tools, such as 
flowcharting a process. 
6. Some CILWs were isolated events with no lasting influence. 
While many veteran DTE Energy employees reported that CILWs were better than 
CCI’s early kaizen events in design, some had little or no influence on the business unit for 
the same reason: As an isolated event, a CILW or kaizen does not in itself alter managers’ 
daily routines.  A CI manager for one of the business units said, “[T]he folks that we 
trained initially have gone back, but they haven't shared with their folks, haven't taught 
their folks, haven't put out an expectation for their folks.” 
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Despite these problems, many employees perceived that CILWs were beneficial.  At 
the 2008 management retreat, a manager said, “For the first time we are speaking the 
same, common language and using the same terms.“  The OSSG personnel were able to 
convince the 11 division leaders of Local 223 to attend a CILW in the HR department on 
the union grievance process in July 2009.  Around this time, a former consultant working 
in the OSSG felt that DTE Energy had succeeded with the CI initiative’s training plan 
where other companies had not.  She said: 
Being a consultant in [CI], I have seen different companies try this cascade 
approach where the vice presidents teach the directors, the directors teach the 
managers, and so forth.  This [approach] has worked better here than other 
places that I've seen it.  I don't know why it is.  Maybe it's because [DTE 
Energy] is a smaller organization — there's only nine thousand of us.  It was 
really difficult to make it happen at Chrysler.  It was really difficult to make it 
happen at Ford.  We tried it also at Johnson Controls — we had around thirty-
five thousand [employees].  You couldn't really make the organization move, 
whereas I think it's happening here.  This has been an exciting place to be for 
anyone who's been doing Lean since 1991.  ...I'm delighted that I got to be 
here at this time and see this happen because I hadn't seen it anywhere else. 
 
B.3. Swarm Events 
The majority of DTE Energy’s CI activity in 2009 consisted of swarm events, for two 
main reasons.  First, almost all of DTE Energy’s senior executives had received an 
introduction to CI in a CILW.  The logical next step was for these executives and the 
OSSG personnel to extend such hands-on CI training to middle managers and front-line 
employees with swarm events.  Second, the senior executives expected DTE Energy’s ECR 
plan to be accomplished with CI methods.  Swarm events were the obvious choice for 
coordinating the cost-reduction efforts of middle managers and front-line employees. 
DTE Energy’s front-line employees did not resist participating in swarm events the 
way they had resisted CI activities before the PEP initiative.  Managers cited several 
reasons for this change of behavior.  First, because of the economic crisis, they understood 
the need to improve their work processes.  This imperative was strong enough to 
overcome their fear of being scrutinized.  Before, front-line employees would typically 
ask, “Why do you want to know my business?”  Second, with the ECR plan’s employment 
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guarantee, they were not afraid of improving themselves out of a job.  Third, they saw 
managers begin to support, or even personally lead, these swarm events to a greater 
degree.  Fourth, they saw swarm-event results that benefitted them directly. 
The OSSG personnel were happy to emphasize swarm events.  Unlike CILWs, they 
had designed swarm events specifically to engage front-line employees in CI activity.  By 
2009, they had subscribed to Jeffrey Liker’s opinion that a CI culture should be built by 
using new procedures to change beliefs rather than the reverse: “It’s not as simple as this, 
but the bottom line is that we’re more likely to change what people think by changing 
what they do, rather than changing what people do by changing what they think. If we 
want people to understand and buy into the assumptions of lean manufacturing, let them 
experience it firsthand.  Direct experience, with on-the-scene immediate coaching and 
feedback, will change behavior over time.  On the other hand, trying to change what 
people believe through persuasive speeches, interactive video learning courses, or 
classroom training will not cut it.  They might begin to say the right things, but it will not 
deeply impact beliefs or behavior” (Liker & Meier, 2006, p. 455). 
Swarm events were a better way of training a large number of employees on basic CI 
concepts and tools, including the Four Capabilities and OPCA, than the OS Specialist 
course.  Swarm events were held on-site, not in a classroom at headquarters or at an off-
site retreat, which was more convenient for the front-line employees and less disruptive to 
operations.  Consequently, front-line employees were able to immediately apply the CI 
concepts and tools to real problems and, hopefully, achieve improvements.  The OSSG 
personnel and business-unit managers continued to replace the automotive examples in 
the training materials with DTE Energy examples, making the concepts easier to grasp.  To 
a limited extent, some managers also tailored the content of their swarm events to their 
local contexts, making the material more relevant to their front-line employees.  A director 
in Fos Gen said, “We can do a C1-C4 overview teach in less than two hours.  We don't 
want to lose the opportunity to show them the tools, show them the [Four] Capabilities, 
and having them start understanding the language and stuff, because then they can 
problem solve better.” 
More importantly, swarm events provided a forum for front-line employees to 
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collaborate with each other and with their managers on fixing process problems — exactly 
the desired behaviors for a CI culture.  Swarm events at the power plants provide good 
illustrations.  All of Fos Gen’s managers attended a CILW in 2008, so they were equipped 
to facilitate swarm events in 2009 (albeit at different levels of proficiency).  Fos Gen’s 
senior executives, per Earley’s directive, expected all of their subordinate managers to be 
always working to improve one or two areas.  At Monroe power plant, director Frank 
Wszelaki assembled his managers in late 2008 to brainstorm areas for swarm-event 
improvements in 2009.  "We’re trying to get to where the guys in the field are naturally 
doing it or they’re bringing the ideas back to us," said Wszelaki.  "Then we go work on 
stuff that we think is practically meaningful..." regardless of who suggested the 
improvement idea.  Fos Gen’s plant managers taught their front-line employees either in 
these formal swarm events or during CI projects.  “We haven't scheduled everybody to 
go,” Wszelaki explained.  “The plan is to catch the people as we can.  There's really no 
training record on it as to how many we've done.  The objective is to have everybody 
exposed to the process over a period of time.” 
Swarm events were particularly useful for redesigning processes with hand-offs from 
one functional group to the next.  One director remarked, “The tougher ones were when 
you had to have multiple work groups that didn't naturally interface come together in a 
room.  Those are really tough ones to do.  They say, ‘I hand it off to this organization and 
then it gets handed off to this [group].’  You get those organizations in a room and they 
sometimes didn't like each other.  Sometimes they didn't even know what each other did 
to know why they didn't like each other!  So it was like: ‘Okay, let's sit down and figure it 
out.  How busy are you?  Where's the hand-off going to take place?  How do we 
communicate that hand-off?’  Just talk about it.  It's been tough.  It's been a road.  It's 
communication.” 
Despite swarm events being an improvement over the CI initiative’s past kaizen 
events, they still exhibited problems in content, in execution, and in use.  Schulist 
admitted that, over the years, DTE Energy’s CI initiative has suffered many of the pitfalls 
that Liker and Meier describe in Chapter 19 of The Toyota Way Fieldbook (2006).  DTE 
Energy’s problems with swarm events match Liker and Meier's generalized observation: 
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“The kaizen workshop approach has gotten a bad name in many quarters.  Jim Womack 
used to laughingly refer to it as ‘kamikaze kaizen,’ or ‘drive-by kaizen.’  The implication 
was that you swoop down fast and furiously, solve some problems, and swoop back up, or 
drive by, take aim and fire, and you’re done.  The problem is not that kaizen workshops 
are inherently bad, but that many companies turned their entire lean process into a series 
of kaizen workshops along with a kaizen promotion office to administer, support, and 
monitor kaizen events.  They may even count kaizen events as a key performance metric” 
(Liker & Meier, 2006, p. 396; italics added).  I elaborate on DTE Energy's problems with 
swarm events below. 
1. Tracking counts of completed swarm events engendered a check-the-box 
mentality that undermined their purpose. 
Senior executives required each of their departments to conduct a certain number of 
swarm events in 2009.  Executives could count swarms easily because they were discrete 
events.  A CI manager explained that the danger in DTE Energy’s practice of tracking the 
CI initiative with counts — of swarms, of countermeasures implemented, of people trained 
— is “then it becomes all about just ticking off the box.”  One middle manager said that 
this compliance mindset can detract attention from achieving results: “It's good we're 
teaching people, but I think there's a bit less accountability than should be there....  I have 
checked that box and now I can move on — politically, I’m a good guy, right?” 
Several managers reported struggling to keep their subordinates’ attention on CI’s 
purpose — fixing problems and redesigning processes — rather than on complying with 
short-term executive mandates.  One of MichCon’s Black Belts suggested that the 
executives could have tracked the 6-month retention rate for swarm countermeasures 
instead, but he acknowledged that such measurement would be much harder. 
A Black Belt in DO perceived “the culture of the organization slipping back” to the 
pre-PEP practice of not quantifying CI savings.  A former CI manager agreed: “If you do 
too much of just the fuzzy, feel-good stuff, you've got too many gamers out there who can 
get around it and make it look like they're doing things — and Gerry [Anderson] doesn't 
catch them until two years later when he looks backwards at the budgets and finds out 
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that we really didn't save anything.”  This worry was not lost on the OSSG either.  An 
OSSG manager said: 
The pendulum swings.  [During PEP], we were trying to put dollars and cents to 
absolutely everything so that we could prove to Gerry Anderson that we saved 
money. 
 
Now the pendulum has swung to the other side.  These swarms — they don't 
even talk about money.  ...[S]ome of the vice presidents, when they're teaching 
this, have said, "We don't have to have dollars-and-cents savings on this.  
We're just looking at how many ideas you come up with.  We want you to 
implement ideas." 
 
...Somewhere in between the two extremes Gerry Anderson may reverse 
direction and move toward asking us to prove that money has been saved. 
 
2. Middle managers and Black Belts exploited the enthusiasm for swarm 
events by using them as political tools. 
With DTE Energy's senior executives hyping swarm events in 2009, some middle 
managers used them as a convenient excuse.  If an executive was upset about a particular 
problem, in a few cases the responsible middle manager would announce his or her 
intention to hold a swarm event to address it.  These executives accepted their subordinate 
managers’ plans without much scrutiny because, by then, conducting swarm events was 
considered a legitimate response. 
Black Belts also sometimes misused swarm events.  One of the CI managers reported 
that a few Black Belts, working on 4G9S projects, were unable to secure resources or 
managerial support for the interventions that they wanted to make, so they convened 
swarm events to get the managerial attention they needed.  OSSG personnel objected to 
this practice, because they believed swarm-event participants should work to solve 
problems, not merely implement a “solution” handed to them. 
3. The content of swarm events varied widely, outside of the OSSG’s control. 
In early 2009, OSSG co-directors Schulist and Hemrick were concerned about the 
variation in how business-unit personnel were conducting their swarm events (and CILWs, 
to a lesser extent).  Most departments followed the OSSG’s plan for promoting a CI 
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culture: Managers attended CILWs to learn the skills and knowledge that they passed 
along to their subordinates in swarm events.  But a few middle managers bypassed CILWs, 
“skipping ahead” to swarm events.  These managers, and a few others, delegated their 
swarm events to their Black Belts or — even worse, in Schulist and Hemrick’s view — to 
non-Black Belt personnel.  Some facilitators trimmed the teaching portion of their swarm 
events, cutting topics or exercises from the OSSG’s teaching materials that they judged 
unnecessary.  CI managers reported business-unit personnel creating 6-hour, 4-hour, and 
even 2-hour versions of the training presentation.  (An OSSG manager joked that these 
could be called ‘mini-swarm,’ ‘micro-swarm,’ and ‘nano-swarm’.)  Schulist and Hemrick 
thought that it was important for swarm-event training to be delivered consistently across 
the company.  By mid-2009, therefore, they restricted access to the training materials on 
the OSSG’s internal website and they implored the CI managers to help them manage 
revisions centrally.  But ultimately they had no mechanism to monitor and control swarm 
events closely. 
4. The mismatch between the OSSG’s intention and business units’ use of 
swarm events created detrimental tension and frustration. 
The OSSG personnel had initially designed swarm events to train employees in 
solving problems rigorously on the front line with the scientific method.  Their guiding 
principle for swarm events was Spear and Bowen's fourth 'DNA rule' of the Toyota 
Production System: "Any improvement must be made in accordance with the scientific 
method, under the guidance of a teacher, at the lowest possible level in the organization" 
(Spear & Bowen, 1999, p. 98).  To aid employees with this process, the OSSG personnel 
developed a step-by-step countermeasure worksheet (see Glossary). 
CI personnel in the various business units, however, began to shape the content 
according to their own perceptions of how their managers or the OSSG wanted them to 
facilitate their swarm events.  These perceptions often diverged from the OSSG's original 
intent, creating confusion and erroneous beliefs among front-line employees about the 
purpose of swarm events.  For example, swarm events, like CILWs, appealed to middle 
and upper managers as vehicles for organizing improvement effort because they 
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effectively focused everyone’s attention on the problems at hand.  When middle managers 
received targets for cost reductions and for a number of swarm events to be held, it is not 
surprising that they tried to combine the two — reduce costs via swarm-event 
interventions — even though the senior executives did not (necessarily) intend that 
connection.  (DTE Energy’s senior executives wanted employees’ to make lasting cost 
reductions with their new CI skills, but I do not believe they cared whether these 
reductions were made within swarm events or not.) 
Another pervasive misperception was that swarm participants should categorize and 
attempt to implement countermeasures for as many (possible) causes of their problem as 
they could.  Some swarm event facilitators overemphasized teaching the OPCA 
framework (see Glossary).  Many employees, however, had difficulty categorizing process 
elements according to OPCA.  One of the OSSG’s trainers had observed that participants 
in the OS Specialist course often struggled with OPCA categorizations, yet they did not 
have difficulty making process improvements in swarm events.  Similarly, an OSSG 
manager acknowledged that OPCA corresponds to the elements of a proper swimlane 
flowchart for process design, but she thought that teaching Toyota’s Seven Wastes (Ohno, 
1988, pp. 19-20) was a less confusing and more effective way of mobilizing front-line 
employees to improve processes (see Seven Wastes in the Glossary).  A MichCon manager 
agreed: “[OPCA] is rigorous process mapping...[but] we spend a lot of time debating 
whether [something] is an output or an activity.  Who cares?  We don’t tell them what to 
do with this information.”  Other swarm event facilitators mistakenly thought that 
something must be done with every brainstormed potential cause.  This misperception 
was reinforced by some managers calling CILWs "fifty-in-five" events.  A Black Belt, who 
attended several swarm events as a participant, described how the facilitator's training 
script conflicted with the aim of making substantial process improvements: 
I don’t support the concept of a swarm as I have seen it used at DTE.  Come up 
with as many possible ideas as you can think of; label them as an O, P, C, or an 
A; tell me what your countermeasure is; and tell me when you're going to 
implement it. 
 
...I had to go to these meetings.  The last one I went to [had] eighty action 
items.  I informed the group that I was not going through eighty causes and 
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guessing a solution to each of them.  I will go through the three or four that we 
think have the biggest impact.  If we need help figuring out which items, let's 
look at the data and figure out what is causing the problem.  ...Why would we 
implement "improvements" when we have no idea whether they would fix the 
problem?  Why would we change things that may not be causing a problem?  
...It's insanity.  ...In their defense, they are doing what they were trained to do. 
 
5. Swarm-event facilitators found it difficult to make employees properly 
follow the problem-solving process. 
CI managers gave three reasons why employees resisted following the scientific 
method in swarm events to solve problems.  Many engineers at Fos Gen’s power plants 
regarded the CI training as “a waste of time” because they were confident they already 
knew how to solve problems systematically.  Some front-line employees who were 
coerced into attending swarm events were skeptical of CI’s value.  Hemrick said that the 
CI personnel at Dana ensured that their swarm events always included a few swarm 
alumni (sometimes from other business units), because a facilitator would have a hard 
time overcoming the collective skepticism of a group comprised entirely of novices.  
(Despite this insight, however, DTE Energy did not adopt this practice.)  Also, swarm-event 
participants felt uncomfortable following a formal process.  “When I led workshops,” said 
Emmett Romine, DO’s former CI manager, “the classical failure with the scientific method 
is they would see an issue and they would jump to the conclusion and skip over the 
steps.”  Getting participants to not skip steps “was like pulling teeth,” and getting them to 
make a quantitative prediction about the effect of implementing a countermeasure was 
even more difficult. 
6. Swarm events were not connected to each other or to a larger strategy for 
improving core processes. 
An infrastructure is needed for both swarm events and for Black Belt projects: to 
collect improvement ideas, to vet and prioritize them, and to assess their connection to 
the company’s core processes.  Within DTE Energy’s business units, however, managers 
often held swarm events haphazardly and sometimes for firefighting (reacting to 
unanticipated problems that demand quick resolution).  A Black Belt explained, “[A 
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swarm] is just a little thing that happens.  What happens after and before it?  Nothing.  
There's no build-up to a swarm, except some excitement about something that happens 
and someone says, ‘Swarm it!’  So they do.  And they're done.  It happened.  On to the 
next swarm!  Where does it tie in?  ...[O]n Friday, you presented to the executives, then 
you forgot about it.  No one really knows if it worked.”  He continued, “There's no 
planning for the swarm, so there's very little focus on good process identification.  For a 
swarm, you should have your process mapped out first, so people can come in and fix it, 
or adjust it, or whatnot.  We don't have that except in rare cases.  There's no...circling 
back to where did that last swarm leave off and how did that affect the plan?  Swarms 
aren't connected to anything.” 
Other aspects of a swarm-event infrastructure missing from DTE Energy were 
mechanisms to ensure that each swarm event met its objectives and that countermeasures 
implemented were retained.  From his experience at Dana, OSSG director Hemrick said 
that sometimes front-line employees need to make more problem-solving iterations than is 
possible over the few consecutive days of a single swarm event.  Depending on the time 
required to assess the effects of their countermeasures, front-line employees may need to 
attack a problem over weeks or months with a series of swarm events.  After efficacious 
countermeasures are implemented, managers and front-line employees need to 
standardize the new process design.  “There’s nothing to sustain those fixes,” said a Black 
Belt.  “If you go out and put in fifty ideas, we have to make sure those fifty ideas stick.”  
Otherwise, he said, “[swarms] end up just being flavor of the month, quick hits and that’s 
it.” 
7. Swarm events were not connected to the Black Belt program. 
According to Toyota’s ideal, employees working on the assembly line solve 
problems either as they occur — when someone pulls the andon cord — or in weekly QC 
circles in their areas.  Toyota managers expect such regular problem solving to yield 
incremental improvements that add up over time.  (A manager at TMMK put it this way to 
David Meier (Liker & Meier, 2006, p. 462): “Dave-san, our job is, every day, little up.  
Then, over time, we up!”)  But Toyota does not expect its front-line employees to redesign 
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core processes that span functional boundaries.  All companies, Toyota included, need 
specialists to (re)design processes that had only evolved over time.  (This need for radical 
process redesign enabled the Business Process Reengineering (Hammer & Champy, 1993) 
management fad to differentiate itself from the incrementally oriented TQM fad.) 
Many automotive companies that adopted both Lean and Six Sigma used their Black 
Belts to redesign the processes that front-line kaizen teams selected for fixing.  DTE 
Energy’s CI initiative did not include a mechanism for making such a connection.  A 
MichCon Black Belt perceived that DTE Energy’s enthusiastic concentration on swarm 
events in 2009 diminished attention on equally important elements of the CI initiative: 
ensuring that “things coming out of [swarms]...cross over into Black Belt projects” and get 
fixed using the 4G9S process, which he viewed as “the core of this improvement 
[initiative].” 
8. DTE Energy’s processes were not yet designed well enough for employees 
to use swarm events as the OSSG intended. 
DTE Energy’s front-line employees could not routinely enact triggered problem 
solving because their work processes did not include embedded tests in their designs.  A 
MichCon Black Belt said, “We’re putting emphasis on the process because our processes 
don’t exist.  We spend a lot of time building the process and arguing about the process.”  
Instead of improving operational measures “to the next level” as in manufacturing, he 
said, “Here it is much more ground level: ‘What’s your process?  You say it’s this — let’s 
write it down.’  Much more mapping and study of it.” 
Processes must also be stable and reliable enough, otherwise the problems that arise 
are too frequent and too large to be addressed by the front line.  A Black Belt said, “Our 
processes aren't good enough to implement a reaction plan to the occasional defect, 
because we're producing defects all the time.  We have to get our processes in better 
shape [before] we could implement that type of problem solving.  We're just not ready for 
it.”  OSSG Lean expert Michele Hieber said, “[Toyota has] a nice escalation process.  We 
have none of that.  That's why for most companies, when you go down, Toyota will ‘open 
the kimono’ and...tell you everything.  They know...you can't do it because you don't 
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have this structure, you don't have an escalation process, you don't know how to solve 
problems.  ‘Sure, we'll tell you everything.  It won't do you any good, but we'll tell you 
what it could be if you ever got there.’  That's where we're at right now.  I know the 
directors and the managers know this is a problem, that we don't have the embedded 
tests, the way to pull the andon cord, and get it escalated up.  We don't have that thought 
process.  Changing the whole culture to that [thought process] is going to be a longer 
journey for us.” 
DTE Energy's CI managers, aware of some of these problems, tried to impose 
additional guidelines on the swarm events in their business units.  In general, their 
guidelines reflected the OSSG’s stance that swarm events — at least at this stage of DTE 
Energy’s CI initiative — were intended primarily to train front-line employees rather than 
to organize serious process-improvement work.  One manager insisted on these 
guidelines: 
1. Have pre-swarm-event meetings to ensure good problem statements. 
2. Ensure swarm-event participants are working from good swimlane process maps. 
3. Because swarm events are for training, pick processes that are “visible” (some 
departments have many processes that are “invisible”). 
4. Teach OPCA with DTE Energy examples, not automotive examples. 
5. Continually emphasize the need to implement, not just identify, 50 countermeasures 
during the swarm event. 
6. Pick measures that can show improvement within the swarm event’s 5-day duration. 
Despite the many problems enumerated above, some departments’ swarm events 
were very successful.  For example, a swarm event in Fos Gen’s Generation Optimization 
group yielded multiple benefits: reduction in cycle time for MISO market submissions 
from 3.5 to 2.5 hours, reduction in staff from 18 to 15 people, increase in time available to 
double-check submissions to avoid mistakes or accommodate unexpected surprises (like 
computer-system failures), and an increase in employees’ enthusiasm for using CI to 
improve their work processes.  A manager in the group recounted the story: 
There are some processes that are pretty rock-solid, like our day-ahead 
submittal process.  But we reviewed it.  We had people who were skeptical.  
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They were mad at us: "Why are you looking at my process?  It’s perfect!"  We 
found it was taking them between three and a half and four hours to get the 
offers in.  We start right at seven-thirty in the morning.  Eleven is the target.  
You have to have your offers in to MISO before eleven o'clock [otherwise] 
whatever is in there from yesterday gets defaulted.  Our target is to get them 
done by ten-thirty and then do any last-minute tune-ups. 
 
We get them done by ten o'clock now.  Instead of having a half hour of panic if 
something happens, you've got an hour.  Believe it or not, [because of] that 
extra thirty minutes, everybody's more relaxed.  [Before], it was a nightmare: 
"Woah!  I've got to get stuff in!"  You don't have that [now].  It has added some 
serenity to the group.  I mean, they're not all [Zen] Buddhists now, but you've 
built in some extra room there.  Sometimes the computer goes down.  I can tell 
you, it happens ten minutes to eleven.  You get caught.  But you can at least get 
a little more flexibility.  Plus, you can take a little more time, to look at it and 
see if something doesn't look right. 
 
...Now with the new market that they've added, you've got another complexity.  
Guess what?  Before we were participating in two markets.  Now we're 
participating in four markets, all in the same time.  We're doing more work but 
in that same timeframe.  It was a real plus.  Even they are seeing it now.  
They're saying, "God, can we swarm this again?  Maybe there are other things 
we can pick up."  ...Instead of having eighteen people for the real-time staff, we 
condensed it to fifteen.  More efficiencies there.  That wasn't popular but we 
did it with normal attrition and some selective redeployments. 
 
B.4. Front-Line Employee Engagement 
Before DTE Energy’s senior executives formulated the ECR plan for 2009, front-line 
employees’ participation in CI activities was limited.  An OSSG manager said, “It was like 
buckshot.  It was out there.  There were little pockets of where stuff was happening, but it 
wasn't really coordinated.  It wasn't really aligned to business needs.”  DTE Energy’s only 
certified Black Belt member of Local 223 said that front-line employees’ world consists of 
their co-workers and their supervisors: “Until you can change that world, [CI] really 
doesn’t mean anything to them.”  He said that front-line behavior depends on local 
relationships and cues.  Putting a CI culture in place requires that supervisors and co-
workers reinforce those behaviors after the CI experts have left; otherwise, a CI project, 
workshop, or swarm event is just an isolated event. 
Many CI managers reported difficulty engaging middle managers and front-line 
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employees in CI activities between the start of the PEP initiative in 2005 and the economic 
crisis in 2008 because of production pressures.  This phenomenon is called the self-
improvement dilemma by Keating and Oliva (2000a, pp. 263-264) and the capability trap 
by Repenning and Sterman (2002, pp. 282-283): Front-line employees work hard to 
overcome workflow impediments but they feel they cannot “waste” time removing those 
impediments with CI because of their managers’ throughput targets.  In the cases when 
problem solving was unavoidable, several managers admitted that everyone tried to 
resolve problems as quickly as possible, even if the root causes were not fixed. 
DTE Energy's leaders did not include a gainsharing program as part of their CI 
initiative, perhaps because the unions’ contracts did not accommodate year-end bonuses 
or other financial incentives.  (Initially, MichCon's union employees participated in a 
gainsharing program, but they traded it in contract renegotiations to keep their level of 
benefits.)  One of the OSSG’s union-member CI experts asked rhetorically at a staff 
meeting, “Why should the workers and union leadership participate in CI?  What's in it for 
them?”  Schulist discussed this question with Local 223 president Jim Harrison in mid-
2008.  They agreed that union members with CI skills are (potentially) more valuable 
employees, thereby justifying employment security and, perhaps, comparatively higher 
wages in the long run.  Safer working conditions, fewer frustrations, and better 
coordinated work processes were also incentives for union members.  But DTE Energy’s 
senior executives did not broadly publicize these benefits of CI. 
Middle managers in DTE Energy’s business units were better at articulating the CI 
initiative’s win-win proposition for front-line employees.  For example, improving 
periodic-outage durations at Fos Gen’s power plants was unambiguously in everyone’s 
interest.  Line restoration following weather storms was the same way for DO employees.  
Emmett Romine, DO’s former CI manager said, “‘Pride in DO.’  ...We ended up using that 
in the strategy as well: being proud in your work.  When was the last time we said we 
were proud of our work?  That one fits really well in the union environment....”  One of 
his Black Belts added, “To most people, [electricity] is a commodity.  It's not something 
that you even think twice about, except when it's not there.  ...[Customers] want price 
competitiveness and high availability.  How do you get proud about that?  ...The only time 
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that you have the opportunity to be proud is when the lights aren't on and then you put 
them back on.  Storms were the opportunity to shine.”  One of Fos Gen’s middle 
managers said, “I've never run into people yet where somebody comes in in the morning 
and says, ‘You know, when I go to work today, I'm going to do a real crappy job.  I'm just 
not going to put out today.’  I don't see that.  I think everybody's on the same page: 
Everybody understands the economic situation we're in, they understand our customers.  
There's a few people who are resistant to change, but they still want to do a good job.” 
Managers and CI personnel working in every business unit agreed that front-line 
employees need to see CI methods work firsthand before they “buy in” to the initiative.  
Naysayers and skeptics tended to be those employees who did not perceive any incentives 
for CI and were fixated on the countervailing pressures instead.  One of MichCon’s Black 
Belts explained how she won people over by appealing to their self-interest: 
As you're trying to manage this change, you pick projects where you can be 
successful from the business team’s perspective.  Impact the work day of the 
working-level employee.  For example, suppose that your employees often 
complained about how long it took to complete their time card.  If your Black 
Belt improved that process, [if] the employees found the process better, it 
would impact every employee every month.  In addition, all of those 
employees now have a positive experience with problem solving and will offer 
more ideas and support for future projects. 
 
We took the ground-up approach while we were still trying to go from the top 
down.  I need people to understand how it works, to not be afraid of this 
program, and get value out of it.  Once you do projects that help people do 
their job better or easier, you don't have to work so hard at convincing people 
to work with you.  "Can you please try this new program that you didn’t ask to 
participate in?"  People don't have a lot of time for that.  They need you to help 
them be more productive.  If you can do that, they'll invite you back all day 
long.  Go for the pain.  Find the pain and see what you can do about it, even if 
it's something tiny. 
 
...That's the strategy that's worked well for me.  ...Small, successful, sustainable 
projects that take the pain away from people doing the work.  That's how you 
move forward.  That's how you change people's understanding of their role in 
continuous improvement. 
 
CI events like learning lines and swarm events generally helped convince skeptical 
employees.  Former CI manager Emmett Romine said that DTE Energy’s employees “need 
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to start experiencing what a well-run process feels like.”  Another manager said, 
“Skepticism dwindles for people who have been on a [CI] team.”  Marcia Jackson, who 
had success leading the learning line at Coolidge, said, “Now my whole attitude around 
anything for continuous improvement is: ‘Okay, when I show up, they’re not going to like 
it, but I’ll win them over in the end!’  If you show them the right way, if you care about 
them — and I do, I care about the work — that shows up with you, no matter what.”  
Others echoed this need for CI personnel to care about the work that front-line employees 
do.  A Fos Gen manager said: 
Once you do a swarm event and they see, "Oh, it does make my job easier!"  
Or better: When you say, "Gee, you used to do fifteen steps to get to the same 
outcome.  We've gone through and analyzed it, we can get it in four.  And not 
only that, you can get more of your work done quicker.  Same output, same 
[effort], same accuracy, but I made your job better."  That's when they buy in.  
They [say], "Wow, this stuff works!"  ...You connect on that base level. I made 
that guy's job easier, not harder.  I haven't eliminated his job [and] he's 
working smarter.  People appreciate that, they absolutely do.  If I put a little 
embedded test in...and it helps them troubleshoot, find an error themselves, 
[then] people take ownership from that.  They like that.  That's a good thing.  
...When people do get it, it's like that little light bulb comes on on top of their 
head.  You actually sometimes see it.  The people who say, "Leave me alone!"?  
Very few.  I don't run into them and I'm all over the organization. 
 
CI experts made progress appealing to front-line employees’ self-interest, but several 
managers said that their subordinates also understood the company’s financial plight in 
2009.  DTE Energy’s front-line employees were more willing to engage in cost cutting and 
process improvement if they perceived managers working just as hard, helping them to do 
so.  An OSSG manager said that the CI initiative needed to be orchestrated properly: 
It's all in how it's presented to them and orchestrated.  If I'm going to make one 
of their jobs easier, they're all for it.  If I'm going to take this nagging defect that 
they have been putting up with for years — that they've been squawking about 
to their supervisor and nobody fixed it — and I fix it, they're going to be on-
board. 
 
If I take a bunch of information from them, to tell them I'm here to help — 
"Give me all your problems" — and I do nothing, they're going to not trust me 
or my methodology. 
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People have common sense.  People support improvements and improvement 
initiatives.  And they even support better, faster, cheaper.  They appreciate the 
fact that we're trying to save a hundred and fifty million dollars company-wide 
and make it labor neutral.  They see some of our peer companies laying off 
five, six hundred people to affect the cost structure that way, so they get it.  
They're on-board.  It's all in how it's managed.  If it's managed effectively, it's 
going to be successful.  If it's not, it's going to fail. 
 
Proper orchestration of the CI initiative meant the way in which middle managers 
engaged their front-line subordinates.  One effective way was managers soliciting 
employees’ ideas in CILWs and swarm events.  Detroit Edison president Steve Kurmas 
said, “What I hear most often is that everybody knows what needs to be done to improve 
their process, and has suggested it in the past to management or through suggestion 
programs, only to see their idea get lost in the bureaucracy.  We gave them the 
opportunity to suggest something, then to try it, test it, implement it almost in real time, 
assuring that the changes were in fact moving us in the right direction.  There was a whole 
fountain of opportunities as they realized that their suggestions might get implemented 
right away and make us...more successful as a company...” (Wilhelm, 2009, p. 36).  A 
middle manager in Fos Gen confirmed the effectiveness of this approach: “That's where 
you really get the buy-in, where somebody says, ‘Hey, they listened to me!  Somebody 
took my idea — and maybe didn't do exactly what I said — but at least listened to me and 
made it better.’”  As we have already seen, however, some managers — like Baum at 
MichCon’s Michigan Avenue service center — were reluctant to “open the floodgates” 
before they were prepared to handle a deluge of problems and ideas. 
DTE Energy had a poor track record trying to implement employee-suggestion 
computer systems.  (DTE Energy called these “corrective action” systems; see CAR in the 
Glossary.)  The IT department and Fermi 2 nuclear power plant each had their own 
specialized systems, but the rest of the company had experimented with several off-the-
shelf and home-grown databases for many years.  Employees thought even the latest 
attempt, built in 2008 as part of DTE Energy’s new SAP system, was overly cumbersome 
and bureaucratic.  Consequently, employees avoided using it.  At the power plants, for 
example, employees brainstormed ideas or raised problems and kept track of them on 
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butcher paper hung on walls. 
Front-line employees, especially union members, also avoided formally submitting 
improvement suggestions for other reasons.  From past experiences during the PEP 
initiative, they believed that managers would ignore their suggestions, perhaps because 
cost savings were not apparent, or would use their suggestions against them by trying to 
reduce staffing levels after improvements were made.  A few front-line employees 
admitted that they would not make suggestions that did not benefit them directly.  But one 
manager said that very few union members used the terms of their contract as an excuse 
not to participate in CI activities. 
Managers and CI personnel in every business unit also agreed that the involvement 
of middle managers, especially the directors, was crucial for engaging front-line 
employees.  They said that middle managers can provide the rationale for using CI tools 
and can foster the right kind of collaboration for problem solving.  The section called 
“Stuck in the Middle” from The Toyota Way Fieldbook was even distributed to everyone at 
one OSSG staff meeting: “Their jobs are to turn the great ideas of the people at the top into 
concrete action and results.  ...They must deliver daily production, be accountable for 
quality and service, and deal with all the ‘experts’ management sends along to ‘help’ them 
do their jobs better.  ...[M]iddle managers have the power to either get things done or 
stonewall” (Liker & Meier, 2006, p. 433).  Monroe power plant director Frank Wszelaki 
described the finesse that he sometimes needed to bring people along: “Probably one of 
the biggest challenges we had in this company is [the front-line employees] get especially 
annoyed that CI comes in and says, ‘You're not going to do this in thirty days; you're 
going to do it in twenty.’  You get the people saying, ‘I can't believe...’  It's how you show 
them and work with them in the process.” 
Finally, managers and CI personnel must pay attention to front-line employees’ trust.  
I conclude this section with two examples of CI projects with different outcomes.  Neither 
of these projects was designed to appeal to front-line employees’ self-interest, but they 
were both successful at winning them over with skillful engagement and good results.  The 
difference in ultimate outcome was attributable to how the CI personnel handled 
employees’ trust. 
 362   
Trombly Cable Plant 
In the past, Trombly cable plant had a reputation as a demoralizing place to work.  
Employees viewed being assigned to Trombly as a punishment.  Gradually, CI work at 
Trombly turned it around — and employee attitudes about it.  Upper management 
approved repainting the floor, which made a big difference to the atmosphere.  Working 
with CI experts, the Trombly employees cleaned up the yard of cable reels, reduced 
inventory (especially the short cable pieces left over when the reels were depleted), 
increased the cycle time for returning empty reels to their vendors (thereby earning larger 
rebates), and experimented with various reel-layout schemes for better efficiency.  They 
also redesigned work processes and installed whiteboards to visually track order statuses, 
work performance, and OSHA events.  A Trombly supervisor said that they had no 
arguments with the union over revising work procedures.  Persistent effort over several 
months increased productivity 100 percent. 
These improvements permitted DTE Energy’s managers to reduce the cable-plant 
personnel from 16 to 9 people.  Unfortunately, they handled this reduction badly.  The 
union workers, proud of what they had accomplished, presented their improvement 
results to upper management.  Only after the presentation were they told that seven 
employees would be involuntarily redeployed elsewhere in the company.  Feeling 
betrayed, the front-line employees stopped their improvement efforts.  Employees at other 
locations also began resisting CI efforts when they heard what happened at Trombly. 
Warren Service Center 
Black Belts Shujaa Smith and Jennifer Johnson led a CI project at DO’s Warren 
Service Center warehouse.  At first, the front-line warehouse employees complained that 
they had “been through these flavor-of-the-month improvement efforts before.”  Smith told 
them, “Don’t tell me it’s Groundhog Day8.  I know you think nothing changes, that today 
is the same as every other day.  Let’s put that aside.  I promise you that something will be 
different.  Tell me when you see something that indicates it’s not Groundhog Day.”  Smith 
                                            
8 Smith is referring to the 1993 Bill Murray film; see Glossary. 
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and Johnson worked with the front-line employees to create a shared understanding of the 
32 core processes of the warehouse: inbound processes like receiving and replenishing; 
inventory processes like cycle counting; and order-fulfillment processes like wave 
planning, releasing, picking, loading, and shipping.  Smith said, “The people there 
couldn’t believe that we cared enough to understand what’s going on in these three 
areas.”  They laminated posters of the final process diagram for the warehouse personnel. 
Smith and Johnson had no problem gaining union support and involvement in the CI 
project.  Smith said they won over the warehouse employees with interest and respect for 
their work and expertise.  He emphasized the following division of responsibility: CI 
people bring the methods and the front-line employees bring their subject-matter 
expertise.  Smith told them, “Leadership is not based on [shoulder] stripes; it’s based on 
topic.  Whatever the outcome, we want to get your voice in the process.”  They also 
ensured that the front-line employees were given enough time away from their regular job 
duties to participate in the CI project. 
Smith chose to concentrate on the order-fulfillment cycle time.  The cycle time for 
non-expedited orders was about two days because of batch processing: Orders received 
after shipping time were held to the next day with no preparation or picking done ahead 
of time.  Smith said, “Nothing was broken; the process was just set up to work this way.”  
They set an improvement target of 8-12 hours.  After flowcharting the process, they 
engaged the warehouse employees in redesigning the 11 process steps, cutting the 
number of hand-off pathways from nine to three, and revising policies.  Before, the pickers 
were assigned to specific sections of the warehouse.  Smith introduced cross-training and 
a rotation system to make the pickers more flexible.  These changes, implemented over a 
period of only 9 weeks, boosted productivity 40-45 percent.  To achieve the cycle-time 
target, however, they needed to eliminate in-process waiting time, so they examined how 
to make the shipping schedules more just-in-time.  They also installed a 6-foot-by-5-foot 
whiteboard to visually display the status of all trucks and work teams. 
Smith and Johnson earned the warehouse employees’ trust by tapping their 
knowledge, by soliciting their opinions, and by striving to be transparent in everything 
they did.  They were careful to communicate the same information to all three shifts.  
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Johnson reported that the warehouse employees began giving them improvement ideas 
voluntarily.  They collected a large number and entered them into a database for future 
swarm events.  The change in employee perspectives at Warren was such that a few 
managers created a short film for DTE Energy’s board of directors about this project. 
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Appendix C: DTE Energy Operating System 
The initial development of the DTE Energy Operating System was started in 
November 2001 and took about 4 months.  OSSG personnel have released two major 
revisions (and several minor revisions) since 2002. 
The first version of 2002 emphasized the "DTE Operating Principles" and 
enumerated all of the CI initiative's tools and practices on a PDCA-cycle diagram (see 
Figure 92, p.367). 
The first major revision, in 2005, reflected the addition of Six Sigma tools to the CI 
initiative, represented by the "Operating System Toolbox" (see Figure 93, p.369). 
The second major revision, in 2009, incorporated Steve Spear's Four Capabilities, or 
C1-C4, and trimmed the Operating Principles to reduce the amount of text (see Figure 94, 
p.371). 
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Appendix D: CI Tools 
The “tools” that the OSSG considers part of DTE Energy’s CI initiative as of early 
2009 are shown in the following list.  The name(s) used at DTE Energy is (are) listed before 
the semicolon; I have provided other common names after the semicolon.  Japanese terms 
are set in italics. 
• 4-Block 
• 4-Gate 9-Step Project Management (4G9S); DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyze, 
Improve, Control) 
• 5S Workplace Organization (Sorting/Sifting/Seiri, Straighten/Set in 
Order/Simplify/Seiton, Shine/Sweeping/Seiso, Standardize/Seiketsu, Sustain/Self-
Discipline/Shitsuke) 
• A3 Summary 
• After Action Review (AAR) 
• Assessment Data Collection 
• Attainment Chart 
• Benchmarking 
• Box Plot 
• Business Plan Deployment (BPD); Quality Function Deployment (QFD), Policy 
Deployment, Hoshin Kanri 
• Cause & Effect Matrix 
• Cause Map, Root Cause Analysis 
• Check Sheet 
• Control Chart 
• Control Plan 
• Control Point Audit 
• Corrective Action Request (CAR) 
• Countermeasure Worksheet, Scientific Method 
• CT Tree, Voice of the Customer 
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• Decision Analysis 
• Design of Experiments (DOE) 
• Embedded Test, Human Performance, Error Proofing; Poka-Yoke 
• Escalation; Andon 
• Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
• Fishbone Diagram, Cause & Effect Diagram; Ishikawa Diagram 
• Gantt Chart 
• Go-and-See; Genchi Gembutsu 
• Histogram 
• Hypothesis Testing 
• Improvement Workshop, Kaizen 
• Individual Skills Chart 
• Knowledge Sharing, C3; Yokoten 
• OPCA (Output, Pathway, Connection, Activity), Process Design, C1 
• Pareto Chart 
• Problem Anticipation Planning 
• Problem Solving, PDSA Cycle (Plan, Do, Study, Act), C2 
• Process Mapping, Swim-lane Flowchart; Deployment Flowchart, Cross-Functional 
Flowchart 
• Project Management 
• Project Scoping Document 
• Project Selection Matrix 
• Radar Chart 
• Regression Analysis 
• Replenishment System; Kanban 
• Run Chart 
• Safety Cross 
• SIPOC (Suppliers, Inputs, Process, Outputs, Customers) 
• Situation Analysis 
• Standard Work Instruction (SWI) 
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• Storyboard 
• SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) 
• Trend Chart 
• Value Stream Mapping (VSM) 
• Visual Management 
• Waste Template, Seven Wastes 
• Weibull Analysis 
• Y=f(x) 
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Appendix E: Peer Utilities 
DTE Energy defines its own peer group of utilities for comparing stock performance 
and other operational measures.  These utilities were selected for their similar generation 
portfolios and because they are publicly traded.  Fos Gen’s metrics are compared to other 
peer-group parent companies, but metrics for DO and MichCon are compared to peer-
group distribution and natural gas sub-units, respectively. 
In 2008, DTE Energy’s peer group of utilities were as follows.  I have listed them in 
stock-symbol order and provided the states in which the utility does substantial business.  
The utilities marked with an asterisk (*) are members of the 15-utility group that constitute 
the Dow Jones Utility Average index. 
 
*AEP - American Electric Power Company Inc. (Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia) 
CMS - CMS Energy Corp. [Consumers Energy] (Michigan) 
*CNP - CenterPoint Energy Inc. (Texas) 
*ED - Consolidated Edison Inc. (New York City, northern New Jersey, eastern 
Pennsylvania) 
DPL - DPL Inc. [Dayton Power and Light] (Ohio) 
GXP - Great Plains Energy Inc. (western Missouri, eastern Kansas) 
LNT - Alliant Energy Corp. (Wisconsin, Iowa, southern Minnesota) 
*NI - NiSource Inc. (electricity: northern Indiana; gas: northern Indiana, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire) 
NST - NSTAR (Massachusetts) 
NU - Northeast Utilities (Connecticut, New Hampshire, western Massachusetts) 
NVE - NV Energy Inc. [formerly Sierra Pacific Resources] (Nevada, eastern California) 
*PCG - PG&E Corp. [Pacific Gas & Electric] (central and northern California) 
PGN - Progress Energy Inc. (North Carolina, South Carolina, west-central Florida) 
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PNW - Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (Arizona) 
SCG - SCANA Corp. (South Carolina, southeastern Georgia) 
*SO - Southern Company (Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi) 
TE - TECO Energy Inc. (Florida) 
TEG - Integrys Energy Group Inc. (electricity: Illinois; gas: Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota) 
VVC - Vectren Corp. (Indiana, Ohio) 
WEC - Wisconsin Energy Corp. (Wisconsin, Michigan upper peninsula) 
WR - Westar Energy Inc. (Kansas) 
XEL - Xcel Energy Inc. (Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin) 
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Appendix F: Scenario Parameters 
In this appendix I provide the parameter changes files that I used to simulate the 
scenarios in Chapter 6.  These parameters are also summarized in Table 4 on page 253.  
Vensim's parameter changes files usually have a '.cin' file extension and include 
parameter settings that differ from the default values defined in the model. 
 
F.1. Parameter Changes File for Scenario 1 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario1' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
SE Training Start Date=12 
Merger Close Date=180 
BB Training Change Date=180 
GB Training Start Date=180 
BB Certification Start Date=180 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=27 
Constant BB Coaching Fraction=1 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=180 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=180 
 
F.2. Parameter Changes File for Scenario 2 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario2' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
SE Training Start Date=12 
Merger Close Date=52 
BB Training Change Date=180 
GB Training Start Date=180 
BB Certification Start Date=180 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=27 
Constant BB Coaching Fraction=1 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=180 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
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Work Scope Increase Start Date=180 
 
F.3. Parameter Changes File for Scenario 3 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario3' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
SE Training Start Date=12 
Merger Close Date=52 
BB Training Change Date=66 
GB Training Start Date=76 
BB Certification Start Date=90 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=27 
Constant BB Coaching Fraction=1 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=39 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=180 
 
F.4. Parameter Changes File for Scenario 4 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario4' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
SE Training Start Date=12 
Merger Close Date=52 
BB Training Change Date=66 
GB Training Start Date=76 
BB Certification Start Date=90 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=27 
Constant BB Coaching Fraction=1 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=39 
Downsizing Start Date=108 
Downsizing Duration=72 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=180 
 
F.5. Parameter Changes File for Scenario 5 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario5' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
  381 
SE Training Start Date=12 
Merger Close Date=52 
BB Training Change Date=66 
GB Training Start Date=76 
BB Certification Start Date=90 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=27 
Constant BB Coaching Fraction=1 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=39 
Downsizing Start Date=108 
Downsizing Duration=12 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=180 
 
F.6. Parameter Changes File for Scenario 6 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario6' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
SE Training Start Date=12 
Merger Close Date=52 
BB Training Change Date=66 
GB Training Start Date=76 
BB Certification Start Date=90 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=27 
Constant BB Coaching Fraction=1 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=39 
Downsizing Start Date=108 
Downsizing Duration=12 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=141 
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Appendix G: Optimization Parameters 
In this appendix I provide the Vensim files for optimization control and parameter 
changes that I used to simulate the policy scenarios in Chapter 7.  Vensim's optimization 
control files usually have a '.voc' file extension.  Vensim's parameter changes files usually 
have a '.cin' file extension and include parameter settings that differ from the default 
values defined in the model. 
 
G.1. Control File for Policy Optimizations A1 and A2 
 
:OPTIMIZER=Powell 
:SENSITIVITY=Parameter Percent=10 
:MULTIPLE_START=Off 
:RANDOM_NUMER=Linear 
:OUTPUT_LEVEL=On 
:TRACE=Off 
:MAX_ITERATIONS=1000 
:RESTART_MAX=0 
:PASS_LIMIT=2 
:FRACTIONAL_TOLERANCE=0.0003 
:TOLERANCE_MULTIPLIER=21 
:ABSOLUTE_TOLERANCE=1 
:SCALE_ABSOLUTE=1 
:VECTOR_POINTS=25 
0<=Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio=0.02<=0.1 
12<=SE Training Start Date=12<=180 
12<=GB Training Start Date=12<=180 
12<=Work Scope Increase Start Date=180<=180 
0<=Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate=0.1<=1 
0<=Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[SE]=0.2<=0.5 
0<=Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[MM]=0.2<=0.5 
0<=Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[FL]=0.2<=0.5 
0<=BB Nonroutine Work Fraction=1<=1 
12<=Constant BB Coaching Start Date=12<=180 
0<=Constant BB Coaching Duration=0<=180 
0<=Constant BB Coaching Fraction=1<=1 
0<=Maximum BB Coaching Fraction=0.5<=1 
12<=BB Training Change Date=12<=180 
12<=BB Certification Start Date=12<=180 
0<=Constant BB Hire Rate[FL]=0.54<=1 
0<=Initial Master Black Belts=1<=5 
0.1<=MBB Training Relative Weight=1.1<=10 
0.5<=BB Shortfall Correction Time=24<=180 
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0<=BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio=0.125<=2 
0<=BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio=0<=2 
0.5<=GB Training SE Target Completion Time=24<=180 
0<=GB Training Maximum Capacity=100<=400 
0<=Maximum SE Training Rate per Person=4<=12 
1<=Work Standard Increase Time=2<=1000 
1<=Work Standard Decrease Time=12<=1000 
1<=Operating Cost Standard Adjustment Time=3<=1000 
0.5<=Improvement Perception Time=1<=3 
0<=BB Fractional Promotion Rate[MM]=0<=0.01 
0<=BB Fractional Promotion Rate[FL]=0.0046<=0.01 
0<=Downsizing Start Date=180<=180 
0<=Downsizing Duration=0<=180 
0<=Productivity Improvement Work Fraction=0.5<=1 
 
G.2. Parameter Changes File for Policy Optimization A1 
The worksheet 'scenario1' in the Excel file defines exogenous time series for no 
organizational crises.  The MichCon merger does not occur.  The other changes below set 
as constant the Black Belt target, the Black Belt program start date, the Black Belt hiring 
rate, and the Black Belt program dropout rate (at zero).  I skip the period of kaizen 
facilitators. 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario1' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
Merger Close Date=180 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch=1 
BB Target Start Date=12 
Constant BB Hire Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience=4160 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch=1 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Rate=0 
First MBB Training Work per Course=0 
 
G.3. Parameter Changes File for Policy Optimization A2 
The worksheet 'policy4' in the Excel file defines exogenous time series for all three 
organizational crises: the period of merger trouble, the PEP initiative, and the ECR 
initiative.  The MichCon merger closes in May 2001.  The one other difference between 
this scenario and Policy Optimization A1 is the exogenous time series for BB dropouts 
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which define dropouts during the period of merger trouble (only). 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'policy4' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
Merger Close Date=52 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch=1 
BB Target Start Date=12 
Constant BB Hire Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience=4160 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch=0 
First MBB Training Work per Course=0 
 
G.4. Control File for Policy Optimization B1 
 
:OPTIMIZER=Powell 
:SENSITIVITY=Parameter Percent=10 
:MULTIPLE_START=Off 
:RANDOM_NUMER=Linear 
:OUTPUT_LEVEL=On 
:TRACE=Off 
:MAX_ITERATIONS=1000 
:RESTART_MAX=0 
:PASS_LIMIT=2 
:FRACTIONAL_TOLERANCE=0.0003 
:TOLERANCE_MULTIPLIER=21 
:ABSOLUTE_TOLERANCE=1 
:SCALE_ABSOLUTE=1 
:VECTOR_POINTS=25 
6<=BB Shortfall Correction Time=24<=180 
0<=SE Training Start Date=12<=180 
12<=Work Scope Increase Start Date=90<=180 
0<=Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate=0.1<=0.1 
0<=Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[MM]=0.2<=0.2 
0<=Maximum BB Coaching Fraction=1<=1 
1<=Initial Master Black Belts=1<=20 
0<=Maximum SE Training Rate per Person=4<=8 
0.5<=Improvement Perception Time=1<=3 
0<=BB Fractional Promotion Rate[FL]=0.0046<=0.01 
0<=Productivity Improvement Work Fraction=0.5<=1 
 
G.5. Parameter Changes File for Policy Optimization B1 
Policy Optimization A1 searched for the best values of some policy parameters that I 
subsequently set as constant in this optimization scenario.  As before, there are no 
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organizational crises and the MichCon merger does not occur.  The Black Belt program 
starts at the earliest point, only front-line employees become Black Belts, certification 
projects are not required, and Black Belts do not provide any coaching to front-line 
employees.  There is no downsizing and the Green Belt training starts concurrently with 
the Black Belt training.  Finally, the largest fraction of their work month that senior 
executives and front-line employees devote to nonroutine work is limited to 20 percent. 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario1' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
Merger Close Date=180 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch=1 
BB Target Start Date=12 
Constant BB Hire Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience=4160 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch=1 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Rate=0 
First MBB Training Work per Course=0 
BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio=0 
BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio=0 
BB Training Change Date=12 
BB Certification Start Date=180 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[SE]=0.2 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[FL]=0.2 
GB Training Start Date=12 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=180 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=0 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
 
G.6. Control File for Policy Optimization B2 
 
:OPTIMIZER=Powell 
:SENSITIVITY=Parameter Percent=10 
:MULTIPLE_START=Off 
:RANDOM_NUMER=Linear 
:OUTPUT_LEVEL=On 
:TRACE=Off 
:MAX_ITERATIONS=1000 
:RESTART_MAX=0 
:PASS_LIMIT=2 
:FRACTIONAL_TOLERANCE=0.0003 
:TOLERANCE_MULTIPLIER=21 
:ABSOLUTE_TOLERANCE=1 
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:SCALE_ABSOLUTE=1 
:VECTOR_POINTS=25 
6<=BB Shortfall Correction Time=24<=180 
0<=Constant BB Hire Rate[FL]=0<=0.54 
12<=BB Certification Start Date=12<=180 
0<=SE Training Start Date=12<=180 
12<=Work Scope Increase Start Date=12<=180 
0<=Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate=0.1<=0.1 
0<=Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[SE]=0.1<=0.2 
0<=Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[MM]=0.1<=0.2 
0<=Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[FL]=0.1<=0.2 
0<=Maximum BB Coaching Fraction=1<=1 
1<=Initial Master Black Belts=1<=20 
0<=MBB Training Relative Weight=0.1<=100 
0<=Maximum SE Training Rate per Person=2<=8 
0.5<=Improvement Perception Time=1<=3 
0<=BB Fractional Promotion Rate[FL]=0.0046<=0.01 
0<=Productivity Improvement Work Fraction=0.5<=1 
1<=Work Standard Increase Time=12<=1000 
1<=Work Standard Decrease Time=2<=1000 
1<=Operating Cost Standard Adjustment Time=12<=1000 
 
G.7. Parameter Changes File for Policy Optimization B2 
The parameter settings for this optimization scenario are mostly a blend of the 
settings for Policy Optimization A2 and Policy Optimization B1.  As for Policy 
Optimization A2, the three organizational crises occur, Black Belts drop out during the 
period of merger trouble, and the MichCon merger closes in May 2001.  The rest of the 
parameter settings match those for Policy Optimization B1 except I do not set as constant 
the maximum fraction of nonroutine work that can be done by senior executives and 
front-line employees. 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'policy4' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
Merger Close Date=52 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch=1 
BB Target Start Date=12 
Constant BB Hire Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience=4160 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch=0 
First MBB Training Work per Course=0 
BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio=0 
BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio=0 
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BB Training Change Date=12 
GB Training Start Date=12 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=180 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=0 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
 
G.8. Control File for Policy Optimizations C1 and C2 
 
:OPTIMIZER=Powell 
:SENSITIVITY=Parameter Percent=10 
:MULTIPLE_START=Off 
:RANDOM_NUMER=Linear 
:OUTPUT_LEVEL=On 
:TRACE=Off 
:MAX_ITERATIONS=1000 
:RESTART_MAX=0 
:PASS_LIMIT=2 
:FRACTIONAL_TOLERANCE=0.0003 
:TOLERANCE_MULTIPLIER=21 
:ABSOLUTE_TOLERANCE=1 
:SCALE_ABSOLUTE=1 
:VECTOR_POINTS=25 
0<=SE Training Start Date=12<=180 
0<=Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[MM]=0.1<=0.2 
0<=Maximum SE Training Rate per Person=4<=8 
0.5<=Improvement Perception Time=1<=3 
0<=Productivity Improvement Work Fraction=0.5<=1 
 
G.9. Parameter Changes File for Policy Optimization C1 
I defined this optimization scenario by starting with the parameters from Policy 
Optimization B1 and adding a few more parameters set as constant.  I set the Black Belt 
shortfall correction time to a realistic minimum and set the initial number of Master Black 
Belts.  Black Belts are never promoted.  And employees' scope of work is increased as fast 
and as soon as possible. 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario1' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
Merger Close Date=180 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch=1 
BB Target Start Date=12 
Constant BB Hire Switch=1 
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Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience=4160 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch=1 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Rate=0 
First MBB Training Work per Course=0 
BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio=0 
BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio=0 
BB Training Change Date=12 
BB Shortfall Correction Time=6 
Initial Master Black Belts=1 
BB Certification Start Date=180 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[SE]=0.2 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[FL]=0.2 
GB Training Start Date=12 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=180 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=0 
Maximum BB Coaching Fraction=0 
BB Fractional Promotion Rate[FL]=0 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=12 
Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate=0.1 
 
G.10. Parameter Changes File for Policy Optimization C2 
The parameter settings for this optimization scenario are a blend of the settings for 
Policy Optimization A2 and Policy Optimization C1.  As for Policy Optimization A2, the 
three organizational crises occur, Black Belts drop out during the period of merger trouble, 
and the MichCon merger closes in May 2001.  The rest of the parameter settings match 
those for Policy Optimization C1. 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'policy4' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
Merger Close Date=52 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch=1 
BB Target Start Date=12 
Constant BB Hire Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience=4160 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch=0 
First MBB Training Work per Course=0 
BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio=0 
BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio=0 
BB Training Change Date=12 
BB Shortfall Correction Time=6 
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Initial Master Black Belts=1 
BB Certification Start Date=180 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[SE]=0.2 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[FL]=0.2 
GB Training Start Date=12 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=180 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=0 
Maximum BB Coaching Fraction=0 
BB Fractional Promotion Rate[FL]=0 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=12 
Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate=0.1 
 
G.11. Parameter Changes File for Policy Scenario D1 
The parameter settings for this simulation scenario comprise the optimal parameter 
values found by Policy Optimization C1 added to its parameter changes file. 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'scenario1' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
Merger Close Date=180 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch=1 
BB Target Start Date=12 
Constant BB Hire Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience=4160 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch=1 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Rate=0 
First MBB Training Work per Course=0 
BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio=0 
BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio=0 
BB Training Change Date=12 
BB Shortfall Correction Time=6 
Initial Master Black Belts=1 
BB Certification Start Date=180 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[SE]=0.2 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[MM]=0.2 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[FL]=0.2 
GB Training Start Date=12 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=180 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=0 
Maximum BB Coaching Fraction=0 
BB Fractional Promotion Rate[FL]=0 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=12 
Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate=0.1 
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SE Training Start Date=6 
Maximum SE Training Rate per Person=8 
Improvement Perception Time=0.5 
Productivity Improvement Work Fraction=0.34 
 
G.12. Parameter Changes File for Policy Scenario D2 
The parameter settings for this simulation scenario comprise the optimal parameter 
values found by Policy Optimization C2 added to its parameter changes file. 
 
Excel File Scenario Name :IS: 'policy4' 
INITIAL TIME=0 
FINAL TIME=180 
Merger Close Date=52 
Constant Target BB to Workforce Ratio Switch=1 
BB Target Start Date=12 
Constant BB Hire Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience Switch=1 
Constant BB Hire Avg CI Experience=4160 
Constant BB Fractional Dropout Switch=0 
First MBB Training Work per Course=0 
BB Trainee MM Odds Ratio=0 
BB Trainee SE Odds Ratio=0 
BB Training Change Date=12 
BB Shortfall Correction Time=6 
Initial Master Black Belts=1 
BB Certification Start Date=180 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[SE]=0.2 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[MM]=0.2 
Regular Employee Maximum Nonroutine Work Fraction[FL]=0.2 
GB Training Start Date=12 
Constant BB Coaching Start Date=180 
Constant BB Coaching Duration=0 
Maximum BB Coaching Fraction=0 
BB Fractional Promotion Rate[FL]=0 
Downsizing Start Date=180 
Downsizing Duration=0 
Work Scope Increase Start Date=12 
Maximum Fractional Work Scope Increase Rate=0.1 
SE Training Start Date=6 
Maximum SE Training Rate per Person=8 
Improvement Perception Time=0.5 
Productivity Improvement Work Fraction=0 
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Appendix H: Glossary 
-#- 
 
4-Block — A 1-page project summary report comprising four different charts arranged in a 
grid: a trend or control chart, a Pareto chart, a Paynter chart, and a list of tasks 
assigned to people. 
 
4G9S (4-Gate 9-Step) — A project-management procedure used at DTE Energy instead of 
Six Sigma’s DMAIC, usually for Black Belt projects or their equivalent. Each phase 
gate is a progress checkpoint at which a decision is made to continue, rework, 
suspend, or cancel the project. The gates and steps are as follows: 
1. Identify potential project 
2. Form team & refine scope 
3. Assess & analyze current reality 
Gate 1: Assessment 
4. Define desired outcome / ideal state 
5. Identify project gaps and countermeasures 
6. Create master plan for implementing solutions 
Gate 2: Design 
7. Test, refine, and implement project solutions 
Gate 3: Implementation 
8. Measure project progress & sustain goals 
9. Acknowledge team, reflect, and communicate results 
Gate 4: Results 
 
4P — A mnemonic for Jeffrey Liker’s (2004) four categories of elements that constitute the 
Toyota Production System: (1) philosophy, (2) processes, (3) people and partners, 
and (4) problem solving. 
 
50-in-5 Event — See CILW. 
 
5S — A practice of the Toyota Production System for organizing a work area and keeping 
it clean such that employees always know where materials and tools are located. 
(Following the adage: “A place for everything and everything in its place.”) Each of 
the original five Japanese ‘s’ words — seiri, seiton, seiso, seiketsu, shitsuke — has a 
few corresponding English equivalents (translated only roughly to keep them all 
beginning with ‘s’): (1) sorting, sifting; (2) straighten, set in order, simplify; (3) shine, 
sweeping; (4) standardize; and (5) sustain, self-discipline. 
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7 Wastes — See Seven Wastes. 
 
-A- 
 
A3 Problem Solving — Toyota’s problem-solving process based on the Deming-Shewhart 
PDSA cycle.  According to Sobek & Smalley (2008), this process consists of the 
following steps: 
1. Grasp the current situation 
2. Identify the root cause 
3. Devise countermeasures and visualize the future state 
4. Create implementation plan 
5. Create follow-up plan 
6. Discuss with affected parties 
7. Obtain approval 
8. Execute the implementation plan 
9. Execute the follow-up plan 
10. Establish process standard 
 
A3 Report — A short management report developed by Toyota, consisting of no more 
than two pages, that summarizes succinctly the results of a problem-solving process 
like A3, PDSA, or DMAIC. According to Sobek & Smalley (2008), an A3 report 
consists of the following sections: 
1. Report Theme 
2. Background 
3. Current condition & problem statement 
4. Goal statement (target condition) 
5. Root-cause analysis 
6. Countermeasures 
7. Effect confirmation (and implementation plan) 
8. Follow-up actions 
 
ACSI (American Customer Satisfaction Index) — A customer satisfaction scale, ranging 
from 0-100, based on a complicated econometrics model (which supposedly 
adjusts for customer dissatisfaction from recent price increases). It was developed 
by the National Quality Research Center at the University of Michigan. 
 
AMI (Advanced Metering Infrastructure) — Meters that automatically send their readings 
to DTE Energy, eliminating the need for “manual” reads by employees. 
 
AMO (Asset Management Organization) — A part of Fossil Generation's central 
organization comprising four departments: outage management, project 
management, reliability, and implementation/building-trade work.  AMO had a 
north-area group and a south-area group. 
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Andon — An integral part of the Toyota Production System used at Toyota’s assembly 
plants consisting of a board, displaying each assembly line’s status, and a stop cord 
running the length of the line through every work area. If a worker cannot solve an 
emergent problem within the line’s takt time, he or she pulls the cord to stop the 
line and request assistance from his or her coworkers and supervisor. See also takt 
time. 
 
AVA (Activity Value Analysis) — A structured five-phase process used by McKinsey as 
part of the PEP initiative to cut costs. 
 
-B- 
 
Balanced Scorecard — A performance-monitoring tool for executives that was developed 
by Kaplan & Norton (1992).  A balanced scorecard comprises a (small) set of goals 
and performance measures in each of the following four categories: 
1. Financial perspective — How do we look to our shareholders? 
2. Customer perspective — How do our customers see us? 
3. Internal business perspective — What must we excel at? 
4. Innovation and learning perspective — Can we continue to improve and create 
value? 
 
BAMA (Bluegrass Automotive Manufacturers Association) — Originally a consortium of 
suppliers to TMMK in Georgetown, Kentucky, through which they learned TPS, but 
its membership has broadened since its founding in 1989. 
 
Beachhead — Jason Schulist's reinvention of the learning-line concept in late 2008, in 
which a CI coach from the OSSG works intensively with the personnel at a 
particular facility to figure out how to make CI work effectively in that context. 
None had been attempted by the end of 2009. 
 
Black Belt (Six Sigma) — A certification that someone is a qualified Six Sigma expert. 
Requirements typically consist of the following: four weeks of training on process-
improvement concepts and methods, statistics, and other tools; an examination; 
and the completion of two projects each yielding $250 thousand in benefits. 
 
BPA (Business Process Assessment) — A tool used by MichCon’s improvement 
department prior to its merger with Detroit Edison. It specifies four levels for how 
much a process is prespecified and documented: (1) no documentation; (2) process 
flowchart with specified activities, pathways, and cycle times; (3) analysis to 
determine efficiency and staffing; and (4) favorable performance comparison to 
other companies (benchmarking). 
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BPD (Business Plan Deployment) — GM’s term for hoshin kanri, Quality Function 
Deployment (QFD), or policy deployment, brought to DTE Energy by former GM 
employees. 
 
BPR (Business Process Reengineering) — A management fad advocating the radical 
redesign of a company’s process (Hammer & Champy, 1993), often starting from a 
clean slate.  BPR contrasts with TQM, the preceding management fad emphasizing 
incremental improvement. 
 
-C- 
 
C1-C4 — Four capabilities posited by Steven Spear (2009) to be characteristic of 
“operationally outstanding” organizations: (C1) process design, (C2) problem 
solving, (C3) knowledge sharing, and (C4) leaders develop people (via coaching 
and mentoring). 
 
CAIDI (Customer Average Interruption Duration Index) — Reliability index = average 
restoration time = SAIDI/SAIFI = sum of all customer interruption durations divided 
by total number of customer interruptions over a rolling 12-month period. 
 
CAIFI (Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index) — Total number of customer 
interruptions divided by total number of customers who had at least one 
interruption over a rolling 12-month period. 
 
CAR (Corrective Action Request) — DTE Energy’s employee suggestion system, run 
formally like an IT problem-ticket system.  It worked poorly because the process 
was overly bureaucratic and several versions of its IT system were notoriously 
difficult to use.  The name was later shortened to Corrective Action (CA). 
 
CCMP (Customer Commitment Management Process) — A department of Customer 
Service responsible for the FCR improvement program.  See FCR. 
 
CILW (CI Leadership Workshop) - A 4- or 5-day workshop consisting of training and 
hands-on practice of improvement concepts and tools, led by a senior leader of the 
business unit and a CI expert (usually a CI manager). Attendees of a CILW divide 
into two teams, select a problem area, brainstorm possible countermeasures, and 
proceed to test/implement as many of the countermeasures as possible. The OSSG 
required the results of every CILW to be summarized in an A3 Report. Some 
managers also called these workshops "50-in-5 events": implementing 50 
improvement ideas in 5 days. Jason Schulist originally intended CILWs to train 
business-unit leaders. In practice, however, some leaders used them to focus 
attention, resources, and action on making operational improvements. See also A3 
Report. 
  397 
 
Complex Change Model — A model for managing organizational change, based on 
Knoster and colleagues’ (2000) adaptation of an earlier model by Ambrose (1987). 
This model was used at DTE Energy in the early years of the CI initiative. It posits 
six necessary conditions for organizational change, each intended to overcome an 
impediment: 
1. Case for change — to overcome the inertia of the status quo 
2. Vision — to avoid confusion 
3. Skills — to avoid anxiety 
4. Incentives — to promote rapid instead of gradual change 
5. Resources — to avoid frustration 
6. Action Plan — to avoid false starts 
 
Countermeasure — An intervention intended to fix the root causes of a process problem. 
According to Spear & Bowen (1999, p. 104), Toyota prefers the term 
‘countermeasure’ over ‘solution’ to emphasize that interventions are never 
permanent: They should be replaced when conditions change or when a better 
approach is discovered. 
 
Countermeasure Worksheet — A problem-solving template created by DTE Energy’s 
OSSG to help employees fix process problems by following the scientific method: 
diagnose the problem, and then invent, test, implement, and monitor 
countermeasures. Similar to Six Sigma’s DMAIC model.  See DMAIC. 
 
-D- 
 
DCS (Distributed Controls System) — A system of instrument controls in a power plant 
that enables remote monitoring of operations. 
 
DMAIC — The standardized problem-solving process of Six Sigma comprising the 
following steps: Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control. 
 
DNA Building — The OSSG’s term for employees enacting new behaviors by using CI 
tools, thereby changing DTE Energy’s culture. Employees sometimes used this term 
to refer to using CI tools outside of swarm events, JDIs, and 4G9S projects. 
 
DOTWIMP — A mnemonic for the Seven Wastes: (1) Defects, (2) Overproduction, (3) 
Transporting, (4) Waiting, (5) Inventory, (6) Motion, and (7) Processing. 
 
 
 398   
-E- 
 
EAF (Equivalent Availability Factor) — The fraction of a power plant unit’s full-time, full-
power output that it has available to generate electricity, if required, over a certain 
period. 
 
EAS (Employee Appraisal System) — DTE Energy’s name for each employee’s annual 
performance review and goal-setting for the following year. 
 
EBS (Enterprise Business Systems) — DTE Energy’s name for its linked implementations of 
SAP and Maximo computer systems. 
 
ECR (Economic Crisis Response) — DTE Energy's term for its 2009 plan, consisting of no 
employee layoffs and a cost-reduction target of $130-150 million.  Furthermore, 
executives wanted 80 percent of these cost reductions to be permanent. 
 
Electric Choice — A program mandated by Michigan’s Public Act 141, signed into law in 
mid-2000, to allow DTE Energy’s customers to purchase electricity generated by 
other suppliers (but still distributed by DTE Energy). DTE Energy reached full 
implementation of the program by January 1, 2001. 
 
Employment security — An employer’s assurance, if not guarantee, that employees will 
not be laid off but will not necessarily keep the same duties. See also job security. 
 
-F- 
 
FCR (First-Contact Resolution) — An improvement program within Customer Service to 
increase the number of customer requests that can be resolved with only one 
contact. 
 
Forced Outage — A power plant’s unit taken out of service involuntarily, not as part of a 
planned periodic outage. See also Periodic Outage. 
 
Foreign Labor — power plants and other locations must budget for labor expense 
associated with full-time-equivalent support employees who are members of DTE 
Energy's corporate departments, such as finance, IT, human resources, security, 
and central engineering. 
 
Four Capabilities — See C1-C4. 
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-G- 
 
Genchi Gembutsu — A practice of the Toyota Production System (TPS) in which any 
employee or manager seeking to understand a work process goes to the “actual 
place” (genchi) and personally observes the actual situation, materials, or products 
(gembutsu, also sometimes transliterated as genbutsu). Liker (2004) defines this 
practice as one of twelve principles of TPS. See also Go-and-See. 
 
Go-and-See — DTE Energy’s version of Toyota’s practice of genchi gembutsu: To properly 
diagnose process problems, employees and managers should go and observe the 
processes personally and speak to the front-line employees working in those 
processes.  Also used to refer to managers visiting other departments to see first 
hand how those departments’ employees made improvements. See also genchi 
gembutsu. 
 
Groundhog Day (1993) — Popular film in which arrogant and egotistical TV weatherman 
Phil Connors (Bill Murray) relives February 2 over and over again with his producer 
Rita (Andie MacDowell) in Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, where he is covering the 
annual Groundhog Day festivities. 
 
-H- 
 
Hard Savings — Cost reductions or benefits from improvement projects that directly lower 
expenses, such as increasing inventory turns or reducing equipment, required 
maintenance, downtime, overtime, part replacements, or prices. 
 
Heat Rate — A measure of power plant efficiency (how much heat is lost). 
 
-I- 
 
IBEW (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers) — Local 17 is the second-largest 
union chapter at DTE Energy with about 500 members.  Its members are overhead 
linemen, underground cable workers, some dispatchers, and some crane and 
elevator operators. 
 
INC — An abbreviation for instrumentation and controls (in a power plant). 
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-J- 
 
JDI (Just Do It) — A process-improvement approach to be used when a problem’s cause 
is well understood, and its remedies are clear and can be implemented with 
minimal risk and disruption.  JDIs were used often to avoid the bureaucratic hassle 
of the 4G9S process. See also 4G9S. 
 
Job security — An employer’s assurance, if not guarantee, that employees will not be laid 
off and will retain the same duties. See also employment security. 
 
-K- 
 
Kaizen — The Japanese word for ‘improvement’ that has been used outside of Japan to 
mean ‘continuous improvement’ or even the entire management philosophy of CI. 
 
Kaizen (event) — Typically a 3- or 4-day workshop consisting of some teaching of CI 
concepts or tools and hands-on practice trying to improve a process.  Such events 
focus attention, resources, and action on making changes quickly, usually intended 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of CI tools to both management and employees. 
See also Swarm Event. 
 
Karate Kid, The (1984) — Popular film in which a bullied teenager Daniel LaRusso (Ralph 
Macchio) befriends the handyman of his apartment complex, Kesuke Miyagi 
(Noriyuki ‘Pat’ Morita). Daniel learns karate from Mr Miyagi and wins a tournament 
by beating the bullies. 
 
Kepner-Tregoe (KT) method — A set of four (common-sense) procedural guidelines, 
which Kepner & Tregoe (1965) call Rational Processes, intended to help managers 
rationally and systematically assess a situation, problem, decision, or opportunity 
(or potential problem). 
 
-L- 
 
Learning Line — A practice adopted from Lean manufacturing in which one of several 
"production lines" is made the focus of experimentation to see what innovations in 
process/work design can be found and implemented.  A learning line involves 
front-line employees working on that production line and is led by a CI expert for 
an extended period of time (weeks or months).  Also called a model line.  See also 
beachhead. 
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LFM (Leaders for Manufacturing) — A 2-year, cross-disciplinary, dual-degree program at 
MIT in which students earn a Master’s degree both from the Sloan School of 
Management and from one of eight departments in the School of Engineering. The 
program was renamed Leaders for Global Operations (LGO) in June 2009. 
 
Lost and Unaccounted-For Gas — The difference between the gas procured by a utility 
and the gas billed to its customers.  The main sources of lost gas are leaks and theft. 
 
-M- 
 
Master Black Belt (Six Sigma) — A certification that someone is qualified to teach, 
mentor, and certify Black Belts. See Black Belt (Six Sigma). 
 
Maximo — An asset-management software application developed by MRO Software 
(subsequently acquired by IBM in August 2006).  DTE Energy uses Maximo as a 
work-management and MRP system. 
 
MBWA (Management by Walking Around) — A practice advocated by Bill Hewlett and 
Dave Packard as part of their management philosophy at HP, The HP Way 
(Packard, 1995). Managers, especially executives, should visit the front lines to (1) 
know their subordinates, (2) understand the work their subordinates do, and (3) 
make themselves visible and accessible to their subordinates. Dave Packard 
brought this practice to HP from GE, but its name was coined by an HP manager. 
See also Go-and-See and Genchi Gembutsu. 
 
MISO (Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator) — The regional 
organization, established in 2001, that operates and monitors the electrical 
transmission system for 13 mid-western states and the Canadian province of 
Manitoba, encompassing 135,000 megawatts of generation capacity from 4,700 
units run by 25 utilities. MISO has operated real-time, day-ahead, and futures 
markets for electricity and natural gas since April 2005. MISO has headquarters in 
Carmel, Indiana, and an operations center in St. Paul, Minnesota. 
 
MPSC (Michigan Public Service Commission) — Michigan’s government agency that 
regulates utilities, telecommunications, and transportation services.  The MPSC is 
led by three commissioners appointed by the governor.  In 2008, the MPSC had 
167 full-time employees. 
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-O- 
 
Opacity — The amount of light obscured by particulates in the emissions from power 
plants’ stacks. Opacity is a performance indicator for power plants’ particulate 
control systems. 
 
OPCA — The four major components of process design according to Spear & Bowen 
(1999): output, pathways (who is responsible for which activities), connections 
(hand-offs between pathways), and activities (process steps). 
 
Operating Principles — The set of twelve principles developed for the DTE Energy 
Operating System (2002 and 2005 versions), intended to guide how DTE Energy’s 
employees think and approach their work. 
1. Ensure safety of our employees, customers, and the general public. 
2. Measure success by how well we meet and exceed customer expectations. 
3. Communicate honestly and effectively. 
4. Hold each other accountable and reward success. 
5. Drive decision making to the point of activity. 
6. Gain high agreement on what and how by standardizing all activities and 
processes. 
7. Create a learning environment where all employees are engaged in organized 
reflection and knowledge transfer. 
8. Optimize enterprise-wide focus through internal collaboration and partnership. 
9. Understand current reality through fact-based measures, articulate the ideal 
state, and understand the gap. 
10. Surface problems quickly, engage everyone. 
11. Identify and eliminate waste. 
12. Improve processes by focusing on activities, connections, and flows. 
 
OS Expert — Someone who had completed the OSSG’s in-depth training course in Lean 
concepts and tools. The course consisted of four weeks of classes over four months. 
It was developed in 2002 and was superseded by DTE Energy’s Black Belt training 
course in late 2003. 
 
OS Specialist — Someone who had completed the OSSG’s introductory course in Lean 
concepts and tools. The course consisted of four days of classes (six days at first) 
over three weeks. It was developed in 2003 and was intended for front-line 
employees who would participate in CI activities part-time only. 
 
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) — The federal agency, part of 
the U.S. Department of Labor, whose mission is to prevent work-related injuries, 
illnesses, and occupational fatality by issuing and enforcing standards for 
workplace safety and health. 
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Outage — See Periodic Outage and Forced Outage. 
 
Outage Pockets — The percent of customers who had three or more outages over a rolling 
12-month period. 
 
-P- 
 
Paynter Chart — A chart developed at Ford showing Pareto-chart bars (counts of defect 
types) for multiple time periods. 
 
Patrol — Operations personnel making rounds of a power plant to observe, inspect, and 
verify the functioning of the equipment. 
 
PDSA Cycle — An iterative problem-solving process adapted and refined by Deming 
(1986, 1994) from an earlier cycle by Shewhart (1939). (Note: Sometimes the third 
step is called ‘Check’ instead of ‘Study’ due to an erroneous translation of Deming’s 
cycle back into English from the Japanese version.) The steps according to Deming 
(1994, p. 132) are as follows: 
P: Plan a change or a test, aimed at improvement. 
D: Do carry out the change or test (preferably on a small scale). 
S: Study the results. What did we learn? What went wrong? 
A: Act. Adopt the change, or abandon it, or run through the cycle again. 
 
PEP (Performance Excellence Process) — A cost-cutting initiative designed by McKinsey 
in 2005 and implemented in 2006. 
 
Periodic Outage — Taking a power plant unit off-line for planned maintenance or 
upgrade, the objective of which is to minimize the unit’s forced-outage time.  A 
unit’s outages typically alternate between major and mini outages, at intervals of 2-
4 years.  A major outage usually requires 8-12 weeks of work; a mini outage 
requires 4-5 weeks. See also Forced Outage. 
 
PMO — An acronym for project-management office. 
 
-Q- 
 
QC (Quality Control) Circle — A group of front-line employees who meet regularly with 
their supervisor to discuss their performance, any emergent problems, and ideas for 
improvement. The group engages in problem solving to test and implement 
countermeasures. 
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-R- 
 
RASCI — A project- or change-management method for assigning roles and 
responsibilities, particularly for planning communications. The acronym letters 
denote the following roles: responsible, accountable, supportive, consulted, and 
informed. 
 
REC (Renewable Energy Credit) — Also called Renewable Energy Certificate.  Certificates 
used to trade credit for 1 megawatt-hour of renewable energy (already produced) to 
meet state-mandated targets. These credits expire after 3 years. 
 
Regulatory Lag — The duration from the time a utility files a rate case with its state’s 
regulatory agency until the date a final decision is issued.  Michigan’s 2008 energy 
legislation imposed a maximum lag of 12 months on the MPSC.  Previously, the 
MPSC’s regulatory lag was one of the worst in the country at 18-20 months. 
 
ROF (Random Outage Factor) — The unplanned fraction of time a power plant’s unit is 
unavailable: the total duration of all forced outages divided by total service hours 
in a reporting period. 
 
RPS (Renewable Portfolio Standards) — Also called Renewable Energy Standards.  State-
specific targets for the fraction of energy produced from renewable sources by a 
certain deadline.  Each state has its own definition of what energy sources count as 
“renewable”. 
 
RSG (Revenue Sufficiency Guarantee) — A mechanism that fines electricity generators for 
over- or under-producing and electricity distributors for over- or under-forecasting 
demand relative to their commitments in MISO’s day-ahead market. 
 
-S- 
 
S1 — DTE Energy’s term for each business unit’s 5-year strategic plan. 
 
S2 — DTE Energy’s term for each business unit’s budget and performance targets for the 
next fiscal year, based on its S1 plan. 
 
SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) — Average outage duration for each 
customer served = sum of all customer interruption durations divided by total 
number of customers served over a rolling 12-month period. 
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SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index) — Average number of interruptions 
that a customer would experience = total number of customer interruptions divided 
by total number of customers served over a rolling 12-month period. 
 
SCCORE — The dimensions of the balanced scorecard used in Fossil Generation: safety, 
customer focus, cost, organizational efficiency, regulatory compliance, and 
environment. 
 
Seven Wastes — The Toyota Production System’s seven types of muda, or non-value-
adding activity (usually translated as waste), as defined by Taiichi Ohno (1988): (1) 
overproduction, (2) waiting, (3) transporting, (4) inappropriate or over-processing, 
(5) unnecessary inventory, (6) unnecessary or excess motion, and (7) rework or 
correcting defects. For a mnemonic, see DOTWIMP. 
 
SIPOC — A Six Sigma tool used in process mapping to ensure that all relevant aspects of a 
process are considered before improvements are attempted. SIPOC is an acronym 
and a mnemonic: suppliers, inputs, process, outputs, and customers. 
 
Soft Savings — Cost avoidance or benefits from improvement projects that allow one to 
resist or delay incurring expenses or price increases. Soft savings are usually 
intangible and difficult to estimate. By contrast, see Hard Savings. 
 
SQCDM — The dimensions of the balanced scorecard used in most of DTE Energy's 
business units: safety, quality (customer focus), cost, delivery, and morale. 
 
STAR — An acronym and mnemonic that Fossil Generation uses to promote workplace 
safety: Stop, Think, Act, and Review. 
 
Sustainability (for countermeasures) — To describe different levels of countermeasure 
permanence, DTE Energy uses the following analogy sequence: hold, tape, clamp, 
bolt, weld. The OSSG personnel adopted this analogy sequence from research on 
the Toyota Production System (see Spear, 2004a, p. 83). See also countermeasure. 
 
Swarm Event — A problem-solving workshop for fixing front-line problems quickly as 
they occur. Swarm events are intended to mimic the on-the-spot problem solving 
by Toyota’s assembly-line employees and team leaders after an andon cord is 
pulled. Each swarm event should include personnel from the functions and levels 
necessary to identify root causes, and to design and implement countermeasures. A 
leader or CI expert teaches basic CI concepts and tools, as needed, during the 
swarm event. (The OSSG initially intended six hours of training during a swarm 
event.) The OSSG replaced the name ‘kaizen’ with ‘swarm’ to eliminate Japanese 
words from DTE Energy’s CI initiative and to avoid association with the previous 
kaizen program’s poor results.  See also Andon, Kaizen (event), and CILW. 
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SWI (Standard Work Instruction) — DTE Energy's standardized procedures for how 
particular jobs or tasks are expected to be done. 
 
SWOT — A situation-assessment tool. SWOT is both an acronym and a mnemonic: 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. 
 
-T- 
 
Takt Time — The desired pace of production in the Toyota Production System (TPS), 
which should match the (near-future) pace of sales in the market. In practice, it is 
often calculated as the total regular operating time available in a period divided by 
the total production requirement for that period. Arguably, takt time is one of the 
most important organizing concepts in TPS, because it emphasizes rates of flow — 
suggesting Just-In-Time — instead of emphasizing inventory stocks. The term 
comes from the German taktzeit, meaning cycle time. 
 
Theory X — According to McGregor (1960, pp. 33-34), the assumptions about employees 
underlying a management style of direction and control: 
1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he 
[or she] can. 
2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be 
coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get them to put 
forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives. 
3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, 
has little ambition, wants security above all. 
 
Theory Y — According to McGregor (1960, pp. 47-48), the assumptions about employees 
underlying a management style integrating individual and organizational goals: 
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or 
rest. 
2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for 
bringing about effort toward organizational objectives.  [Employees] will 
exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which 
[they are] committed. 
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their 
achievement. 
4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept 
but to seek responsibility. 
5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and 
creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, 
distributed in the population. 
6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of 
the average human being are only partially utilized. 
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Tracker — A formula approved by the MPSC for changing rates as needed, obviating 
repeated applications for such changes.  One of DTE Energy’s approved trackers is 
for storm expenses. 
 
Trade Up Culture — Fossil Generation’s initiative to change its culture, particularly to 
change assumptions about managing people. Started in August 2008, it was based 
on the books Joy At Work by Bakke (2005) and Trade Up! by Sharpnack (2007). 
 
TSSC (Toyota Production System Support Center) — Toyota established the Toyota 
Supplier Support Center in 1992 to teach the Toyota Production System to TMMK’s 
suppliers and other affiliated manufacturers in North America. Toyota spun off this 
center in 2002.  It was renamed in 2009 to better reflect its mission, but retained 
the abbreviation TSSC.  It’s headquarters are in Erlanger, Kentucky. 
 
-U- 
 
UWUA (Utility Workers Union of America) — Local 223 is the largest union chapter at 
DTE Energy with about 4500 members.  It has eleven divisions. 
 
-V- 
 
VA/VE (Value Analysis/Value Engineering) — An analysis technique like QFD in which 
the rows of a matrix divide the cost of product components among desired 
functions and and the columns divide the value of desired functions among the 
product components. 
 
VSB (Voluntary Separation Bonus) — An incentive payment made to an employee who 
agrees to leave the company willingly.  DTE Energy used these bonuses during the 
PEP initiative to minimize layoffs. 
 
VSM (Value-Stream Mapping) — An approach to process design and improvement in 
which a process is flowcharted and the cycle times of each step are measured and 
usually divided into value-added time (like production) and non-value-added time 
(like waiting). 
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